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8

Compensating Differentials and Intermarriage

This chapter applies the theory of compensating differentials in marriage, to the case of marriage between members of two groups. The degree of homogamy-- i.e. assortative mating--in one area, such as religion, is related to the similarity of husband's and wife's characteristics in other areas, such as education, age, and divorced status. Despite some similarities, this theory differs from the theory of compensatory reciprocal exchange developed by sociologists (see Part One). Analysis within a comprehensive economic theory of marriage leads to some insights that do not follow from the earlier sociological literature. This theory also differs from other economic theories of religious intermarriage, which have been based on the premise that religious homogamy is always a positive marital trait (Becker 1974, Becker *et al.* 1977, Chiswick and Lehrer 1992 and Lehrer and Chiswick 1992).

It has long been clear to scholars from a variety of disciplines that conditions in markets for husbands and wives influence observed marriage patterns. Sociologists, demographers, and economists have often related observed religious or ethnic homogamy to: (1) a group's size (e.g., Heer

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1962, Rosenthal 1970, DellaPergola 1976, and Fisher 1980); (2) its sex ratio and geographic concentration (e.g., DellaPergola 1976 and Fisher 1980); and (3) personal characteristics of group members, such as age and previous marital status (e.g., Rosenthal 1970, DellaPergola 1976, Heer 1980, and Becker 1981).

The theory of compensating differentials, embedded in a general theory of marriage, could also lead to hypotheses predicting correlates of these compensations, given a certain pattern of inter-group marriage. An interesting application of this theory regards the use of alimony and child support payments at divorce. It follows that under the assumptions used for the derivation of Hypothesis 30, Jewish men marrying non-Jewish women are likely to pay their wives higher alimony and child support payments at time of divorce than similar non-Jewish men marrying similar non-Jewish women (this would include controls for income and education.) Similarly, one expects that black men marrying white women are likely to pay their white ex-wives higher alimony and child support payments than would white men of similar characteristics marrying similar white women. They would also pay higher alimony and child support to a white ex-wife than to a black ex-wife.

The four hypotheses derived here all deal with the predicted effect of individual and group characteristics on the probability of intermarriage. The theory is then tested using a sample of American Jewish men.

Hypotheses

The following analysis of intermarriage will be presented in terms of groups A and B, which could for instance be interpreted as Jews and Christians. Following the analysis found in Chapter 3, marriage markets are presented as markets for spousal labor. For simplicity, I will focus on markets for female spousal labor. I introduce two markets, one for each group of women. It is assumed that men discriminate between two types of women and that women from groups A and B cannot be easily substituted for each other. Figure 8.1 presents two markets for spousal labor: panel *a* is a market for women of type A and panel *b* is a market for women of type B.

Similarly to men, women also discriminate between men of types A and B. Consequently, in each market one has to draw separate supply curves to men A and to men B. The first case we analyze is a situation where A women generally prefer homogamy, i.e. A women would rather marry A men. This case is similar to the case found in Merton (1941) based on the theory of compensatory reciprocal exchange. The supply of spousal labor by A women to A men lies below their supply to B men. As a result, as can be seen from panel a in Figure 8.1, the market establishes a compensation for

FIGURE 8.1 IS FOUND AT THE END OF THIS CHAPTER. PLEASE CONTINUE TO SCROLL

Fig. 8.1 Markets for spousal labor (h_f) by women from groups A and B.

women of type A who marry B men, w_{AB}^* , which exceeds the compensation A women get when they marry homogamously (w_{AA}^*). Were these same women heterogamous in their preference, their supply to A men would lie above their supply to B men, and w_{AB}^* would be lower than w_{AA}^* .

There are many ways by which market conditions, personal characteristics, and preferences regarding homogamy interact.¹ To illustrate the fruitfulness of a market theory of intermarriage, two assumptions will be made regarding preferences for homogamy. To make the discussion more concrete, groups A and B are taken to be Jews and Christians with particular views on intermarriage.² In both cases it is assumed that Christians prefer to marry other Christians, possibly due to discrimination against Jews. In Case 1, Jews prefer to marry Christians, whereas in Case 2, Jews prefer to marry homogamously.

Case 1. The Discriminating Christian and the Assimilationist Jew. It is assumed that the person belonging to one group prefers homogamy, whereas the potential spouse prefers heterogamy. Let us assume that Christian women A prefer homogamy, for instance because of antisemitism. According to this analysis, such woman A requires a higher compensation for her spousal labor if the husband is from Group B than if he is from Group A. Stated differently, if her husband is also from A part of her compensation consists of the satisfaction of fulfilling some cultural expectations that she has absorbed. In the context of Christian-Jewish marriage, the above mentioned assumptions imply that a Jewish man who prefers to marry a Christian woman, possibly due to his desire to assimilate into mainstream

America, needs to make up for his religious origin by compensating her with qualities exceeding those she can expect from a fellow Christian under given market conditions. The same would be true if marriages were arranged by parents. The guardians of a woman from Group A would attempt to extract an extra compensation if the groom belonged to Group B.

An example of what the explicit market theory presented here adds to the existing theory of compensatory reciprocal exchange is that even if a particular woman does not discriminate personally between the two types of men, but if she aims at getting the best possible deal for herself in the marriage market, she is likely to require a higher compensation when marrying a B man than when marrying homogamously. She would then take advantage of the fact that other Christian women tend to discriminate and require extra compensations when marrying Jews.

The following hypothesis is formulated using Jewish-Christian marriage from a male perspective as an example, but can be generalized to other groups and to a female perspective. Homogamy could be measured in terms of income, education, age or previous marriages.

Hypothesis 30

If Jews prefer assimilation and Christians prefer homogamy, Jewish men marrying Christian women are expected to have desirable characteristics relative to their wife's characteristics and to the characteristics of Jewish men marrying homogamously.

Characteristics of men considered desirable in the marriage market include income and determinants of spousal productivity such as health and vitality. Past a certain age, additional years of age are likely to be a liability in the marriage market, for instance.

How about Jewish women marrying either Jewish or Christian men when the same assumptions still hold? If they seek assimilation, their supply of spousal labor to men from their own group will lie to the left of their supply to men from the other group. Given a downward-sloping demand for that labor, the equilibrium compensation to men from Group A is lower than that compensation to men from their own group. In other words, such Jewish women will provide spousal labor to Christian men at a cheaper rate than to Jewish men, which implies expecting less productive talent from Christian men for a given amount of talent the women have.

Given the melting-pot mentality, it is realistic to assume that many Jews prefer to assimilate. However, there are also many cases of Jews who prefer homogamy. This brings us to Case 2.

Case 2. Discriminating Jew and Christian. This is a case where both groups prefer homogamy. It can be shown that for there to be any incidence of people marrying outside their group when two groups prefer homogamy, it

is necessary to assume either that (1) the equilibrium compensation for a wife from the same group exceeds the compensation determined in the market for spousal labor by women from the other group by an amount higher than the premium a man is willing to pay in order to marry homogamously, or that (2) search costs for finding a spouse from one's own group are higher than the cost of finding a spouse from outside the group.

A differential in the compensation for a wife from inside versus that for a wife from outside the group will occur if the demand and supply curves in each market are sufficiently different. This could be the case for a number of reasons, such as imbalances in numbers, differential preferences for characteristics other than group identity, or differential attitudes towards marriage and work. Whatever the origin of the differential in equilibrium compensations, if such differential is the cause of observed heterogamy, the Jewish men who marry outside their faith will tend to be the ones who were unable to afford a Jewish wife. In turn, this inability to marry homogamously in the face of a preference for homogamy is likely to be due to possession of undesirable characteristics (such as low income, low general education, or previous marriages).

Therefore, assuming that search costs for spouses from inside the group are equal to or lower than search costs for spouses from outside the group, we obtain

Hypothesis 30'

If both Jews and Christians prefer homogamy, it is predicted that Jewish men marrying Jewish women will have desirable characteristics relatively to the characteristics of Jewish men marrying Christian women.

It is noteworthy that Hypotheses 30 and 30' lead to opposite predictions. If Jews prefer assimilation and heterogamy, the ones who marry Christians are likely to have more desirable characteristics than their counterparts marrying homogamously. The opposite is true if Jews prefer homogamy. Given the possible importance of search costs in Case 2, Hypothesis 30' may depend on variables affecting search costs.

Differences in search costs lead us back to the well-known theoretical insight stating that the smaller the size and density of the Jewish community, the higher the likelihood of heterogamy. No interaction terms between size of Jewish community and personal characteristics is expected if search costs are uniformly higher for finding Jewish spouses than for finding Christian spouses. However, search costs for finding a Jewish spouse could be considerably higher than the costs of finding a Christian spouse if one also searches for relatively rare characteristics. If search costs are higher for Jewish spouses with given desirable characteristics than they are for Christian spouses with similar characteristics, Hypothesis 30' could possibly be blurred.

Moreover, one expects an interaction between effect of size of the Jewish community and personal characteristics for another important reason. The last hypothesis was derived on the assumption that search costs are not at the origin of observed intermarriage. The larger the Jewish community in comparison to the population on a whole, the more it is likely that different search costs are not causing intermarriage. This leads to:

Hypothesis 31

Hypothesis 30' is more likely to hold where there is a dense Jewish population.

If it is relatively easy to find a Jewish mate, actual heterogamy in the face of preferences for homogamy is not as often associated with differential search costs as it is with factors related to imbalance in numbers and other factors causing different compensations for the two types of wives.

Given our assumption about Christian preferences for homogamy, characteristics of Jews marrying inside and outside their faith depend on Jewish preferences for homogamy. They also depend on market opportunities. Market opportunities faced by men and women vary not only as a function of the size of the pool of marriage eligibles in a given area, but also with changes in the sex ratio over time. As explained in Chapter 5, marriage squeezes (imbalanced sex ratios) change over time because (1) on average, women marry men generally somewhat older; and (2) the number of births fluctuates from year to year. As pointed out by DellaPergola (1976) the post World War II baby boom has caused a marriage squeeze for females. It follows that

Hypothesis 32

It will be more likely that a Jewish man will marry the wife of his first choice (homogamy or heterogamy) if the woman was born during the baby boom--and faces a marriage squeeze for women--than if the woman was born prior or after the baby boom.

These hypotheses were tested based on a subsample of married men.

Data and Methods

The theory was tested using a subsample of Jewish men interviewed for the 1970-71 National Jewish Population Survey sponsored and financed by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, the first attempt to conduct a nationwide survey of U.S. Jews.³ After selection of the men married at the time of the interview and born Jewish more than 2,200 cases were left.⁴ Next, the sample was subdivided according to presumed preference for homogamy or heterogamy, as measured by exposure to and

intensity of Jewish education, given the well known link between Jewish education and adoption of a preference for homogamy. Two alternative indicators of Jewish education were used: knowledge of Hebrew and enrollment in relatively intensive programs of Jewish education (denoted as medium or high level of Jewish education).⁵ It is assumed that the men who learned more about Judaism have a preference for homogamy, while other men prefer heterogamy or have neutral preferences.

As can be seen from Table 8.1, 11.4 percent of the Jewish men who do not know Hebrew married a Christian-born wife, whereas only 5.6 percent of the men who know Hebrew did so. Of those who had little Jewish edu-

TABLE 8.1 Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations (by Subsample)^a,
National Jewish Population Survey, 1972

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cation, 10.7 percent intermarried, whereas 7 percent of those with a medium or high Jewish education did so.

Table 8.1 also defines the variables used to explain the likelihood that a particular man intermarried. Information on the wife's and husband's

(general) education, age and marital status before their current marriage were included as characteristics reflecting relative desirability. More general education presumably increases desirability, e.g., by raising earning potential and expected children's intelligence.⁶ Age is likely to reflect attitudes towards homogamy and other cohort-related effects. Persons who had been divorced prior to their current marriage are likely to have less desirable characteristics (especially given that the average age of the respondents was approximately 44 for men and 41 for women and that divorce carried more of a stigma earlier in the century). An important reason why previously married individuals tend to be less desirable marital partners is that they often have children from their previous unions. Such children have been found to have a significant destabilizing effect on the new marriage (Lehrer 1992). Also included is information on whether a person was born during the baby-boom following World War II.⁷

As a rough indication of the opportunities for Jewish homogamy, a distinction was made between five regions of the United States: New York City, the Northeast, the South, the West and the Midwest.⁸ It appears that among the men with more Jewish education, 30 percent lived in New York.

In order to test the hypotheses derived above it is necessary to simultaneously take account of wife and husband characteristics and to control for region of residence, a goal that can be achieved by means of regression analysis. Ordinary least squares regressions were estimated, the dependent variable being marriage to a Christian (non-Jewish) woman.⁹

Findings

Separate regressions were estimated for men presumably preferring homogamy and for men presumably preferring heterogamy. Table 8.2 approximates preference for homogamy according to knowledge of Hebrew.

Table 8.2 presents regression results for the subsamples of 1,298 men who know Hebrew and the 911 who do not. For each subsample the table presents one regression with personal characteristics and location and the other identical to the first, but also including interaction terms differentiating between the effect of personal characteristics inside and outside of New York City. The discussion focuses on coefficients that were statistically significant.

As predicted in Hypothesis 30', it is found that controlling for wife's characteristics, among those who do not know Hebrew (and presumably

TABLE 8.2 CAN BE FOUND AT THE END OF THE CHAPTER.
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prefer heterogamy) the Jewish husband has relatively more desirable characteristics if there had been a mixed marriage than in the case of homogamy. It was found that a Jewish man who does not know Hebrew and marries heterogamously tends to have more years of (general) schooling than such Jewish man who marries homogamously. This indicates the presence of "compensating differentials" if there is a preference for heterogamy. In contrast, if the husband knows Hebrew and presumably prefers homogamy, years of schooling and likelihood of intermarriage are not related (significant positive coefficient of male education in regressions 1 and 2 in Table 8.2).

In support of Hypothesis 30, it was found that an indicator of negative husband characteristics, previous divorce, is positively associated with likelihood of intermarriage only if the husband knows Hebrew.¹⁰ If the husband does not know Hebrew, and presumably prefers intermarriage, intermarriage and male divorce are not related. This result was found only if a couple lives in the New York metropolitan area and also supports Hypothesis 31, which stated that where Jews are endogamously oriented and search costs for Jewish spouses are relatively low one is more likely to find undesirable characteristics to be associated with heterogamous marriage. In other words, among Jewish men who are assumed to prefer homogamy and have low costs of finding partners from their own group, those who marry heterogamously are more likely to have been divorced prior to the current marriage. In other words, men who marry homogamously and prefer to do so (and presumably the Jewish women they marry have the same preferences), have to compensate their wives by showing good past behavior. Being divorced is a drawback and lessens the likelihood of homogamy.

The results also show that the likelihood of exogamous marriage is highest among the youngest and the oldest respondents who do not know Hebrew. Based on this linear formulation, it would appear that among men who do not know Hebrew the probability of intermarriage decreases with age, until around age 68, when that probability increases. The negative relationship with age is probably due to the secular trend towards more intermarriage, while the surprising turn in the age-intermarriage function may be due to the small number of Jews living in the United States prior to 1900 (people who were 68 years old in 1971 were born in 1903) and the high proportion of German Jews among early Jewish immigrants to the United States. Among men who know Hebrew this U-shaped curve of intermarriage as a function of age is expressed in the positive coefficient of age and the positive coefficient of baby-boom (regression 4 in Table 8.2). From column 4 it appears that throughout the country men born during the baby boom are more likely to marry heterogamously, but that this is not true in New York City. The coefficients of the variables "baby boom" and "age" are difficult to interpret without data on marriage squeezes faced by American Jews. The fact that younger men born during the baby boom and living in New York

are not more likely to intermarry than their older counterparts can be explained in two ways. First, Jewish men who are homogamously oriented and have opportunities to find Jewish women are more likely to be influenced by the relative over-supply of Jewish women than by the over-supply of non-Jewish women. Plenty of Jewish baby-boom women were available in New York for interested baby-boom men. Second, Jewish baby-boomers in New York are more likely to be first or second generation Americans, many of them children of orthodox holocaust survivors; their counterparts in other parts of the country are more likely to be Americans for three or more generations, and therefore less interested in homogamy.

This suggests that in the earlier part of this century the upward trend in intermarriage was concentrated among Jews with no knowledge of Hebrew and presumably little preference for endogamy. Given the relatively small number of Jews who lived in the U.S. when these older respondents got married, age could also be correlated with high costs of finding a Jewish wife. It would be very worthwhile to check whether these results are sensitive to method of estimation.

Location, as defined here, does not appear to have a significant direct effect on likelihood of intermarriage. However, it has indirect effects *via* divorce and baby-boom. The indirect effect of location regarding endogamously oriented Jews that was formulated in Hypothesis 31 receives some confirmation in regression 4 that includes interaction between divorce and birth in New York City. The baby-boom effect found for New York can be viewed as possible evidence of Hypothesis 32. That the baby-boom effect for the rest of the country goes in the opposite direction does not necessarily contradict Hypothesis 32, for changes in the location and position of Jewish communities outside of New York after World War II could dampen any pure baby-boom effects.

Finally, it appears from Table 8.2 that irrespectively of whether the husband knows Hebrew or not, non-Jewish (mostly Christian) wives who marry Jews are more likely to have been previously divorced than Jewish wives. This supports the assumption that Christians prefer endogamy to marriage with Jews. It is also interesting that in the regressions for husbands who do not know Hebrew, the coefficients of divorced are larger in magnitude for women than for men, and only significant in the case of women. This is consistent with the interpretation of divorced status as an indication of the presence of children from a previous marriage. As women retain custody of children more often than men do, divorced status is more of a negative trait for women than for men.¹¹

Additional tests of the theory were performed by dividing the sample according to level of Jewish education. It was assumed that people with a low level of Jewish education have a preference for marrying outside the faith, while the opposite is true for people with high levels of Jewish

education.¹² These regressions also showed that men's secular education is associated positively with heterogamous marriage among Jews with low exposure to Jewish education, but not among Jews who presumably prefer homogamy. An interesting finding that also confirms Hypothesis 30' is that where a preference for homogamy can be assumed the non-Jewish wives are likely to have a better education (controlling for husband's general education) than do the Jewish wives. Such finding was not found when husbands presumably prefer intermarriage to endogamy. The regressions using level of Jewish education as criterion for endogamous preference also showed evidence for a direct effect of location, in the expected direction. In New York City homogamously-oriented previously divorced men were more likely to marry heterogamously than were similar men who had not been married previously.

Summary and Suggestions for Further Research

The market approach to intermarriage presented here led to the hypotheses that if non-Jews prefer homogamy, (1) Jews who do not prefer homogamy and marry a non-Jew have better qualities than their counterparts marrying Jews (Hypothesis 30), whereas (2) among Jews who prefer homogamy, those marrying a non-Jew have undesirable characteristics relatively to those of their counterparts marrying Jews (Hypothesis 30'). Moreover, (3) in locations where the market for Jewish spouses is large relatively to that for non-Jewish spouses, the findings of Hypothesis 30' will come out more strongly (Hypothesis 31). Finally, it was hypothesized that (4) the cohorts born during the post-World War II baby boom experience a marriage squeeze for females which will make it easier for Jewish men to marry the wife of their first choice (Hypothesis 32).

These hypotheses were tested by applying regression analysis to subsamples of Jewish men whose background varied in terms of the intensity of their exposure to Jewish culture, as measured by knowledge of Hebrew and years of Jewish education. It was assumed that preferences for homogamy develop as a result of intensive Jewish education. As predicted, it was found that in the subsamples likely to have low or no preference for homogamy, Jewish men who married heterogamously had more desirable characteristics (measured in terms of general education, and previous marriages) relatively to men who married homogamously. The opposite was true for Jewish men likely to have a strong preference for homogamy.

It was found that in New York--and not elsewhere--divorced men who know Hebrew were more likely to marry heterogamously. This confirms Hypothesis 31, for a previous divorce is generally considered to be an undesirable characteristic and New York offers a relatively large market for Jewish spouses.

The effects of marriage squeeze were difficult to estimate given that the variables age and baby-boom contain both period effects and cohort effects.

These results stress the usefulness of the market theory of intermarriage presented here.¹³ Further research could add to the value of this study in a number of ways. First, the empirical study of Jewish-non-Jewish marriage could be improved by using more appropriate methods of estimation (such as logit), better explanatory variables, more recent data, and an extension to heterogamy among Jewish women.¹⁴ Second, other empirical studies of homogamy--whether religious, ethnic, or class--could provide tests for the theory. Third, the theory of homogamy could benefit from more elaboration.

It is believed that the market theory at hand can not only help us understand intermarriage between Jews and Christians, but also other cases of intermarriage. Moreover, insights gained from studying assortative mating could also contribute to our understanding of the allocation of employees in the job market.

Postscript

Results from a recent study of intermarriage between U.S. Jews and Christians indicate the possible existence of compensating differentials of the kind that were discussed here. Medding, Tobin, Fishman, and Rimor (1992) distinguish between inmarrying and outmarrying Jews based on data collected from close to 7,000 households in eight Jewish communities between 1985 and 1988. The tables they report don't include information on spouses, so that it is not possible to establish whether outmarrying Jews have more desirable characteristics in comparison to their spouse than do inmarrying Jews. What Medding *et al.* do report are comparisons between inmarrying and outmarrying Jews in terms of educational level, occupation, and income. The authors report significant differences between respondents older than 45 and younger than 45.

Among older respondents, outmarrying Jews tend to have a higher socio-economic status than inmarrying Jews. The opposite is the case among younger respondents. For instance, 4% of Jews above age 55 with a high school degree married outside their religion (marriages involving a conversion are categorized as inmarriages for the purpose of this discussion). In contrast, more than 9% of older Jews with a graduate degree married outside their religion. Whereas in the past more educated Jews had a higher likelihood to marry out than less educated Jews, the opposite is the case among Jews younger than 45. For instance, 41% of Jews age 18-34 with a high school degree married outside their religion, which is more than double the percentage of outmarriage for Jews in this age category with a graduate degree (19% of outmarriage).

Similarly, Jews age 18 to 34 in professional or technical occupations had an outmarriage rate of 20%, less than half the outmarriage rate for their counterparts working in blue collar occupations or in the service industry (45%). In contrast, among older Jews, there was no relationship between outmarriage and occupation. Also, income does not seem to be related to outmarriage among Jews above age 45. But among Jews under age 45 the percentage marrying out is 37% among respondents earning less than \$30,000 and only 21% among respondents earning more than \$75,000 a year.

Medding *et al.* attribute this difference between older and younger Jews to the fact that most younger Jews and few older Jews are educated. Consequently, younger Jews who are not educated can not easily find a Jewish mate. Their explanation assumes a preference for inmarriage among Jews. Elsewhere, they report that 33% of the marriages that occurred between 1980 and 1989 (of which a high proportion presumably involved a respondent age 18-34) were outmarriages. This stands in contrast to 5% outmarriages among respondents who married prior to 1960, and 12% outmarriages among respondents who married between 1960 and 1969. The assumption of a preference for inmarriage among Jews is compatible with increased rates of outmarriage to the extent that the driving force behind such increased outmarriage is a reduction in the degree of antisemitism in the U.S.

Medding *et al.* also report a clear association between outmarriage and years of Jewish education and increasing levels of Jewish education over time. In light of the theory presented here, there is a connection between these associations between outmarriage and socio-economic status on the one hand, and outmarriage and Jewish education on the other hand. The theory presented here predicted that among Jews with low levels of Jewish education, and presumably a preference for outmarriage, outmarrying Jews would have more desirable characteristics than inmarrying Jews (which includes higher education or income). In contrast, among Jews with high levels of Jewish education, and presumably a preference for inmarriage, outmarrying Jews would have less desirable characteristics than inmarrying Jews. In theory, the generational differences in socio-economic characteristics of outmarrying and inmarrying Jews could possibly be the result of a switch from a population dominated by a preference for outmarriage to a population dominated by a preference to inmarriage, a switch which may be related to increased levels of Jewish education. Such switch could have possibly occurred at the same time that the percent of outmarriages increased if substantial reductions in antisemitism occurred as well.

These changes over time thus suggest a substantial reduction in discrimination against Jews in U.S. marriage markets. If that is the case, the theory presented here implies that there must have been a substantial reduction in compensating differentials in marriage. One expects a reduction

in the positive gap between the desirable traits of the Jewish spouse and the non-Jewish spouse. It is hypothesized that the less antisemitism is prevalent, the less it is necessary for a Jewish spouse to compensate a non-Jewish spouse for being Jewish.

A multivariate analysis of the kind presented here could be performed with recent data, such as the data used by Medding *et al.* and the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, thereby allowing tests of the hypotheses mentioned in this chapter, including the hypothesis mentioned in this postscript.

Notes

1. Various theories from disciplines other than economics have dealt with the determinants of preferences for religious homogamy. Such theories have considered the following factors as influential: the relationship with one's parents along the lines of psychoanalytical theory (for references, see Berman 1968), the provision of social controls by parents and religious organizations (see for instance Heiss 1960), and the tendency to avoid the frustration of being part of a minority (DellaPergola 1976). Most relevant to the perspective presented here, Rosenthal (1963) has shown that an individual's religious education during childhood is a determinant of the propensity to intermarry.
2. The entire discussion could also be read in terms of marriage between Blacks and Whites, for instance.
3. For details about this sample and discussion of how representative it is of U.S. Jews, see Lazerwitz (1973, 1974). When the original version of this chapter was written, this was the only national survey of Jews available.
4. Jewish men, and not women, were selected because (1) there were relatively few intermarriages between Jewish women and non-Jewish men, and (2) so far the theory has been simplified by focusing on men's likelihood to intermarry. Information on whether a wife who was not born Jewish converted or not, was not used here. The sample was limited to men who were born Jewish and did not convert. Ideally, one would have preferred a sample including men who have been previously married. By restricting the sample to men who were married at the time of interview, one excludes marriages which ended in dissolution, possibly in part due to religious differences.
5. Low level Jewish education was defined as no education at all or attendance of Sunday school only.
6. However, general education could also reflect different attitudes towards homogamy, or imbalances in particular categories of education. As Chiswick and Lehrer (1992) have pointed out, high levels of education also imply wider intellectual horizons, and additional dimensions of compatibility which may be more beneficial than the possible cost of religious differences (in cases where homogamy is preferred).
7. The response rate on the question regarding monetary income was so low that this information was not used in the regressions.
8. Region was defined according to place of birth. It would have been preferable to include region of residence prior to marriage, but that information was not available.

9. Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable--the likelihood that a Jewish man be married to a Christian--methods such as logit regressions would be appropriate. However, given the often similar results obtained with linear regression models, the method of Ordinary Least Squares was utilized
10. It is especially appropriate to assume that previous divorce is an undesirable characteristic in a subsample where the average husband's age at interview was 44 years.
11. I owe this point to Evelyn Lehrer.
12. Some results are available upon request.
13. If Jewish education indeed makes as much difference in explaining heterogamy as is implied from this study, it would also be interesting to explore in detail what particular aspects of Jewish education have the most impact on heterogamy and correlates of heterogamy.
14. Unfortunately, I have not found the time or resources to do any of these things myself.




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intensity of Jewish education, given the well known link between Jewish education and adoption of a preference for homogamy. Two alternative indicators of Jewish education were used: knowledge of Hebrew and enrollment in relatively intensive programs of Jewish education (denoted as medium or high level of Jewish education).⁵ It is assumed that the men who learned more about Judaism have a preference for homogamy, while other men prefer heterogamy or have neutral preferences.

As can be seen from Table 8.1, 11.4 percent of the Jewish men who do not know Hebrew married a Christian-born wife, whereas only 5.6 percent of the men who know Hebrew did so. Of those who had little Jewish edu-

TABLE 8.1 Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations (by Subsample)^a, National Jewish Population Survey, 1972

	Definition	Subs. 1	Subs. 2	Subs. 3	Subs. 4
Likelihood of exogamous marriage	dummy=1 if Jewish man married to non-Jewish woman	.114	.056	.107	.07
Education, husband	years of (general) schooling	15.1 (4.4)	15.3 (4.6)	15.4 (4.3)	15.1 (4.6)
Education, wife	in years	13.9 (3.3)	13.8 (3.6)	14.0 (3.1)	13.8 (3.6)
Age, husband (at interview)		44.3 (16.6)	44.3 (17.4)	45.7 (16.9)	43.9 (17.2)
Age, wife (at interview)		40.9 (15.7)	40.7 (16.7)	42.1 (16.2)	40.4 (16.4)
Divorced, husband	dummy=1 if husband was married before this marriage	.04	.03	.05	.03
Divorced, wife	dummy=1 if wife was married before this marriage	.05	.04	.05	.04
Baby boom, husband	dummy=1 if husband born in 1946 or later	.03	.05	.02	.05
Baby boom, wife	dummy=1 if wife born in 1946 or later			.07	.09
Regions:					
New York ^b	dummy	.27	.30	.23	.30
Northeast ^c	variables	.22	.24	.23	.23
South	(reference: Midwest)	.11	.09	.12	.09
West		.15	.10	.15	.11
N	sample size	911	1298	582	1540

Notes: a) Subsamples: (1) Husband does not know Hebrew; (2) Husband knows Hebrew; (3) Low level of Jewish education; (4) Medium or high level of Jewish education; b) New York City and surrounding areas; c) Except for New York;

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TABLE 8.2 Regressions of Likelihood of Jewish Man Marrying Exogamously by Knowledge of Hebrew (OLS)

	Husband does not know Hebrew (N=911)		Husband knows Hebrew (N=1298)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Education wife(years)	-.001 (.004)	-.001 (.005)	.003 (.002)	.002 (.003)
Age wife (years)	.007 (.007)	.00 (.003)	-.008 (.0045)	-.004* (.002)
Age wife, squared	.00 (.00)		.00 (.00)	.
Wife, divorced	.13* (.05)	.11* (.057)	.15* (.036)	.16* (.041)
Education husbd	.01* (.003)	.01* (.0036)	.00 (.001)	.001 (.002)
Age husbd	-.0137** (.0075)	-.002 (.002)	.00 (.005)	.003* (.001)
Age husbd, squared	-.0001** (.0007)		.00 (.00)	
Husbd divorced	.04 (.06)	.09 (.06)		-.05 (.046)
Husbd baby boom		.004 (.09)		.16* (.043)
Location:				
New York	-.032 (.03)	.06 (.10)	-.015 (.017)	.03 (.058)
Northeast	-.026 (.03)	-.025 (.03)	.01 (.017)	.01 (.017)
South	.041 (.04)	.047 (.04)	.02 (.025)	.02 (.025)
West	.042 (.03)	.043 (.03)	.04 (.023)	.04** (.023)
Interactions of N.Y. and:				
Education, husband		-.005 (.007)		-.005 (.004)
Education, wife		-.001 (.009)		.002 (.005)
Divorced, husband		.05 (.13)		.20* (.083)
Divorced, wife		.09 (.15)		-.05 (.081)
Baby boom, husband		-.05 (.12)		-.12* (.056)
Constant	.18	.004	.17	.004
R ²	.05	.05	.05	.06
F	3.96	2.92	5.84	5.36

Notes: (Standard errors in parentheses); * Significant at 95% level. **Significant at 90% level.