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Contemporary Jewish Diaspora in Global Context: Human Development Correlates of Population Trends

AT THE TURN OF THE 21ST century, international political and military interactions, socioeconomic development and transactions, and, not less significantly, cultural patterns and communication networks reached a definitive stage of globalization. A short span of years witnessed the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Soviet Union as a major global power, the reunion of Germany, the revival of religious fundamentalism, particularly within Islam, the return of “ethnic cleansing” in Europe and Africa, new waves of mass international migration, the beginning but also the stoppage of a peace process in the Middle East, the Catholic Church’s improvement of its relationship to the Jewish people and its historic recognition of the State of Israel, the European monetary union, and also the rise of the internet and other global and regional societal changes. Transformations of the global polity, economy, and communications deeply and rapidly affected the daily life, identity, and boundary definition of nations, communities, and individuals in world society, and among world Jewry within the broader context.

Since the late 1960s, powerful events related to general geopolitical change and more specific events directly stemming from the Jewish experience have contributed to transforming Jewish population and society. One major factor of a general nature was the end and dismemberment of the Soviet Union as a major global power. Among other things, this not only crucially affected the strategic position of the successor republics on the global scene, but also made possible radical changes in migration policies, which were followed by one of the largest migration waves in modern Jewish history. A major example of a more specifically Jewish circumstance, which actually preceded the migration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and its European client states in time, concerns the long

and—at the time of this writing—unresolved chain of events following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. While an analysis of the strategic and geopolitical significance of those events is outside the purpose of this paper, 1967 and its aftermath deeply affected the position of the state of Israel in the world system, and more specifically made it much more salient among the Jewish Diaspora. Through a chain of direct and indirect consequences, the balance of demographic, migratory, and identifiable trends within the Jewish people significantly changed.¹

The pressures, opportunities, and dilemmas brought about by these global changes also stimulated the emergence of conflicting visions of the present and future of the Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel. While in the Diaspora the quest for Jewish continuity was challenged by a steady pace of assimilation and alienation, in Israel the once predominant paradigms of ingathering of the exiles, immigrant absorption, fusion of the Diasporas and nation-building based on a Jewish majority were challenged by alternative non- or post-Zionist views. These ideational-cultural developments carried major consequences for Jewish demography. The size, pace of change and characteristics of Jewish population, reflecting both biological-demographic and cultural-identification determinants, were in fact strictly intertwined with the major turning points in contemporary Jewish history and society. Facing changes affecting the Jewish Diaspora, modern historiographic and sociological interpretations have competed over a variety of analytic propositions. Two major axes of investigation have been concerned with the uniqueness of the Jewish experience in relation to other Diasporas,² on one hand, and what the more useful explanatory framework would be for observed patterns of change over time and in comparative context, on the other.³

Keeping in mind these trends and debates, this article's purpose is two-fold. After concisely reviewing some of the main recent and current trends in the world Jewish population, we shall focus on some observable relationships between major demographic and socioeconomic indicators at the macrosocial level, and changes in the geographical distribution and mobility of the Jewish population. Special attention will be paid to migration movements, following the assumption that changes in the quality of life experienced by Jews in different environments may stand at the origin of decisions concerning their choices of countries or cities of residence. In turn, such intensive patterns of mobility may generate powerful consequences for the overall sociodemographic and cultural configuration of world Jewry. The existence of any such significant patterns will be investigated at the global level and with regard to the two specific case studies of Jews in the United States and in the Russian Republic.

GLOBALIZATION, NATIONAL CONTEXTS
AND JEWISH POPULATION TRENDS

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND JEWISH POPULATION SIZE

The combined effects of the global, regional, and national changes outlined above have resulted in a powerful geographical redistribution of world Jewish population. A first descriptive look at these changes appears in Table 1, which compares Jewish population distribution by major geographical areas at the end of 1970 and 2002.⁴ While the “core” world Jewish population developed at a rhythm close to zero population growth at a level of between 12.5 and 13 million people, significant changes occurred in the different continents and major regions within them.⁵ Between 1970 and 2002, the number of Jews declined by nearly 80 percent in the European parts of the FSU, by 91 percent in the Asian parts of the FSU and in North Africa, 56 percent in the rest of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 36 percent in Southern Africa, and 22 percent in Latin America. Minor declines occurred also in North America (-0.5 percent) and in Western Europe (-5 percent). On the other hand, Jewish population increased by nearly 53 percent in Oceania, and by over 97 percent in Israel. Large-scale emigration is an important, though not the only, factor behind the drastic drop in Jewish populations in the FSU, and in the Muslim countries in Asia and Africa. Further determinants of regional Jewish population change reflect different fertility levels and highly variable balances of Jewish birth rates and death rates, as well as different frequencies of Jewish identificational assimilation. Overall, while Israel’s Jewish population nearly doubled between 1970 and 2002, the total size of the Jewish Diaspora diminished by over one fifth.

While these data hint at a greater resilience of the Jewish communities in Israel and in the Western countries, as compared to Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, the general societal context of these changes needs to be explored more systematically. We need to assess more explicitly the local determinants of Jewish population change—beyond regional labels that can, at most, evoke intuitive associations. The question under investigation here is what specific levels of human development characterize each country, and whether these local conditions are related to Jewish population change. Table 2 presents a classification of the countries of the world into five strata (or quintiles) of countries, showing the respective total and Jewish populations. Each stratum includes the same number of countries, but not the same amount of population. The strata result from a detailed ranking from top to bottom of all countries for which relevant data existed. In 1988, country scores were obtained through combined use of five major indicators.⁶ In 2001, the classification mainly reflects a

Table 1
 Estimated Core Jewish Population, by Continents and Major Regions
 End 1970 and 2002

<i>Region</i>	<i>1970</i>		<i>2002</i>		<i>Percent change</i>
	<i>N.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>%</i>	
<i>World</i>	12,662,400	100.0	12,950,200	100.0	2.3
<i>Diaspora</i>	10,080,200	79.6	7,856,000	60.7	-22.1
<i>Israel</i>	2,582,200	20.4	5,094,200	39.3	97.3
<i>America</i>	6,199,800	49.0	6,071,600	46.9	-2.1
North ^a	5,686,000	44.9	5,670,500	43.8	-0.3
Central, South	513,800	4.1	401,100	3.1	-21.9
<i>Europe</i>	3,240,600	25.6	1,550,800	12.0	-52.1
West	1,118,900	8.8	1,066,400	8.2	-4.7
Former USSR ^b	1,905,400	15.0	389,700	3.0	-79.5
Rest East, Balkan ^b	216,300	1.7	94,700	0.7	-56.2
<i>Asia</i>	2,944,900	23.3	5,137,000	39.7	74.4
Israel	2,582,200	20.4	5,094,200	39.3	97.3
Former USSR ^b	262,400	2.1	23,300	0.2	-91.1
Other	100,300	0.8	19,500	0.2	-80.6
<i>Africa</i>	207,100	1.6	83,900	0.6	-59.5
North ^c	82,600	0.7	7,300	0.1	-91.2
South ^d	124,500	1.0	76,600	0.6	-38.5
<i>Oceaniae</i>	70,000	0.6	106,900	0.8	52.7

^aUnited States and Canada.

^bAsian regions of Russia and Turkey are included in Europe. Including Tats.

^cIncluding Ethiopia.

^dSouth Africa, Zimbabwe, and other sub-Saharan countries.

^eAustralia, New Zealand.

Source: Adapted from: Sergio DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel" (1998) 54; Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2003," in *American Jewish Year Book*, 103 (2003).

country's General Domestic Product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parities.⁷

Between 1988 and 2001, the world's total population grew by nearly one billion—an increase of 19 percent—versus an increase of only 100,000, or 0.1 percent, among the world Jewish population. Most of the world's total population was contained in stratum 4 in 1988, and in strata 3 and 4 in 2001. Population growth in the two upper strata, 1 and 2, was faster than the world's average, probably reflecting a significant impact of immigration to more developed countries, where fertility and natural increase tend to be quite low. Shifts in the classification of countries across strata as a consequence of improvements or a worsening of their situations explains the fast growth of total population in stratum 3 and the decline in stratum 4.

The main change affecting world Jewry was its becoming nearly completely concentrated in stratum 1 (92 percent in 2001), versus 55 percent in 1988, when another 42 percent of the world's Jews lived in countries included in stratum 2. Of particular significance was Israel's passage from stratum 2 in 1988 to stratum 1 in 2001, thus joining the world's 25 most developed countries, which are mostly located in North America and Western Europe. Largely as a consequence of Israel's improved standing in the world system, the total Jewish population of countries in stratum 1 increased by 68 percent, while in all other strata it sharply diminished or, at best, it did not increase.

Accordingly, the presence of Jews per 1000 individuals in stratum 1 became stronger not only in absolute, but also in relative, terms. Overall, Jews represented little more than 2 per 1000 of the world's population in 2001, but stood at 12.8 Jews per 1000 in stratum 1, versus 10 per 1000 in 1988, while in all other strata from 2 to 5 the Jewish presence had become very small if not non-existent. These significant changes were partly an artifact of the expanded number of countries with relevant indicators, from 131 in 1988, to 190 in 2001. More importantly, changes reflected the reclassification of countries from one stratum to another], and differential paces of population growth in the countries belonging to each stratum. The overall dissimilarity between global distributions of Jews and of total population increased from 70.8 percent in 1988, to 76.4 percent in 2001. In other words, over the last decade we have witnessed a significant tendency of the Jews to concentrate in countries that offer the better socioeconomic prospects, and where a tradition of political stability and legal equity is usually well established. This represents a significant departure from the situation that prevailed all through modern history and until the first half of the 20th century.

Table 2
World Total and Jewish Population,
by Socioeconomic Development of Country of Residence
1988 and 2001

Country strata, ranked by level of economic development ^a	1988			2001			Percent change 1988–2001	
	Total	Jews	Jews p. 1000	Total	Jews	Jews p. 1000	Total	Jews
<i>N. of countries</i> ^b		131			190			
Total (millions)	5,101	12,858		6,050	12,948			
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	2.5	100.0	100.0	2.1	18.6	0.1
1 (highest)	14.0	55.0	10.0	15.5	91.9	12.8	31.3	68.3
2	12.5	42.3	8.6	13.5	6.6	1.1	28.1	-84.3
3	11.1	2.3	0.5	29.3	1.2	0.1	213.1	-47.4
4	52.7	0.3	0.0	31.0	0.3	0.0	-30.2	0.1
5 (lowest)	9.7	0.1	0.0	10.8	0.0	0.0	32.1	-100.0
Dissimilarity index ^c	0.708			0.764				

^aIn 1988: a composite of five variables: GNP per capita, energy consumption per capita, infant mortality rate, adult literacy rate, political freedom/type of governance. In 2001: GDP per capita.

^bFor each series of data, countries classified according to socioeconomic indicators were ranked from highest to lowest, and sorted into five strata (quintiles) each with the same number of countries.

^cPercent of one population that should be transferred to obtain the same distribution as in the other population.

Source: 1988: Adapted from Sergio DellaPergola, "Changing Cores and Peripheries: Fifty Years in Socio-demographic Perspective," (1995) 22; Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2002," in *American Jewish Year Book*, 102 (2002); United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York and Oxford, 2001).

Further insights on the relationship between Jewish population trends and general indicators of quality of life can be gained by studying the evolution of the Index of Human Development (HDI) over time. HDI was suggested by the United Nations' Development Program (UNDP) and consists of a synthesis of various indicators of public health (life expectancy at birth), educational attainment (adult literacy; combined primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment), and economic development (Gross Domestic Product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity in US dollars).⁸ Table 3 refers to the 24 countries that had the largest Jewish populations (30,000 Jews or more) in 1980. Data reported include the respective Jewish population estimates, as well as country HDIs, in 1980 and 2000. These 24 countries contain a broad cross-section of different regional situations and include economically more developed and stable democracies in North America and Europe, as well as less affluent or stable societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and less developed countries in Asia and Africa. What is the relationship between these contextual indicators of human development and Jewish population trends?

Because of historical constraints, it usually takes a long time and a large amount of social intervention before significant changes in HDI may emerge. Therefore it is not surprising to find a high correlation coefficient of 0.94 between HDIs in 1980 and in 2000 (based on 24 countries). On the other hand, a trend to reduce the gaps that existed initially across countries can also be observed. A negative correlation coefficient of -0.62 emerges between the initial HDIs in 1980 and the percent change in HDIs over the period 1980–2000. This means that development indicators in less developed countries were making comparatively faster progress than in more developed societies. Israel's position in this context is particularly interesting. Of the 24 countries included in Table 3, Israel had the second highest absolute increase in HDI after Iran between 1980 and 2000, and the fourth highest in percent terms after Ethiopia, Iran, and Brazil, which all were included among the bottom four countries in 1980. In other words, while being already part of the group of countries with higher HDI in 1980, Israel's progress was faster than among other countries of comparable human development. Consequently, the gap between Israel and the top ranking countries considerably narrowed. Israel's HDI in 1980 corresponded to 92.1 percent of the highest (then, the United States), while in 2000 it corresponded to 95.3 percent of the highest (Canada). The world's highest HDI, in the meanwhile, had increased by over 6 percent. It also seems significant that several countries, all in the FSU or Eastern Europe, experienced absolute declines in HDI between 1980 and 2000 (Russia,

Table 3
Human Development Index and Jewish Population in 24 Selected Countries
1980–2000

Country ^a	Human Development Index ^b				Jewish population (thousands)			
	1980	2000	Difference 1980–2000		1980	2000	Difference 1980–2000	
			Number	Percent			Number	Percent
United States	884	939	55	6.2	5,690	5,330	-360	-6.3
Canada	883	940	57	6.5	308	360	52	16.9
France	863	928	65	7.5	530	500	-30	-5.7
Belgium	861	939	78	9.1	33	31.5	-1.5	-4.5
Australia	861	939	78	9.1	70	98	28	40.0
Germany	859	925	66	7.7	34.5	98	63.5	184
UK	848	928	80	9.4	350	300	-50	-14.3
Italy	846	913	67	7.9	32	29.5	-2.5	-7.8
Israel	814	896	82	10.1	3,283	4,952	1,669	50.8
Russia	809	781	-28	-3.5	701	275	-426	-60.8
Argentina	799	844	45	5.6	242	197	-45	-18.6
Belarus	794	788	-6	-0.8	135	25	-110	-81.5
Hungary	793	835	42	5.3	65	51.5	-13.5	-20.8
Romania	788	775	-13	-1.6	33	11	-22	-66.7
Ukraine	780	748	-32	-4.1	634	112	-522	-82.3
Uruguay	777	831	54	6.9	32	22.5	-9.5	-29.7
Azerbaijan	760	741	-19	-2.5	35	7.5	-27.5	-78.6
Mexico	734	796	62	8.4	35	40.5	5.5	15.7
Uzbekistan	726	727	1	0.1	100	7	-93	-93.0
Moldova	720	701	-19	-2.6	80	6	-74	-92.5
Brazil	679	757	78	11.5	110	97.5	-12.5	-11.4
South Africa	663	695	32	4.8	120	79	-41	-34.2
Iran	563	721	158	28.1	32	11.5	-20.5	-64.1
Ethiopia	250	327	77	30.8	32	0.1	-31.9	-99.7
Correlation coefficients *	<0.94>				<0.77>			
	<-0.62>				<0.16>			
	<0.47>							

^a24 countries with largest Jewish populations in 1980, ranked by HDI in 1980.

^bOriginal HDI multiplied by 1000.

^cRank correlation: 0.69.

Sources: United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2002* (New York, 2002), DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2003" (2003).

Belarus, Romania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). How could these environmental changes be related to changes in Jewish population size?


We note, first, that correlation between the sizes of the selected 24 Jewish populations in 1980 and 2000 was high, 0.77, yet much lower than the correlation between country HDIs over the same time span. Correlation between the size of the Jewish population in 1980 and its percent change in 1980–2000 was a low 0.16, indicating no direct effect of the initial size of the Jewish population on subsequent demographic development. On the other hand, relatively strong links appear between the initial HDI in a country and the subsequent pace of change of the respective Jewish population. The total correlation between HDI in 1980 and the percent of Jewish population change in 1980–2000 was 0.47. However, when we compare for each five-year period separately the initial HDI and the subsequent five-year population change, the following correlation coefficients obtain: 1980–85, 0.67; 1985–90, 0.26; 1990–95, 0.64; 1995–2000, 0.65. Most of the time, therefore, the general conditions of human development in a society had a strong relationship with the demographic development of the respective Jewish communities.

We pursue further this line of investigation, turning now to correlation between the ranks of the 24 selected countries rather than between the actual values observed. Reflecting an ongoing redistribution of Jewish population under the impact of contextual circumstances, correlation between HDI and Jewish population size increased from 0.41 in 1980 to 0.67 in 2000. Rank correlation between HDI in 1980 and percent change in Jewish population between 1980 and 2000 was 0.69.

A synthesis of these analyses appears in Figure 1, which graphically portrays the relationship between country HDIs in 1980 and the percent of Jewish population change in 1980–2000. Besides the already noted strong and positive correlation between these two variables, two further important pieces of information emerge from a detailed inspection of the position of each country. The first is the existence of clear regional affinities. Besides Israel, four major groups of countries are outlined: Asia and Africa, Latin America, the FSU and Eastern Europe, and Western countries (including North America, Western Europe, and Australia). This underlies the existence of significant historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political affinities among the societies of different countries within each region, as well as significant inter-regional differences.⁹

A second interesting lesson from Figure 1 is that, while most countries are located quite in proximity to an exponential curve that outlines the main trend of the whole configuration, there are several outliers. As

Figure 1
Jewish Population Change,
by Human Development Index in Selected Countries* 1980–2000



an interpretative hypothesis, we suggest the existence of globally diffused contextual factors that explain the overall trends in Jewish population change. Moreover, each country possibly features some specific contextual constraints or contextual incentives. The former tend to depress the expected pace of Jewish population change, causing lesser growth or faster decline, while the latter tend to enhance Jewish population change, causing lesser decline or faster growth. When we examine the countries whose pace of population change has been inferior to what might have been predicted according to the HDI in 1980, we find, not unexpectedly, Ethiopia—one of the world's poorest countries—together with all of the several FSU republics included in this analysis plus Romania—where the transition to the post-Soviet era has been accompanied by at least temporary lowering of health standards, economic crises, and, in some cases, bloody ethnic conflict. Two other countries somewhat below their expected rank of Jewish population growth are France and the United States. In the past, both Jewish communities had received large inflows of Jewish immigrants, but recently, they experienced population decreases due to growing assimilation and aging. In the case of France, however, this has also been due to

emigration under the impact of unfriendly circumstances; namely, a rapid growth of the Muslim population.¹⁰

Deviations from the expected ranking of Jewish population growth as a function of HDI are, however, much more significant among countries where, according to our definition, contextual incentives operate. Two basically different situations emerge here. On one hand, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and, to some extent, Iran feature highly polarized and socioeconomically unequal societies with a strong component of ethnic stratification. Under these circumstances, Jewish communities have long been quite segregated from the majority of society and have been able to nurture a niche of high socioeconomic achievement in comparative if not absolute terms. Even in a context of relatively poor human development that would expectedly stimulate emigration or faster negative population trends, the overwhelming social advantages so far accumulated tend to enhance resilience of the respective Jewish communities. A different explanation applies to Israel, Germany, and Australia, whose Jewish population growth was also faster than would be expected according to the respective HDIs. In recent decades, each of these communities indeed received the input of significant international migration. Germany and Australia represent explicit alternatives to Israel in the range of possible choices of Jewish migrants. A common thread has been the strong support to migrants offered by government incentives in Israel, Germany, and Australia alike, and also motivations of cultural and historical nature, albeit clearly different in Israel versus the other two countries.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

As already noted, international migration has consistently represented one of the critical mechanisms in changing Jewish population size and distribution. Since World War II, about 4.7 million Jews involved in international migration: 1.9 million between 1948 and 1968; 1 million between 1969 and 1988; and 1.8 million between 1989 and 2002.¹¹ Table 4 provides a parsimonious classification of the main Jewish migration streams relating to two main areas of origin—Eastern Europe and countries in Asia and Africa—and two major competing areas of destination—Israel and the Western countries. Out of 2.8 million Jewish migrants since 1969, Israel received 59 percent of the total, while 41 percent was distributed across the major Western countries. Of the total 1969–2002 migration, 55 percent came from Eastern Europe, 16 percent from Asia and Africa, 16 percent from Israel, and 13 percent from the aggregate of Western countries. With regard to the frequency of emigration per 1000 Jews in the countries of

Table 4
 Jewish International Migration, by Major Areas of Origin and Destination
 Absolute Numbers, Percent Distribution,
 Yearly Rates per 1000 Jewish Population in Countries of Origin
 1969–2002

<i>Areas of origin and destination</i>	<i>1969– 1976</i>	<i>1977– 1988</i>	<i>1989– 1996</i>	<i>1997– 2002</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>Absolute numbers, thousands</i>				
<i>Grand total</i>	451	589	1,240	535	2,815
<i>Yearly average</i>	56	49	155	89	83
	<i>Percent</i>				
<i>Grand total</i>	100	100	100	100	100
<i>From East Europe</i>	39	41	64	62	55
To Western countries	8	29	23	25	22
To Israel ^a	32	12	41	36	33
<i>From Asia-Africa^b</i>	14	14	19	10	16
To Western countries	5	7	1	1	3
To Israel ^a	9	8	18	9	13
<i>From Israel^c to West countries</i>	20	24	11	17	16
<i>From Western countries to Israel^a</i>	27	20	5	12	13
<i>Regional subtotals</i>					
<i>To Western countries</i>	33	60	35	43	41
<i>To Israel^a</i>	67	40	65	57	59
	<i>Yearly emigration per 1000 Jews in country of origin</i>				
<i>Grand total</i>	4	4	12	7	6
<i>From East Europe</i>	10	12	110	97	51
To Western countries	2	8	38	40	20
To Israel ^a	8	3	72	57	31
<i>From Asia-Africa^b</i>	44	73	146	134	97
To Western countries	14	32	42	13	27
To Israel ^c	30	40	94	121	70
<i>From Israel^c to Western countries</i>	4	3	4	3	4
<i>From Western countries to Israel^a</i>	2	1	1	1	1

^aSince 1970 includes immigrant citizens (from West).

^bSince 1990, Asian regions of FSU included in Asia-Africa.

^cAll emigration from Israel included here.

Source: Adapted from Sergio DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel" (1998) 58.


Based on data from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; HIAS; and various other sources.

origin, the highest propensity to leave appeared in the numerically reduced communities in Asia and Africa (a yearly average of 97 per 1000), followed by Eastern Europe (51 per 1000), Israel (4 per 1000), and the Western countries (1 per 1000). Such regional ranking again clearly reflects the extent and intensity of environmental factors that are likely to stimulate or depress emigration propensities.

Turning to migration to Israel, the background and explanation of *aliyah* have been the subject of analyses that have often tended to stress cultural and ideological motivations as a dominant, or at least a necessary, determinant. Without doubt, ideational explanations need to be part and parcel of any analysis of *aliyah*—at least from the perspective of the preference given to Israel over competing countries of destination.¹² The very different rhythm of *aliyah* from different countries over time, however, and the very different frequency of *aliyah* from different countries as compared to Jewish population size in the countries of origin, calls for attention. Figure 2 presents a series of rates of *aliyah* per 1000 Jews in 73 countries of origin in 2001. Migration data include also non-Jewish immigrants *within* the framework of Israel's Law of Return, while the base populations refer to the "core" concepts and do not include non-Jewish household members. The *aliyah* rates thus computed are therefore overestimates, and, in one case (Ethiopia) amount to a value well above 1000. In spite of this technical limitation, the comparison aims at providing an illustration of the existing relationship between *aliyah* frequencies and HDI in each country. To improve the graphical efficiency of the presentation, *aliyah* frequencies are displayed in a logarithm scale. For comparative purposes, Figure 2 also displays the rate of emigration of Jews from Israel in 2001.

There exists a strongly negative relationship between a country's HDI in 2000 and the frequency of *aliyah* from the same country in 2001. The correlation coefficient was -0.66. Countries whose *aliyah* propensities appear above the average trend outlined by the exponential fit, which points to especially negative effects of the socioeconomic, political, and physical environment, include the republics of the former Soviet Union. Part of this stronger propensity may, however, be an artifact of the somewhat inflated "enlarged Jewish" numerators compared with the "core Jewish" denominators. Countries with lower than expected *aliyah* propensities include, in particular, the leading English-speaking societies (United States, Canada, Australia), whose high standards of living may play as a deterrent toward *aliyah* decisions, as well as several countries in Latin America, whose particular circumstances we already discussed above.

Figure 2
Rates of Aliyah per 1000 Jews in Countries of Origin,
by Human Development Index, 2001



Finally, it is interesting to compare the rates of emigration *from* Israel [*yeridah*] with rates of migration to Israel from the Diaspora. The data for 2001 position Israel emigration frequency quite exactly at the level that might be expected for *aliyah* rates from a country having exactly the same level of human development as Israel's. Given the emotion that usually accompanies the debate about Israeli emigration—and even the sometimes wild and unsubstantiated evaluations of its quantitative volume—this is a sobering finding. It indicates that decision-making concerning migration is strongly and similarly affected by rational considerations about quality of life, constraints, and opportunities, in both the Diaspora and Israel.

Having outlined some major patterns and determinants of contemporary Jewish population change in relation to indicators of human development at the global level, we now present two case studies of major Jewish communities that have long operated in extremely different sociopolitical environments: Jews in the United States and in the Russian Republic. We search in the recent demographic experience of these two large communities for some local validation of the more general propositions outlined so far in this article.

CASE STUDY 1: JEWS IN THE UNITED STATES

TRENDS IN GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

The experience of American Jewry over the 20th century has been one of large scale immigration and population growth, with relatively minor emigration. A central question therefore concerns the patterns of adaptation of the Jewish minority in the broader societal framework and the role of individual and contextual variables in this process of Americanization.

Jewish immigrants who arrived in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries tended to concentrate in the port cities of entry in the Northeast. There they found a demand for labor which better suited their occupational skills in manufacturing and clothing.¹³ Since the desire to live in close proximity to people of the same religio-ethnic group is typical of the first stages of settlement in a new country,¹⁴ the geographic dispersion of the Jews tended to be significantly different from that of the total American population, with the latter being more evenly dispersed throughout the country. In 1930, shortly after the termination of mass immigration, the index of dissimilarity¹⁵ between Jewish and total regional population distributions reached a high value of 40.3 percent.

Since World War II—and with growing significance over time—internal movement has played a key role in the redistribution of the U.S. Jewish population. Growing numbers of Jews began to adopt the residential preferences of Americans as a whole, who were shifting to the South and the West of the United States. Since the pace of internal migration was more pronounced among Jews than among the total population, diversity between the regional distribution of the two populations diminished. Table 5 shows the geographical distribution of the Jewish and total populations in the US in 1970 and 2000. Today the west has a slightly larger share of Jews than of the total population. The index of dissimilarity calculated for the distribution of the two populations according to four major regions significantly declined from 36.6 percent in 1970 to 19.6 percent in 2000. This attested to the successful integration of Jews into the American social mainstream and reflected residential patterns determined by educational and economic opportunities, as well as by other non-economic rewards, such as geographical variation in the quality of life. Constraints and incentives related to belonging to a particular community and minority status played a diminishing role in determining the geographical distribution of the Jews in the United States.

Table 5
Regional Distribution of Jewish and Total Population, United States
1970 and 2000

<i>Region</i>	<i>1970a</i>		<i>2000b</i>	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Jews</i>
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Northeast	24.0	60.7	18.9	38.0
Midwest	27.8	16.3	22.9	12.0
South	31.0	11.9	35.6	27.0
West	17.2	11.1	22.5	23.0
Dissimilarity index	0.366		0.196	

^aUzi Rebhun, *Migration, Community and Identification: Jews in Late 20th Century America* (Jerusalem, 2001) 39 (Hebrew); Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1971," *American Jewish Year Book*, 73 (1972) 387.

^bEgon, Mayer, Barry A. Kosmin, Ariela Keysar, *American Jewish Identity Survey, 2001* (New York, 2002) 29; Jim Schwartz and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population in the United States, 2000," *American Jewish Year Book*, 101 (2001) 261.

Blurring of the geographic distinctiveness of American Jews was likewise evident when measured according to individual states, rather than by broad regions. The index of dissimilarity regarding the geographic distribution of the Jews as compared to the total population diminished from 44.2 percent in 1970 to 38.9 percent in 2000. This rather small amount of change, in contrast to results at the broad regional level, suggests that the unique social status of American Jews directed them to a limited number of major states and metropolitan areas within each given region, where economic activities better corresponded to their professional specialization. In this regard, Jews continue to be much more concentrated than total Americans: the ten states with the largest numbers of Jews constitute slightly more than 80 percent of the American Jewish population, while the parallel figure for the total population is only 54 percent (Table 6). Thus, in some of the states with a large Jewish presence, the Jews constitute a substantial proportion of the total population and accordingly hold significant political power.

The thinning out of Jewish physical density is perhaps more significant in the intimate and immediate environment of the residential neighborhood. Based on their subjective judgment, as many as two-thirds of American Jews in 1970 said that they lived in a somewhat or very Jewish neighborhood; by 1990, this was true for only 39 percent (Table 7). This tendency away from Jewish residential clustering is an emblematic indication

Table 6
States with Largest Populations, Jews and Total, United States
2000

Rank	Total population			Rank	Jewish population		
	State	Percent	Cumulative percent		State	Percent	Cumulative percent
1	California	12.0	12.0	1	New York	26.9	26.9
2	Texas	7.4	19.4	2	California	16.2	43.1
3	New York	6.7	26.1	3	Florida	10.2	53.3
4	Florida	5.7	31.8	4	New Jersey	7.6	60.9
5	Illinois	4.4	36.2	5	Pennsylvania	4.6	65.5
6	Pennsylvania	4.4	40.6	6	Massachusetts	4.5	70.0
7	Ohio	4.0	44.6	7	Illinois	4.4	74.4
8	Michigan	3.5	48.1	8	Ohio	2.3	76.7
9	New Jersey	3.0	51.1	9	Texas	2.1	78.8
10	Georgia	2.9	54.0	10	Michigan	1.8	80.6

Source: Adapted from: Schwartz and Scheckner (2001) 259–260.

of acculturation and reflects inter-generational change, as shown in the variation between different age groups at the same point in time; period change, as manifested in the differences between similar age groups at different points of time; and life-cycle change, as experienced by the same birth cohort passing over time from one to the next age group and stage of life.

American Jews have thus tended to become a more dispersed population at both the national and local levels. These changes have developed along geographic coordinates similar to those of the total population. Nevertheless, Jews have maintained some distinct residential patterns which are probably associated with their socioeconomic structural affinities, as well as with cultural and other non-materialistic needs.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

To better evaluate these relationships, we need to explore the macrosocial environment to which both the Jewish and the total population are exposed in the respective places of residence, and whether changes over time have stimulated the Jews to move closer to, or further from, the core of the American geopolitical and socioeconomic system. To gain some insights into these questions, we gathered information on several major sociodemographic variables and added them together to form a composite index of life quality. The index comprises the average score obtained for per capita

Table 7
 Jews Aged 18 and Over, by Jewishness of Residential Neighborhood,
 United States
 1970 and 1990

<i>Neighborhood Jewishness</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>18-37</i>	<i>38-57</i>	<i>58-77</i>	<i>78 +</i>
<i>1970 - Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Not at all or a little Jewish	31.6	32.4	33.0	29.4	18.5
Somewhat Jewish	38.6	39.3	37.1	38.4	50.5
Very Jewish	29.8	28.2	29.9	32.1	31.0
<i>1990 - Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Not at all or a little Jewish	61.4	68.0	65.1	50.2	43.6
Somewhat Jewish	28.9	23.9	27.8	35.2	40.7
Very Jewish	9.8	8.1	7.2	14.6	15.7

Source: Uzi Rebhun, "Directions, Magnitude, and Efficiency of Interregional Migration, 1970-1990: Jews and Whites in the United States Compared," *The Review of Regional Studies*, 32 (1) (2001) 62.

income, educational attainment (percent with an academic degree), and public health (physicians per 100,000 inhabitants). This can be considered a rough proxy for an Index of Human Development, since it addresses the same main substantive components of income, education, and health.

Separate scores were calculated for each of the 50 states. Despite the simplicity of this measure, we believe that these variables represent good proxies for each state's general quality of life and relative position in the American scene, as well as for the contextual human development offered to the respective local Jewish populations. For each of the above variables, states were ranked from highest (score 1) to lowest (score 50). The average score for the three variables, with equal weight to each, determined the overall score of a given state. The 50 states were then regrouped into five strata (or quintiles) with each stratum containing ten states (Table 8).

In 1970, slightly more than 70 percent of the U.S. Jewish population lived in the stratum of states with the highest level of human development. Among the states included were Connecticut, New York, California, Maryland, and Massachusetts. Another 12 percent lived in the states in stratum 2, including Arizona, Illinois, and Oregon. The distribution of Jews was significantly different from the distribution of the general American population, among whom less than one-third were concentrated in the states of stratum 1, and another 18 percent in stratum 2. At the other end of the quality of life continuum, only 2.8 percent of the Jews lived in the least developed states (strata 4 and 5), while this was true for about one-fourth of the total U.S. population.

Table 8
 Jewish and Total Population Distribution,
 by Socioeconomic Development of State of Residence, United States
 1970 and 2000

State strata, ranked by socio- economic profile ^a	1970					2000				Percent change, 1970–2000	
	Score range	Total	Jews	Jews p. 1000	Score range	Total	Jews	Jews p. 1000	Total	Jews	
Total (thousands)		205,513	6,045			280,801	6,111				
Total (percent)		100.0	100.0	29.4		100.0	100.0	21.8	+36.6	+1.1	
1 (highest) ^b	3.7–13.3	32.0	70.8	65.0	1.3–11.3	33.4	64.0	41.7	+43	-9	
2 ^c	17.0–20.7	18.2	12.1	19.5	12.0–23.3	17.7	13.3	16.4	+33	+12	
3 ^d	20.7–26.7	25.9	14.3	16.2	24.0–30.0	27.5	16.9	13.3	+45	+19	
4 ^e	27.7–37.0	11.4	1.6	4.2	30.3–38.0	11.5	5.0	9.4	+38	+208	
5 (lowest) ^f	38.7–48.0	12.5	1.2	2.7	38.0–48.7	9.9	0.8	1.8	+8	-27	
Dissimilarity Index	0.388				0.306						

^aA composite index based on three variables: per capita income, percentage adults with B.A. degree or more, and physicians per 100,000 resident population. Each variable was scored for each state on a scale between 1 and 50, from high to low. The average of scores for the three variables, each of which received equal weight, determined the state's socioeconomic profile. States were regrouped into five score strata, each stratum including 10 states. The grouping of states changed from 1970 to 2000 according to their average scores.

^b1970: Connecticut, New York, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey, Washington, Delaware. 2000: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Minnesota, Colorado, New Hampshire, Virginia, California.

^c1970: Arizona, Illinois, Oregon, Vermont, Minnesota, Alaska, Rhode Island, Michigan, Nevada, Florida. 2000: Illinois, Washington, Rhode Island, Vermont, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, Oregon, Alaska.

^d1970: Kansas, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, New Hampshire, Ohio, Missouri, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Texas. 2000: Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Maine, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee.

^e1970: Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, Iowa, Oklahoma, Maine, Indiana, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana. 2000: Georgia, Louisiana, South Dakota, Iowa, Utah, Arizona, North Dakota, Nevada, New Mexico, Kentucky.

^f1970: North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, South Carolina, North Dakota, Kentucky, South Dakota, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi. 2000: Montana, Wyoming, South Carolina, Indiana, Alabama, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Idaho, Arkansas, Mississippi.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census. *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington DC, 1972; 2002); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population, vol. 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 1—United States Summary, Section 1* (Washington, DC, 1973) 493–494; Chenkin (1972) 386–387; Schwartz and Scheckner (2001) 259–260.

Between 1970 and 2000, the distribution of Jewish and total populations evolved in somewhat different directions in terms of the respective states' human development. The concentration of Jews in the strongest states declined while it increased in the less developed states, especially those in stratum 4. By contrast, among the general population the relative share of stratum 1 increased slightly, and that of stratum 5 declined. It should be noted that these trends do not significantly derive from changes in the ranking of states by level of human development. Most of the states in the upper stratum maintained their position over the period 1970–2000. Moreover, the number of Jews living in those states that joined stratum 1 was larger than the number of Jews in states that were reclassified into lower strata. Part of the increase in the percentage of Jews in stratum 4 resulted from the move of Arizona and Nevada from stratum 2 in 1970 to stratum 4 in 2000, with Nevada also experiencing a substantial increase in the size of its Jewish population. Georgia, which in both 1970 and 2000 belonged to stratum 4, also gained a large number of Jewish inhabitants.

In 2000, more than twice as many Jews, as compared to the percentage among the total population, lived in the strongest states in stratum 1. At the same time, the proportion of Jews in the least developed states in stratum 5 was only one-twelfth of the proportion of total Americans in those states. Thus, the presence of Jews in the leading areas of the American socioeconomic system continued to be much above their average share in the population notwithstanding some decline over the last three decades.

An interesting feature in the redistribution patterns of American Jews is the move to small and isolated locations in non-metropolitan areas. Such areas, many of which are in the Western part of the United States, experienced new economic and technological initiatives, and Jews often were among the first to be attracted by them. This is also true for metropolitan areas such as Atlanta, where the expansion of business and scientific opportunities over the last decade—and hence the pace of population growth—were faster than the development of public services and infrastructure.¹⁶ These areas were therefore ranked in a somewhat lower position of the human development scale.

Jewish intermarriage, which has been on the rise,¹⁷ was most likely associated with geographic movement to areas preferred by the non-Jewish partners, thus contributing to the overall narrowing of the environmental differences between Jews and the total population. The index of dissimilarity between Jewish and total populations, measured for the five strata of states, indeed declined from 38.8 percent in 1970 to 30.6 percent in 2000.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNAL MIGRATION

The various individual and contextual factors that shape internal migration patterns of American Jews are examined in a multivariate analysis in Table 9. Overall, it seems that individual characteristics have a stronger effect than broader environmental considerations. This is evident with regard to inter-regional migration as well as to interstate migration. Variables such as age, education, marital status, or previous experience in migration are better predictors of who is likely to move and who is not than contextual conditions of the areas of residence. Similarly, the causal relationships between human development variables at the state level and internal migration do not always fit into classical economic theories, according to which the main anticipated benefit of migration is improvement in employment opportunities. Over time, and with the increasing rate of Jewish internal migration, sociodemographic selectivity of the Jewish migrant population has diminished, as people from different social sectors have recently been involved in geographical mobility. This in turn may also have contributed to the diminishing importance of contextual indicators.

The high educational and occupational attainment of American Jews turns them into a geographically highly mobile population. Jews change their places of residence according to economic stimuli which may not reflect the overall characteristics of the new areas of residence. Their high income and socioeconomic status is likely to direct them, within any particular state, to the cities and residential neighborhoods with the higher standards of living. This enables them to consider their migration with relatively little attention to the macrosocial profile of the state of destination, albeit they eventually tend to resettle in the more developed parts of the country. An important exception may be related to the natural environment, especially climate, which is increasingly becoming a paramount determinant of residential preference among young and middle-aged Jewish adults.

The weak, and sometimes unexpected, directions of the relationships between contextual socioeconomic characteristics of different places in the United States and individual migration behavior may be associated with recent social structural changes among American Jews. We mainly refer to the increasing number of Jewish males who are employed as operatives and service workers. This occupational shift is likely to reflect new values and life-styles, or "income opportunities especially during times of economic uncertainty."¹⁸ These people will move in large numbers to areas with a strong demand for these kinds of skills, which are not necessarily very highly developed. In addition, the income differentials between Jews and

Table 9
 Interstate Migration among Jews:
 Summary of Significant Directions with Individual Characteristics,
 Migration Status and Characteristics of State of Residence, United States
 1965–70 and 1985–90

<i>Variable</i>	<i>1965–70</i>	<i>1985–90</i>
<i>Individual characteristics</i>		
Age	-	-
Education	+	
Family status (married)	+	
Self-employed	-	
<i>Migration Status</i>		
Early migrant ^a	+	+
<i>Characteristics of state of residence</i>		
Per capita income		
Unemployment rate		
Health services (physicians per 100,000 population)	+	
Crime rate	-	
Climate (average % of possible days of sunshine)		+
Variance explained (percent)	26.6	14.9

^aRespondents who at the beginning of the period lived in a state other than state of birth.

Source: Adapted from: Uzi Rebhun, "The Changing Roles of Human Capital, State Context of Residence, and Ethnic Bonds in Interstate Migration: American Jews 1970–1990," *International Journal of Population Geography*, 9 (2003) 11.

urban non-Hispanic white households have diminished substantially.¹⁹ The observed decline in Jewish income advantage versus the total population may have enhanced personal economic considerations over general conditions of life quality and human development in prospective areas of residence.

CASE STUDY 2: JEWS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

TRENDS IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF EMIGRANTS

The central motive of recent Jewish population change in the republics of the former Soviet Union has been mass emigration. Over the years 1989–2002, more than 1.5 million Jews and their non-Jewish relatives left the former Soviet Union. Most of this movement (about 940,000,

or 62 percent) was directed toward Israel. During this period, more than 297,000 Jews from the Russian Federation and their non-Jewish relatives migrated to Israel. The latter constituted about 32 percent of the total number of all FSU immigrants to Israel. During 1991–1994, and again in 1999, immigrants from the Russian Federation were the most numerous group to arrive in Israel. To obtain further insights into the determinants and consequences of emigration, one needs to explore the existing relationships between individual characteristics of the migrants and the contextual characteristics of their original cities and regions of residence.

During the recent mass emigration, the geography of Jewish population decline within the Russian Federation displayed very different regional patterns. For the purposes of this analysis, Russia's Jewry can be divided into three large residential groups: the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad), and the provinces. According to the data of the 1989 census, 31 percent of the "core" Jewish population in Russia (including "Tats"²⁰) lived in Moscow, 19 percent in St. Petersburg, and the other half in the provinces. From the data of the 1994 microcensus, we learn that the distribution of Russia's "core" Jews had changed slightly: about one-third lived in Moscow, 15 percent in St. Petersburg, and approximately 52 percent in the provinces as a whole. The numerical decline from the 1989 census caused by mass emigration was much greater in St. Petersburg (43 percent) than in Moscow (23 percent), or in the provinces (26 percent).

The share of emigrants to Israel from St. Petersburg peaked in 1990 (31.7 percent), and that from Moscow in 1991 (31.6 percent). By 1994, these shares had declined to 11.0 percent from Moscow, and 9.7 percent from St. Petersburg, and, in 1998, they were as low as 5.0 percent of all emigrants for each city (Table 10). On the other hand, the percentage of immigrants from the provinces increased steadily, from about half in 1990–1991, to 79 percent in 1994, and 90 percent in 1998—much above the respective share among all Russian Jewry.

Emigration from the Russian Federation to Israel peaked in the period of the final crisis and dissolution of the Soviet State in 1990–1991 (45,500 and 47,300, respectively), after which it steadily decreased. The number of immigrants to Israel from the Russian Federation was 23,100 in 1993 and 15,700 in 1995; by 1998 it had fallen to 14,400. Thus, the serious political problems and socioeconomic transformations in the period after 1991 and up to 1999 did not generate any dramatic migration response from Russia, at least concerning Israel as a country of destination.

For the period of rather steady emigration between 1994 and 1998, we can estimate rates of emigration to Israel for 10 regions of the Russian

Table 10
Emigration to Israel from the Russian Federation, by Area
1990–1998

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Moscow</i>	<i>St. Petersburg</i>	<i>Provinces</i>
<i>Percentage of Jews^a</i>				
1989 ^b	100	31.0	19.0	50.0
1994 ^c	100	33.0	15.0	52.0
<i>Percentage of total emigration to Israel</i>				
1990	100	21.7	31.7	46.6
1991	100	31.6	13.7	54.7
1992	100	22.1	10.6	67.3
1993	100	14.1	9.5	76.4
1994	100	11.0	9.7	79.3
1995	100	9.0	8.8	82.2
1996	100	9.0	8.0	83.0
1997	100	6.6	5.9	87.5
1998	100	5.0	5.0	90.0

^aIncluding “Tats”.

^bEstimate based on the 1989 Soviet census.

^cEstimate based on the 1994 Russian microcensus.

Source: Mark Tolts, “Aliya from the Russian Federation: An Analysis of Recent Data,” *Jews in Eastern Europe*, 1–2 (2002) 6, 8.

Federation.²¹ Levels of *aliyah* as a percent of the “enlarged” Jewish population in 1994 by region of origin were significantly different and ranged between a high of about 60 percent from Birobidzhan and a low of 4.5 percent from St. Petersburg and 2.3 percent from Moscow city. Among Jews of Russia’s provinces, the Jewish autonomous oblast (Birobidzhan) represented an especially large share of emigration to Israel. According to the data of the 1994 microcensus, only 1.9 percent of the “core” Jews of the Russian Federation lived in Birobidzhan. However, in 1996–1998, this oblast sent the greatest number of emigrants to Israel of all the regions of the Russian Federation, or about 13–14 percent.

At the same time, levels of Jewish assimilation were very different by region. According to the 1994 Russian microcensus, the percentage of “core” Jews living in multi-national²² households—the product of a previous intermarriage—was as low as 9 percent in the Dagestan Republic and reached 52 percent in the Rostov oblast (Table 11). Based on these data, rank order correlation shows that the association between levels of

Table 11
Aliyah and Assimilation, by Region of Residence, Russian Federation
1994–1998

<i>Region^a</i>	<i>Percentage of “core” Jews living in multi-national households, 1994</i>	<i>Emigration to Israel in 1994–1998 as % of “enlarged” Jewish population in 1994</i>
Dagestan Republic	9	25.0 ^b
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	35	6.6
Birobidzhan	37	59.6
Moscow City	42	2.3
St. Petersburg City	43	4.5
Samara Oblast	45	5.9
Cheliabinsk Oblast	46	11.7
Moscow Oblast	48	4.9
Sverdlovsk Oblast	50	9.8
Rostov Oblast	52	12.9

^aRegions are listed in ascending order of the percentage of “core” Jews living in multi-national households, 1994

^bEmigration of Jews to Israel as percent of “core” Jewish population in 1994.

Sources: Evgueny Andreev, “Jews in Russia’s Households (Based on the 1994 Microcensus),” in Sergio DellaPergola and Judith Even (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography 1997* (Jerusalem, 2001) 157–159; Mark Tolts, “Jews in the Russian Federation: A Decade of Demographic Decline,” *Jews in Eastern Europe* 3 (1999) 19, 21.

assimilation and emigration to Israel is weakly negative: -0.10.²³ Thus, the great differentiation noted above in the level of assimilation does not provide us with a reasonable explanation for the great differentiation in regional *aliyah* levels.

The different spread of anti-Semitism also does not help much to explain the geographical differentiation of *aliyah* levels. In 1998 the share of emigrants from Siberia and the Russian Far East as a whole reached 37.7 percent, which was much higher than their percentage in Russia’s total Jewish population; however, according to a pre-flight survey of Russia’s immigrants to Israel of February–August of that year, “anti-Semitism in place of origin” was a relatively minor reason and was mentioned more as the main reason for emigration from the European parts of Russia (4 percent of respondents) than from Siberia and the Russian Far East (2 percent).²⁴

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND ALIYAH

In view of the preceding observations, the great differentiation in quality of life and human development in the different regions of the Russian Federation needs to be seriously considered in assessing *aliyah* levels. Since 1996 a Human Development Index has been estimated annually for each region in the Russian Federation (Table 12). Based on 1996 data, a strongly negative association exists between human development in the region of origin and the frequency of emigration to Israel, as shown by a rank order correlation of -0.79 .

Among all the regions of the Russian Federation, in 1996 Birobidzhan had the third lowest level of HDI after the Tuva and Ingush Republics, where there were hardly any Jews. In the same year, life expectancy at birth for males in Birobidzhan's urban population was only 55.4 years.²⁴ Birobidzhan also suffered from the highest level of unemployment in the Russian Federation; however, at the end of October 1997, this reached 25 percent, which was five times higher than in Moscow, and 2.5 times higher than in St. Petersburg.²⁶

There is a well known difficulty, however, in separating Moscow oblast from Moscow city. Inhabitants of the oblast share the benefits and services of the city, and thus the HDI level of Moscow oblast may be seriously underestimated. The 1997 HDI for Moscow oblast was better estimated when its rating, computed by a new method, rose sharply among Russia's 79 regions from 52nd to the 18th place in 1996. Based on HDI for 1997, including Moscow oblast, rank correlation between HDI and *aliyah* frequencies rose to -0.88 . Thus, in 1994–98, a very strongly negative correlation prevailed between levels of human development in the regions of residence of Jews in Russia and their levels of emigration to Israel.

In 1999, after the 1998 financial crash, differences in *aliyah* levels were influenced by socioeconomic causes. The HDI of the Russian Federation was ranked 55th worldwide in 1999, between Belize and Malaysia, whereas Israel was ranked 22nd.²⁷ Moscow and St. Petersburg Jews are closer, however, to the more developed strata of world society, whereas Jews in Russian provinces live in less developed parts of the country and, therefore, of the world system as a whole (see Table 13). For 1999, the HDI in Moscow city was similar to that of the Czech Republic (33rd among countries of the world), in St. Petersburg it was similar to Latvia (50th place), and in Birobidzhan it was as low as in Jordan (88th place among countries of the world). Clearly, for many of Russia's provincial Jews,

Table 12Human Development and Aliyah, by Region of Residence, Russian Federation
1994–1998

<i>Regiona</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI), 1996</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI), 1997</i>	<i>Emigration to Israel in 1994–1998 as % of “enlarged” Jewish population in 1994</i>
Moscow City	0.867	0.800	2.3
St. Petersburg City	0.852	0.758	4.5
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	0.849	0.754	6.6
Samara Oblast	0.840	0.764	5.9
Cheliabinsk Oblast	0.810	0.740	11.7
Sverdlovsk Oblast	0.794	0.730	9.8
Rostov Oblast	0.710	0.720	12.9
Moscow Oblast	0.706	0.736	4.9
Dagestan Republic	0.616	0.707	25.0 ^b
Birobidzhan	0.603	0.656	59.6

^aRegions are listed in the order of Human Development Index (HDI) in 1996.

^bEmigration of Jews to Israel as percent of “core” Jewish population in 1994.

Sources: Mark Tolts, “Jews in the Russian Federation: A Decade of Demographic Decline,” *Jews in Eastern Europe* 3 (1999) 19, 21; UNDP, *Human Development Report. Russian Federation 1998* (Moscow, 1998) 118–119; UNDP, *Human Development Report. Russian Federation 1999* (Moscow, 1999) 101–103.

especially Birobidzhan’s, emigration to Israel is, at least in part, the realization of a desire for consistent improvement of life quality and upward mobility within the world system.

Following the financial crash of August 1998, Moscow city’s share of Russia’s total emigration to Israel in 1999 increased to 7.8 percent, while St. Petersburg’s share rose to 7.9 percent; the share from the provinces remained high at 84.3 percent of the total. In 1999, as in previous years, most of the Jewish emigrants from Moscow (72 percent) and St. Petersburg (59 percent) went to the Western countries. Conversely, the great majority of Russia’s provincial Jews (82 percent) chose Israel as their destination, and for the Jews of Birobidzhan this majority was even greater (94 percent). This oblast, where in 1999 only one percent of Russia’s Jews lived, provided more than 9 percent of the total migration from the Russian Federation to Israel, while the percentage of emigrants from Siberia and the Russian Far East as a whole was about 38 percent.

Table 13
Human Development and Aliyah, by Area of Residence, Russian Federation
1999

<i>Area</i>	<i>Percentage of area in total "core" Jewish population</i>	<i>Aliyah as % of total Jewish emigration from area^b</i>	<i>Percentage of area in total aliyah^c</i>	<i>Human Development Index (HDI)</i>	<i>Country with similar HDI</i>
<i>Total</i>	100	68	100.0	0.775	<i>Malaysia</i>
Moscow ^a	35	28	7.8	0.845	Czech Rep.
St. Petersburg ^a	13	41	7.9	0.788	Latvia
Provinces, thereof:	52	82	84.3		
Birobidzhan	1	94	9.3	0.712	Jordan

^aNot including Oblast.

^bAccording to Goskomstat of Russia data.

^cAccording to data of the Jewish Agency (Sochnut): assisted flights of immigrants to Israel.

Sources: Mark Tolts, "Russian Jewish Migration in the Post-Soviet Era," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 16 (3) (2000) 185, 197; Mark Tolts, "Aliya from the Russian Federation: An Analysis of Recent Data," *Jews in Eastern Europe*, 1–2 (2002) 8; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York and Oxford, 2001) 141–142; UNDP, *Human Development Report. Russian Federation 2001* (Moscow, 2002) 82–83.

By the start of the recent mass emigration, there were substantial educational and socioeconomic differences between the Jews of the three large groups of Russia's Jewry (see Table 14). According to the 1989 census, the majority of Moscow and St. Petersburg Jewry under the age of 40 consisted of intelligentsia, as was true of their parents who had received higher education. This was not true of provincial Jewry.²⁸

As the level of human development is higher in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the decreasing share of migrants from these cities among those making *aliyah* to Israel inevitably led to a serious decline in the level of education of the immigrants from the Russian Federation (see Table 15). In 1990–1991, more than 60 percent of the immigrants aged 15 and over had 13 or more years of schooling, or in Soviet terms, higher (including incomplete) and secondary vocational education. After the dramatic decrease in the propensity to migrate to Israel from Moscow and St. Petersburg; however, by the mid-1990s, the lower education group of 9–12 years of schooling had become the most sizable group. This confirms the existence of a strong relationship between the contextual variables of human development in places of origin, including the population's average level of education, and the individual variable of educational level among migrants

Table 14
 Jews Aged 15 and Over, by Education Level and Area, Russian Federation
 1989

<i>Education level</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Moscow</i>	<i>St. Petersburg</i>	<i>Provinces</i>
<i>Total</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Higher ^a	55.2	64.3	58.8	47.8
Secondary vocational	17.4	14.0	17.9	19.4
Secondary general	13.4	12.4	12.9	14.3
Less than secondary general	14.0	9.3	10.4	18.5

^aIncluding incomplete higher.

Source: Mark Tolts, "The Interrelationship between Emigration and the Socio-Demographic Profile of Russian Jewry," in Noah Lewin-Epstein, et al. (eds), *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London, 1997) 165.

Table 15
 Immigrants to Israel Aged 15 and Over, by Education Level, Russian Federation
 1990–1999

<i>Year</i>	<i>Years of schooling</i>				
	<i>Total</i>	<i>0–8</i>	<i>9–12</i>	<i>13–15</i>	<i>16+</i>
1990	100.0	6.9	25.2	47.6	20.3
1991	100.0	7.8	29.3	47.8	15.1
1992	100.0	9.8	34.3	43.9	12.0
1993	100.0	13.2	38.8	39.9	8.1
1994	100.0	13.5	40.5	37.4	8.6
1995	100.0	11.8	40.3	39.0	8.9
1996	100.0	10.7	40.8	37.3	11.2
1997	100.0	9.4	43.1	34.1	13.3
1998	100.0	7.9	43.5	36.2	12.4
1999	100.0	6.8	41.8	37.8	13.6

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics data.

to Israel. Differential decision-making stimulated by variable life qualities in the places of origin generates powerful effects on the social and cultural composition of migrants, and ends up by affecting the society in the country of destination.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we have presented an overview of some major trends in the development of the Jewish population over the last quarter of the 20th century. We mostly stressed macrosocial aspects related to changes in the size and geographical distribution of Jewish populations at the country and global levels. A compelling and coherent picture emerges from our various analyses, no matter at what level they were conducted—global or national. The underlying logic of emerging Jewish population trends appears to be quite similar to trends operating at the worldwide level, as well as within countries as different as the United States and the Russian Republic. A similar analytic approach provided highly consistent results applied to the changing geographical distribution of the combined Jewish population of the European Union at the beginning of the 1990s.²⁹

The main thrust of the findings is that Jewish population is extremely sensitive to the general societal context to which it is exposed in terms of human development and quality of life. The effects are remarkably powerful and consistent, both in a static perspective of geographical distributions attained and in a dynamic perspective of the volume, directions, and composition of migration flows. Jewish populations have tended to concentrate next to the most developed and influential centers of the global societal system. This regrouping in the more developed countries, and in the more developed regions within countries, has become possible because of the removal of many of the legal and policy limitations that once regulated human movement, and movement of Jews in particular. Global reconfiguration of Jewish population distribution worldwide tends to sharpen geographical differences between Jews and others and may have far-reaching consequences for the mutual perceptions of Jews and others. Through the gradual concentration of Jews in a few dominant places, more countries do not have a significant Jewish population on their territory, while a few tend to have a relatively important Jewish presence. The clear revelation of coherent regional patterns within the broader global picture strengthens the argument that Jewish life largely depends on deeply rooted societal circumstances that are outside the Jewish power of determination.

In many respects, the same processes occurred within the territory of countries characterized by significant internal diversity and large Jewish populations, as demonstrated here in the case of the United States and of the Russian Republic. It is also possible, however, to recognize an opposite process of Jewish population “de-concentration” and diffusion in parallel with the ongoing process of structural and cultural assimilation of the

minority in the context of the majority. With the deepening acculturation of Jews within the majority of society, there may be a diminishing likelihood that they will be attracted, as their forbears were, by a special and unique cluster of environmental factors and a greater propensity to align with the majority.

In our discussion, we refrained from explicitly claiming causation in the various relationships observed, and we mostly presented measures of correlation, similarity and dissimilarity. It goes without saying that it seems more plausible to claim that patterns in the presence, size, and mobility of Jewish populations tend to respond to conditions in the environment—namely the levels of human development observed in the local environment—rather than the other way round.

The focus of this analysis, which has been particularly concerned with social structural correlates and determinants, cannot pretend to have given an exhaustive picture of ongoing changes in Jewish society in Israel and in the Diaspora. Clearly, the impact of cultural determinants should be considered in detail if one wishes to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of ongoing trends and of their implications. Nor have we claimed that the macrosocial analytic level stressed here should be used at the expense of microsocial analyses, such as those focusing on individual variation in identities, constraints, and opportunities.

It should be noted, however, that, in the statistical terms of the amount of “variance explained,” the simple juxtaposition of basic social indicators, such as the Index of Human Development, and Jewish population trends provides very high returns by normally accepted research standards. This calls for the need to pay attention to the general context of Jewish life in any effort aimed at elucidating the whole and more complex unfolding of the Jewish Diaspora and world Jewry. Our analysis also indicates that powerful relationships exist between the collective and the individual level within the broader Jewish population framework. Differential individual responses to variable environmental circumstances end up by determining significant compositional changes in the Jewish population found at any given moment in a given locale, and hence, in the subsequent trends in each place.

The findings outlined here carry significant implications for prospective Jewish population trends at both global and local levels. Growing interdependence of the various geopolitical components within a dynamic global system calls for greater attention to a wide array of apparently distant factors, even when one focuses on specific local situations. One particularly important conclusion stems from what precedes with regard to Israeli

society and its role within world Jewry. Besides the indisputable role of culture and ideology, Israeli society competes on the global scene by virtue of its socioeconomic opportunities and its standards of human development. During the 1980s and 1990s, Israel's development and opportunities grew at a pace that was among the fastest in the world. These trends were consistent with a rising prominence, if not centrality, of Israel in the perceptions of the Jewish Diaspora, and were eventually translated in rapid population growth, thanks to mass immigration. Population growth, in turn, significantly enhanced Israel's ability to further develop and strengthen on the global scene.

Since the last months of 2000, because of circumstances beyond the scope of this article, the intertwined development of human and economic resources in Israel seems to have reached a point of immobility. The Gross Domestic Product per capita took a downward path, and the question is whether indicators of educational achievement and public health will eventually take the same course, reflecting the economic policies that have emerged in the current geopolitical context. Such developments would cause an immediate downturn in Israel's HDI, if such decline has not occurred already because of the diminished GDP per capita. If this were the case, the findings discussed in this article strongly suggest that a negative demographic response, including a significant rise in emigration from Israel, might follow. The remaining potential of Jewish international migration from the Diaspora might prefer alternative destinations, and the pace of demographic growth of Israel's Jewish population might slow down even more because of possible changes in family behaviors as well. Consideration of the cogent relationships that demonstrably tie together Israel, the Jewish Diaspora, and the world's broader society calls for brave analyses of the sociopolitical causes and consequences of ongoing trends, and for major policy decisions.

NOTES

*Sergio DellaPergola took primary responsibility for the section on world Jewish population and for the conclusions; Uzi Rebhun for the section on the United States; and Mark Tolts for the section on the Russian Republic.

1. Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun and Rosa Perla Raicher, "The Six-Day War and Israel-Diaspora Relations: An Analysis of Quantitative Indicators," in Eli Lederhendler (ed), *The Six-Day War and World Jewry* (Bethesda, MD, 2000)

11-50.

2. Gabriel Sheffer, "Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique?" in Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny, and Yaacov Ro'i (eds), *Contemporary Jewries: Convergence and Divergence* (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2003) 23–44.

3. Yosef Gorny, "Klal Yisrael: From Halakha to History," in Ben-Rafael *et al.* (eds), *Contemporary Jewries*, 13–22.

4. Detailed analyses of recent and prospective Jewish demographic trends appear in Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2002," in *American Jewish Year Book*, 102 (2002) 601–42; Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Demography: Facts, Outlook, Challenges*, The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, Alert Paper 2 (Jerusalem, 2003); Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, "Prospecting the Jewish Future; Population Projections 2000–2080," in *American Jewish Year Book*, 100 (2000) 103–46.

5. All the estimates reported here refer to the concept of "core Jewish population"; i.e., the aggregate of people reporting themselves or being reported by others as Jews in censuses, surveys or similar sources, and of people of Jewish parentage reporting no ethnic or religious preference and not holding an alternative identity. In the American National Jewish Population Survey of 2000–01, persons who have a non-monotheistic religion and have at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing were also included. See Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Steven M. Cohen, Jonathon Ament, Vivian Klaff, Frank Mott, and Danyelle Peckerman-Neuman, *The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01: Strength, Challenge and Diversity in the American Jewish Population* (New York, 2003). The concept of "enlarged Jewish population" also includes all other non-Jewish members in Jewish households.

6. Sergio DellaPergola, "Changing Cores and Peripheries: Fifty Years in Socio-demographic Perspective," in Robert S. Wistrich (ed), *Terms of Survival: The Jewish World Since 1945* (London and New York, 1995) 13–43.

7. Since the data must be converted into a common currency, PPP rates of exchange allow this conversion to take account of price differences between countries.

8. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York, 2002).

9. For a general discussion, see Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ, 1997).

10. Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz *et al.* (eds), *The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01* (New York, 2003); Erik H. Cohen with Maurice Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France: Valeurs et Identité?* (Paris, 2002).

11. For an overview, see Sergio DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel," in Elazar Leshem and Judith T. Shual (eds), *Immigration to Israel: Sociological Perspectives, Studies of Israeli Society* 8 (New Brunswick, NJ, and London, 1998) 51–92.

12. Sergio DellaPergola, "Aliya and Other Jewish Migrations: Toward an Integrated Perspective," in Uziel O. Schmelz and Gad Nathan (eds), *Studies in*

the Population of Israel in Honor of Roberto Bachi, Scripta Hierosolymitana 30 (Jerusalem, 1986) 172–209.

13. Sidney Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution among American Jews," in Uziel O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson and Sergio DellaPergola (eds), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1981* (Jerusalem, 1983) 315–41; Paul Ritterband, "The New Geography of Jews in North America," *New Insights on a Changing Jewish Community*, North American Jewish Data Bank, Occasional Papers 2 (New York, 1986).

14. Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York, 1964).

15. The Index of dissimilarity indicates the percentage of people from one group who would have to change their area of residence to display the same geographic distribution as that of the other group. The index is sensitive to the number of categories used in the comparison.

16. Pinchas Landau, "Midrom-Mizrach Tipatach Hatovah" [From the South-east Good Fortune Shall Flare Up], *Ha'aretz*, 10 July 2002, C9.

17. Barry Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg, Nava Lerer, Ariella Keysar, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1991); Uzi Rebhun and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Sociodemographic and Jewish Identity Context of Mixed Marriage among Jews in the United States," in Israel Bartal and Isaiah M. Gafni (eds), *Sexuality and The Family in History* (Jerusalem, 1998) 369–98 [Hebrew].

18. Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," *American Jewish Year Book*, 92 (1992) 115.

19. William H. Walters and Esther I. Wilder, "American Jewish Household Income, 1969 and 1989," *Journal of Economic and Social Measurement*, 23 (1997) 197–212.

20. "Tats" are a Jewish population group mostly concentrated in the Caucasus area, and originally comprising several tens of thousands. Tats have usually been mentioned as a separate group in Soviet and post-Soviet statistics, but they are incorporated in the framework of Israel's Law of Return.

21. We used only data on regions where, according to the estimated sampling error, chances are 95 out of 100 that the "core" Jewish population (which is the base for estimating the "enlarged" Jewish population) did not differ by more than ± 10 percent from the medium estimate of the 1994 Russian microcensus.

22. This term reflects the usual Russian terminology. An English alternative would be "multi-ethnic."

23. Rank correlation measures presented in this section are Spearman's coefficients. All subsequent coefficients are significant at a level of 0.01.

24. Eliezer Leshem & the Information Sector of the Former Soviet Union Department of the Jewish Agency, *Pre-Flight Survey, February–August 1998* (Jerusalem, 1998), Table 1.

25. Goskomstat of Russia, *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii, 1997 / The Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 1997* (Moscow, 1997), 110. In 1995, life expectancy was even lower: 53.8 years (ibid.).

26. Goskomstat of Russia, *Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2001* (Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2001) (Moscow, 2001) 135–40.

27. United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York and Oxford, 2001) 141–42.

28. Mark Tolts, “The Interrelationship between Emigration and the Socio-Demographic Profile of Russian Jewry,” in Noah Lewin-Epstein, Yaakov Ro’i, and Paul Ritterband (eds), *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London, 1997) 166–67.

29. Sergio DellaPergola, “Jews in the European Community: Sociodemographic Trends and Challenges,” in *American Jewish Year Book*, 93 (1993) 25–82.