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FROM NOBLESSE OBLIGE TO PERSONAL REDEMPTION: THE CHANGING PROFILE AND AGENDA OF AMERICAN JEWISH LEADERS

The past decade and a half has witnessed significant changes in the ideology and *Weltanschauung* of the American Jewish polity. Studies reveal a noticeable reassessment of American Jewish priorities. Throughout the spectrum of Jewish life there is evidence of an increased interest and intensity in Jewish tradition and affiliation. Within the religious spheres of American Jewish life, from the most intensely Orthodox segments of the community to those who are most classically Reform one sees the results of these changes. More interesting, however, is the fact that these changes are also evident in those spheres which might be termed secular. This reordering of the Jewish communal agenda as it relates to political, religious and educational matters can be attributed to an array of events in the international and national, Jewish and secular, religious and civil spheres. Some of the stimuli for change have been unique to the Jewish community. In other cases Jews have simply responded to forces affecting America as a whole.

This paper will analyze some of the reasons for these developments in American Jewish life as they affect a specific group of Jewish lay leaders. Our focus will be on the ideology and communal theology of those who, in the next generation, will assume leadership positions in the community on both a local and a national basis. They will form and are already beginning to form, a power elite in American Jewish life. We will analyze and compare their communal agenda with that of the preceding generation of leaders.

The emerging power elite has adopted a Jewish agenda which differs significantly from the agenda of the previous generation of leaders. These changes are most evident in the way in which each group defines the priorities of American Jewish life. We will argue that the new generation has abandoned what has been described as the "assimilationist" agenda of the previous generation of leaders and adopted a "survivalist" one.[1] They have focused their energies on the internal wellbeing of the com-

295

munity and have paid less attention to the relations of the American Jewish community with other sectors of the general American society. These changes have far-reaching implications for the specific qualities of American Jewish life as well as for American Jewry's relationship with the State of Israel.

THE ASSIMILATIONIST AGENDA

For at least two decades after the termination of World War II American Jews, often unconsciously, designed their educational, communal and religious institutions as well as their private life so that they replicated the Christian world in which they lived.[2] [Naturally, the American Jewish community of the post-war era was not the first to determine its religious behavior on the basis of a non-Jewish model. Western and central European Jewish communities of the 19th and 20th century did likewise to a certain extent.] It was similarity of form that American Jews sought, not similarity of identity or content. Jewish parents were intent on having their children retain their Jewish identity, but the intensity, nature and substance of that identity were recast and restructured.[3]

These changes resulted in part from the fact that at the end of World War II the economic status of American Jews rose dramatically. In contrast to the pre-war and wartime generations, ever increasing numbers of Jews now were counted among the middle and upper middle class. The number of Jews engaged in manual work and in lower levels of white collar work dropped considerably. [The percent of the American Jewish population holding manual labor jobs dropped from 37% in 1935-1945, to 27% in 1948-1953. It dropped even more precipitously in subsequent years.][4]

With the rise in economic status came a move to new areas of settlement. These included the newly developed suburban areas and wealthier urban areas. There Jews tended to live among Protestant neighbors. They saw themselves and were seen by others as a religious community. They celebrated their "alikeness"—which many among them took to mean their acceptance—and frowned on and were threatened by any deviations from the assimilatory model. American Jews remained intent on retaining their individual identity but were equally intent on doing so in an acceptable non-deviant fashion. Actions and behavior which Jews believed would appear "strange" in the eyes of non-Jewish neighbors were eschewed. Levels of deviance were determined by Jews' perceptions of non-Jewish reactions.[5] In terms of social contact, the lines between Jew and non-Jew were as sharply, if not more sharply drawn. Jews behaved like non-Jews but did not socialize or fraternize with them to any great extent.[6]

The symbols and myths of this generation were different from those of the previous generation. Jewish secularism, which included movements such as Zionism and Bundism and their various ideological sub-groups, had flourished in America in the 1920s and 1930s. Now it was found wanting as an existential ideology. Furthermore, as American Jews attained middle class status, they considered secularism an unacceptable means of expressing subgroup identity. It was not consonant with their new-found rank in society and was, they correctly deduced, less acceptable in the America of the 1950s and 1960s than it had been in pre-war America.

Synagogue membership rose markedly and became the dominant mode of Jewish identification. By 1964 estimates were that over three fifths of American Jews were affiliated with a synagogue. Others believed the figure to be considerably higher.[7] But this rise in affiliation was not due to a religious revival or new found spiritualism. Rather, membership in a synagogue became a way for a Jew to express his "otherness". In contrast to the secularism of the pre-war generation, synagogue affiliation was one of the "forms of separateness" which was "desired from within and sanctioned from without."[8] There was another factor which propelled American Jews towards synagogue membership and formal identifications with Jewish organizations. Association with religious institutions and communal work were identified as accepted and valued components of the upwardly mobile American middle class.[9] Identification with the organized Jewish community was no longer something associated with an immigrant or unenlightened status. It became a sign of rank and a means of achieving respect in the eyes of one's non-Jewish neighbors.

Jews adapted to the religious patterns which prevailed among their non-Jewish middle and upper middle class neighbors. According to H. Richard Niebuhr this included a tendency to turn from a "transcendental faith to a cultural religion." Mordecai Kaplan defined it as a move from a "supernatural religion to religion as civilization."[10] Religion and religious institutions became just one element in a complex of communal institutions. August B. Hollingshead, who conducted a study of a community he called "Elmwood" described the church as "a community facility like the school, the drug store, the city government and the bowling alley."[11] It was not religious faith which propelled all, or even most, American church goers to attend services. Rather it was the conviction that "going to church is the nice thing that proper people do on Sundays." For Jews attendance was not necessary for proper behavior, but affiliation and a modicum of education for the children were. While religious affiliation rose, Americans in general and apparently Jews in particular, became increasingly secular. The nature of their religious institutions and their religious participation reflected this secular tendency.

The non-theological nature of this synagogue affiliation was revealed in the low level of attendance at the synagogue. Most of those those who were members failed to attend except on the Days of Awe. In 1962 Sklare and Vosk found that three out of ten Jews did not attend even on the high holidays and only two out of ten came to synagogue on other occasions.[12] Jewish attendance at religious services was significantly lower than that of the non-Jewish population. A Boston survey found that 17% of the Jewish population attended religious services on a "regular" (more than once a month) basis in contrast to 65% of the non-Jewish population who did so. [It is possible that due to the high proportion of Irish Catholics in Boston the rate of non-Jewish attendance at religious services is higher than the rate would be in other cities. However, the Jewish rate of attendance in Boston does not seem to deviate from the prevailing pattern.][13] A New York survey found that 19.8% of the Jewish population was present at synagogue services more than once a month whereas 35% of the general population was. [This survey, conducted in 1963, found a striking contrast between foreign born and native born Jews. While 34% of the foreign born population were regular participants in synagogue services only 12% of native born Jews were.][14]

Participation in synagogue services dropped as a communal priority while gaining the respect of the non-Jew rose. American Jews were significantly concerned about how Jewish behavior and practice would appear in non-Jews' eyes. Surveys conducted during this period revealed that 75% of those queried regarded gaining the respect of Christian neighbors as a far more important element of Jewish behavior than either joining a synagogue or marrying within the faith.[15]

Evidence of this attitude was most clearly demonstrated by the Lakeville Studies.[16] Although this sample of the population may not be representative of American Jewry in its entirety, these findings and those of other studies from the period reveal that the generation of the late 1950s, when asked what they consider to be the essential characteristics of being a "good Jew", singled out behavior that they believed would improve the Jewish community's status in the non-Jews' estimate.

Due in great measure to their commitment to "turning outward" to the non-Jewish world, this generation elevated actions which stressed links between Jew and non-Jew to the level of the sacred. Included in this range of priorities was action which helped the underprivileged non-Jew. This was regarded as three times more important than support of Israel and twice as important as belonging to a synagogue or temple.[17]

The Jewish leaders of this period were as observant and identifying as the general American Jewish population. Though their observance may have been most nominal and they may have emphasized winning the favor of the non-Jew in whose midst they lived, they were not leaders from the periphery. Kurt Lewin's model of a leader whose status in the

general community qualifies him or her for a position of leadership in the minority community may have been true of American Jewish life in earlier years. It was not applicable in post World War II America.[18] The leaders' behavior and values appear to have reflected those of the community.

The Survival of Israel: The Commanding Myth of Jewish Life

The most striking signs of a changing agenda came in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 touched responsive chords in American Jews. American Jewry now perceived of its survival as linked to and partially dependent on the survival of Israel. No longer were American Jews exhorted to support Israel solely on the basis of Israel's need of America. Now that support was elicited by Jewish leaders on the basis of American Jewry's need of Israel. American Jews did not seem to fear that they would suffer physical harm if Israel was threatened. It was a psychological harm that would come to them. Israel protected American Jews from a deep emotional abyss; from "the bottomless pit of anomie."

The importance and centrality of Israel became in turn a commanding myth of American Jewish life. However the question of exactly what that centrality constituted was left open to question. Support of Israel became the lowest common denominator for inclusion in the Jewish community. For many Jews, Judaism appeared to be primarily dependent on the survival of the Jewish state. The conflict between Israel and its neighbors was regarded by many as the most critical problem facing American Jews. A shift had occurred in Jewish life. In October 1967 Milton Himmelfarb described it as a move from the "general to the particular, from the abstract to the concrete."[19]

The myth of the survival of Israel was part of a larger whole. In the wake of 1967 the destruction of European Jewry, a topic which had virtually been absent from American Jewish mythology for the twenty years following the war, assumed a new-found importance in American Jewish life. "From destruction to rebirth" was invoked to compel Jews to respond to everything from appeals for funds to demands for increased observance of *mitzvot.*

This perception of a mutually dependent destiny was particularly striking in light of the fact that a decade earlier only 31% of those in Lakeville believed support of Israel to be one of the essentials of being a "good Jew." The Lakeville study was conducted in the wake of the Sinai campaign. It is difficult therefore to argue that the Israel of that period did not appear to be threatened by hostile neighbors. Obviously the 1956 conflagration and the victory which followed it did not elicit from the

American Jewish community a feeling of linkage and shared destiny the way 1967 and 1973 did. One could explain this in part by arguing that the victories of 1967 and 1973, accomplished without the aid of allies as had been the case in 1956, were more noteworthy. The threat during May 1967 and October 1973 was more frightening than anything that preceded the 1956 campaign. Furthermore, Sinai carried with it the overtones of old world alliances because of the joint nature of the campaign. White House and State Department criticism of Israel's action made it more difficult for American Jews to be mesmerized by Israel's accomplishments in 1956 as they would be in 1967 and 1973.

Nonetheless, one cannot help but be struck by the different reaction to the various events. The Sinai war seemed to have had no critical effect on the American Jewish community's perception of its own position in America or the nature of its relationship to Israel. Therefore, the reasons for the change in the priorities of American Jewry, particularly its elevation of Israel to a central concern, cannot only be sought in events in the Middle East. While events in Israel in 1967 and 1973 may have helped propel Israel to the center of American Jewish life there were other factors operative as well. The domestic American situation helped elevate the symbolic importance of Israel for American Jews.

During this period American Jewry began to witness the disintegration of many of its traditional and long term alliances. Traditional allies were silent during the difficult and trying days of May 1967. Others engaged in direct attacks on Israel. Those Jewish leaders who had participated in the ecumenical or inter-faith dialogue found that their partners in discussion had nothing to say when it appeared that Israel's fate was dire.[20] The left/liberal community had many in it who engaged in an assault on Israel using the familiar rhetoric, imagery and mythology of traditional antisemites.

The silence and attacks of others might not have been so traumatic had they not occurred in close proximity to the disintegration of other decades-old political and racial alliances. Most disconcerting for many Jews were the expressions of hostility which came from the leaders of the Black community. The anger of the Jewish community was further exacerbated by the institution of affirmative action programs which many Jews charged were a return to discriminatory quotas. American Jews began to feel that they were a nation that truly did dwell alone.[21]

Among certain Jews there was a sense of foreboding which led to a fortress mentality, namely a conviction that the "whole world is out to get us" and there is nothing that can be done but be prepared and be on the defensive if not the offensive.[22] The trauma of rejection and betrayal experienced by many American Jews had historical precedents. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century Russian Jews who had aligned themselves with revolutionary groups were shocked

when the revolutionaries justified the pogroms.[23] Jews who expected sal-
vation to come from the ranks of the revolutionaries experienced a deep
sense of betrayal. Some reacted by turning inwards towards Zionism.[24]
Their counterparts within the American Jewish community would also
turn inwards but in a different fashion.

At the same time that these external changes were occurring, certain
generically American movements were emerging. They deeply affected
the generation of American Jews which was just coming of age. One was
the quest for one's genealogical "roots." The desire to know and emulate
—often in a rather hollow and inauthentic fasion—the traditions and
practices of one's forebears became a national American obsession. A
second movement, which predated the genealogy movement and greatly
influenced it, was the linkage of ethnic differentiation and political power.
Ethnic and religious issues won new found importance and became le-
gitimate umbrellas for the formation of political coalitions. This was
particularly so when some ethnic leaders began to use the emerging
ethnic consciousness of their followers to win political power.[25] As Edgar
Litt noted in *Beyond Pluralism: Ethnic Politics in America,*

> The upwardly mobile men who became ethnic group leaders were
> quick to see the advantage of the political contacts and ethnic identi-
> fications nurtured by the [ethnic] organizations' existence and ac-
> tivities.[26]

Ultimately in the 1980s that ethnic political movement emerged as the
politics of "single issues." Increasingly groups began organizing around
various religious, social and moral issues and using their organizational
strength in the political arena. Most prominent in this regard has been
the Moral Majority, a loose coalition of religious groups which has fought
against abortion and for prayer in the public school. For the Jewish com-
munity the issue has been Israel. While Jews had long been politically
organized around the issue of American support for Israel it was not
until the past decade that they felt as free to question openly political
candidates on their stand on the Middle East and link their support of
particular candidates to this issue.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s changing domestic factors as
well as the attacks on Israel and the precarious and yet seemingly invin-
cible position Israel occupied helped to render the Jewish homeland the
central locus of Jewish identity. Israel became the source from which, as
Ahad Ha'Am had wished, cultural sparks emanated to the diaspora to
rejuvenate and inspire the American Jewish community. The truth was
that these sparks were a quantum leap beneath the lowest level Ahad
Ha'Am imagined they would be.

Israel of the post-1967 era became a mystical place and the Israeli a
mythical Jew. For many Americans Israelis were all that diaspora Jews

and diaspora Judaism were not. Israel was powerful and seemingly invincible. Israelis were soldiers and farmers; strong and yet sensitive. The myth of Massada now reigned supreme. It overshadowed and might even be said to have totally obliterated the image of Yavneh. [Micha Bar Am's famous picture of an Israeli soldier gazing up at the Western Wall in the aftermath of the entry of the Israeli Defense Forces into the Old City of Jerusalem epitomized this perception of the Israeli. The soldier stands with his back to the camera, a crocheted *kippah* perched on his · head and a chain of bullets around his neck. The bullet shells bear a remarkable resemblance to an *atarah*, the collar of silver or gold which is used to adorn the prayer shawl. He represented the Jews of days of yore who came to stand before the remnant of a glorious past and at the same time he was the "new" Jew who had learned to farm and to fight.[27]]

Lack of support for Israel was the one offense for which American Jews could still be subjected to *herem*, excommunication. A failure to believe in God, exogomy and a myriad of other serious *avayrot* (sins) did not and do not disqualify a Jew from occupying the most important positions in American Jewish life. Failure to support Israel will immediately disqualify one from a position of power, even if that position has no relation to events in the Middle East.[28]

At a time when ideological, theological and political confusion seemed to mark the American condition, and decades-old political and racial alliances in America were crumbling, in the eyes of American Jews, Israel loomed as a beacon. The demands it made on American Jews were specific and limited in scope, it wanted political and financial support. It asked American Jewish leaders to make no change in personal observance or practice.

Ironically it may be precisely because the demands and rewards were vicarious that the current relationship between the American Jewish community and the State of Israel may change. The vicarious spiritual gratification that American Jews received through Israel seems to be found wanting as a satisfying myth for a new generation of leaders who in the mid-1980s have begun to assume positions of power in the American Jewish community and who seek a more personalized means of Jewish expression. While support for Israel has not weakened today, that mythic image does not command the power it once did.

The Power Elite: Changing Myths

The tendency to transform Israel into the focus of Jewish identity was nurtured by a generation of Jewish communal leaders who, though they knew little about Jewish tradition and had few Jewish resources on which to draw, "personally lived the days of horror of the Holocaust and the

joy of the rebirth of Israel."[29] These leaders, whose behavior patterns closely approximated those of the majority of American Jews, believed support of Israel to be a sufficient replacement for personal observance of Jewish tradition.

The older established Jewish leaders, the power elite which led the community during the late 1960s and early 1970s, could point to the extraordinary amount of time and money they dedicated to Jewish endeavors but most could not cite any specific Jewish skills or characteristics which legitimized their claim on the *keter malchut*, the crown of leadership. They certainly could not justify it on the basis of observance of *mitzvot* or knowledge of Jewish history and tradition. They did have one claim — distant as it may have been — on the mantle of leadership. They had memory. They knew how things were done; how their parents and, in certain cases, their grandparents used to observe. They were aware of the importance tradition had occupied in their parents' value system. They remembered those neighborhoods in which they had been surrounded by a spectrum of institutions which helped them maintain, if only by osmosis, their Jewish identity. Few among them could remember much in terms of "authentic Jewish life."[30] Their memory was of a more distant kind. They had witnessed how others observed. There is of course a danger inherent in memory. Daniel Bell has observed that it can easily become sentimentality, particularly when it is solely rooted in filio-piety.[31] In addition to nostalgic memory they were also motivated, in varying degrees, by a sense of "guilt" regarding that which they perceived as the failure of the American Jewish community to react properly during the years of the Holocaust.

The changes that are taking place in American Jewish life are particularly noticeable when this group of leaders is compared with those who today are emerging as a dominant force in the Jewish community. Like its predecessors this new group is composed of successful business and professional people in their thirties and early forties. They are associated and identify with the established Jewish community and particularly with its leadership development programs. Most of them were designated by lay leaders or professionals within the community as "heirs apparent". They were invited to join leadership groups designed to give them an intimate knowledge of the community and a sense of their elite role as future leaders. An impressive amount of time and effort is expended by the Council of Jewish Federations and the United Jewish Appeal to cultivate these young leaders. They are told in both an implicit and explicit fashion that they will one day have both the duty and privileges that are attendant upon leaders.[32]

These young leaders will soon assume, and in certain cases have already assumed, the reins of control over a complex and sophisticated network of Jewish organizations. They will speak for the Jewish com-

munity and will have access to the sites of political power, the White House and Congress. In both local and national arenas they will determine the allocation of millions of dollars raised for a broad spectrum of Jewish causes and institutions. Political candidates on the local and national level will actively seek and already do seek their endorsement and aid. That aid is dispensed through political action committees (PACs) and is allocated to those who have supported or promise to support Israel. The fact that in March 1984 President Ronald Reagan chose a gathering of this group to make a major policy statement on the Middle East is indicative of their emerging power particularly in the political arena. It is of critical importance to understand the nature of their Jewish identity because they will help shape and are already shaping the American Jewish agenda of the coming decade.

The agenda of this emerging group of leaders differs in a qualitative fashion from that of the preceding generation of communal leaders. The two generations' perceptions of the objective of the communal enterprise in which they are engaged are markedly different. The differences bring into focus dramatic changes which have occurred in American Jewish life in the past two decades.

The contrast between the two generations of established communal leaders lies not in the realm of the energies and financial contribution they are willing to devote to Jewish activities. One could in fact, argue that the previous generation had the financial capability to give larger sums and more of its time to communal work than does the younger group. The new leaders include a larger proportion of professionals, particularly lawyers and doctors. Professionals' capability for philanthropic activity is limited as compared to those in business.[34] Both groups expend extraordinary amounts of time on communal activities.

The difference between them lies in the fact that for the younger group this is less a philanthropic exercise and more a means of personal spiritual fulfillment. Their communal work is a religious enterprise, albeit in a secular or civil context. To fully understand the activities and priorities of this group it is necessary to understand the nature of the emerging "civil Judaism" in America. Daniel Elazar and Jonathan Woocher have demonstrated the degree to which the communal activities of this group have become their religious expression.[35]

The older generation conceived of much of what they did as *noblesse oblige;* for them it was a fulfillment of the commandment of extending one's hand to a fellow Jew who is in need. The current generation of young leaders does not perceive of its work in these terms. They certainly acknowledge that they are doing something for someone else, but they are convinced that in the course of so doing something is also happening to them. Their expectations regarding their personal growth and experience differs from those of the preceding generation. They are convinced

that the nature of the communal work which they do has not only human but transcendental significance. They are committed to the idea of the "chosenness" of the Jewish people and believe that their activities strengthen Jewish unity and distinctiveness and further Jewish survival.

The problem is that they often have but the vaguest notion of the Jewish tradition to which they are committed and the nature of the chosenness which they affirm. Since they lack the skills to preserve this tradition in their individual activities they give expression to this desire through their communal activities. Their work in the communal arena, rather than being an expression of *noblesse oblige*, is their way of seeking a spiritual expression of their identity. They exemplify the romantic strain which has emerged in American Jewish life and which seeks more than just a memory of Jewish life. Through the 1970s and into the 1980s concern about Israel, work for Israel and the myth of "destruction to rebirth" acted as an antidote to assimilation and served as an anchor for the Jewish identity of a major portion of the American Jewish community.[36] Yet for some who came of age in the late 1960s and who were born into a post-Holocaust America these memories and symbols may not be enough. In this context the Holocaust and Israel, which were sufficient for maintaining a residual identity may be found and are already beginning to be found wanting as the wellsprings for nurturing a growing and emerging personal identity.

Despite the fact that they lack the skills and the knowledge associated with Jewish tradition they have begun to restructure the American Jewish agenda in a way that places far greater emphasis on the acquisition of skills and knowledge. The clearest example of this is the way Jewish education has been adopted as a communal and not solely a synagogue or denominational concern. This is most clearly evidenced by the significant rise in financial support of Jewish education by Federations. Some Federations are considering a voucher system for synagogue membership and Jewish education. This reflects more than just a concern about the quality of Jewish education and the viability of Jewish "religious" institutions. It also reflects the fact that the Jewish community as embodied in Federation recognizes that it is in its interests to encourage Jewish education and affiliation with synagogues. Rather than viewing this as "competition" for funds (Federations are, after all, primarily fund raising bodies), it is seen as a means of strengthening an individual's identification with the Jewish community. Of course the younger generation of leaders are not alone responsible for this change but they have strongly supported it. What is more striking is the degree of commitment they demonstrate to personal educational endeavors in various arenas of Jewish learning.

Jewish survival comes to mean more than remembering the Holocaust and supporting Israel as a place where other Jews—particularly those facing oppression—live. Jewish survival has come to be rendered

in more personal terms. It is internalized and then externalized in a fashion that transcends reliance on fund raising and political activities for Israel. This does not mean that their concern about Israel's political fate is diminished. Recent studies of this group reveal that they consider the relationship between Israel and its neighbors to be the most important problem facing American Jewry. Financial support for Israel remains, in their estimation, the most critical communal priority. However, while their concern about Israel's fate has not diminished—if anything it seems to have increased—their reliance on Israel for vicarious fulfillment of their Jewish identity seems to be weakening.

This has prompted them to begin to assess or reassess American Jewry's relationship with Israel. They are committed to Israel and more politically active on its behalf than previous generations. [There are over 200,000 Jews who contribute to political campaigns on the litmus test of the candidates' support for Israel. These young leaders are disproportionately represented among them.] However, they do not stand in awe of their Israeli counterparts, but perceive of the two communities as partners in a world Jewish polity. The myth of the Israeli as supernatural hero has diminished for them and they seek a relationship based on contemporary reality.[37]

It can be argued that, in the context of its relationship to Israel, the American Jewish polity is moving from the model proposed by Ahad Ha'Am to one closer to that of Simon Dubnow. Expressions of peculiarly American brands of cultural and theological diaspora nationalism have become increasingly common. [The recent decision by the Reform movement to define an individual's Jewish identity on the basis of patrilineal as well as matrilineal descent may be interpreted in part as signifying its willingness to adopt an independent stance, to proclaim its equal status in terms of its relationship with Israel.]

These changes do not necessarily portend a chasm between America and Israel. It may mean that in future years the relationship between these two communities will be founded on a much healthier basis. Israel and Israelis will not be expected to serve *in loco* Judaism for American Jews. It is unclear whether future relations between these two Jewish communities will be based on the model proposed by Ahad Ha'Am, that of sparks emanating from the center—Israel—to spiritually rejuvenate American Jewish life, or the model proposed by Simon Dubnow, that of two separate but equal Jewish communities sharing a common national identity and existing on a co-equal basis. In all likelihood the model will be somewhere in between. On some level, possibly a subliminal one, American Jews recognize that the existence of Israel gives them the freedom to exist as a secure minority within a majority culture. Rather than make their existence in the diaspora less tenable, it has done the reverse.

In either case it is clear that American Jewry is experiencing a re-

generation that could not have been predicted two decades ago. The breadth, depth, quality and, most important, the full implications of these changes on a long term basis remain to be seen. Nonetheless, there is no question that there have been critical changes in Jewish life in the past decade. We may have witnessed the beginning of a true renewal of Jewish life in America, a renewal that will affect more than one small segment of the community. Those who have participated in this change should be wary of too hastily engaging in self-congratulations for there always is the depressing possibility that it will evolve into sentimentality and ethnic chauvinism. Even if it does not, the new leaders face the challenge of spreading that renewal beyond the confines of a small proportion of the American Jewish community. The way in which they choose to do so will have a significant impact on American Jewish life of the coming decade.

<div align="center">UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES</div>

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

1. This study is based in part on a series of in depth interviews I conducted with various members of the United Jewish Appeal's Young Leadership Cabinets and the Council of Jewish Federations Leadership Development groups over the course of 1982-1984. Participants were queried regarding their attitudes towards Israel, Israel-Diaspora relations and the priorities of American Jewish life. I also attended a series of retreats and meetings organized by these groups in different parts of the United States. In addition the survey data compiled by Dr. Jonathan Woocher of Brandeis University on the attitudes of members of Young Leadership groups was utilized. Jonathan Woocher, "'Jewish Survivalism' as Communal Ideology: An Empirical Assessment," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service*, Vol. 57, no. 4 (Summer, 1981), pp. 291-303. Earl Raab, "The End of Jewish Community Relations?," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* (Winter, 1977), pp. 107-15.

2. Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism* (Chicago, 1972), p. 127.

3. On the manner in which this "religious" revival affected not only Jews but Protestants and Catholics see Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic and Jew* (New York, 1960).

4. Nathan Glazer, "Social Characteristics of American Jews, 1654-1954," *American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 56 (1955), pp. 3-41.

5. Phillip Roth's *Eli the Fanatic* is a farcical portrayal of the panic which besets a suburban Jewish community when a group of Jews who are "different" moves into town.

6. C. Bezalel Sherman, "Demographic and Social Aspects" in Oscar Janowsky, *American Jews: A Reappraisal* (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 27.

7. Arthur Hertzberg, "The American Jew and His Religion," Janowsky, p. 101. Albert J. Mayer, *Flint Jewish Population Study: 1967* (Flint, Mich.: Flint Jewish Community Council, 1969), p. 45. Sidney Goldstein, *A Population Survey of the*

Greater Springfield Jewish Community (Springfield, Mass.: Springfield Jewish Community Council, 1968), p. 93. Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews* (New York, 1971), p. 123. On the manner in which locality affects the patterns of Jewish affiliation and identification see Bernard Lazerwitz, "The Community Variable in Jewish Identification," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 16, no. 4 (1977), pp. 361-69.

8. Sherman, p. 47.

9. Harold Weisberg, "Ideologies of American Jews," Janowsky, p. 351.

10. Sherman, p. 45.

11. August B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth* (New York, 1949), p. 246. Vance Packard, *The Status Seeker* (New York, 1959), p. 194.

12. Marshall Sklare and M. Vosk, *The Riverton Study* (New York, 1962), p. 11. Hertzberg, p. 414.

13. Morris Axelrod, Floyd J. Fowler and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning—A Study of the Jewish Population in Greater Boston* (Boston: Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1967), p. 139. Sklare, *America's Jews*, p. 122.

14. Jack Elinson, Paul W. Haberman and Cyrille Gell, *Ethnic and Educational Data on Adults in New York City, 1963-64* (New York, 1967), p. 147. Sklare, *America's Jews*, pp. 120-21.

15. H.T. Lipman, *The White Plains Jewish Attitudes Survey* (New York, 1958), p. 4. Sherman, p. 51.

16. Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (Chicago, 1972).

17. Leonard Fein et al., *Reform is a Verb* (New York, 1972), pp. 34-35.

18. Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948), p. 196. For a complete discussion of the applicability of Lewin's thesis to the American Jewish community see York, pp. 25-33.

19. Sklare, *America's Jews*, p. 217; Milton Himmelfarb, "In the Light of Israel's Victory," *Commentary* (October, 1967), pp. 54, 57. Jacob Neusner, "Israel and American Jewry," *Commentary* (August, 1967), p. 70.

20. Himmelfarb, p. 57.

21. For an expanded discussion of this period see Deborah E. Lipstadt, "Holocaust: Symbol and Myth in American Jewish Life," *Forum* (Winter, 1981), pp. 73-88.

22. Earl Raab, "Antisemitism in the 1980s," *Midstream* (February, 1983), p. 17.

23. M. Ma'or, "Ha-kereuz ha-antishemi shel 'Narodnaya Volya,'" *Zion* (1950), pp. 150-55. David Vital, *The Origins of Zionism* (New York, 1980), p. 56.

24. Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (New York, 1970), p. 43. Louis Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia* (New Haven, 1951), vol. II, pp. 57-58.

25. Alan York, "American Jewish Leaders from the Periphery," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23 (June, 1981), pp. 25-26.

26. Edgar Litt, *Beyond Pluralism: Ethnic Politics in America* (Glenview, Ill, 1970), as cited in York, p. 26.

27. Jacob Neusner, "Israel and Yavneh: The Perspective of Time," *New Outlook*, Vol. 20, no. 1 (1977), pp. 46-52.

28. Arthur Hertzberg, *Being Jewish in America* (New York, 1979), p. 223.

29. Richard Gunther, "Israel-Diaspora Relations: A New Model for the Fu-

ture," typescript of speech delivered before the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations, November 1982.

30. Elazar, p. 286.

31. Daniel Bell, "Reflections on Jewish Identity," in Peter Rose (ed.), *The Ghetto and Beyond: Essays on Jewish Life in America* (New York, 1969), pp. 465-72. Jacob Neusner, *American Judaism: Adventure in Modernity* (New York, 1978), p. 66.

32. Woocher, pp. 291-92.

33. Preliminary analysis of a survey of 1000 of these leaders conducted in March 1984 supports the finding of their strong political interest in Jewish issues. They determine their support of a particular candidate primarily on the candidates' position on Israel and other related Jewish issues. Deborah E. Lipstadt, Jonathan Woocher, Charles Pruitt, *American Jewish Young Leadership Survey, March 1984*, [Milwaukee, 1984].

34. Sklare, *America's Jews*, p. 67.

35. Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity*. For a discussion of the various aspects of "civil Judaism," see Jonathan Woocher, *"Civil Judaism" in the United States*, (Center for Jewish Community Studies, 1978) and Jonathan Woocher, *"Civil Judaism": The Religion of Jewish Communities*, (National Jewish Conference Center, New York, 1979). For a discussion of "civil Judaism" as reflected in the patterns of leadership see Jonathan Woocher, "The 'Civil Judaism' of Communal Leaders," *American Jewish Year Book* (1981), pp. 149-61.

36. Hertzberg, *Being Jewish in America*, p. 226. Eugene B. Borowitz, "The Chosen People Concept as it Affects Life in the Diaspora," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* (Fall 1975), pp. 553-68.

37. It was with this in mind that the United Jewish Appeal's Young Leadership Cabinet organized together with a group of Israelis who are loosely affiliated with *Dor Hemshech*, the World Zionist Organization's Young Leadership Division, a World Assembly of Young Jewish Leadership. Held in Israel in December 1983 it was designed to be a "no hold barred encounter between Jews representing diverse backgrounds and differing ideological standpoints." The underlying supposition of the conference was that Israeli and Diaspora Jewry were drifting apart and it was the responsibility of this group to try to reverse that direction. *In Process: The UJA Young Leadership Cabinet Forum* (New York, 1984).