North Africa

Tunisia

In 1965 Tunisia experienced serious economic difficulties as a result of the disruption of economic relations with France, following President Habib Bourguiba's unilateral nationalization of French-owned land in May 1964 (p. 433). In response to this violation of the Franco-Tunisian agreements of 1963, France had stopped her budgetary aid to Tunisia in June, and in September canceled the commercial agreement which gave Tunisia a preferential status. At the beginning of 1965 Tunisia was seeking a rapprochement. Mohamed Masmoudi, well-known for his francophile sentiments, was named ambassador to Paris. The Tunisian government also made numerous other goodwill gestures, such as a proposal that the French colonists be indemnified in accordance with a procedure to be established jointly.

In May the French government rejected these efforts: "In the present conditions, there is no reason to reestablish special relations between Tunisia and France," it declared. Tunisia was extremely disappointed but did not burn its bridges, for Bourguiba did not wish to endanger the technical and cultural assistance still being received from France. In May the cultural agreement was renewed for a year, France agreeing to furnish Tunisia with 2,500 teachers for the academic year 1965–66. In November an agreement on social security was also signed between the two countries. Bourguiba was obviously waiting for the French presidential elections before renewing the dialogue. In view of President Charles de Gaulle's intransigence, it seemed likely that his reelection would mean that France would insist on a return to the 1963 agreements.

Strained relations with France led Tunisia to look for other Western partners. In the spring it was granted loans by the German Federal Republic, and some German businessmen came to investigate conditions. Krupp showed interest in the economic conversion of the Bizerte base, and trade between the two countries increased.

Politically, the economic agreement with the United States (AJYB, 1964

[Vol. 65], p. 322) remained one of the basic elements of Tunisian diplomacy. At a Ford Foundation conference in Tunisia in June, President Bourguiba declared: "The friendship which Tunisia feels for the United States dates back to the dark days of the war after 1940. Our sympathy has been increased by the role played by the United States in the preservation of world peace. If the Chinese Communist waves have not yet burst upon the world, the credit belongs to the Americans." This attitude of Bourguiba's was again demonstrated on July 4, when he denounced Chinese colonialism in an interview for German television; he repeated this attack on November 23. Peking sent a note of protest, which he rejected. In December Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., declared that relations with Peking were near a break.

In February Bourguiba undertook a tour of the Middle East which appeared intended to confirm Tunisian friendship with the United Arab Republic. The Tunisian president was, in fact, received in Cairo with full honors but, after visiting the Arab refugees in Jordan in March, he dropped a diplomatic bomb by proposing a confederation of Middle Eastern states which would include Israel (p. 396). "The Palestinian question," he said, "requires a peaceful solution in which there will be neither victor nor vanquished." He made the same proposal in Jordanian Jerusalem, in Beirut, in Libya, in Greece, and on French television. In July the Paris correspondent of the Israeli paper *Ma'ariv* asserted that former French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, who had been Bourguiba's host in June and had accepted an invitation from Israeli Deputy Premier Abba Eban for August, had been entrusted with a mission between Israel and Tunisia. But in an interview with the London *Observer* the Tunisian President declared: "My compromise plan has failed. Neither the Arabs nor Israel want anything to do with it. I do not intend to take the leadership of a movement to press for a settlement." Nevertheless, the World Jewish Congress, meeting at Strasbourg in September, paid tribute to Bourguiba "for his realistic attitude toward Israel." It should be noted that Bourguiba's proposals had already been advanced in 1964 by Bechir Ben Yahmed (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 473) editor in chief of *Jeune Afrique* and the former Tunisian minister of information.

On July 19 Tunisia was absent when the 13-nation Arab International Boycott Commission on Israel opened its 22nd meeting in Tripoli (p. 443). Nor was Tunisia represented at the Casablanca conference of the Arab League leaders later, on September 13. A few hours before the conference opened, Bourguiba, in a memorandum that was distributed to its participants, attacked President Gamal Abdul Nasser of the United Arab Republic: ". . . the interference of Egyptian leaders in the internal affairs of other Arab countries is unacceptable and we will refuse to cooperate with the Arab League as long as it does not show respect for the member states." On November 20 Nasser counterattacked, referring to Bourguiba as "the valet of the USA."

On September 19 Bourguiba received a representative of General Mustafa

Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish rebellion against the government of Iraq. On October 22 Tunisia took part in the African conference at Accra. In November and December Bourguiba visited the African countries of Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast.

President Bourguiba reacted favorably to the fall of Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella (p. 441) with whom his relations had been cool ever since Algerian independence. He emphasized that, as a result of Ben Bella's fall, "Egyptian influence will greatly diminish in the Maghreb [Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria] which, while forming a part of the Arab world, refuses to be made into a satellite."

Domestic Affairs

There was little change in the government. Bourguiba reaffirmed his authority within the ruling Socialist Constitutional party (Parti socialiste destourien, formerly Neo-Destour) by appointing four new members to its central committee. The four, all unconditional Bourguibists, were Caid Es-Sebsi, Abdallah Farhat, Mohamed Jeddi, and Bechir Bellagha.

There was an open crisis between the government and the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). Its former secretary-general, Ahmed Tlili, who attended the Amsterdam congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (July 5–6) as an observer, made a strong anti-Bourguiba statement at a meeting of its executive board. "The Tunisian government," he charged, "wants to liquidate the trade unions completely and absorb everything into the unity of the party." Tlili was arrested, and Habib Achour, the secretary-general then in office, was dismissed in the same month. He was replaced by Bechir Bellagha, in whom Bourguiba had complete confidence. There was also a mild demonstration of independence by the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET), which refused to merge with the National Federation of Destourian Students.

In November a law was passed legalizing abortion, in the Tunisian effort to check overpopulation. Half of Tunisia's people were under 20; one-fifth were under 14 years of age. The annual rate of increase was 2.1 per cent. Contraceptives had been on sale since 1961, and in 1965, with the aid of the Ford Foundation, the government launched a pilot project to instruct women in their use. Twelve rural centers were set up at a cost of $379,000, shared by the government and the foundation. In respect to the emancipation of women, Tunisia was thus placed at the head of all African nations.

Economy

The year 1965 was a particularly difficult one for the country's economy. Wages had been frozen since 1956, while the cost of living had risen first gradually and then, abruptly, after the devaluation of the dinar and the cancellation of the commercial agreements with France in September 1964. The prices of some imported goods doubled then, as did the deficit in the trade

balance with France. Imports increased more rapidly than exports. The end of the commercial agreements with France meant a loss of 1,366,000 dinars in grain exports and 3,491,000 in wine exports. There were about fifty million gallons of wine in storage in the converted cisterns at Bizerte.

To remedy the situation, Finance Minister Ahmed Ben Salah attempted in October to set up a "club" for foreign assistance to Tunisia, to include Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland. But for the time being this "club" was not functioning, and it did not seem likely to be more than a palliative.

The United States Agency for International Development granted Tunisia a loan of $10 million in 1965 to pay for imports of American goods and also released $6.5 million for the construction and repair of more than 6,000 miles of road. In November the International Monetary Fund extended to Tunisia a credit of $5.6 million.

Tunisia was making a major effort to attract tourists. A Hilton Hotel opened in the capital, and several palatial hotels constructed since independence quoted much lower rates than comparable places in Europe.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

At the end of 1965 there were an estimated 8,000 to 12,000 Jews in Tunisia, out of a total population of 4,500,000 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 472). About 6,000 to 8,000 Jews were in Tunis and the rest were in Bizerte, Nabaul, Sousse, Sfax, Djerba, and the interior. About 100,000 Jews had left Tunisia since independence. In 1965, for various reasons, the rate of emigration decreased.

Attitude Toward the Jews

During the first years of independence Bourguiba was an enemy of Nasser, and many Jews held high posts in the government. But after the Bizerte tragedy in 1960 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], pp. 432–33), Bourguiba abruptly reversed his course. He ranged himself with the Arab League, ironed out his differences with Nasser, and burned his bridges to France.

Even though the legal status of all Tunisian citizens was the same, the Jews did not feel secure in their position. Bourguiba had given them equal rights with Moslems. There was a Jewish deputy, Albert Bessis, and theoretically Jews were eligible for all government positions except that of president, which was reserved for a Moslem. But in fact, in the course of ten years, Jews were more and more being eliminated from important positions (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 473). In their daily life, too, they often met with unfriendly attitudes. The worsening economic situation made it increasingly difficult for Jewish merchants to obtain import licenses, for which Moslems had priority. And Western culture, of which the Jews were partisans, was losing ground in the face of Arabization.

Emigration

While 30,000 to 40,000 Jews had left Tunisia from 1960 to 1962, and about 10,000 in 1963 and again in 1964, the number who left in 1965 do not seem to have exceeded 4,000. Businessmen, lawyers, physicians, and later the bulk of the working population gradually had left for Europe and Israel. The departures took place in a friendly atmosphere and without bloodshed; but Bourguiba saw to it that the emigrants could carry away with them not even a small part of their property. Most of the Jews remaining in Tunisia were old people, who would have found it difficult to adjust in Europe and who felt that they would only be a burden to Israel. But they remained for other reasons as well.

Although the very name of Israel continued to be suspect in Tunisia (not only books dealing with Israel, but also French reference works mentioning it were banned) and Tunisia carried out to the letter the Arab League's decisions in such matters as the withdrawal of passports from all persons with Israeli visas, still the president had recognized the existence of Israel. He had courageously proposed the coexistence of the Arab states and Israel, and for this the Jews of Tunisia were grateful to him. They also supported the sharp break between Bourguiba and Nasser in 1965, which followed the conciliatory attitude of the previous year, as well as Tunisian efforts for a rapprochement with France.

Communal Activities

Since 1958, when a Provisional Administrative Committee for the Jewish Religion was established, there had been no official Jewish community organization. The communal elections that were to have been held that year had evidently been postponed indefinitely (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 261–62).

The activities of the Provisional Committee, headed by Simon Zana, consisted largely of maintaining the synagogues and offering courses in religious education which were attended by many young Jews. Funds for these programs came from taxes on kosher meat, sacramental wine, and *matzot* for Passover, and from funerals.

Tunisia had a total of six Alliance Israélite Universelle schools, with an enrolment of 543 Jewish students (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 473).

GILBERT COHEN-TANUGI

Morocco *

In 1965 the continued economic depression contributed to the government's difficulties at home. In January the budget of the ministry of public works was rejected in parliament by a vote of 56 to 41; fourteen members of the pro-government Mouvement Populaire voted with the opposition Istiqlal and National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). In March, student demonstrations against certain policies of the ministry of education touched off rioting in the major cities, and at least seven persons were killed and 700 arrested. Large numbers of unemployed joined the students, and the demonstrations soon assumed a general political character. The government blamed "left-wing elements"—the Union of Popular Forces and the allied, but independent, Moroccan Labor Union (UMT)—and its first reaction was a large-scale use of force. On April 1 King Hassan ordered the release of most of those arrested. While at the time of the riots fourteen persons who had been convicted in 1964 of attempting to overthrow the government (in 1963) were executed, other political prisoners, including sixty also convicted in 1964, were amnestied in May. It was not clear whether King Hassan was using conciliation to balance repression, or whether the two policies reflected a conflict within his administration.

Immediately after the amnesty King Hassan met with the various political groups—those supporting the government, Istiqlal, UNFP, and the trade unions—to discuss the formation of a government of national unity. He proposed a "minimum program" based on the government's rather vague three-year plan of economic development. Istiqlal replied by demanding new elections, while the moderate wing of the UNFP, represented by Abderahim Bouabid, called for the formation of a "homogeneous government" and a royal promise that this government would be permitted to carry out its policies. UMT and the left-wing of UNFP demanded basic structural reforms as a condition for cooperation. Another UNFP demand was a pardon for their exiled leader Mehdi Ben Barka, who had twice been sentenced to death *in absentia,* so that he might return to take part in the negotiations.

The negotiations failed to produce results, and in June the King dismissed Prime Minister Ahmed Bahmini and his cabinet, dissolved the parliament, and announced that he was temporarily taking over all executive and legislative power. Most of the cabinet members he then appointed were holdovers from the Bahmini government; besides the prime minister, he dropped only the minister of education, whose policies had precipitated the March riots. A promise to revise the constitution was regarded as a concession to UNFP, and informal conversations between the King and the opposition continued.

* The section reviewing general political developments was prepared in the office of the AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK.

On October 29 Mehdi Ben Barka was kidnapped in Paris; UNFP leaders asserted that King Hassan had been about to pardon Ben Barka so that he could join in negotiations in Morocco, and that the kidnapping was therefore aimed at wrecking these negotiations. An investigation in France soon disclosed that Ben Barka had been held at the home of a French gangster where he had been questioned and tortured by Moroccan Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir. It was widely assumed that he had been killed, although there was no definite proof. The French government asked General Oufkir to testify in the investigation; when he failed to do so, it issued an international warrant for his arrest. King Hassan refused to surrender the general or to drop him from the cabinet.

In November the UMT called a 36-hour general strike which its Secretary-General Mahjoub Ben Seddiq called a protest against the government's policies, "of which the kidnapping of Mehdi Ben Barka is in our view a direct consequence." French newspaper reports of the investigation were repeatedly barred in Morocco, and on November 27 the government recalled its ambassadors to Lebanon and Syria to protest press coverage of the Ben Barka case there. Diplomatic relations with Syria were broken off on December 7; by the end of the year, relations with France too were close to a break.

Relations with North African states however, improved markedly. Moroccan territorial claims against Algeria were allowed to lapse, and after the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria relations between the two countries were cordial. While irredentist claims against Mauritania were not formally abandoned, they were not pressed. A number of Mauritanians who had held posts in the Moroccan government and had supported Moroccan claims to that country announced that they now backed Mauritanian independence.

In July an agreement between Morocco and Libya provided for the employment of several thousand Moroccan workers in the Libyan oil fields, which somewhat relieved Moroccan unemployment and helped the balance of payments. Progress was made in coordinating the economies of the Maghreb states and Libya with regard to development projects and exports.

During the year Morocco received aid from several countries: The United States supplied several hundred thousand tons of grain on credit; France continued various forms of assistance, and Spain agreed to construct certain factories in Morocco. The International Monetary Fund announced in October that Morocco would be granted a credit of $45 million. Among private foreign investors were an increased number of German firms as well as the Occidental Petroleum Company of California, which in April announced the formation of a $100-million Moroccan-American chemical company.

The unification of Morocco's judicial system was completed in December 1965. Henceforth only Moroccan citizens could function as judges, and Arabic was made the official language of the courts. Former French magistrates could serve only as advisers to Moroccan judges; French lawyers could continue to practice, but had to take Moroccan partners if they did not know Arabic.

JEWISH COMMUNITY

There were about 70,000 Jews in Morocco at the end of 1965, about 75 per cent of whom lived in Casablanca, the economic capital. Jews continued to leave the country, with emigration rising and falling in cycles, increasing whenever the country underwent a political or economic crisis. Some went to Israel, but many settled in or near the major cities of France, especially Paris, Toulouse, Lyons, and Marseilles. In the Moroccan mellahs, the ancient Jewish quarters, a Moslem sub-proletariat was now installed and Jews usually constituted only a tiny fraction of the population.

Communal Activities

For almost three years Jewish institutions had been quiescent. The Council of Jewish Communities, the coordinating body of the Jewish organization in the various cities, no longer met. In its eyes, silence was the best policy. The voluntary suspension of the Jewish community's organ *La Voix des Communautés,* the only Jewish journal left in Arab territory (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 475–76), was followed in July 1965 by the ending of the Jewish broadcast on the Moroccan radio. This program was suspended by the Moroccan minister of information without advance notice to the Council of Jewish Communities because of the Arab League meeting which was to take place in Casablanca in September. The program, which was purely religious in character, had been broadcast for fifteen years. The broadcasting of Israeli recordings had been prohibited since 1957. Another program, broadcast in 1960 over the privately-owned Tangiers radio under the direction of Victor Malka, had been prohibited by the government in 1961.

Jewish Education

The activities of Jewish institutions were for the most part wrapped in obscurity. Constant emigration greatly reduced their scope. The Alliance Israélite Universelle served fewer than 10,000 Jewish students; four years earlier there had been over 30,000. ORT, OSE, JDC and the department for the education of Jewish youth (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 476) were still functioning, but on a reduced scale. The Jewish Committee which heads the Casablanca community, recorded the loss of more than half its members and confined itself to day-to-day activities. There was nevertheless a great revival of interest in Jewish all-day schools, especially the Otzar Ha-torah schools, and Lubavitcher *yeshivot,* which the young people attended voluntarily. Jewish lycées were established, and these, as well as the AIU-sponsored Ecole Normale Hébraïque of Casablanca, enjoyed success.

Religious Life

This institutional decay did not spare even the most respected Jewish institution, the Grand Rabbinate. The Moroccan government, unlike that of Tunisia in 1960, never actually suppressed the rabbinical courts by a stroke of the pen. On the contrary, it always showed them a certain respect and regarded them as the true representatives of Moroccan Jewry. Thus whenever King Hassan II gave an audience to Jewish leaders, Grand Rabbi Saül Danan was invited to attend. But the Moroccan judicial reforms entailed certain consequences for the rabbinical courts, which had hitherto functioned with complete autonomy. The rabbinical judges who had administered justice in their own courthouses in Jewish neighborhoods were now given space in the regular Moroccan courthouses. All proceedings were henceforth to be in Arabic, while previously they could have been in French or Hebrew.

The most significant aspect of the reform was the abolition of the Supreme Rabbinical Tribunal at Rabat, which had functioned as the highest court of appeal. While the reform simply provided for the disappearance of this tribunal, two of its members—Rabbi Michael Encaoua and its president, Rabbi Danan—were appointed to the Moroccan supreme court without definitely assigned functions. The third member, Simon Cohen, was still awaiting transfer.

Certain rabbinical judges (who had jurisdiction only in matters of personal status and inheritance in municipal courts of first instance and in five regional courts) were assigned by the minister of justice to sit also as advisers with Moslem judges in Moroccan penal courts in Casablanca. The administrator of the court called on them to uncover their heads during hearings. They refused.

Moslem-Jewish Relations

There was constant fear of a renewal of the riots of March (p. 436). These were the worst disturbances since Morocco had become independent. However, it should be noted that although there was rioting in a Jewish district, the demonstrators made no attacks on Jews as Jews. A Jewish bookstore was looted and a synagogue was burned to the ground, but all the stores near the bookstore were also destroyed, and the fire spread to the synagogue from a store belonging to a Moslem.

Jews were beset by serious fears before the Arab League meeting of September 13 (p. 432). They remembered that they had experienced one of their most unhappy periods when the Arab League met in Casablanca in January 1961 (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 440–41), and they feared a recurrence of hatred. But the Moroccan authorities took preventive measures. To be sure, all Jewish employees of the Casablanca municipality, where the meeting took place, and of the hotels where the Arab heads of state were staying, were invited to take several days' leave. Jewish journalists who

sought accreditation to the conference were systematically turned down, and some young people suspected of "activism" were asked to report to the police. But things went no further. The chief rabbis of Casablanca were invited, together with all the leading Moroccan personalities, to pay their respects to the Arab leaders, and nothing untoward happened. Moreover, it was a Jewish physician of Casablanca, Dr. Raoul Cohen, who attended President Abdel Salam Arif of Iraq when the latter was slightly indisposed.

Several days after the meeting, the press of the Istiqlal party published extracts from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which were currently enjoying a considerable vogue in the Arab countries and had become the backbone of a new Arab antisemitism. In general, there had been little antisemitism in Morocco, and Jews and Arabs had always lived in harmony. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1965 there was an anti-Jewish press campaign, conducted simultaneously by three parties. The government-backed Democratic Socialist party wrote: "The Jews, although vile and essentially traitorous, have been better treated by Islam than by Jewry itself." Even the left-of-center National Union of Popular Forces, largely based on the trade unions, took part in this anti-Jewish campaign.

In December 1964, Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan ambassador to the United States, declared, at a dinner arranged by the American Jewish Committee, that "the independence of our country contributed to the strengthening of the relationships between Jews and Moslems, and will permit the integration of Jews of Morocco into the political life of the country with the same rights and the same obligation as those of their Moslem compatriots." The authorities made great efforts to give reality to the rights formally guaranteed by the constitution, including the right to travel.

Ministers and other high government officials took part in all major celebrations of Jewish institutions. Once a year, on Yom Kippur, the king's representative visited the synagogue. There were still numerous Jews in the higher echelons of the administration, a fact which drew criticism from anti-Jewish political groups such as Istiqlal.

It was generally accepted that the position of the Palace in Rabat on the conflict between Israel and the Arab states was close to that of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. On the other hand, both Istiqlal, under the leadership of Allal al Fassi, and the left, led by Abderahim Bouabid and Mehdi Ben Barka, reacted violently to the statements of the Tunisian president (p. 432). Ben Barka had frequently expressed a liberal attitude toward Israel in private conversations, but his public statements were violently anti-Israel.

It was difficult to predict future developments, but if the trend continued the Jewish population of Morocco seemed likely to be eventually stabilized at about 25,000.

VICTOR MALKA

Algeria

EARLY on June 19 President Ahmed Ben Bella was arrested in his bedroom by his vice president and defense minister, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, and the chief of staff, Major Tahar Zbiri. On the same morning his deposition was proclaimed, and he was charged with wasting public funds, despotism, arbitrary rule, and even treason. Colonel Boumedienne placed himself at the head of a new cabinet which included most of its old members, among them Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, whom Ben Bella had tried to oust. It was announced that a new constitution would be promulgated and that a white book would be published on the misdeeds of the Ben Bella regime.

The event took the world by surprise and produced a major sensation. At the time of the coup, Ben Bella had been preparing to welcome the delegates of numerous nations of the "third world" to an Afro-Asian conference, the so-called "second Bandung," which was to have started on June 29.

Among the new Algerian politicians who had come out of the maquis of the Kabyle mountains, the French prisons, and political exile, Boumedienne had the reputation of being more strongly imbued with the spirit of Islam and Arab culture than most of his colleagues. Some expected an immediate reinforcement of the pan-Arab trend in Algerian policy, despite the clearly anti-Nasser tendency of the June 19 coup. Quick recognition of the new regime came from the Ba'ath government of Syria, and from Communist China, which was always ready to back the most extreme and intransigent elements in the "anti-imperialist camp."

The last-minute postponement of the Afro-Asian conference by the delegates who had already arrived for the meeting, despite stubborn Chinese efforts to have it held on schedule, was a slap at the Boumedienne government and hindered its efforts to consolidate its position. It was faced with demonstrations of hostile students and youths, who paraded in the streets of Algiers shouting, "Long live Ben Bella!" Cairo and Moscow also showed their opposition. The Communists set up an underground resistance and attempted in vain to bring about a repression which they could then denounce as fascist.

Nevertheless, the Boumedienne government was able to establish itself after a short while. It quickly showed that it was disinclined to step up its pan-Arabism, which would have implied, among other things, a more intensive anti-Israel campaign. On the contrary, although there was no question about its adherence to the principle of solidarity with the Arab world or its allegiance to the Arab League, one could detect a relative moderation in statement regarding Israel, which contrasted sharply with Ben Bella's violence.

The new rulers of Algeria gave first consideration to the deteriorating eco-

nomic situation—large-scale unemployment among the urban proletariat and huge deficits in the autonomous "socialist" enterprises, especially the more or less collectivized farms. Boumedienne placed particular emphasis on maintaining close relations with France in order to retain the priority in receiving technical assistance and large-scale financial aid which Ben Bella had obtained for Algeria. This was part of the program of assistance to the newly independent countries of the "third world," by which President Charles de Gaulle had constituted France as their protector and, to some extent, partner.

Franco-Algerian relations were not affected when a number of French Marxists, who had come to Algeria in connection with the technical-assistance program, supported the Communist resistance because of their sympathies for Ben Bella. These were kept in prison for a time and then sent back to France. Their discomfiture did not seriously disturb French public opinion or discredit the Boumedienne regime in France.

The signing in July 1965 of the Franco-Algerian oil agreements, after 18 months of negotiations, was a success for Boumedienne which largely made up for the postponement of the Afro-Asian conference. The new arrangements were advantageous to Algeria, for they brought most of the benefits of a nationalization of mineral resources without its costs, which were shouldered by France.

Nothing came of the regime's hopes and efforts to bring about greater rapprochment with the liberal bourgeoisie and the non-socialists. Discussions for this purpose were held with Ferhat Abbas, once the leader of the provisional government of the Algerian republic and later president of the National Assembly, whom Ben Bella had disgraced, violently denounced as an agent of the bourgeoisie, and finally placed in forced residence. From these discussions it was apparent that there was no possibility of an agreement, and that a development similar to that of Tunisia under Bourguiba could not as yet be expected. (Boumedienne did, however, show a genuine desire for unity of the Maghreb. This had been completely abandoned by Ben Bella, who made war on Morocco and constituted himself the champion of revolutions all over the world.)

Boumedienne had no greater success in making peace with Ben Bella's "socialist" opponents, such as the followers of Hocine Aït-Ahmed (condemned to death but pardoned by Ben Bella in April), who had been in a state of permanent insurrection (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 479). But there was nevertheless a sort of armistice with the rebels, and there was no longer an armed guerrilla movement such as had existed throughout the latter part of Ben Bella's regime. Boumedienne's Communist-line opponents did not have enough popular support to set up armed underground groups and were unable to do more than harass the government. By comparison with the political repression which existed under Ben Bella, with its use of torture and summary justice, the methods used and the sentences imposed by the Boumedienne regime against Ben Bella's followers and the Communists could not be regarded as very severe.

At the end of 1965 the regime still lacked a constitutional basis or dem-

ocratic sanction, or even a conventional structure. Ben Bella, in secret confinement was legally still president of the republic. Yet, the regime sought to respect the norms of justice, mindful that the principal justification for the coup had been Ben Bella's despotism and arbitrary rule.

In November the Afro-Asian conference was formally postponed by the Afro-Asian foreign ministers, this time indefinitely. But this could hardly be considered as a reversal for Boumedienne, since Algeria was not responsible for it. The postponement was related to the Soviet diplomatic victory over Peking when Nasser advocated Russia's admission to the conference, and to Chinese maneuvers to secure Afro-Asian unity on an anti-American basis.

The attitude of the Algerians at the Arab summit conference in Casablanca was one of relative moderation (p. 432), and, although their hostility toward Israel did not diminish, it showed a commendable difference from Ben Bella's outspoken belligerency. It may also be noted that the Algerian press took a moderate line in the Arab world's attack on President Bourguiba of Tunisia for daring to contemplate the possibility of peace with Israel. Several semi-official sources stated that Boumedienne preferred Morocco's and Tunisia's position of maintaining relations with West Germany after Bonn established diplomatic relations with Israel. But Ben Bella had broken off relations, and Boumedienne was committed to continue this policy.

In December Colonel Boumedienne went to Moscow for negotiations on military aid and technical assistance. This official visit indicated that the Soviet Union had more or less abandoned hope for the return to power of its Lenin Peace Prize winner, Ben Bella. Communist anti-Boumedienne propaganda immediately diminished.

Islam

A number of young Moslems who had acquired the habit of publicly drinking alcoholic beverages in violation of Koranic law were prosecuted in November. Dozens of cafés were closed, and several persons were tried and convicted for serving alcohol to Moslems. A press campaign was unleashed not only against the proscribed drinking, but also against nihilism, hedonism, and the unreserved adoption by some young Algerians of the "dissolute" ways of the West. There was insistence that Islamic morality was an essential part of the Algerian personality, and that a bad Moslem was therefore a bad Algerian. Even the French-language press of FLN, the official government party, stressed the necessity of an Islamic revival. This campaign contrasted sharply with the situation in neighboring Tunisia, where the authorities encouraged an anti-traditionalist modernism, especially extensive freedom for women.

What was happening in Algeria was an understandable outgrowth of a developing national consciousness. Under the French regime, there had been a significant de-Islamization of the cities. Since, according to a stubbornly maintained myth, Algeria was part of France, the dominant morality was secularist. Islamic law was religious, with no power of compulsion, and Moslems could violate it with immunity by serving and drinking alcohol,

eating during the Ramadan fast, etc. Such violations occurred only rarely in small communities, where social pressure was strong, but they were more and more frequent in the anonymity of the great cities during the last phase of the colonial regime, which saw a general relaxation of morals.

The regime that came to power in June 1965, wishing to be a government of stabilization and sobriety, naturally turned to the law of the Prophet as the basis of all morality in an Islamic land. The rehabilitation of Islam opened the way to a general revalidation of religious ethics. It had its effect also on the small remaining Jewish community by serving as a stimulus to the preservation of Judaism, to the extent that this is possible among Algeria's Jews.

Jewish Community

In 1965 there was no notable change in the Jewish community (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 481–82). The political events of June did not directly affect the Jews. The Jewish youth of Algiers and Oran did not take part in the tumultuous student demonstrations for Ben Bella. Occasionally Jewish names appeared in connection with anti-Boumedienne activities, but those involved were dejudaized and pro-Communist intellectuals who had no contact with the Jewish community.

On the whole, the change of regime was received with relief by the Jews, since under Boumedienne there were no longer incessant anti-Israel tirades or spectacular and venomous "Palestine weeks," as in February 1964 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 479). To be sure, the virulent anti-Zionism of Ben Bella had never seriously affected them. But it created a constant uneasiness, and one never knew where it might lead.

The number of Jews in Algeria was estimated to be about 4,000. No one attempted a systematic count. Aside from its regular members, the community knew only those who for one reason or another made themselves known to it. Isolated Jews were lost in the small communities. In 1965 there were some departures for France, mainly for economic reasons.

Charles Hababou continued to serve as president of the Federation of Communities, whose activities were strictly confined to religion and philanthropy. Whenever requests for assistance were received, Rabbi Gilbert Seror traveled from Algiers to all parts of the country to perform circumcisions and officiate at *bar mitzvahs,* marriages, and funerals. Kosher meat was supplied principally from Oran.

Sabbath services were possible only in the large cities of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. On all the Jewish holidays services were held in the few synagogues still open. Services were usually attended by older men and women. In the large cities, with a thousand or more Jews, they made every effort to hand down their religious tradition to their children. But a Jewish child born in 1960 in a medium-sized city such as Philippeville or Tiaret, and remaining there, had little chance of learning to decipher even one word of Hebrew.

ARNOLD MANDEL