

# American Public Opinion

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**F**OR FOUR WEEKS, beginning May 15, 1967, when Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq began mobilizing their forces against Israel, until June 10, when the six-day war ended, most Americans were caught up in Middle East events. The Israeli-Arab crisis affected Americans more deeply than any foreign conflict—except, of course, the war in Vietnam—partly because it was a microcosm reflecting the larger conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The conflict aroused in American Jews unpredictably intense feelings regarding Israel, Jewish survival, and their own sense of Jewish identity. The relatively cool responses from official Catholic and Protestant spokesmen had unforeseen and dramatic consequences for relations between Jews and Christians. Finally, the crisis, especially because of what was called its parallels with the war in Vietnam, created deep and lasting divisions among a wide variety of leftist parties and organizations in the United States.

## PUBLIC OPINION

*Time* (June 16, 1967), in a story on the American reaction to the six-day war, asserted that “there was little doubt as to where the majority of Americans stood.” To the extent that Americans knew about the crisis, they were in the main on Israel’s side.

### *Public-opinion Polls*

The first polls, released when the war was over but obviously taken before the war, showed that public opinion favored Israel. A Gallup poll, released June 11, found that 59 per cent of a national sample were aware of and knew something about the conflict. When asked about their sympathies, 55 per cent said they were with Israel, compared with only four per cent who said their sympathies were with the Arabs. Forty-one per cent were undecided, or expressed no particular sympathy for either side.

A Harris poll taken immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, released June 10, showed that 41 per cent of a national cross section were more sympathetic with the Israelis, 1 per cent was sympathetic with the Arabs, 40 per cent had no strong feelings either way, and 18 per cent were not sure.

Forty-six per cent thought the Israelis were right, while only 4 per cent held that the Arabs were right. When asked which side wanted to start the war, 63 per cent blamed the Arabs, contrasted with only 16 per cent who thought Israel wanted to start the war.

Both polls showed that most Americans did not want the United States to become directly involved in the conflict. According to Gallup, 41 per cent said the United States ought to stay out of the conflict; 16 per cent thought that the United States ought to support Israel short of military involvement; 14 per cent thought the United States ought to negotiate for peace, without specifying how; 11 per cent thought the United States should work through the United Nations. Only 5 per cent thought the United States should send American troops to support Israel. Though the Harris poll showed substantial differences from the Gallup poll in some responses, it reinforced the findings that Americans did not want the United States to become involved in a Middle East war. According to Harris, 77 per cent of the respondents said that the United States should work through the United Nations; ten per cent felt that the United States should send supplies, but not troops, to Israel. When asked if they would favor or oppose America's sending troops and military supplies to back Israel in the war, only 24 per cent said they favored sending American troops to aid Israel, 56 per cent were opposed, and 20 per cent were not sure. Though most Americans thought that the United States should work through the United Nations, 49 per cent believed that the United Nations had not been effective in dealing with the Middle East crisis.

According to a July 8 Gallup poll, 57 per cent of a national sample thought that the Israelis and Arabs ought to work out their own formula for peace; 36 per cent felt that the United Nations should have the final say in peace plans. When asked whether Israel should be required to give back all or some of the Arab land it had occupied during the war, 24 per cent said Israel should keep all the land and 49 per cent said Israel should keep some of it; only 15 per cent said that Israel should give it all back; 12 per cent had no opinion.

A Harris poll, released July 10, showed that a majority of Americans supported Israel's principal conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. Eighty-eight per cent said Israel should be guaranteed the right to send her ships through the Gulf of Aqaba; 86 per cent thought Israel should be given freedom of passage through the Suez Canal; 82 per cent felt that the Arab nations should recognize Israel as a state; and 62 per cent disagreed with a statement that Israel should withdraw all her forces from Arab territory before other issues would be settled. When asked how they felt about Russia's efforts to have the United Nations condemn Israel as an aggressor, 79 per cent expressed disagreement, 7 per cent favored such condemnation, and 14 per cent were not sure.

A Harris poll in July found that 70 per cent of respondents favored having Jerusalem under international control, 10 per cent supported Israel's return-

ing control of the city, and 20 per cent were not sure. But in September, according to a Harris poll released October 9, 43 per cent felt Israel should continue to control Jerusalem, only 33 per cent still favored international control, and 24 per cent were not sure.

Even before the emergence of Israel as an independent state, Americans have generally been more sympathetic to Israel (or to Palestinian Jews aspiring to statehood) than to the Arab states.<sup>1</sup> In part, this favorable attitude was the residue of sympathy for Jewish suffering during the Holocaust and for Jewish homelessness. In part, it was elicited by the courage and determination of a little nation vastly outnumbered by aggressive enemies bent on its destruction. The sympathy was reinforced by the image of Israel as an outpost of Western democracy in the Middle East. Over the years, as the Arab states tried to gain worldwide political leverage by playing off Russian against American interests in the Middle East, Americans tended to become even less sympathetic toward the Arabs.

### *The Press*

Israel's spectacular military victory reinforced favorable American attitudes toward Israel. Unlike the Suez-Sinai conflict in 1956, this time the issues were clearly of right against wrong, of aggression versus survival. Furthermore, Russia's strident support of the Arabs and malevolence toward Israel served to strengthen American mistrust of the Arabs and faith in Israel's political integrity. The swift progress of the war and Israel's decisive military victory solidified America's moral support for Israel. Israel had managed to win without the help of American armed forces. Her military feat had given America a remarkable political advantage without any appreciable cost. The Soviet Union had been revealed for all to see as the world power that had been the threat to world peace; the United States appeared as the world power committed to peace and stability.

The nation's press, like national public opinion, did not advocate American military intervention in the Middle East, though there was considerable discussion comparing American interest and commitment in Southeast Asia with American interest and commitment in the Middle East. When war broke out on June 5, editorial sympathy tended toward Israel. The *Wall Street Journal* which on May 24 declared the Middle East conflict to be peripheral to American interest and a "good place to begin a policy of greater military restraint," was moved to remark, on June 6, despite its coolness for Israel:

It is saddening that at this late stage of human history certain states refuse to recognize the right of another to exist, especially when the Israelis have given numerous indications that they would, if permitted, cooperate with their Arab neighbors in building a better life for the whole area.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Charles Herbert Stember *et al.*, *Jews in the Mind of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 171-196.

The New York *Daily News*, whose anti-foreignism and isolationism are matched only by its anti-Communism, commented the day after war broke out that "most Americans seem likely to sympathize with Israel, a small nation and a brave one." On June 8, the day after Israel had swept within 18 miles of the Suez Canal, captured Sharm-el Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, taken the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, and gained control of the West Bank of the Jordan River, the *Daily News* argued editorially that "to the victors belong the spoils." Using the voice of a fictional character, Cussin' Cousin J. Fussen Rasmussen, the editorial declared:

"I mean let the Israelis keep most if not all of the territory they've overrun this week, and the hell with squawks and squeals from Nasser, Syria, Jordan, the UN, or anybody else.

"And I'm not being overly pro-Israeli or anti-Arab. I'm merely talking common sense."

Israel generally enjoyed a favorable press during the conflict, though it was rather cool at the outset, no doubt because editors feared American military intervention. It was in fact more favorable than it had ever been, particularly among conservative newspapers impressed by Israel's military prowess. (Jokes abounded about the possibility of General Moshe Dayan's helping the United States win a victory in Vietnam.)

The most notable gain for Israel in editorial opinion came from the Luce publications, particularly *Time* and *Life*. For years both journals had been consistently pro-Arab, their criticism of Israel focusing on the Arab refugees and the status of Jerusalem. They had frequently criticized United States policy because it appeared to favor Israel over the Arab states. It seemed the six-day war effected a dramatic change in these long-held views. (Or was the change a consequence of Henry Luce's death in March?) A *Time* essay, "On Facing the Reality of Israel" (June 23), concluded:

The sad persistence of the Arab attitude is perhaps the strongest argument for Israel's need to protect itself. Since the U.N. has shown its inability to protect them, Israelis argue that they can give up the real estate they deem essential to their security only if the Arabs agree to peace—and to reality.

Another *Time* essay, "Arabia Decepta: A People Self-Deluded" (July 14), reflected disappointment in the Arabs, taking an unromantic, hardheaded view of them:

... for two decades, Arab leaders have been interested in mounting suicidal wars against Israel. If the Arabs truly weighed their own self-interest after their latest, disastrous defeat, they would face facts—or so a Westerner would reason—accept Israel's extended hand, and join in desert-blooming projects that could lift the whole Middle East to unprecedented heights of peace and prosperity. To begin this process, they would not need suddenly to embrace the Israelis, or grovel to them; they would need only to acknowledge the country's right to exist. What ails them? Are they really a case of arrested development, doomed for generations to the kind of emotional and political instability that makes the Middle East one of the world's danger zones?

Israel's incredible military victory and the Arab defeat generated jokes, cartoons, posters, and comic books, many of dubious taste, which reflected the unexpectedness in associating Jews, typically pacific people, with extraordinary military prowess.

### *Public Officials*

Thousands of Americans, no doubt mostly Jews, addressed an enormous volume of letters and telegrams on behalf of Israel to President Lyndon B. Johnson and to their Congressmen and Senators. The President's standard reply was:

I am grateful that you shared your thoughts and feelings with me during the difficult and anxious days of the crisis in the Middle East.

We worked hard to bring about a cease-fire.

We shall work with all our capacity to try to bring lasting peace in the area.

During the last two weeks of May, dominant opinion in the Senate reflected that in the country at large: the Middle East crisis was one that should be settled by the United Nations. Senator J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on May 23 described the conflict as a "classic case" for the United Nations because of "multilateral interests" in the area. Many Senators agreed, and no one urged unilateral action on behalf of Israel.

According to an Associated Press survey, published June 16, of the 438 members of Congress who answered a questionnaire on the Middle East, 364 (42 Senators and 322 Representatives) expressed the unqualified opinion that Israel should get assurances of national security and access to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba before withdrawing troops from Arab territory. Of the remainder, 41 gave qualified responses and 33 declined to give any view.

In response to mail from their constituents, both before and after the war, many Congressmen and Senators gave verbal support for Israel, condemned Communism, and praised American nonintervention. Rep. Edward J. Gurney's (D., Fla.) letters of reply read:

The President has my complete support in bringing to bear the full prestige and influence of the United States in bringing peace to the Middle East.

We have two sinister influences at work causing trouble in the Middle East. Egypt's Nasser is a power-bent dictator with dreams of a great Empire in the Middle East with him at the head. He is cut out of the same cloth as every other conquerer throughout history. I hope Israel gives him a good lesson, and it looks as though they are. Nasser is no friend of ours.

The other influence is Russian Communism seeking to stir up trouble in the East while the United States is occupied in Viet Nam. It is certainly not in the interests of the United States to have Russia succeed in her latest efforts of troublemaking.

The President should take a firm stand on freedom of the seas in the Gulf

of Aqaba waters and the Suez Canal, and I would support him in that also.

It looks to me as though the spunky little nation of Israel is well able to take care of herself. I hope so.

The most impressive statement about Israel, inspired by its achievements in the conflict, was made by former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at a luncheon in New York on the occasion of the publication of the second volume of his memoirs, *The Blast of War* (Harper & Row). John Barkham, editor of the *Saturday Review* Book Service for Newspapers, asked about the sort of future Macmillan envisioned for Britain, now that the empire was gone. Should Britain be another Sweden, or another Athens? Macmillan replied:

Not another Athens. The people who suggest that have not read their history. Athens was based on slave labor, ran a powerful empire, fought great wars, and eventually decayed and died. It may well be that Britain will someday follow in the footsteps of Sweden, but if so I'm glad I won't be here to see it.

No, the future I hope for Britain is more like that of Israel. In the time of Elizabeth we were only two million people, in the time of Marlborough, only five or six million, in the time of Napoleon, only ten million. The other day, while the world debated, Israel's three million imposed their will on their enemies. They had what any great people need—resolution, courage, determination, pride. These are what really count in men and nations.<sup>2</sup>

### THE JEWISH RESPONSE

American Jews, like Jews elsewhere in the world outside Israel, experienced a trauma, perhaps best diagnosed as a reliving of the Holocaust in an eerie awareness of once again being put to the ultimate test. In the words of one observer:

the immediate reaction of American Jewry to the crisis was far more intense and widespread than anyone could have foreseen. Many Jews would never have believed that grave danger to Israel could dominate their thoughts and emotions to the exclusion of all else. <sup>3</sup>

No study was undertaken at that time, no probing of the inner feelings and thoughts of American Jews. But it is generally agreed that the Holocaust was the underlying catalyst.<sup>4</sup> American Jews have been afflicted with a deep sense of guilt. With the passage of time, their very survival when millions of others Jews were murdered and, even worse, their failure to rescue more than a miniscule number of European Jews have increasingly tormented them. Long suppressed, these guilt feelings began to emerge in 1961, with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel. That trial focused discussion not only on German genocide, but also on questions of morality and politics—obe-

<sup>2</sup> *Saturday Review*, January 27, 1968, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Arthur Hertzberg, "Israel and American Jewry," *Commentary*, August 1967, pp. 69-73.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *ibid.*; Morris Laub, "Jewish Feeling and Christian Understanding," *Congress Bi-Weekly*, January 22, 1968, pp. 9-12.

dience to unjust laws and superior orders, as well as the cooperation of Jewish leadership with the Germans and the alleged passivity of the Jewish victims. The publication in 1963 of Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* made exploration of these questions both more painful and disputatious. That discussion, especially on the morality of "obedience to superior orders," in turn was applied, especially by young people who had not themselves experienced the period of the Holocaust, to American involvement in the war in Vietnam.

American Jews surprised even themselves by their intense response to the six-day war. Yet the surprise itself was a phenomenon of that response. Previous studies have shown a near-universal sentiment for Israel among American Jews. A 1948 survey of Baltimore Jews showed an extraordinary sense of Jewish solidarity: 95 per cent felt that American Jews should help the Jews in Palestine, "even if the United States does not help" them.<sup>5</sup> A survey conducted ten years later among Jews living in a highly acculturated Midwestern suburb showed that 65 per cent of the respondents would feel a "very deep" sense of loss "if the Arab nations succeed in carrying out their threat to destroy Israel," 25 per cent would experience "some" sense of loss; only 10 per cent said they would feel no sense of loss. About 70 per cent explained that sense of loss as an expression of their feeling of Jewish identity.<sup>6</sup>

As the Arabs began to close in on Israel in the second half of May, American Jews, so frequently accused of indifference and passivity, turned into a passionate, turbulent, clamorous multitude, affirming in unprecedented fashion that they were part of the Jewish people and that Israel's survival was their survival. The Arabs had pledged Israel's destruction. Ahmed Shukairy, leader of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army, had declared on June 1, in Amman, Jordan: "When the Arabs take Israel, the surviving Jews will be helped to return to their native countries; but I figure there will be very few survivors." For the second time in a quarter of a century the Jewish people was facing annihilation. But this time, somehow, things would be different. There would be no passivity, no timidity. That was the mood of American Jews.

### *Moods and Feelings*

The moods, feelings, and spontaneous and organized actions of American Jews testified to their sense of Jewish solidarity and their commitment to Jewish survival. At first, anxiety and tension were commonplace reactions. As the crisis deepened, irritability and nervousness became more marked.

<sup>5</sup> Marshall Sklare and Benjamin B. Ringer, "A Study of Jewish Attitudes Toward the State of Israel," in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 440.

<sup>6</sup> Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 215-216.

American Jews were sleeping less, listening more and more to radio and television, waiting, worrying, wondering why the Israelis were waiting.

Even before war broke out on June 5, the hunger for news seemed insatiable, and during the war it assumed epidemic proportions. The volume of transistor radios on New York's streets, rattling off news reports and bulletins, seemed sometimes almost to drown out the city's habitual noises. Strangers asked each other if there was news. Day and night people sat before their television sets watching the emergency sessions of the United Nations Security Council, whose protocol became familiar and comic, but whose impotence was exasperating, even agonizing.

American Jews with relatives and friends in Israel clogged the telephone lines with long-distance calls; even before war broke out, calls to Israel had to be booked three weeks in advance. The callers were anxious for personal and political news, but, even more, they wanted to communicate to the Jews in Israel their feelings of solidarity.

Jews congregated. They went to more meetings than ever before and they went in unprecedented numbers to the synagogue. Reports from all over the country indicated that attendance on the Sabbaths before and after the war approached that on Yom Kippur. Before the war, Jews went to pray for the survival of Israel, and afterwards, to give thanks. The reunification of Jerusalem and reports that Jews were once again praying at the Western Wall exposed latent religious feelings among American Jews who had regarded themselves as secularists: "With the Israeli war there was a reassertion of an old Jewish feeling about God and Providence, of a kind that we have not seen in many years—in the United States as well as in Israel."<sup>7</sup>

Jews kept asking what they could do, always with a frightening sense of impotence, fearful of the fate of a collective Auschwitz for the Jews in Israel.<sup>8</sup> There was talk of airlifting children, women, elderly people out of Israel before the fighting would begin, before the Arab destruction would start. Yet everyone knew that such attempts at rescue, even of children, would be regarded as defeatism, hardly calculated to raise Jewish morale in Israel or elsewhere in the world.

Israel's military victory brought elation and pride, but, even more, release from tension, gratitude, a sense of deliverance. Of course the pride was one of being victorious, a new kind of pride in being Jewish, in the aura that radiated from General Moshe Dayan, his ruggedness, vigor, determination. Many Jews took pride in the changed image of the Jew, no longer seen as victim or the historic typification of a persecuted people. To be sure, there

<sup>7</sup> Milton Himmelfarb, "In the Light of Israel's Victory," *Commentary*, October 1967, pp. 53-61.

<sup>8</sup> Expressive of this mood was a letter written June 1, the day after Israel's mobilization, by Rabbi Leonard J. Mervis, of the Oak Park (Ill.) Temple B'nai Abraham Zion, to members of his congregation:

This is the most important letter I have written in my 28 years as Rabbi. . . We Jews must get together, not only to be informed, but to consider what we must do to support Israel in this very disturbing situation. If we Jews will not help, who will?

was ridicule at the ignominious performance of the Arab armies and some gloating and boasting. But more characteristic of the Jewish response was a rabbi's reminder that "All military victories are purchased with human life, and this one was no exception."<sup>9</sup> He quoted a Midrash: At the crossing of the Red Sea, with the Israelites safe on dry land and the Egyptians drowning, the angels began to sing a hymn of thanksgiving; but the Lord rebuked them, saying: "The work of My hands are drowning in the sea, and would you sing hymns?"

### *The Financial Outpouring*<sup>10</sup>

It seemed as if there was nothing American Jews could do except give money for Israel. This they did on a sacrificial level, surpassing even the highwater mark of 1948 giving. Not only did they give, but they did not wait to be solicited. In fact, in hundreds of cities across the country the givers goaded and stimulated the fund raisers to more, and more intensive, fund raising. That unsolicited giving was unparalleled in philanthropic experience. Then there occurred the extraordinary phenomenon of large numbers of people personally bringing their contributions to the campaign offices. They felt compelled to do this physical act, as if by bringing the money they, too, were participating in a real physical way in the crisis. Perhaps they felt that writing a check and mailing it was too easy, too uninvolved.

What exactly did people think they were accomplishing with their contributions? Did they imagine they were buying arms, tanks, planes for Israel? Were they providing for a new wave of refugees? The speed with which the war was concluded made it appear unlikely that Jews felt their contributions would help ensure Israel's physical survival. Perhaps many were not thinking realistically of what their money was going to be used for; perhaps for many their contributions were in expiation for their indifference 25 years earlier.

In less than a month—from the time the crisis began until the war ended—UJA raised over \$100 million (pp. 305–306). Community after community reported that campaign offices were unable to keep pace in tabulating the contributions that kept pouring in. New York's UJA had been swamped by contributions beyond the capacity of staff and volunteers. Several banks made available 40 employees for two days to help UJA catch up with its receipts. All Jewish organizations postponed their own fund-raising campaigns and urged their members to give for Israel.

No evaluation of the characteristics of contributors and no analysis of size of contributions were available, but it was obvious that regular contributors

<sup>9</sup> Rabbi Mark S. Shapiro (Congregation B'nai Yehoshua Beth Elohim, Morton Grove, Ill.), *Bulletin*, June 1967.

<sup>10</sup> I wish to thank Mr. Marc Tabatchnik of the United Jewish Appeal for giving me access to UJA teletypes during June 1967 and sharing his impressions with me. I am grateful also to Mr. Dan S. Rosenberg, of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, for providing me with the series of Council reports, *Israel Crisis* (June 5–August 8, 1967).

gave more than they had ever given before and that many new contributors emerged, who were giving to UJA for the first time in their lives. Funds were tripled or quadrupled in comparison to previous years. In St. Louis, for example, a normally generous contributor gave, in addition to the usual amount, \$5,000 worth of securities. In San Francisco, a \$7,000 contributor gave \$30,000; an \$8,000 donor gave \$20,000.

At a UJA luncheon meeting in New York on the day the war began, a million dollars a minute was pledged within fifteen minutes for the Israel Emergency Fund. That night in Chicago another \$2.5 million was raised, in Atlanta the following night \$1.1 million more was pledged.

Reports from Philadelphia were typical of the experiences of federations and welfare funds throughout the country. People continued to stream into the offices with their unsolicited contributions. Elderly people without checking accounts came in with cash. Secretaries brought their contributions during lunch hours. Children donated their coin banks and bags of pennies. Students offered to give up their vacations, volunteering their services to the community. Boy Scout troops and youth clubs were turning over their treasuries. Many schools canceled graduation parties and held graduation ceremonies without caps and gowns and gave the savings to the Israel Emergency Fund.

Synagogues in Essex County, N.J., set up telephone squads to reach their members for support of the Israel Emergency Fund. One synagogue, which in its hundred-year history had never had a fund-raising appeal at services, did so for the emergency fund. An Essex County country club closed its golf course on Sunday morning and conducted a fund-raising meeting instead. (That particular strategy was used all over the country. The Board of Directors of the Los Angeles Hillcrest Country Club ruled that all its members must contribute to the Emergency Fund.) Chicago, notoriously laggard in Jewish giving, raised over \$9 million for the Israel Emergency Fund. A tremendous outpouring of mass giving supported the large contributors.

As a public service, a Cleveland bank set aside \$1,000,000 for loans to individuals, who otherwise would have been unable to pay their UJA pledges, at an interest rate one-half per cent below the prime rate.

In the small Jewish community of Norfolk, Va., over a million dollars was raised at six parlor meetings, more than twice the amount reached in the previous annual campaign. All synagogues scheduled prayer meetings, many immediately followed by fund raising. In Charleston W.Va., another small community, contributors paid up all their past commitments, many borrowing money to do so.

Louis Stulberg, president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, announced on June 8 that his union would purchase a million dollars worth of Israel bonds as an initial step to aid Israel in the present emergency.

It even appeared that some of the top leaders of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism did not remain untouched. On July 16 the New York

*Times* published an article on the Council. It said that some of the organization's leaders looked upon the June war as an act of Israeli "aggression," and upon the "massive Jewish support for Israel in America as amounting to 'hysteria.'" Three days later the *Times* reported the repudiation of this position by Donald S. Klopfer, vice chairman of Random House; Joseph H. Louchheim, deputy commissioner in charge of the New York city division of the State Department of Social Welfare; John Mosler, chairman of Mosler Safe Company; Walter N. Rothschild, Jr., president of Abraham & Straus department store, and Stanley Marcus, president of Neiman-Marcus company in Dallas. They or their spokesmen emphasized their current sympathy for Israel, backed up by substantial contributions to the Israel Emergency Fund or other Israeli causes during or right after the fighting. Several announced their intention of resigning from the Council; all others said they were reviewing their membership.

The outpouring of contributions was accompanied by anecdotes, accounts, tales about the givers. In Boston a woman about to enter the hospital for major surgery wrote: "Here is my contribution. Give me some cards and I'll make calls from my bed." The owner of two gas stations in New York turned over to the UJA the deeds to the stations as his contribution to the emergency fund. Other contributors donated the cash-surrender values of their life-insurance policies. Another story reported at UJA headquarters concerned a well-dressed man who almost timidly approached a clerk's desk to say he was pledging another \$100,000: "I am now going to give my friends a talk. If the Israelis can give their blood, we can give what we have." The day before he had contributed \$100,000.

Jewish soldiers in Vietnam donated considerable amounts of money. There were reports of virtually 100 per cent backing and admiration for the Israeli army among the United States troops in Vietnam.

In the New York metropolitan area teen-age volunteers, with coin boxes and shopping bags, solicited contributions at subway and bus-terminal entrances. Four *yeshivah* students stood at Broadway and 42nd Street, holding the corners of a bedsheet and soliciting funds: "There is no food being produced in Israel. All able-bodied men are at the front. Give for medical supplies, for food and shelter for the children."

Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York offered to pay the salaries of doctors for up to three months while they served in Israel. Eight doctors immediately volunteered, but only one was able to leave before the war began. The hospital paid the transportation of the Israeli nurses on staff who returned to Israel. It helped obtain critically important medical equipment for Israel. Staff doctors conducted a campaign among their colleagues, as did the medical social workers, collecting many times the usual amounts.

There were numerous reports of people who cashed securities and insurance policies so that they could give larger contributions. All over the country con-

tributions to UJA were made in lieu of customary anniversary, birthday, bar mitzvah, Father's Day, and graduation gifts.

On June 5 Saul H. Lieberman, Professor of Talmud at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, issued the following statement "for all Jews in the world and, in particular, for the members of the Rabbinical Assembly and the congregants of the United Synagogue":

The Jewish people has never in its history passed through an hour of such danger. Its entire existence is gravely threatened. The people of Israel have the privilege to give their lives to preserve the very existence of the nation. The best that we Jews in America can do is to support them with our money. This day is our great opportunity, one that may never repeat itself, to help save *Klal Yisrael*. Mrs. Lieberman and I, in addition to over \$5,000 which we have already personally given to the Israel Emergency Fund, are thus adding, in cash, \$20,000 more. We call on all Jews for comparable action.

He concluded with a quotation from Psalms (20:8), "Some trust in chariots, and some in horses; But we will make mention of the name of the Lord our God."

### *The Organized Jewish Community*

As the Israeli crisis deepened in the last days of May, many Jews, frustrated at the political inactivity, asked their organizations what they could do. In response to such requests, the Boston Jewish Community Council, for instance, issued a leaflet suggesting that people could attend an Israel solidarity rally scheduled for June 4 on the Boston Common; send telegrams to President Johnson; pay their pledges to the UJA; buy Israel Bonds; and urge their friends to give moral and financial support to Israel.

Synagogues and Jewish community centers engaged in a variety of activities. Their personnel put aside their normal tasks and became part of the total community mobilization by helping to organize fund-raising campaigns and providing meeting and working space for volunteers, with hastily installed telephone batteries and office equipment. In St. Louis the Jewish Community Center organized a community-wide rally in its building. A three-mile traffic jam was created by the crowd heading for the rally. Jewish community centers that had never before been open on the Sabbath or festivals were crowded with volunteers working during the emergency, with the blessing of the local rabbis.<sup>11</sup>

Every Jewish organization worked on behalf of Israel. The American Red Magen David which supplies medical aid to Israel, was swamped with calls from people offering to give blood, donate first-aid supplies, ambulances, and other medical equipment. National Jewish organizations felt that their main function was to influence public opinion and inform the President and Congress what they hoped and expected the United States to do to save Israel

<sup>11</sup> Bernard Postal, *How the Jewish Community Centers Mobilized in Support of Israel* (New York: National Jewish Welfare Board, n.d.), 8 pp. (Mimeographed.)

from annihilation or slow strangulation. They issued information about the Middle East, fact sheets about Israel, documentation of Arab aggression. Though many did similar things, cooperation among all organizations was exceptional.

The central coordinating agency was the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, representing 21 national organizations and their local counterparts. On June 6 Dr. Joachim Prinz, chairman of the conference, issued a statement on its behalf, asking the United States government "to provide all necessary material assistance and political support in order to put an end for all time to Arab aggression—an aggression which for 20 years has threatened to destroy the State of Israel, imperiled the vital interests of the United States and jeopardized the peace of the world."

The conference sponsored a "national leadership emergency meeting" in Washington, D.C., on June 7; its participants visited members of Congress to mobilize support for Israel. It held a rally on June 8 at which about 40,000 people heard addresses by dozens of prominent Jewish leaders, Senators, Congressmen, civic and trade-union leaders. News announcements of the progress of the war and of diplomatic negotiations in the United Nations punctuated the proceedings, as reported from the platform and from the transistor radios to which many participants were listening. When Dr. Prinz announced the news of the first cease-fire, the crowd broke into cheers and demonstrations of excitement.

In Los Angeles a rally for Israel, held on July 11 at the Hollywood Bowl, drew 20,000 persons. Over 4,000 large and small gifts were pledged. Top government officials including Governor Ronald Reagan, Senator George Murphy, and Mayor Samuel Yorty joined in the rally, along with dozens of celebrities of the entertainment world.

The American Jewish Committee asked its members to urge non-Jewish community leaders and the mass media to issue statements, print editorials, and send telegrams to Washington on behalf of Israel. Influential AJC leaders in various states visited or wrote to their Senators and Congressmen.

The Jewish Labor Committee puts its main emphasis on generating public support for Israel in the labor movement. A strongly pro-Israel resolution was adopted by the San Francisco Labor Council. A number of San Francisco's largest unions, including the carpenters and teamsters, agreed to co-sponsor a local rally in support of Israel. On June 2, and again on June 5, AFL-CIO president George Meany declared that the trade-union movement would "stand side by side with Israel," and that the labor movement had an interest in the preservation of Israel "as a democracy in a part of the world where democracy is largely unknown."

On June 2, the American Association for Jewish Education (AAJE) circularized all Jewish schools, teachers, and principals, asking them to pledge all Keren Ami funds for the UJA Israel Emergency Fund. AAJE's estimated that several hundred thousands of dollars came from these funds. A few

days after the war began, AAJE convened a meeting of Jewish educators for the purpose of compiling a file of available personnel if Israel would require qualified people to assist in teaching and related fields. Several hundred men and women volunteered for such service.<sup>12</sup>

### *The Young: Students and Volunteers*

The impact of the Israeli crisis and war on young Jews was intense. Many were perplexed and dismayed that the events did not conform to their political notions. They found that their ideas of war which had been shaped by Vietnam were irrelevant to Israel. Views on pacifism, civil disobedience, resistance to government, and the inherent evil of military might were suddenly questioned. Unlike the confrontation in Vietnam, this was a just war, a war of self-defense against the threat of military genocide.

Some young people discovered the importance of being Jewish, as they found themselves impelled to take a stand. One young writer gave words to these feelings in a letter to the editor of the *Village Voice*:

I think it must have been this way for many of my generation, that the Israeli-Arab collision was a moment of truth. For the first time in my grown-up life, I really understood what an enemy was. For the first time, I knew what it was to be us against the killers.

Us. Two weeks ago, Israel was they; now Israel is we. I will not intellectualize it. I will not say that it is only because Israel was in the right during this brief war as I never felt my own country to be in the wars of my own life-time. I will not intellectualize it; I am Jewish; and the we has to do with more or less than the brotherhood of man, the bond of the good; it is a Jewish we. Something happened. I will never again be able to talk about how Judaism is only a religion, and isn't it too bad that there has to be such a thing as a Jewish state. I will never again say as I said two years ago: Yes, I feel sympathetic with Israel, but I would feel the same way if France were involved in this kind of crisis. I will never kid myself that we are only the things we choose to be. Roots count.

And I will never again claim to be a pacifist; I will never again say that if I had been an adult during World War II I might have been for non-intervention, or, if a man, been a conscientious objector. I have lost the purity of the un-tested, and when someday my children are very pure with me about how there is no reason for us not to buy a Porsche, I will argue with them the way my parents have had to argue with me: impurely, from the heart.

I was walking along the street listening to a transistor radio when I first heard that the Israelis, the Jews, had reached the Wailing Wall and with guns slung over their shoulders were praying there. No one was watching me, but I wept anyway. Sometimes even the tear-glands know more than the mind.<sup>13</sup>

An American girl studying in Israel decided to remain there when war was imminent. In a letter to her parents she wrote:

After learning all my life about Hitler and the destruction of the Jews and the rise of a Jewish state, I cannot just run out like this. There is so much to do

12 "AAJE Acts in June Emergency," *Jewish Education Newsletter*, October, 1967, p. 5.

13 Nancy Weber, "The Truth of Tears," *Village Voice*, June 15, 1967.

here. We are working with schools, youth groups, kibbutzim, and hospitals to fill the jobs that the men who are sent out from the reserves left vacant. I want to stay and do whatever I can so that the country can continue to function while others may have to fight. I feel it is my duty to my religion, my people, and my country, to stay here and do whatever I can.<sup>14</sup>

A UCLA student who had been in Israel during the war wrote:

I've always felt proud to be a Jew. Now I've got Jewish problems. I went to Israel because I owed it to some girl of 22 who might have been in Israel if she hadn't been killed by the Nazis or kept unwillingly in Russia. I am not a Zionist. But now that I'm safely home again, I wonder what I'm doing here. It's so easy to be Jewish in the United States. Jews can live without Israel; but Israel cannot survive without Jews.<sup>15</sup>

At the Bronx High School of Science, an elite public high school in New York City whose student body of 3,000 is about 85 per cent Jewish, a teacher reported that during the crisis the "students listened to news on their transistors, argued, prophesied, shouted protest, approval, regret, and joy. Israel seemed very present, their imminent exams worlds away."<sup>16</sup> Some of these students were asked to write brief candid statements about their feelings on the Israeli situation and their own emotional involvement. A girl, now at Brandeis University:

. . . I felt terrified. All of a sudden my Jewish background and the existence of Israel became important and I was afraid that Israel would be defeated; I didn't believe that she *could* win. I kept thinking of the many hardships that the Jewish people have had to endure and the tragedy that they have had to fight for a country of their own. I refused even to consider the Arabs' point of view; now, a month later, I can look at things objectively again. When Israel "won" so quickly, I had a strong feeling of pride. Unjustifiably, I felt the superiority of Jews over people of every other religion. I felt strong ties with Israel for the first time.

A serious young man:

Being against the war in Viet Nam (I have taken part in all the protest marches) for reasons of pacifism, I was very disturbed when Israel went to war. How could I be against war in one place and excuse it in another? Still the two wars were not alike. The United States is a big and powerful country which is attacking a small, weak one. The Arabs said over and over that they would destroy Israel. If Israel was not willing to fight, it would have been wiped out.

Still I do not see right only on one side. Arabs who have been living in the country for centuries have been driven from their homes. And I was very upset when it was reported that Israel was using napalm. (I hope it isn't true.) I was confused and I still am.

A student now at City College:

The Israeli-Arab war has had a schizoid effect on my emotions. On the one

14 Read by Carl Reiner at the Hollywood Bowl rally, June 11, 1967.

15 *Campus: A Hillel Newsletter*, Winter 1967.

16 Jack Luria, "As the Young Saw It," *Jewish Frontier*, October 1967, pp. 22-25.

hand, I find war and its inherent loss of life revolting and I could not and would not participate. On the other hand, I realize that Israel has been struggling for its existence while surrounded by hostile neighbors bent on her destruction, and I sympathize with Israel. The net result is that I sit home and curse war and the Arabs.

Their teacher concluded that their responses varied according to the strength of their feelings of Jewish identity. Yet none was indifferent, not even the hippies among them, who have been least involved in the real world.

When the Israel crisis was becoming acute, most college students were taking final examinations or preparing to leave campus. On June 5, when war actually broke out, many campuses were deserted, with only scattered groups of students, mostly graduate students, remaining. A survey of the responses of students still on campus showed that they, too, responded strongly and demonstratively: "The spirited concerns, emotional shock waves and eagerness for positive action that swept across the adult Jewish community during the Israel crisis was mirrored in the most striking expression of Jewish identification and responsibility that ever welled up on university and college campuses."<sup>17</sup>

Students volunteered to go to Israel for civilian service. They volunteered for local Jewish community service. They gave money and collected money. They signed petitions and solicited signatures. They attended teach-ins, prayer vigils, marches, and mass demonstrations. They wrote letters and sent telegrams to Congressmen and Senators.

Here are a few characteristic episodes. At Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, 500 students jammed the Hillel House to pick up applications for volunteer work in Israel. In fifteen minutes the 200 available applications were gone. One student commented, "My parents feel that Israel is worth saving. They are willing to let me go." Another said, "Being 18, we were born about the same time as the State of Israel. I feel we, in our generation, have an obligation to go." And a third, "I think we are at this moment at the crossroads of Jewish history. We must stand up and be counted."

At Wayne State University, Detroit, there was increased traffic at the Hillel House, where the radios were kept going to provide news. There were constant telephone inquiries. The question was always the same: is there news from Israel?

A thousand students attended a vigil for peace in the Middle East at the University of California at Los Angeles. About 200 students signed up for volunteer service in Israel.

At New York's City College, 100 students signed up in four hours for the Sherut La'am program in Israel. Questioned about his interest in Israel, one confessed to a feeling of guilt for never having done "anything for his people," and volunteered to distribute a leaflet about civilian service in Israel.

<sup>17</sup> Saul Goldberg, comp., *The Campus Response to the Israel Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation, 1967), 21 pp. (Mimeographed.)

He had headed a leftist extremist group on campus, had participated in campus sit-downs, and had even been suspended for participating in an illegal sit-down. Another volunteer said he was acting for moral reasons and because of ethnic ties with Israel. He thought that "in the Hitler era, people had stood aside and not helped," and that he personally intended to help his people where he could.

In all, about 7,500 young people volunteered for civilian service in Israel, though only a small proportion managed to get there before the war. In New York City, 510 volunteers answered a simple questionnaire distributed by the American Zionist Youth Foundation.<sup>18</sup> They were overwhelmingly college students or college graduates. Only seven per cent had not gone to college or were not attending college; a few of these were still in high school. The most significant information elicited from this questionnaire was that 80 per cent (406 respondents) had had some kind of Jewish education. More than half had attended a supplementary Hebrew afternoon school. About half of these had attended for six years or more, most of the others for three to five years. Over 30 per cent of the volunteers had attended all-day Jewish schools, most of them for eight years or more. The remaining volunteers had attended Sunday school, about 40 per cent of them for three to five years. Among volunteers 21 years old or younger, the largest proportion had gone to all-day Jewish schools. Obviously a strong relationship existed between Jewish education and the sense of Jewish identity that impelled these young people to volunteer. Furthermore, the more intensive Jewish education was more likely to produce more committed Jews.

Many volunteers reacted in a visceral way to the crisis. They wanted to do something right away. Once the war was over and the actual physical danger to Israel lessened, many young people no longer felt the same urgency about going overseas. One volunteer wrote:

I was aware of Israel's danger and wanted to offer my services. Now there is no danger and I cannot go. However, if there is a vital need for me in the future, please inform me.

Besides giving their vital statistics and some facts on their Jewish upbringing, some volunteers tried to explain their feelings. Curiously, those with less Jewish education and less previous Jewish commitment were more likely to explain their decision to volunteer. For example, a 21-year-old man, attending college part time, with four years of Hebrew school, who does not belong to a synagogue, and is not affiliated with any Jewish organization, said:

When I was driving to work I heard on the radio what had happened. . . I went to my office and could not work. Chills went through me and I knew that I must go and fight for my people. I am not very religious, but I knew that I had to try and help. I got my passport . . . but I could not get a visa because

<sup>18</sup> The questionnaires were kindly made available to the American Jewish Committee by Theodore Comet, the Foundation's director.

of the State Department. Since I would have given up my life for Israel, I would like to spend my next vacation there. I bought Israeli bonds with my vacation money this year.

**And a 20-year-old college girl, with minimal Jewish education:**

If ever Israel needs people to help I would like you to notify me. Since Israel is no longer in dire need of manpower, I must work in the United States to pay for my college education now.

**A 20-year-old college man, with practically no Jewish education, but active in the civil-rights movement:**

I consider myself a religious agnostic from a Jewish background. I believe in Israel and feel that several of my ideals may be represented there. It was on the basis of these ideals that I volunteered to fight and die during the past crisis. Someday I'll live in Israel for a while, but I don't want to make a social group out of everyone who wants to congratulate themselves for heroically volunteering to go to Israel.

**A 23-year-old college graduate, studying for an MA in business administration, with four years of Hebrew school and no membership in any Jewish group:**

It is obvious that I am neither a Zionist nor even a religious Jew. Yet there seemed no ethical alternative to volunteering to serve in Israel. I regret that I cannot participate in the reconstruction, but have every confidence that with God's help it will be successful.

**A 29-year-old college graduate, with a wife and small child, no Jewish education and no Jewish group association:**

When I first heard that Israel was at war with the Arabs, my being born a Jew meant something more to me than it ever had. I had to do something for the Jewish state of Israel. I served four years in the U.S. Navy. My wife would like to teach and I could work in a hospital or instruct sports.

**A 22-year-old college senior, with a Sunday school education:**

I called the Israel Embassy to see if I could enlist to fight. I have never in 22 years felt a strong Jewish attraction. As a matter of fact, at times I even rejected my heritage. For the first time in my life I was forced to resolve this problem within myself. I still have doubts as to what the "Zionist" movement stands for, but I felt obliged not just to sit back and see the State of Israel wiped off the map.

**A 25-year-old man, studying business administration and law in graduate school, without Jewish education:**

I volunteered to defend the existence of Israel but my services were not needed. I can be of greater use to Israel now by working here and donating to the UJA rather than on a kibbutz. But I would like to be apprised of Israel's needs in the future so I may do what I can and that includes my military knowledge. Shalom!

**A 22-year-old law student, without Jewish education:**

I am not religious, but quite aware of my Jewish identity. I became very upset when Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba. As soon as the fighting broke out, I tried to go to Israel. But then the travel ban was on. I would go to Israel now for six months, but draft and school obligations are in the way.

**A 31-year-old married man, with no Jewish education:**

At the time of Israel's crisis I felt, with a passion that I had previously not believed existed within me, the desire to help Israel in her time of peril. However, I now feel that my obligation here in this country is more important to me than whatever contributions I can now make by volunteering for service in Israel.

**A 20-year-old pre-medical college student, who had attended an all-day Jewish school and was active in the peace and civil-rights movements:**

Just felt the need to volunteer—an impulse based on some knowledge and a great deal of passion.

**An 18-year-old high-school girl, without any Jewish background:**

As you can see I have not been active in any kind of a group. Now that I am older I realize I would like to do something for my people. Going to Israel to help and work there would mean a great deal to me.

**A 20-year-old college student, with Sunday school education and Reform affiliation:**

I desire to make a contribution to the nation of my people. This is perhaps the one great chance of doing something really important in my life, something big and vital. Only a fool would turn such an opportunity down. My heart is with Israel and I want to be there.

**A 27-year-old college graduate, with ten years of Sunday school and Reform temple membership:**

The decision to go to Israel's aid was among the most important events in my life. In so doing, I was able both to discover and to affirm many aspects of myself.

***The Academics***

Though alienation from Judaism, the synagogue, and the Jewish community has been most prevalent among academics and intellectuals on college campuses, they responded to the crisis in much the same way as Jews with strong, or stronger, communal ties. At Yale University, for example, Rabbi Richard I. Israel, director of the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation, reported that the response of the Jewish faculty to a simple fund-raising appeal was so "incredible" that the experience was difficult to assimilate:

Our Jewish faculty, which in a good year gives between \$200 and \$400 to the Yale Jewish Appeal, three days after the letter was out had given over \$10,000.

I got a call for surgeons and anesthetists at noon on Thursday. By three o'clock that afternoon, thirteen senior faculty people from the medical school were packing their bags for the plane that night. I would never have believed it.<sup>19</sup>

In the tense days at the end of May, Jewish professors on several campuses began collecting signatures for a variety of petitions to rally opinion on behalf of Israel. A group of Cornell University faculty members, calling itself Ad Hoc Committee of American Professors, contacted colleagues on other campuses for signatures to a statement for publication as an ad in the *New York Times*. Within three days, 3,700 names were gathered and money was raised to pay for a two-page ad, scheduled to appear on July 8. (An additional 1,500 names came in after the ad went to press.) Meanwhile, war broke out, but the group felt that the statement was still valid because it clearly defined the strong feeling in the intellectual community that the United States was committed to safeguarding the integrity, security, and survival of Israel and its people:

As responsible members of the academic community, we must not stand by in silence in the face of Arab threats, illegal blockades and massive mobilization aimed at the destruction of the people and State of Israel.

It concluded: "Our generation has witnessed the monstrous result of silence," an implicit reference to the passivity of the Western world in the face of the Holocaust.

The professors' experience in gathering signatures encouraged them to establish an ongoing organization, and on July 11, 25 professors from 20 campuses met in New York to form the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East. An announcement of its formation was mailed to the 5,200 signees of the statement. Over 8,000 professors at 170 colleges and universities indicated interest in the committee, with promises of support, contributions, and volunteer assistance. Well-functioning groups were established on Boston, Baltimore-Washington, Los Angeles, Berkeley, Cornell, and other campuses. Elsewhere individual faculty members agreed to undertake responsibility on behalf of the organization. Allen Pollack, associate professor of history at the University of Pittsburgh and a central figure in organizing the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, became its secretary.

Besides a substantial minority of non-Jews, who believed in the justice of Israel's cause, the organization attracted mostly Jews. Among these were persons closely associated with Hillel and other on- and off-campus Jewish organizations, persons whose Jewish associations had been only lukewarm, and, finally, "new Jews," who had previously never identified themselves with the Jewish community, some who had not even regarded themselves as Jews. American Professors became the agency through which the lukewarm Jews and the "new Jews" could express their sense of identity with Israel and the Jewish community.

<sup>19</sup> Saul Goldberg, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.

American Professors undertook educational work to acquaint both the academic community and the American public with the nature of the underlying social and political issues in the Middle East. Faculty members organized speakers' bureaus and themselves spoke on the Middle East situation to campus and community groups. They prepared briefing kits and fact sheets, and produced reprints of useful materials. They wrote articles in their local newspapers, answered letters to the editor, and appeared on local radio and television programs.

On December 9 and 10, American Professors for Peace in the Middle East convened their first annual conference in New York. Several hundred members attended the sessions devoted to "The Middle East in the Contemporary World."

### THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE

The first public expression of Christian concern about Israel's fate came on May 28, when eight religious leaders, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox, appealed to President Johnson to honor American commitments in support of Israel's right of passage through the Strait of Tiran. A few days later and with four more signatures, that statement, "The Moral Responsibility in the Middle East," was widely printed in newspapers throughout the United States. Declaring at the outset that "men of conscience must not remain silent at this time," it called on "Americans of all persuasions and groupings and on the Administration to support the independence, integrity and freedom of Israel." It concluded that "the people of Israel have the right to live and develop in tranquility and without fear." It was signed by the Rev. John C. Bennett, president of Union Theological Seminary; the Rev. Robert McAfee Brown, professor of religion at Stanford University; the Rev. Thurston N. Davis, S.J., editor of *America*; the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Dr. Franklin H. Littell, president of Iowa Wesleyan College; Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, professor emeritus of Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary; James O'Gara, editor of *Commonweal*; Dr. Daniel Poling, chaplain of the Interfaith Memorial of the Four Chaplains; the Rev. Alexander Schmemmann, dean of St. Vladimir's Russian Orthodox Seminary; the Rev. John B. Sheerin, C.S.P., editor of the *Catholic World*; Bishop Stephen Gill Spotswood of Washington, D.C.; and Bishop Lloyd C. Wicke, former president of the Methodist Council of Bishops.

In the days before war broke out, a number of Catholic and Protestant clergymen issued individual or joint statements of conscience in support of Israel.<sup>20</sup> But the official Christian church establishments remained ambivalent or silent.

<sup>20</sup> See Judith Hershcopf Banki, *Christian Reactions to the Middle East Crisis: New Agenda for Interreligious Dialogue* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1968), 20 pp.

## Official Church Responses

At its spring business meeting in Boston, June 1-2, the General Board of the National Council of Churches (NCC) adopted a resolution supporting the United Nations peace-keeping functions in the Middle East. After the start of the war, NCC president Arthur S. Flemming sent to President Johnson a telegram of even-handed neutrality, calling for negotiation of all claims through the United Nations, "with particular attention to national and international rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, the rights of Arab refugees, and the recognition by all of the State of Israel."

R. H. Edwin Espy, NCC's Executive Secretary, who spoke at the pro-Israel rally in Washington, D.C., on June 8, was unable to complete his address when news of the cease-fire was announced. His expression of NCC's neutrality was subsequently published to "clarify the situation," that is, to reaffirm NCC's neutrality:

Our hearts are filled with compassion and concern for the people of Israel and of all the Middle East. Our identification is not of course exclusively with any one community, one belligerent, or one set of national aspirations. . . . Had we been invited to attend a corresponding meeting of the Arab community in the United States we would have been bound by our principles to bring the identical message—the plea for peace with justice and freedom which we derive from our Judeo-Christian heritage.<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement June 8, deploring the war and designating June 11 as a day of special prayer for peace. It was a masterpiece of abstract rhetoric, expressing no more than the bishops' support of Pope Paul's "fervent hope that the United Nations organization will be successful in halting the conflict."

On July 7 the NCC executive committee met in special session to consider the Middle East crisis. It adopted a six-point resolution, sounding deliberately neutral, yet unmistakably pro-Arab. The statement sharply criticized Israel's "territorial expansion by armed force" and "unilateral retention" of occupied lands. It declared that "acceptance by the international community" of the State of Israel was indispensable to peace. As for the Arab refugees, Israel must accept "significant responsibility for solving the refugee problem." NCC specifically expressed its disapproval of Israel's "unilateral annexation of the Jordanian portion of Jerusalem," and declared its support for "the establishment of an international presence" in the city. Its final section, "Reconciliation and Reconstruction," called for a variety of cooperative economic and development projects and, almost casually, endorsed "free trade and with it free access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal by all countries in the area."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> "National Council Position On Middle East," *The Christian Century*, June 21, 1967, pp. 804-805.

<sup>22</sup> "The Crisis In The Middle East," *The Interchurch News*, August-September, 1967, p. 4.

Representing some forty Protestant denominations and ten Orthodox churches, NCC may have had difficulty obtaining unanimity on so complex an issue from so diverse a group with a wide variety of specific interests. Perhaps one reason the NCC statement was so unfeeling with regard to Israel's survival and so carping in its criticism of Israel was that many of its member bodies have vested interests in the Middle East. Most have had active missionary programs for well over fifty years and have established in the area schools, hospitals, institutional homes, missions, and churches. Many own land and other properties. Besides, their close associations with the Arabs over many decades have made Protestant missionaries deeply sympathetic with the Arab cause. Late in June NCC set up a 40-member emergency task force for relief and welfare in the Middle East and most denominations developed their own programs.<sup>23</sup>

### *Jewish Disappointment, Christian Resentment*

Following Israel's military victory, Jewish religious leaders began to criticize the "organized Christian Church" for having failed to speak out more vigorously when Israel's existence was imperiled. Because Jewish-Christian relations had been exceptionally open and sincere in recent years, as inter-religious dialogue had become a channel for intergroup understanding, Jews may have had unrealistically high expectations of Christians, believing that Christians identified with them and shared their outlook.

At the annual meeting of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), June 22, Rabbi Balfour Brickner, director of its Commission on Interfaith Activities, charged that by failing to support the integrity of Israel, the "Christian establishment" had failed not only Jews, but also "the cause of world peace." Conceding there were notable individual exceptions among Christian clergy, he said the "organized Church seemed unable to take a strong stand on what it considered to be a political issue," though "the survival of the Jewish people [was] not a political issue."

Rabbi Pesach Z. Levovitz, president of the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), speaking at its annual meeting on June 26, called for a cessation of interfaith discussions until Christian leadership supported the territorial and political integrity of Israel in the Middle East. He expressed deep disappointment over the failure "of major segments of the world and American Christian communities to raise their voices in defense of Israel when before the outbreak of hostilities President Nasser of Egypt was threatening the annihilation of its more than two million Jews." That silence, according to Levovitz, signified the "failure of the ecumenical movement and interfaith and inter-religious cooperation."

Some Christian leaders responded angrily to these charges. Msgr. George G. Higgins, secretary to the Commission for Catholic-Jewish Relations of the

<sup>23</sup> For details, see Banki, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-12.

Bishops' Committee for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, charged that the rabbis' "criticism of the Catholic Church in the United States, whether they realize it or not, is a form of ecumenical or interreligious blackmail."

A savage response to the rabbis came from Henry P. Van Dusen, a past president of Union Theological Seminary, in a letter to the *New York Times*, July 7:

All persons who seek to view the Middle East problem with honesty and objectivity stand aghast at Israel's onslaught, the most violent, ruthless (and successful) aggression since Hitler's blitzkrieg across Western Europe in the summer of 1940, aiming not at victory but at annihilation—the very objective proclaimed by Nasser and his allies which had drawn support to Israel.

Van Dusen condemned Israel for having "consistently refused collaboration with the U.N. in maintaining peace," and for her "callous indifference" to the Arab refugees and for her "appropriation" of "Arab homeland."

The letter shocked many Christian and Jewish readers for its comparison of Jews with Nazis. The Rev. A. Roy Eckardt, a Methodist minister, chairman of the department of religion at Lehigh University, and editor of the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, replied (*New York Times*, July 13). Addressing himself to Van Dusen's Nazi-Israeli parallel, which he called a sin, Eckardt declared that "the entire Christian community must stand appalled at this unredeemed act of calumny by one of its erstwhile leaders."

The *Christian Century*, interdenominational Protestant weekly, which for the last twenty years has been pro-Arab more frequently than neutral in the Arab-Israel conflict, completely failed to understand what the discussion was all about. In an editorial, "Israel and the Christian Dilemma" (July 12), the journal self-righteously defended its position of neutrality:

We could not permit our awareness of the perilous state of world peace to be blotted out by strong sympathy for Israel in the present crisis. Nor can we understand those Christian spokesmen who have permitted this to happen. We have read their explanations, but we do not understand nor do we indulge in the rationalistic gymnastics engaged in by Christian leaders who, having worked hard to get U. S. military power out of Vietnam, insist that the power of the United States be unleashed in the Middle East on the side of Israel. With what amazing speed and dexterity, what involuted rationalizations, these sometime doves flew into a telephone booth and emerged as hawks.

### *The Meaning of Jerusalem*

Another reason for Jewish disappointment was the consistently political approach of Christians toward Jerusalem and its reunification. In late June Pope Paul proposed that Jerusalem and its religious shrines be placed under international control to insure their safety and the right of access by members of all faiths. He was supported by the head of the Orthodox Church in Greece and by the Standing Conference of Orthodox Bishops in the Amer-

icas. Protestant leaders of both NCC and the World Council of Churches also favored internationalization.

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum, national director of the interreligious affairs department of the American Jewish Committee, addressing the Religious Newswriters Association at their annual meeting in early July, claimed that the pressure for internationalizing Jerusalem intensified the politicalization of Middle East problems and failed to take account of the overwhelming role of Jerusalem in Jewish religious experience. Rabbi Brickner explained that, in Judaism, Jerusalem represented the "quintessence and summation of nearly 4,000 years of identity and ethnic being." Was it any wonder, he asked, that Jews throughout the world were "reluctant if not downright unwilling to see Israel yield one inch of that city, a city the destruction of which they carefully avoided during the recent war at the cost of many young Israeli lives."<sup>24</sup>

Though the official Christian establishments failed to perceive the centrality of Jerusalem to Jews, some individual Christians did. Sixteen eminent Protestant theologians signed a statement, "Jerusalem Should Remain Unified," that appeared in the *New York Times*, July 12. The statement grounded its support of a unified Jerusalem under Israel's control on Christian acknowledgment that Judaism "presupposes inextricable ties with the land of Israel and the City of David, without which Judaism cannot be truly itself. Theologically, it is this dimension to the religion of Judaism which leads us to support the reunification of the city of Jerusalem."

### *Christian Self-criticism*

The bitter exchanges between Jews and Christians, and within the Christian community, initiated a process of self-examination among Christians of their attitudes toward Jews, and their understanding of Israel and its meaning to Jews. Thus, an editorial in the Methodist journal *Concern* (July 1-15) declared:

While Christians may not be able to participate existentially in the community that is Judaism, they must be able to understand what that community means to Jews. And Jews must be able to understand that Christians are never going to allow genocide of the Jews to mar human history again, even though they may not see eye to eye on Middle Eastern issues.

The Rev. A. Roy Eckardt and Mrs. Alice L. Eckardt in two articles subsumed under the title, "Again, Silence in the Churches," addressed themselves to the underlying reasons for Christian silence and indifference to the plight of Israel. The first article ("The Case for Israel," *Christian Century*, July 26) concluded that in sum "the overwhelming moral force of the case for Israel makes it impossible even to explain or justify the new silence of

<sup>24</sup> Balfour Brickner, "No Ease in Zion For Us," *Christianity and Crisis*, September 18, 1967, pp. 200-205.

the churches through the contention that the evidence is either lacking or equivocal."

In the second article ("Christian and Arab Ideology," *loc. cit.*, August 2), the Eckardts suggested that the pathological collective unconscious of Christendom had come to the surface:

Whenever original Israel is assailed, certain suppressed, macabre elements in the Christian soul are stirred to sympathy with the assailants. It is difficult to account in any other way for the vehemence and mendacity of some of the current Christian attacks upon Israel.

Quoting from Karl Barth that "in order to be chosen we must, for good or ill, either be Jews or else be heart and soul on the side of the Jews," the Eckardts concluded:

It almost seems that the entire history of Christianity, including the churches' current response to the Middle Eastern crisis, has been an attempt to make Barth's words as irrelevant as is humanly possible. Writing as Christians who oppose that attempt, we say to our Jewish brothers: We too have been shocked by the new silence. And we are greatly saddened. But we have not been surprised. The causes of the silence lie deep in the Christian soul. Therefore we can only mourn and pray and hope.

Another thoughtful analysis of the Christian response to Israel's crisis was written by Dr. Elwyn A. Smith, professor of religion at Temple University ("Did the June War Damage Jewish-Christian Dialogue?" *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Fall, 1967). Dr. Smith asserted that the American Christian response was in the main secular rather than religious, since, in his view, Christian liberals grasped "ancient but not contemporary Jewish reality." The shift of sympathy among Christians to the Arabs by the end of June, Professor Smith wrote, "exposed the secular character of the liberal Jewish-Christian coalition. Only a theological sense of sacredness of Israel could rejoice in a great victory for God's people and sing his praises, even if muted by the tragedy of the deaths of so many." The "sharp collision between American Christianity and the American Jewish community" was, he concluded, evidence of inadequacy in fundamental understanding; liberal theology, which had contributed much to the causes of civil liberty and church cooperation, was not adequate to the new ecumenism after Vatican II.

### *Jewish Reevaluation of Dialogue*

The cool Christian response to Israel's crisis stimulated spirited discussion among Jews about the value and/or adequacy of Christian-Jewish dialogue. Many rabbis held that the crisis had revealed great lacunae in Christian understanding, but concluded that dialogue should be continued, not halted, in an effort to improve Christian-Jewish communication. Thus, Rabbi Tanenbaum concluded ("Israel's Hour of Need and the Jewish-Christian Dialogue," *Conservative Judaism*, Winter, 1968) that the rabbis and Jewish teachers had

not sufficiently clarified for Christians the fundamental meaning of Israel to the Jewish people, and that they therefore had before them "a great task of intellectual clarification, and of communication."

Jacob Neusner, professor of religion at Brown University ("Communications," *Judaism*, Summer 1967, p. 363) chided Christian leaders who remained silent because they held that "Israel-Arab relationships constitute a political issue," though "our support has been solicited by these same people in other issues, such as Vietnam, race relations, and the like which are no less political." Neusner felt that "the middle ground of religious and theological conversation has . . . been closed by the massive indifference and, I think, craven silence of those from whom some of us hoped for better things." In his view, "the way forward is likely to lead away from interreligious conversations and cooperation, except in secular, humanitarian ventures . . . and in scholarly inquiries into historical, literary, and philosophical issues. "

Rabbi David Polish of Beth Emet, the Free Synagogue, Evanston, Ill., took the view ("Why American Jews Are Disillusioned," *Christian Century*, July 26, 1967) that in the light of the Christian "moral failure, the much-touted Christian-Jewish dialogue is revealed as fragile and superficial." The Jews, he felt, would have to stop instigating dialogue and wait for a true initiative from the Christian side. He concluded, nevertheless, that this should not necessarily mean the end of dialogue, but rather its reexamination. Malcolm L. Diamond, associate professor of religion at Princeton University, analyzed ("Christian Silence on Israel: An End to Dialogue?" *Judaism*, Fall, 1967) the underlying difference in historical experience that accounted for the variance in Jewish and Christian responses to the June war. He concluded that new developments in theological discussion could provide a more meaningful basis for dialogue than secularist preconditions, though dialogue could be expected to yield only "limited gains in intellectual cooperation and illumination."

Rabbi Richard L. Rubenstein, director of the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation in Pittsburgh, differed from other rabbis in regarding the crisis not in moral terms, but in the perspective of interest and power ("Did Christians Fail Israel?" *Commonweal*, December 1, 1967). He thought the rabbis were "profoundly mistaken" in their anger at Christian coolness, for Christians ought not to be expected to share Jewish interests. Yet he, too, felt that recent events demonstrated "the greater need for forthright Judaeo-Christian dialogue."

#### RESPONSES ON THE LEFT

The old political mythology that the left is hospitable to Jews or, at the very least, anti-antisemitic, was once again revealed as delusory during Israel's crisis. Many leftists were too committed to their political ideologies to respond to political realities. One leftist journalist described this as "politics

by deference": "The traditionalist Communists deferred to Moscow; the militant Communists deferred to Peking; the non-Communist leftists deferred to the Third World; and many a Jewish leftist simply deferred to the Arabs."<sup>25</sup>

Like Caesar's Gaul, the Left (recently) has been divided into three parts: (1) the democratic independent Left, including the Socialist party and small groups associated with *Dissent* and *New Politics*; (2) the nihilistic, anarchistic, or individualistic Left, usually categorized as "New Left," whose groups mostly align themselves with the so-called Third World; and (3) the totalitarian Left, consisting of the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA), whose loyalty is to the Soviet Union, and its schismatic spinoff, the Progressive Labor party (PLP), which supports Communist China. Somewhere along this continuum are the black nationalist groups, particularly the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), whose loyalties are sometimes with the Third World and sometimes with Communist China.

### *Israel and Vietnam*

The only issue uniting these diverse leftist groups has been their opposition to America's involvement in the war in Vietnam. The Israel crisis shattered that agreement. One observer, himself active in the New Left, remarked:

It is precisely because so many of the Left rank-and-file feel both existential and rational ties to the people of Israel, while the radical ideologues at the top are in almost complete sympathy with the politics of Israel's enemies, that there have developed within every part of the peace and rights constituency fissures shattering the fragile unities cemented by the war in Vietnam.<sup>26</sup>

The fact that many liberals and some leftists appeared to be asking the American government to do in the Middle East what they wanted it to stop doing in Vietnam, threatened the peace movement. The historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., refused to sign a public appeal for American support of Israel (*New York Times*, June 7, 1967) because he thought it was inconsistent to favor unilateral intervention in one part of the world, while opposing it in another. (Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith and poet Robert Lowell also declined to sign that statement, Lowell because he opposed all wars.)

Just as nationalism and national loyalties had torn apart and paralyzed the Second Socialist International on the eve of World War I, so nationality—in this case, Jewishness and identification with Israel—bitterly divided the Left and the critics of the war in Vietnam. Penn Kemble, chairman of the Young People's Socialist League, expressed this concern ("Crisis Splits New Left," *New America*, June 18):

<sup>25</sup> M. S. Armoni, "The American Left and the Middle East," *Midstream*, January 1968, pp. 58-68.

<sup>26</sup> Martin Peretz, "The American Left and Israel," *Commentary*, November 1967, pp. 27-34.

If the New Left loses the substantial support it once had among the Jews as a result of the Middle East crisis, it might well be a decisive blow.

There are already some elements in the Jewish community who have begun to argue that if the Jews want the United States to help Israel they had better not rock the boat. This means, above all, keeping quiet about Vietnam.

It would be tragic if disillusionment with New Left slogans and a desire to gain U. S. support for Israel were to lead anyone into acceptance of our present Vietnam policy.

Policy-makers of leftist groups and editors of their journals were divided; every journal had to give space to the opinion of whichever side dissented. A moving statement on behalf of Israel, which also tried to clarify the differences between Israel and Vietnam, appeared in the independent socialist journal *Dissent*:

At one point, shortly before the war broke out in the Mideast, it seemed that the very survival of Israel was at stake.

In these circumstances, our first reaction was concern for the survival of Israel. We are not Zionists; or Jewish nationalists; or by any means uncritical of the State of Israel. But we believe that the destruction of Israel, coming after the holocaust of this century, would be intolerable. For it is a simple fact of geography that in a war an Israeli victory would not threaten the survival of Egypt or Syria while an Arab victory could easily signify the end of Israel. And that is why, at the moment of crisis in early June, we hoped that the United States would take a stand in behalf of Israeli sovereignty and her right to innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The editors, defensive about ironical criticism that the Middle East crisis turned them into "doves for war," concluded by contrasting Israel and Vietnam:

Judging the war in Vietnam to be reactionary, we oppose U. S. policy there. But that is surely no reason to claim that this binds us to a policy of inflexible abstentionism in other circumstances. . . It is all a matter of where, in what way, toward what end, and within what limits. Our hope therefore is that the Mideast crisis will in no way diminish opposition to the Vietnam war.<sup>27</sup>

Theodor Draper, professor of history at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and a signer of the public appeal in support of Israel, took sharp issue with the underlying assumption of the "doves for war" criticism—that "one must be all hawk or all dove in the United States foreign policy, and there is only one touchstone to determine which one it is—Vietnam." Draper called that a "dangerous and pernicious doctrine." If the Vietnam war were "to become the one determining factor in United States foreign policy half-way across the globe in totally different circumstances," he said, "the result must be war everywhere or paralysis everywhere." He saw "no inherent reason why one cannot criticize the abuse of power in Vietnam and the abdication of power elsewhere."<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Irving Howe and Stanley Plastrik, "After the Mideast War," *Dissent*, July-August, 1967, pp. 387-390.

<sup>28</sup> "Israel and World Politics," *Commentary*, August 1967, p. 41.

Several thoughtful analyses of leftist rationalizations and perversities were published.<sup>29</sup> Robert Alter dissected the attitudes among leftist intellectuals, particularly "the more self-consciously assimilated and militantly 'progressive' segments of the American Jewish intelligentsia." Some of these less doctrinaire and more reasonable leftists appeared to concede that Israel's existence was actually threatened by the Arabs. But, after Israel's decisive military victory, they came to see the Jewish state as "a breeding-ground of chauvinism and brutal militarism, a callous victimizer of its vulnerable neighbors." This image of a bellicose Israel, according to Alter, was the more readily acceptable to leftists because it fitted so neatly into "a popular New Left mythology of world politics in which the nations are divided into sinister superpowers and innocent, freedom-loving peoples of the Third World."

### *The Totalitarian Left*

In the pro-Russian Communist Party, U.S.A., too, divisions occurred over the Middle East crisis. Some Jews found the party's ideology too much at variance with their feelings of Jewish solidarity at a time of grave danger.

The CPUSA supported Moscow's position on the Israel-Arab conflict. Hyman Lumer, CPUSA's national educational director and associate editor of its theoretical journal, *Political Affairs*, expounded the party line ("The Middle East Crisis," *Political Affairs*, July 1967, pp. 1-16). (Lumer is frequently used as Jewish apologist for the party's anti-Jewish positions: he also authored "*Soviet Anti-Semitism—A Cold-War Myth.*") He described the Middle East conflict, in traditional Communist terms, as a conflict "between U. S. and British imperialism on one side and the peoples of the Middle East, both Jewish and Arab, on the other," and the issue, he said, was oil. Israel, by threatening an attack on Syria, had forfeited its right of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, and, besides, the blockade was not a serious blow against its economy. As for the Soviet Union, Lumer reasoned that its condemnation of Israel was a service in the cause of peace.

When accused of being anti-Jewish or anti-Israel by some of its own (Jewish) members, the CPUSA defended itself by quoting corroborative statements from the Communist party of Israel. But, back in 1965, the Israeli Communist party had split into two factions, each claiming to be the authentic Communist party. The split was essentially ethnic, though it appeared to be ideological. One faction, headed by Shmuel Mikunis and Moshe Sneh, was Jewish; the other, headed by Meir Vilner and Toufiq Toubi, was Arab. Until the June war, Moscow had permitted both factions to coexist, but favored the Arab group.

That division of the Communist party in Israel proved useful to Communists in the United States. The *Worker* published statements by the Arab faction (seldom identified as such), while the Communist Yiddish-language daily,

<sup>29</sup> Robert Alter, "Israel and the Intellectuals," *Commentary*, October 1967, pp. 46-52. See also Marie Syrkin *et al.*, "I. F. Stone Reconsiders Israel," *Midstream*, October 1967, pp. 3-17.

*Morning Freiheit*, published statements by the Israeli party's Jewish faction.

Thus, on August 6, Gus Hall, CPUSA general secretary, sent a letter of solidarity and support to the Arab faction of the Israeli Communist party, enclosing \$300 "collected by and from Jewish garment workers in New York as a tribute to your courage and militancy and for your correct Communist stand."

The *Morning Freiheit*, responsive to the feelings of its Jewish readers supported Israel, but did so by taking cover behind the Jewish faction of the Israeli Communist party. An editorial, "Israel Must Not Become Another Vietnam," (May 26) condemned Egypt, Syria, and the other Arab nations for their "attempt to strangle Israel." The *Freiheit* even dared to criticize Russia for comparing Israel to the Nazis ("Time to Stop Crying 'Nazis,'" July 9):

How can anyone, and particularly representatives of the great Soviet land, the land of Lenin, bring themselves to cry "Nazis" at the fighters of Israel's army who repelled the attempt to drive the Jews of Israel into the sea?

Reports of defection from CPUSA of Jewish members circulated. No one knew how many left. It was also reported that CPUSA had liquidated its Jewish Commission because it was divided over the party's critical attitude towards Israel and Moscow's support of the Arabs.<sup>30</sup>

*Challenge*, organ of the Progressive Labor party, Maoist faction in the United States, published a series of wildly irresponsible articles against Israel, based on lurid Arab propaganda. One such article ("Zionists Betray Oppressed Arab and Jew Both," *Challenge*, July 1967) charged:

Just as the Israeli leaders who betrayed millions of Jews to the Nazi executors now pose as humanitarians and saviors of the oppressed Jews, so they proclaim to the world their desire to live in peace with the Arabs, while arming themselves to the teeth and grabbing more and more land from the Arabs.

### *The Nihilists*

The radical black nationalists and their white supporters outdid Russia, China, and most of the Third World in attacking Israel. SNCC's June-July *Newsletter*, parroting the crudest Arab propaganda and the oldest anti-semitic canards, accused Jews of committing atrocities against Arabs. Several antisemitic cartoons accompanied the text, one depicting General Moshe Dayan with dollar signs on his epaulets, another showing a hand marked with a Star of David and a dollar sign, tightening a rope around Nasser's neck and Mohammed Ali (Cassius Clay, the heavyweight boxer).

The same black-nationalist, antisemitic radicalism agitated the National Conference of New Politics, meeting Labor Day weekened in Chicago. The "Black Caucus" (a minority of Negro delegates which had bullied the white majority into yielding to them 50 per cent of the conference votes) had in-

30 "U.S.A. Communists Caught Out," *Jewish Chronicle* (London), July 21, 1967.

sisted on a resolution condemning "the imperialistic Zionist war." Efforts to soften the resolution by recognizing Israel's right to survival failed to win approval. This development caused a serious rupture, several influential Jewish leftists walking out of the conference and, subsequently, severing their connections with New Left groups.

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