Politics and Intergroup Relations in the United States

Politics in this country, particularly in an election year, always has reflected ethnic, racial, and religious cleavages. However, it is unlikely that any national election in American history saw such blatant appeals by candidates to ethnic group interests and widespread public discussion of these interests as were used in 1972. As a result the election largely turned on ethnic issues, although these usually dealt with differences in morality and life styles rather than with more traditional income or class divisions.

The election returns revealed a major change in the way minorities and the less advantaged have responded politically for almost two generations. The coalition of Southern whites, Jews, white ethnics, blue-collar workers, and campus-oriented intellectuals, that had felt comfortable in the Democratic party since the advent of the New Deal, was shattered, at least nationally with the landslide reelection of the Nixon-Agnew ticket.

According to an extensive postelection survey conducted for CBS, Roman Catholic voters for the first time in the country’s history selected a Republican candidate, by a margin of 53 to 46 per cent. And, for the first time since reliable election survey data became available in the mid-1930s, 54 per cent of labor-union families voted the Republican ticket. Jewish voters gave the Nixon-Agnew slate an estimated 35 per cent, double the 1968 percentage. Even voters earning less than $7,000 annually—the traditional bulwark of

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3 Gallup Opinion Index, December 1972.
Democratic strength—gave Nixon 42 per cent of their votes, a jump of 18 per cent over 1968, an NBC survey showed.

The CBS survey also found that, contrary to earlier predictions, the President narrowly won the youth. He carried the rural areas, the suburbs, and even some of the cities, including Cleveland and very nearly New York City. Even among academics, who generally have been found on the liberal-left side of the political fence, there was only a slight lead by Senator McGovern of 51 to 48 per cent. Finally, President Nixon completed the process begun in 1948 by sweeping all 11 Southern states—in 1968 the Democrats had taken Texas—thereby completely reversing the role that had made these states a consistent source of Democratic majorities.

In the battle for the George C. Wallace vote, and the anger and alienation it represented after Wallace had been disabled in an assassination attempt, Nixon was the primary beneficiary. The President’s 1972 percentage was the sum of his 1968 vote (43.4 per cent), Wallace’s 13.5 per cent, and as he, himself, suggested “about five points” for the assorted misfortunes that befell the Democratic ticket. However, the Wallace vote probably was not crucial. Had Wallace run and gained 15 per cent of the vote, Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab estimate, Nixon would have ended up with 50 per cent and Senator McGovern 35 per cent of the ballots cast.

Blacks maintained their overwhelming support of the Democratic party. However, their vote for Nixon increased from about 10 per cent in 1968 to 13 per cent, according to a November 10 release by the Joint Center for Political Studies; other sources put it as high as 21 per cent. The Center indicated it may have underestimated his vote slightly, since it did not include information from suburban areas.

The apparent victory for conservatism and the Republican party, however, was somewhat less clear than the actual presidential vote indicated. The GOP failed to carry the House or Senate despite the Republicans’ presidential 60.7 per cent of the votes. Republican governors declined in number from 31 in 1968 to 19. Liberal Republicans, such as Senator Edward W. Brooke (Mass.), Clifford P. Case (N.J.), Mark O. Hatfield (Oreg.) and Charles H. Percy (Ill.) were reelected. Conservative Senator Jack Miller of Iowa was replaced by a Democrat, and another conservative, Senator Gordon Allot of Colorado, was defeated by an ex-Republican who had abandoned his party over the unsuccessful attempt to nominate Judge Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court.

Since the election was neither a personal endorsement of the President nor a clear-cut victory for conservatism, its meaning was fiercely debated. Some observers argued that the electorate appeared to be rejecting social change as projected by a coalition of "new class" intellectuals, an elitist youth culture, and an underclass led by militant blacks. In contrast to the ambiguities of Senator George McGovern's ideas, it was said, Nixon offered an escape into nostalgia and familiar values, such as the work ethic and strongest-nation doctrine. By doing so, he managed, as Governor Wallace earlier and Senator McGovern briefly in the primaries, to emerge as champion of the alienated, white underdog rebelling against the elitism of the "new politics." That the election outcome indicated no racial backlash was seen by some in the fact that a majority of 2 to 1 of both Nixon and McGovern supporters said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would improve opportunities for blacks.\(^7\)

The American Jewish Committee's executive vice president, Bertram H. Gold, declared that the voters had opted for "a progressive centrism, built firmly on a foundation of positive social content," rather than reaction.\(^8\)

However one interpreted the meaning of the election, it seemed to signal for the 1970s the access to power of a new alliance between low- and moderate-income white ethnics, mostly Roman Catholic, and a broader base of Evangelical Protestants and some Jews. The question was whether this alliance was a temporary phenomenon or the "new majority" President Nixon had boasted of having created. In any case, it was clear that this would have a profound impact on intergroup relations in this country.

**Ethnic Consciousness and Middle America**

The revived interest in ethnic identification continued as a major current in American life. When World Publishing Company issued an "Ethnic Prejudices in America" series, it explained that it did not include material on the blacks because there were enough publications on this group. Other books published included Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in the Seventies*\(^9\) and Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer's *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*.\(^10\) *New York* magazine had a special issue on the Irish (March 13), and the *New York Times Magazine* (April 30) carried Richard Gambino's article,

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) "Progressive Centrism, Mandate For the Seventies," address before the American Jewish Committee's National Executive Council Meeting, December 1, 1972, Hollywood, Fla.


"Twenty Million Italian-Americans Can't Be Wrong." NBC featured a Polish private eye, Banacek; CBS did a one-hour documentary on Italian American culture; the film "The Godfather" played to packed houses. There were signs, too, that "the ethnics" were organizing politically. New figures like Barbara Mikulski and Stephen Adubato had been elected to city councils in Baltimore and Newark, respectively.

However, this growing affirmation of the value of ethnicity and the "new pluralism" (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], pp. 98-102) did not go unchallenged. Critical reviews appeared of Murray Friedman's *Overcoming Middle Class Rage* and Novak's, *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*. Colin Greer said the "new pluralism" was "soil as fertile for group hatred and violence as it might be for social strength." A revived ethnicity, Norman Podhoretz warned, could pose a threat to "the idea of a common culture." Regardless of the intellectuals' debate, political parties and national candidates made strenuous efforts to harness the forces of ethnicity. The GOP had been moving aggressively into this field since 1968, when it established a Republican National Committee ethnic office. Its allocation to win ethnic voters in the 1972 election campaign was estimated at half of its $40-million budget; target states included New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey, where ethnics constituted half of the population.

In 1972 the ethnic press gave wide publicity to a constant stream of presidential appointees having ethnic names. The White House committed itself to sending a representative to 13 separate ethnic functions in Chicago alone. Mrs. Nixon attended a Lithuanian folk festival, while the President, himself, appeared at an Italian folk festival in place of his daughter Patricia Cox, who could not attend.

Italian-Americans were a special target. In 1972 they seemed to be the most angered white ethnic group seeking political recognition. In 1968 they had been crucial in bringing New Jersey into the Republican camp. Levy and Kramer also reported that Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller had been

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14 *Commentary*, June 1972.
17 Levy and Kramer, *op. cit.*
reelected in 1970 with 65 per cent of the Italian vote. Two years earlier, they said, Nixon’s 49 per cent plurality among New York state’s Italians had made him the first Republican presidential candidate to capture a major ethnic group. In the 1972 election Mayor Frank L. Rizzo of Philadelphia, who had been elected a year earlier on the Democratic ticket, announced his support for Nixon. With other Italian-American political figures, such as Representative Mario Biaggi of the Bronx, N.Y., and Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco, on the rise, the vote of this group was in a state of flux.

The President carefully planned his efforts to appeal to the sensitivities and values of “the ethnics.” He put a presidential ban on the use of the word “Mafia.”18 On the eve of Columbus Day he paid tribute to the nation’s Italian immigrants, noting that they came “not asking for something, asking only for the opportunity to work.”19 When he visited the Soviet Union, Nixon publicly noted in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, that many Ukrainians lived in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and other parts of the United States. He also went to Warsaw, and on his return to the White House met with some Polish-Americans who burst into appreciative song20.

In the campaign for the “ethnics” Senator McGovern seemed strangely out of place, despite the traditional Democratic affinities of these groups. “The prairie personality,” one observer wrote, has “a sense of justness and uprightness but not so much of family and community.”21 During their national convention in Miami Beach, the Democrats planned a two-day ethnic fair, replete with organ-grinders, mazurka-dancers, lasagna, baklava, and kolaches; but this was ethnic politics of yesteryear. Reported James P. Gannon in the June 12 issue of the Wall Street Journal: “Planners of folk fairs do not seem to understand that there is a new ethnic politics developing that has little or nothing to do with tacking a -ski on the end of your anglicized name. It is an issue-oriented politics based on the real-life concerns of white ethnic voters rather than the sentimental massaging of homeland memories.” And Michael Novak, who enlisted in the Shriver campaign, explained that the new ethnic politics means you have to “look at the world, the way they do,” and not necessarily be a part of an ethnic group.22

“The ethnics” seemed to be less attracted to the Republican national ticket than repelled by McGovern’s mainstream liberalism mixed with evangelical Protestant style and the elitist, overly ideological forces that supported him. It was symptomatic of the McGovern forces’ lack of identification with ethnic

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18 Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1972.
19 Philadelphia Inquirer, October 9, 1972.
groups that the ethnic division of the Democratic party was abolished in July, when Mrs. Jean Westwood, who had been supported by McGovern, became national chairman of the Democratic party. An urban ethnic office was opened in McGovern campaign headquarters only after Shriver became the vice-presidential candidate, whose major role was to try to woo back ethnic voters.

The Rise of Evangelical Protestant Movements

In 1972 there emerged into clearer focus an important parallel movement to the ethnic surge: the rise of 30 million Protestant fundamentalist evangelicals. The movement was described in a number of books published during the year, including Religion and the New Majority, by Lowell D. Streiker and Gerald S. Strober, and Why Conservative Churches Are Growing, by Dean M. Kelley. Kelley pointed out that in recent years most liberal Protestant denominations, like the United Methodist Church and the Episcopal Church, either lost members or barely maintained themselves. To the degree that the Roman Catholic Church moved to a less absolute posture, its membership, too, was leveling off, and 1970 saw the first decrease since the Church’s founding in this country. Groups showing steady gains were the Mormons, Southern Baptists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses who held on to old-time beliefs, shunned compromising contact with other churches or secular causes, and maintained that they alone possessed the truth. Churches which had diluted their traditional purpose of providing meaning in personal life in favor of “extraneous goals such as changing social structures,” Kelley noted, were losing ground. There also was developing an “ecclesiastical fundamentalism” or “populism” among liberal and conservative Protestant groups. This prompted Presbyterians and others to emphasize and spend money on local rather than national programs.

There were signs, mainly outside of the cosmopolitan centers but even within them, that the values and life-styles of Protestant fundamentalist groups were taking hold in reaction against the counter-culture. A bagpipe and military-band version of the 200-year-old hymn, “Amazing Grace,” made it into Billboard’s “Top Twenty.” Cat Stevens’s “Morning Has Broken,” an old English school hymn, reached number eight. In addition, the Jesus People movement spawned an estimated 25 to 50 fairly stable monthly publications not unlike the underground press of the Left. Like the

latter, they were beginning to penetrate the college campus.\textsuperscript{27} Campus officials in various parts of the country also reported a sharp increase in the demand for religious studies.

During his four years in office President Nixon carefully cultivated these currents which perhaps embodied many of his own values and experiences. Under him, "evangelical Protestantism had gone about as far as it was possible to go toward achieving official establishment," religious columnist Louis Cassels suggested.\textsuperscript{28} The President's statements on patriotism and the work ethic moved Charles P. Henderson, Jr., to label him the "theologian" of the new American civil religion. Nixon had formed a close personal and political alliance with moderate evangelist Billy Graham whom Strober and Streiker described as "the quintessential Middle American." He was a frequent visitor to the White House, not just to lead Sunday prayer services. Leaders of the more liberal Protestant denominations publicly complained that they were unable to get an appointment with the President to present official policy statements adopted by their groups.

Republican leaders campaigning for Nixon sought to capitalize on these conservative or more traditional currents. Republican Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott called McGovern the "Triple A candidate—Acid, Amnesty and Abortion." Clearly, McGovern's cause came to be identified with social issues that set on edge the teeth of evangelical fundamentalists and ethnics. Symbolically, Mayor Frank Rizzo and Billy Graham emerged as the two most important political figures in 1972.

\textbf{Working-Class Alienation}

Another political target group in the campaign, overlapping the ethnics and fundamentalist Protestants, was labor, mainly the blue-collar and, to a lesser degree, the white-collar workers. Traditionally allied with the Democratic party, organized labor was courted by the Nixon administration during the turmoil surrounding the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, when thousands of "hard-hats" marched on Wall Street to demonstrate their support of the Vietnam war. Recognizing that Democratic workers normally viewed American life much as he did, Nixon began to woo them assiduously. Whether coincidentally or not, former Teamster president James R. Hoffa was let out of prison. The construction unions were the beneficiaries of special treatment by the administration under a separate wage-control board. These unions also were pleased with modifications of the Philadelphia Plan which had been designed to increase the number of minority workers in the building

\textsuperscript{27} New York \textit{Times}, November 5, 1972.

trades (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 134). As a result of these efforts and the lack of confidence in McGovern among working-class whites, unions representing five million members, among them the Teamsters, endorsed the President in October.29 At the conclusion of the Democratic National Convention, the executive council of the AFL-CIO, following the lead of its president, George Meany, agreed to remain officially neutral in the campaign. Earlier Meany had said about McGovern, "This man's ideas aren't liberal. This man's ideas are crazy."30

In 1972 American workers, especially the young, were at a peak of dissatisfaction. While industrial America had recovered from a two-year recession and hard-hat cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo were humming again, many workers seemed to become dissatisfied with their daily job experience and the quality of their lives. A number of social-science investigations in 1972, some of them government-sponsored, documented this development. Among them were HEW's massive study, Work in America; America's Young Workers, the American Jewish Committee's National Project on Ethnic America survey of attitudes of young workers of Polish, Irish, and Italian extraction in Chicago and Hartford; Irving Howe's The World of the Blue-Collar Worker; The Hidden Injuries of Class, by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, and Where Have All the Robots Gone?, by Harold L. Sheppard and Neal Q. Herrick.

The feeling on the part of workers of being trapped and dehumanized by monotonous jobs offering little opportunity to use their skills, lowered their productivity, increased absenteeism, raised turnover rates, and gave rise to industrial sabotage and wildcat strikes. The "'Lordstown syndrome'"—as the strike by young workers against a General Motors plant in Lordstown, O. because of an alleged speed-up on the assembly line was called—received considerable public attention.31 Sheppard and Herrick reported that workers with bad jobs and little opportunity of change were less likely to vote, and when they did, they tended to support George Wallace.

As the political campaign progressed, it became increasingly evident that the McGovern forces, who had had high hopes of capturing a major proportion of the 25 million young first-time voters, were encountering the deep dissatisfaction of many young workers who represented two-thirds of the youth constituency. The other third was college students. In interviews of voters under 25 years of age, conducted between October 11 and 15 in 24 locations across the United States, Peter Hart Research Associates of

Washington, D.C., found that they preferred Nixon to McGovern by a margin of 52 to 36 per cent. However, McGovern led on college campuses.\textsuperscript{32}

Nixon concentrated on the various elements that made up the Middle America of 1972. One Democratic worker described his technique: "Nixon gnawed around the edges of a worker's life. He hasn't touched the central trade union part. But he gnaws a little at the Catholic part, a little at the Polish part and a little at the anti-hippie part. After a while, he has an awful lot of workers."\textsuperscript{33} Underlying the specific tactics or strategies used by Nixon and McGovern was a profound difference of opinion on where the country was going, or wanted to go. Conservative columnist and former Nixon political advisor Kevin Phillips, summed it up on the eve of the campaign:

While it is oversimplistic to divide "alienation" into just two categories, there would seem to be a basic cultural difference between "new value"-oriented indignation—the elitist McGovern brand—and the "Middle American" anger of trod upon tradition and spurned Levittown societal beliefs and values. Perhaps the real pivot of the election is this: Just how much have people—or human nature—really changed? If there is an all-pervasive new morality-cum-alienation that cuts across previous ethnic and chronological lines, then McGovern, the clear beneficiary, could win. But if the real frustration is with the trampling of traditional values, and if major chunks of the old Democratic coalition are angry at the cultural upheaval represented by McGovern, then Richard Nixon will come out on top.\textsuperscript{34}

The results of the election seemed to bear out the latter alternative. According to a Gallup poll, 54 per cent of labor-union members and their families voted for Nixon. Four years earlier, 56 per cent of the labor vote went to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, 29 per cent to Nixon, and 15 per cent to George Wallace. Even in the 1956 Eisenhower sweep, 57 per cent of the voters in union families voted for Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic candidate.\textsuperscript{35} Angered by McGovern's stand on welfare, busing, and other civil-rights issues directly affecting their neighborhoods and jobs, as well as his position on abortion, drugs, proposed "surrender" to Communist Vietnam, and amnesty for draft dodgers, ethnic groups shunned the Democratic national ticket. In Cleveland's 23rd ward, which was 80 percent Slovene and blue-collar, Nixon won a clear majority of 57 per cent over McGovern's 41. In 1968 Humphrey captured this ward with 53 per cent, to Nixon's 24 and Wallace's 23.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{34} Kevin Phillips, \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{36} "Splintering the Great Coalition," \textit{Time}, November 20, 1972.
After the election the "hard hats" and organized labor received their reward: Peter J. Brennan, president of the New York City and New York State Building and Construction Trades Council, who had led the famous "hard hat" parade in New York in 1970, was appointed Secretary of Labor. The President was reported to have offered to put a labor-union representative also in a high level post in every department of the federal government.\[^{37}\]

However, there was no indication that any of the problems that gave rise to ethnic, working-class, and middle-class rage were being dealt with by either the administration or Congress.

Broader questions, such as improving the nature of work so that a worker can feel pride and satisfaction in the job, went unaddressed. General Motors moved to the offensive on the issue. Top executives dismissed boredom and unhappiness among workers as exaggerated and emphasized high salary scales and generous fringe benefits.\[^{38}\] The HEW study's findings and proposals seemed to conflict with administration thinking and policy, particularly with Nixon's view that the "work ethic" was giving way to a "welfare ethic." Outgoing Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson, whose department would be responsible for carrying through the study's major recommendations, said that the issue of job dissatisfaction had been overblown; that it was largely a creation of "pop sociologists" and their media sisters-under-the-skin.\[^{39}\]

At year's end, influential senators, including Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), Birch Bayh (Dem., Ind.), and Charles H. Percy (Rep., Ill.), were beginning to address themselves to the issue. Kennedy indicated in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that alienation of blue-collar workers was a key issue for the Democratic party, which would have to "more effectively express concern for keeping elements that have been friendly in the past."\[^{40}\]

**Roman Catholics and Church-State Relations**

A special target of the "ethnic" strategies of the Republican and Democratic candidates was the country's largest religious group, the 48 million Roman Catholics who were estimated to constitute one-fourth of the total electorate.\[^{41}\]

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\[^{38}\] Ibid., December 24, 1972.

\[^{39}\] Ibid., December 22, 1972.

\[^{40}\] Ibid., December 24, 1972.

\[^{41}\] 24 per cent Italian-Americans; 16 per cent Irish-Americans; 16 per cent German-Americans; 12 per cent Polish-Americans; 32 per cent other Catholics.
Andrew M. Greeley and other social scientists were demonstrating that Catholics no longer fitted politicians’ image of an unwelcome immigrant population that related closely only to their Church and unions. After a slow start, considerable numbers of Catholics had “made it” by the beginning of the 1970s. Those under 40 years of age were as likely to be college graduates and economically successful as comparable American Protestants. In 1970 one-third of the nation’s college students were Catholic, compared to one-fourth in 1960. Many were moving to the suburbs. Much of the sharp increase in the Long Island population in the last decade resulted from the exodus of Italians from New York City. Despite their socio-economic success, however, Catholics had not “made it” in terms of broader acceptance of their cultural values and traditions which continued to be ignored and resented by many leaders in American culture.

Contrary to the widespread belief that Vatican Council II inspired changes in the American Catholic Church in the 1960s, it was the social and economic changes of that decade that in fact heavily influenced both the Church and laity. The latter were somewhat to the “left” of comparable groups in the population on a number of political and social questions. In the first of a planned series of yearly reports on attitudes and behavior of United States Catholics, based on statistics gathered by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, Greeley and William C. McCready indicated Catholics seemed to have become “virtually indistinguishable from Protestants” in their views on moral and religious issues. The report charted a rapidly shifting outlook on such matters as church attendance, sexual morality, and even abortion under certain circumstances, although official church teachings remained essentially unchanged. Tensions persisted on such matters between younger and older Catholics and between the younger and older clergy. Only 40 per cent of the priests in the United States still supported the Church’s official teaching on birth control, while 83 per cent of the bishops did.

Like generals who fight this year’s war with last year’s strategies, both Nixon and McGovern responded to Catholic voters in traditional political terms. The former entered the campaign riding a growing Republican tide among Catholic voters, which had been interrupted only by the Kennedy and Johnson elections, probably because of the increasingly suburban and “have” character of this group since the 1950s.

42 Andrew M. Greeley, “American Catholics—Making It or Losing It?”, *The Public Interest*, Summer 1972.
Estimates based on Gallup poll election surveys indicated that the Catholic vote for the Democratic presidential candidates was as follows: Stevenson received 56 per cent in 1952, but only 51 per cent in 1956; it rose to 78 per cent for John F. Kennedy in 1960, decreased slightly to 76 per cent for Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, and dropped again to 59 per cent for Hubert H. Humphrey in 1968 (8 per cent of the vote went to Wallace).

Nixon courted the Catholics in a variety of ways. He jetted to Philadelphia in the spring to tell a cheering crowd of nuns, priests, and lay educators gathered at the annual meeting of the Catholic Education Association that he was "irrevocably committed" to proposing measures to preserve parochial schools. He praised these schools for offering "spiritual values" and a "moral code." In a radio speech, on October 25, he promised to seek tax credits from Congress for parents of children attending parochial schools.46 In May he wrote a widely publicized letter to Terrence Cardinal Cooke of New York personally supporting a church-led drive to repeal the state's liberal abortion law, which was later passed by the legislature and vetoed by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. In rejecting his own population commission's recommendations for liberalized abortion, planning services, and contraceptives for minors, he appealed to family-centered, ethnic Catholics.47

In return John Cardinal Krol, head of the National Conference of Bishops and, since the death of Cardinal Spellman, perhaps the leading Catholic prelate in the country, delivered the invocation at the Republican National Convention. The Cardinal also was photographed with the President on the eve of the election after his return from Poland where he commemorated the martyrdom of a priest who had died in Auschwitz. The photograph, which appeared in newspapers around the country, aroused criticism by liberal Catholics. To some Cardinal Krol seemed to be the religio-political Catholic counterpart to evangelist Billy Graham.

Besides economic issues including his stand on tax reform, McGovern heavily banked on traditional Catholic loyalties to the Democratic party to work in his favor. On September 19 in Chicago, as polls showed his strength among Catholic voters eroding, he endorsed a tax-credit system of providing federal aid to parochial and other nonpublic schools. In a statement issued later in the day he said he favored something along the lines of a bill before the House Ways and Means Committee, pushed by Wilbur D. Mills of Arkansas and other Democratic congressmen, calling for a $200 annual tax credit for each child attending a qualified nonpublic school. The bill was supported also by the Nixon administration. On September 23 the New York Times editorially attacked McGovern's stand as "a threat to the principle of

the separation of church and state, no less real for being an indirect subsidy."

Early in October the Ways and Means Committee reported the bill out, but Congress adjourned without acting on it.

Abortion, too, became a hot political issue during the campaign in a number of states. In contrast to Nixon's clear-cut support of the campaign to repeal New York's liberal abortion law, McGovern's repeated assertions that the federal government should not get involved; that the matter should be left to the states, hurt him politically. In Michigan and North Dakota the issue of liberalizing abortion laws was on the ballot: it was turned down in both states by a margin of 2 to 1 and 3 to 1, respectively.\(^{48}\) The Pennsylvania legislature passed a strict anti-abortion bill, which was killed only because the lower house could not muster the necessary two-thirds vote to override Governor Milton Shapp's veto. McGovern was contending against a Nixon-led national current against "permissiveness," with the implicit view that child-bearing be made mandatory as penalty for sexual indulgence.

The election demonstrated that, at least on a national level, Nixon's "Catholic strategy" had been successful: for the first time in American history slightly more than half of all Catholic voters supported the Republican presidential candidate. McGovern split the two most predominantly Catholic states, carrying Massachusetts and losing Rhode Island by a narrow margin.

Catholic sociologist Andrew M. Greeley stated that, insofar as Catholic voters were concerned, the message of the election was that the "New Politics" had lost it, not that the President had won it. He argued that by rewriting the rules of the Democratic National Convention and insisting Catholic ethnics were "racists" and "hawks," the "reformers" lost a substantial number of Catholic votes for the top of the Democratic ticket. Greeley also felt that the "New Politicians" were eager to dump the Catholic ethnics and Middle Americans because "there is a strong—and frequently quietly explicit—strain of anti-Catholicism in the liberal-left wing of the Democratic Party."\(^{49}\)

This clearly was an exaggeration. However, there was little doubt that many Catholics, along with other voters, rejected the ideological, moralistic, and evangelical qualities of many McGovern supporters and the personality of the candidate, himself. On the eve of the election, Hart Research Associates reported that had Edward Kennedy been his party's nominee, Catholic voters would have selected him over Nixon.\(^{50}\) It was not so much change they resisted and resented, Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab pointed out, but "extremism" and "change that takes place in a non-traditional manner".\(^{51}\)

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\(^{49}\) "New Politics Drove Catholics From Democratic Party," ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., October 26, 1972.

\(^{51}\) Lipset and Raab, op. cit.
As in the case of the ethnics, there was no serious effort to deal with social, economic, and even moral issues on which Catholic voters were wooed. Despite Nixon’s explicit statements of support for aid to parochial schools, critics noted, he had introduced no legislation on this subject during his previous four years in office. His endorsement of tax credits for parents of nonpublic-school children was accompanied by off-stage warnings by his budget and Treasury Department advisors, who pointed out that the enactment of such legislation would mean a billion dollar loss in revenues. And this loss would have to be made up some other way, possibly by cutting other education expenditures.  

As the year came to a close, the Catholic Church continued to find itself in serious difficulties. The decline in parochial-school enrollment continued, although at a slower rate than the year before. A report by a committee of businessmen and community leaders in Philadelphia on the financial crisis in archdiocesan schools early in the year was presented personally to the President by John T. Gurash, the group’s chairman and head of the INA Corporation, and Cardinal Krol. It described an impending disaster for public as well as parochial schools unless government aid was forthcoming shortly, but made no specific recommendations. To relieve the situation statutes providing for tax credits or for monetary reimbursement to parents for tuition paid to nonpublic schools were enacted in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Ohio.  

A number of Supreme Court and lower court decisions in 1972 added fresh difficulties to the serious defeats suffered by proponents of aid to parochial schools the year before (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 105). On October 10 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down by a vote of 8 to 1 a 1971 Ohio law for direct tuition grants to parents of children in nonpublic schools. In doing so, it let stand the opinion of a three-judge federal court which held, “One may not do by indirection what is forbidden directly.” In the lower court’s view, the Ohio law violated the First Amendment’s prohibition of any public “establishment of religion” because the “effect of the scheme is to aid religious enterprises.”  

This action endangered systems of tuition grants to parents of private-and parochial-school children which a number of states adopted when, in 1971, the court in *Lemon v. Kurtzman* and *Earley v. DiCenso* (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 105).  

53 Catholic Standard and Times, November 2, 1972.  
73], pp. 73-74, 105) ruled out direct grants to these schools. It also seemed to some that in their legal effects tuition grants more closely approximated tax credits now advocated by parochiaid proponents than did "purchase of services arrangements" barred by the Supreme Court a year earlier. In New York, a federal appeals court struck down two sections of a law enacted in May, providing for private-school tuition refunds to poor parents and state-supported maintenance allowances to inner-city private schools, but upheld an income-tax benefit plan for parents. In Ohio, however, a three-judge federal court invalidated that state's tax-credit statute during the last days of the year.\(^56\)

Critics of proponents of government aid to private and parochial schools were irked by efforts to find some way around the 1971 Supreme Court decisions. Leo Pfeffer, who for many years had played a leading role in arguing against parochiaid before the Court, called the proposals "a chess game with the Constitution," comparable to efforts in the South to circumvent school-desegregation decisions.\(^57\)

Nor was parochiaid supported by voters in several states in 1972. A ballot proposition to establish a $12.1 million fund for scholarships to nonpublic-school students was rejected in Maryland. Idaho voters defeated a measure allowing nonpublic-school students to use public-school buses to go to school, and in Oregon a proposal to amend the state's constitution, with possible benefit to proponents of aid to nonpublic schools, was turned down.\(^58\)

The difficulty of liberals, most of whom opposed parochiaid, was that they had won a series of court decisions and several referenda and, as a result, failed in their attempt to get the political support of urban Catholic voters. Adam Walinsky was one of the few liberal voices endorsing some form of aid to parochial schools. (McGovern's support of tax-credits received little attention.) He recommended, in the October issue of the New Republic, tax deductions for all charitable contributions, including those to church and parochial school fund-raising drives. Efforts of this kind might have helped liberals regain some credibility with Church leadership and many of the laity. "To do otherwise," Walinsky concluded, "is to risk the worst political sin of all, which is not failure, but irrelevance to the concerns of our people; and as well to all of those children, black and white and Puerto Rican, Catholic and non-Catholic, for whom the parochial schools are one of the few bases of stability in the difficult and often menacing urban world."

\(^{56}\) American Jewish Congress, op. cit.

\(^{57}\) "Aid to Parochial Schools," Reform Judaism, October 1972.

\(^{58}\) Catholic Standard and Times, November 16, 1972.
The Jews

THE ELECTIONS

Although the Jews numbered just under three per cent of the total United States population, their concentration in six important states—New York, Florida, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Illinois—their proportionately large turnout at the polls, and their generosity in supporting causes they believed in have made them special targets for politicians in recent years. The 1972 election year, however, saw an unprecedented concentration on, and at times an almost obscene public discussion of, the alleged “Jewish vote.” A sampling of articles and headlines in the news media included “Will Jews Dance to Nixon’s Tune,” a special section in New York magazine (August 14); “Wooing the Jewish Vote,” in Newsweek (August 21); “The Jewish Swing to Nixon,” in Time (August 21); “Is There Really a Jewish Vote?”, in The Philadelphia Inquirer (October 1); “Nixon Accused of Backing Israel to Woo Jewish Vote,” in the New York Times (October 1); and “Nixon Stronger Among Jews,” in the Detroit Free Press (October 23). It was widely assumed that Jews would vote as a group on such Jewish issues as Israel, Soviet Jewry, and racial quotas, rather than on a broad range of concerns, as would other Americans.

Both political parties organized “Jewish desks” to move in aggressively on Jewish voters. The Nixon forces believed the Jews offered an unusual opportunity for significant political gains over the approximately 17 per cent received in 1968. McGovern could only hope to maintain the high proportions of the Jewish Democratic vote in national elections since the New Deal era—according to Levy and Kramer, 90 per cent in 1940, 1944, and 1948; 64 per cent in 1952; 60 per cent in 1956; 82 per cent in 1960; 90 per cent in 1964 and 83 per cent in 1968.

For more than a year before the election, presidential advisors had been suggesting that it would be a mistake to “write off” the Jews. They pointed out that the safety of Israel was a central Jewish concern. as was the safety of Soviet Jewry. They also argued that, as a relatively prosperous community, Jews should be turning more conservative and should support Nixon’s economic views, his strong stand on law and order, and his opposition to quotas in affirmative-action programs.

ISSUE OF ISRAEL

In connection with the role of Israel in the campaign and Nixon’s strategy to capitalize on this issue, a major controversy had developed even before the presidential nominating conventions over alleged intervention in American politics by the Israel government. In a speech over the Israeli state radio on the occasion of the anniversary of the six-day war, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, was quoted as saying, “We have to differentiate between aid in the form of action and aid in the form of words. While we appreciate support in the form of words, we are getting from one camp, we must prefer support in the form of deeds we are getting from the other camp.” Rabin reportedly said on another occasion that no other American had made such a far-reaching statement committing the United States to support Israel’s existence as President Nixon in his address to Congress upon his return from Moscow.60

The speech was seen in newspaper stories and editorial interpretations as expressing Israel’s preference for Nixon. Among some of the strong condemnations it called forth was Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s assertion that no foreign envoy since British Ambassador to the United States Jackville-West (who publicly stated in 1888 that the election of Grover Cleveland to the presidency would be to the advantage of Britain) “has intervened so mindlessly in American politics” as Rabin; that “unless his Government recalls him, one must assume that he is executing a premeditated policy.”61 Rabin said that he had been quoted out of context and that his remarks had been misinterpreted.62 Several days later Senator Ribicoff (D., Conn.), a key McGovern advisor, released a statement by Prime Minister Golda Meir asserting Israel’s neutrality in the United States presidential campaign.63

From the very outset, McGovern was on the defensive with Jewish voters, a position that remained essentially unchanged during the campaign. He had won the nomination over Humphrey and Jackson, who, over the years, had built solid support in the Jewish community as a result of efforts on behalf of Israel and other issues important to Jewish voters. Arguments that McGovern was weak on the issue of Israel, which first surfaced in the California primary where McGovern defeated Humphrey, were given wide publicity. At the height of the California primary, Los Angeles Anglo-Jewish papers carried a

series of advertisements calling McGovern's support of Israel questionable. The ads, which bore no imprint of Humphrey sponsorship, contained excerpts from earlier McGovern speeches in support of reparations for Palestinian refugees, and pointed to his having voted against military credits for Israel and his inclination to support the internationalization of Jerusalem.

In addition, McGovern's campaign manager Gary Hart said in the question period following his address to students at George Washington University on September 9 that McGovern "should have condemned Israel" for its attacks on Lebanon following the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympiad (p. 451). Another aide, Richard Stearns, signed pro-Arab advertisements carried by the Washington Post and New York Times on June 23 and November 22, 1967, respectively. While McGovern disavowed these positions, the statements were widely reported in the press, and reprints turned up in Nixon campaign packets circulated in the Jewish community.

The McGovern-Shriver forces fought back as best they could on issues that were known to be of importance to Jewish voters; but they could not deal with the undercurrents. They struck hard at Nixon's credibility. In a speech on October 30 in a West Los Angeles synagogue, vice-presidential candidate Sargent Shriver pictured Nixon as historically cold to Israel and insensitive to the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union. He criticized the President for having "an insufficient number of Jews and ethnics on his personal staff." Said Shriver: "Nixon just became friendly [toward Israel] this year. Are you confident that on November 8th Nixon won't revert back?"

Earlier, on August 30, McGovern stressed in a talk to members of the New York Board of Rabbis his long-time commitment to Israel, asserting that the security of Israel was not a partisan issue. On September 21 he told leaders of 25 major national Jewish organizations that he would vote in favor of a plan to withhold "most-favored-nation" trading status from the Soviet Union until it abolished its "slave tax" on Soviet-Jewish emigrants and ceased its "arming of Arab terrorists." 65

Within the Jewish community the maneuvering for votes and statements by leaders identified with major Jewish organizations for or against national political candidates aroused concern. Newspaper reports late in August indicated that the formation of a Jewish committee backing the Nixon-Agnew ticket, co-chaired by William A. Wexler, the immediate past president of B'nai B'rith, and Samuel Rothberg, chairman of the Israel Bond organization, was to be announced after the Republican convention. Criticism came immediately from the board of governors of B'nai B'rith. This was followed by the release, on September 1, of a statement by eight major Jewish

64 Hatchet (George Washington University student publication), September 21, 1972.

organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, and the United Synagogue of America, deplored appeals to Jews based on the single issue of United States support of Israel. It declared that it was an “error to assume that political endorsements by individuals identified as officers or members of an organization reflect the views of that organization or its membership,” and it noted further that the record of both major parties was supportive of Israel. Simultaneously, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council released guidelines on political campaigns, adopted in June 1971, to help its constituent organizations avoid even the appearance of partisanship.

These reactions seemed to have some effect. The announcement in October of the formation of Concerned Citizens for the Re-election of the President—the original Jews for Nixon organization—which contained the names of major Jewish organizational leaders like the Detroit philanthropist Max Fisher, omitted the names of their organizations and mentioned only their home cities.66

The campaign was remarkably free from antisemitism; but there was some discomfort among Jews about the emergence of a number of stereotypes. Newspaper stories referring to Jewish “fat cats,” “Jewish financiers,” and “Jewish money” began to appear during the early days of the Democratic primaries. For example, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote in their column, “GOP’s Belling of Fat Cats,” in the July 27 Washington Post, that Nixon campaign workers had enlisted “every major contributor to Humphrey’s 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns,’” and described the contributors as “these Jewish businessmen.” The syndicated columnist Nicholas von Hoffman commented on what he called the competition among politicians for the Jewish vote by their support of Israel “the valiant little country,” which is also “a very truculent one, the Prussia of the Middle East,” whose “combative desire for Lebensraum” could “drag us into disaster.”67

**ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWS**

One of the most significant issues on which Jewish interests cut across the political campaign was the Senate debate over a bill to ratify President Nixon’s opening of trade channels with the Soviet Union. Along with 74 other senators, Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) introduced an amendment to the bill which sought to block the trade agreement, scheduled to be voted on in 1973, unless the Soviet Union stopped harassing Soviet Jews wanting to emigrate and rescinded the education tax. The *Christian Science Monitor*, in an

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October 6 story, "U.S.-Soviet Trade and Jewish Issue," described Senate resistance as partly pre-election tactics. Time was even more critical, asking in an article, "Catering to the Jewish Vote," in the October 26 issue, "at what point the desire to bring justice to persecuted minorities in other lands should override the clear U.S. national interest." On this question, Nixon was politically on his weakest grounds with Jewish organizations. He urged them not to force a harsh confrontation with Russia in view of the administration's policy of quiet diplomacy. Pressures in the United States appeared to have forced some relaxation of the emigration tax, which, however, was reportedly reinstated after the election.

The election bore out earlier predictions of a significant rise in Jewish votes for Nixon. An American Jewish Committee study of neighborhoods on the East and West coasts, and Florida indicated about 35 per cent of Jewish voters who actually voted for a presidential candidate, voted for Nixon. This figure was about 25 per cent of all registered Jewish voters.\(^68\)

**VOTING PATTERN**

The heaviest volume of Jewish votes for the Nixon-Agnew ticket was in areas of racial tension. In Michigan, with busing for greater desegregation a key issue in Detroit, Flint, and Pontiac, the Jewish vote for Nixon increased markedly. In Brooklyn's heavily Jewish Canarsie district, which also was in the throes of a busing controversy, the President received 54 per cent of the vote, compared to 23 per cent four years earlier. It was estimated that in Ohio McGovern won between 52 and 54 per cent of Jewish voters, down heavily from 81 per cent in 1968 (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], p. 100).

As noted earlier in mayoralty elections in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, there were political divisions among Jewish voters along class lines. Wealthier, upper-class Jews tended to vote for the more liberal candidate regardless of party label, whereas a larger percentage of poorer, less-educated Jews voted for the conservative candidate. While there was a moderate decline in the Democratic vote among the more prosperous Jews between 1968 and 1972, the drop was sharp in the Democratic vote among the less prosperous.\(^69\)

Even so, the election demonstrated how difficult it was for Jews to vote for a conservative political candidate, though many disliked McGovern, in the high rate of their abstention and boycott of the presidential-line on the ballot. In the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn, a low income area of elderly

\(^{68}\) Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jewish Vote (Again)," *Commentary*, June 1973, p. 81.

people, many of them foreign-born, the physical and presidential abstention rate was 24 per cent, compared to 8 per cent in 1968. Among Americans generally, according to the *Gallup Opinion Index*, 45.5 per cent did not cast ballots. This represented the lowest voter turnout since 1948. The high percentage of votes McGovern received among Jewish voters cast doubt on the "turn to the right" noted in so many discussions of Jewish voting patterns. Had the rest of the electorate voted as the Jews did, McGovern would have been sent to the White House in a landslide majority larger than Nixon's.

Nevertheless, the decline in Jewish votes for the top of the Democratic ticket was significant. In an important article, "Why Jews Turn Conservative," in the *Wall Street Journal* for September 14, Irving Kristol argued that the Left had moved further left, thereby "disinheriting Jews . . . of their traditional political loyalties. . . . Jews have not become 'reactionary,'" he wrote, "as a result of affluence or [Israel's] military victory. But they are certainly reacting against the new politics of the Left." He concluded that Jews, both in the United States and Israel, were moving toward a concern for conserving the kind of liberal society that prevails in both lands.

The election demonstrated that much of the discussion of the "Jewish vote" and Jewish issues had been misleading. Jews voted on the whole range of issues affecting America.

Twelve Jews were elected in November to serve in the 93rd Congress, the same number as in the 92nd Congress, two less than in 1967, and six less than in 1966. "Jews have depleted their potential political strength almost for the next ten years," Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of Queens told an interviewer before the election. "There will not be an increase in major Jewish officeholders during this period of time."

**ANTISEMITISM**

While antisemitism was not an important factor in the election campaign, it was found to persist in a number of areas. In August the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress filed a formal charge with New York City School Chancellor Harvey B. Scribner, seeking an investigation of the appointment of Luis Fuentes as community superintendent of School District No. 1, Manhattan. They asked for Fuentes's dismissal on the grounds that he allegedly made antisemitic remarks when he was acting principal in the Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville demonstration school district, and for the removal of the school board for having failed to investigate his conduct.

Late in the year, the Anti-Defamation League released a survey noting "a marked increase during the previous two years in the scope of American anti-Jewish activities, incidents, organizations and publications," accompanied by diminishing public concern. The dimensions of the threat were not negligible, the ADL said, and came from the far Left as well as the right, "from otherwise respectable sources and from extremist segments of other minority groups."

At the same time, ADL also released the preliminary findings of a study of teenagers in three integrated East Coast public school districts, conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of California, which showed a high incidence of anti-Jewish and anti-black prejudice. Blacks were held to be less antisemitic than whites.

An analysis of teaching material published by 12 denominational and independent Protestant groups, undertaken by Gerald Strober for the American Jewish Committee, found that they continued to "perpetuate outdated stereotypes and prejudices [about Jews] in daily life," and thereby to "hamper the growth of mutual respect between Christians and Jews."

THE JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

A very pessimistic view of antisemitism was taken by Rabbi Meir Kahane, international chairman of the Jewish Defense League, who now lives in Israel (p. 505). Declaring that the dangers to American Jews were mounting at an alarming rate, he urged in an article on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times of May 26 that the American Jewish communities and organizations convene an emergency conference to develop a campaign for explaining this threat and planning for mass emigration to Israel. The JDL in this country continued to be the subject of public controversy throughout the year largely in connection with its efforts to dramatize the plight of Soviet Jewry. Three members pleaded guilty in a federal court in Brooklyn to charges related to bombing incidents in 1971 at two offices and property of the Soviet Union in New York. Three teenagers identified by police as members of JDL were arrested in connection with the bombing of impresario Sol Hurok's office on January 26, in which a secretary was killed and 13 persons, including Hurok, were injured.


Christian Evangelism

Jewish anxieties were aroused by intensified nationwide campaigns of Christian evangelism. Plans were developed during the year for Key '73, a year-long effort for the first time involving mainline Protestant denominations, as well as Roman Catholic and Evangelical bodies, "to saturate the entire nation with the claims of Jesus Christ in 1973." Jewish leadership worried about a possible revival of the prepluralistic ideology of a "Christian American" nation. While the campaign, as such, was not directed specifically at Jews and involved no antisemitism, there were during the year stepped-up efforts to proselytize among Jews, spearheaded by old-line evangelical groups like the American Board of Missions to the Jews.

A well-financed media campaign was developed in 1972 utilizing nationwide television programs ("The Passover") and full-page advertisements ("So Many Jews are Wearing 'That Smile' Nowadays") in major daily newspapers around the country.

A special target of some evangelical groups was Jewish youth, whom they tried to reach through the "Campus Crusade for Christ" chapters at colleges and universities and "Youth for Christ" organizations. Time magazine, on June 12, quoted Rabbi Samuel Cunin of the Lubavitch House at the University of California, Los Angeles, as saying "young Jews are converting to Christianity at the rate of 6,000 to 7,000 a year." Richard Gelwick, chairman of the department of religion at Stephens College, warned in Christian Century of the "threat of anti-Semitism emanating from the 'Jesus revolution' as a result of the dogmatism stemming from biblical literalism."

There was little indication, however, that these efforts were very successful. A B'nai B'rith survey of 80 major colleges found that only a "negligible percentage" of Jews were responding to appeals of the Jesus Freaks, the Campus Crusade for Christ, and other fundamentalist groups. The year, in fact, saw the continued upsurge of Jewish identity following the six-day war. Jewish studies had become a new campus favorite, with more than 300 colleges offering such courses. And Charles Berlin, bibliographer in Judaica of the Harvard College library, estimated that, not counting seminary faculties, there were 250 major academic posts in the field, about twice as many as a decade ago. The writings of Elie Wiesel, Isaac B. Singer, Chaim Potok, as well as other fiction dealing with Orthodox and hasidic life, found a ready market. A group called Jewish Nostalgic Productions even began an

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effort to revive the Yiddish theater with a new production of "Yoshe Kalb" on Second Avenue in New York. While the depth and significance of the "Jewish revival" was open to question, an increasing sense of identity was clearly developing among Jews.  

A special issue emerging for Jews in 1972 was a growing insensitivity on the part of the general community with regard to their feelings and concerns, as for example the invitation by the National Council of Churches in Dallas to black militant Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones) to address its members in December, despite his record of antisemitism. The June issue of the Anti-Defamation League publication Facts contained an analysis of the increased use of anti-Jewish slurs, stereotypes, and insulting innuendos in various media. The report noted the "callous indifference on the part of public figures and public officials to incidents of raw anti-Semitism."

Of special concern, Robert Alter felt, was the appearance of birthday cards, allegedly comic posters, and "party books," representing the Jews as "prickly bearded, hideously hook-nosed, money-grubbing, sordidly scheming slobs." Alter was particularly critical of what has emphatically been called "the age-old self-mockery of Jewish humor" which in the case of Roger Lamanski's pamphlet, It's Fun To Be Jewish, was nothing so much as the kind of material contained in the classic literature of European antisemitism. (Lamanski: "Q. What's the difference between a German Jew and a Russian Jew? A. Nothing—it depends on what language you want to get gypped in."

Another favorite of the caricaturist was the Jewish woman who has been receiving clinical analysis for a number of years. The archetype of the destructive "Jewish Mother," Sophie Portnoy, was a central figure in Philip Roth's novel Portnoy's Complaint and of the film released in 1972. Fred Hechinger, reviewing the film in the New York Times of July 16, labeled it antisemitic and strongly objectionable: "All that emerges is a vulgar and offensive portrait of an unpleasant cast of Jewish characters." The fact that some of this material was written by Jews made it no less disturbing. ADL, taking a serious view of this cultural phenomenon, said it was "acceptable" because it relied upon "deep and ancient wellsprings of anti-Semitism in the Western and American experience." Alter saw it as an indication that the "tacit moratorium on vocal anti-Semitism after the Holocaust is now definitely over." Another interpretation might be that "jokebook" Judaism


was an indication that Jews have lost their minority and victim status and no longer required sensitive treatment.

Black America

THE ELECTION

A growing sense of black group identity continued as a powerful force, often turning into a quest for separatism. Black fraternities made significant gains at a time when white fraternities were slipping. Increasingly, black economists, journalists, ministers, teachers, accountants, lawyers, psychiatrists, and even nuns were leaving integrated professional organizations to form their own groups. Professor Charles L. Sanders of Atlanta University and Hunter College reported to the National Association of Black Social Workers the formation of at least 22 all-black national professional organization.78

Nationalist and integrationist factions and viewpoints sharply divided the black community. This split, together with a growing white backlash on issues of concern to blacks, kept the latter from playing a major role in the election outcome. By and large, voters were not responding sympathetically to either faction, so that there was no meaningful discussion of, or action on, issues of vital concern to this normally important segment of the electorate by either presidential candidate.79

The landslide reelection of Nixon was keenly disappointing to most blacks. Roy Wilkins, head of NAACP, wrote in his syndicated column that the "secret issue" in the campaign was race. Mayor Richard G. Hatcher of Gary, Ind., also felt that the election was a victory for racism: the big losers were blacks and other minorities. To many, therefore, the election was still another manifestation of racial retrogression in line with the pullback on commitments to open housing, appeals against "forced integration" and "forced busing," and the "no quotas" directive of the President. The fear persisted, as a study of 1,890 blacks living in Philadelphia and Charlotte, N.C. by Dr. Castellano Turner, a black psychologist at the University of Massachusetts, reaffirmed, that whites would try to decimate future generations of blacks through birth control, sterilization, and other planned programs of genocide.

However, a closer look at the situation suggested a more complex picture. A 1972 Harris poll reported that whites were more acutely aware of discrimination against blacks than in 1969; and blacks, themselves, felt that there had been substantial gains in reducing discrimination. The poll also

reported that the percentage of whites who thought blacks were "moving too fast" had declined from 70 in 1966 to 52. Three new black congressmen and congresswomen were elected—Andrew Young in Atlanta, Mrs. Barbara Jordan in Houston, and Mrs. Yvonne Brathwaite Burke in Los Angeles—and all 13 black congressmen were reelected, including Washington, D.C.'s nonvoting delegate, Walter Fauntroy. Young and a number of others had significant white support. Republican Senator Edward W. Brooke won reelection in Massachusetts, which had only a small black population.

While the November election indicated a weakening of political strength by blacks on the national level, their gains were striking at state and local levels. The Joint Center for Political Studies reported in March that there were 2,264 black elected officials in the country, an increase of 21.7 per cent over 1971. After the 1972 election, the Center reported there now were 222 black state legislators, a gain of 22. For the first time, blacks were elected in Arkansas, Minnesota and Oregon legislatures. Black lawmakers in California and Michigan were described by a New York Times survey conducted earlier in March, as wielding considerable influence, both individually and as a group. And in 22 other states, where there was only a single black, their presence affected the way legislative business was done.

Blacks made significant showings in elections in the South, according to the Voter Education Project, with some 598 blacks voted into office, to make a record high total of 1,144.80 (Arkansas had been the last Southern state without black representation.) The greatest advances were made in Alabama. In Selma, where black demonstrators in 1965 were assaulted by state police as they sought to march to Montgomery to petition for the right to vote, black registration had risen from 2.3 per cent in that year to 67 per cent in 1972, and half of the 10 city council seats were won by blacks. Blacks were elected, for the first time, to the city councils of Brunswick, Ga., Natchez, Miss., and Seguin, Tex. and to the Orange County, N.C., board of supervisors. More significantly, in recent years the growth of Negro suffrage and the success of Republican candidates in replacing Democratic incumbents in the South made for a major decline in the power of Dixiecrat congressmen.

There also had been an increase in black influence in the Democratic party, which was crucial in keeping a number of cities Democratic, among them New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. After the election, blacks received more representation on the Democratic National Committee, and Basil Patterson of New York was reelected as vice-chairman.

At the same time, blacks were becoming politically more sophisticated. Although Illinois went to Nixon, Democratic candidate for state's attorney Edward V. Hanrahan, campaigning with the support of the Mayor Richard J. Daley machine, was defeated. His defeat was in part the result of a carefully

targeted campaign of blacks to topple him because he had been charged with, though later acquitted of, obstructing justice in connection with a police raid in 1969, which took the lives of two Black Panther members. Hanrahan, the incumbent, also tried to capitalize on the crime issue by announcing the capture of alleged members of a black terrorist band called "De Mau Mau," charged with nine random murders of whites. For days newspapers printed articles about a "3,000-strong" murder band, which several days later retracted in apologetic editorials.

In Mississippi many blacks split their vote to support McGovern and the Republican foe of segregationist Senator James Eastland, though without success. Two months earlier, blacks provided nearly half the votes for the man who unseated Representative John McMillan (D., S.C.), chairman of the House District Committee and longtime foe of home rule for the heavily black District of Columbia. They also helped defeat conservative Congresswoman Louise Day Hicks in Boston and Congressman Earle Cabell in Texas.

Citing black political gains in recent years, some with the aid of whites, Bayard Rustin denied in his column, which appeared in a number of black newspapers, that race was the predominant issue in the election. Those asserting the contrary were writing off the possibility of "a vibrant interracial political party," and this was both dangerous and defeatist.81 A study prepared by the National Urban League's Research Department, however, found claims of growth of black political power to be exaggerated. Black elected officials represented only 0.4 per cent of the total, and black congressmen, 3 per cent. There was only one black senator and no black governor. Only 1.6 per cent of all elected state officials, 0.7 per cent of all elected municipal officials, and 0.2 per cent of all elected county officials in the nation were black.

The study also found continued barriers to voting or representation by blacks, including inaccurate census data, one-year residency requirements in more than 30 states, and disqualification of convicted felons and ex-convicts in most states.82 The fact remained that only 41 per cent of the black voting-age population went to the polls, 14 below the national percentage.83

MIDDLE CLASS

A significant aspect of the 1972 election was the continued evidence it provided of the emergence of a black professional and suburban middle class

82 Vernon E. Jordon, Jr., "Barriers to Black Political Participation," Civil Rights Digest, October 1972.
83 Focus, December 1972.
which tended to vote more conservatively. On the basis of returns from black wards in 22 cities, the Joint Center for Political Studies estimated that the black vote for Nixon had increased from 10 per cent in 1968 to 13 per cent. The Nixon vote was probably understated since information was not yet available from suburban areas, at the time of the center’s release on November 10. Black columnist Lu Palmer reported an increase from about 5 or 6 per cent in 1968 to 15, while columnist Marianne Means said the President received 21 per cent of the black vote.84 According to Lipset and Raab, over 90 per cent of the black vote in slum areas was for McGovern; but it was 80 per cent in other city areas and only 67 per cent in suburbia.85

When Nixon began on his first term of office, Daniel P. Moynihan advised him of the existence of a black middle class and urged that their values and needs be considered. The Nixon administration responded with contracts and grants to encourage black enterprise and increased the number of blacks employed in the federal government and federally funded programs. U.S. Commissioner of Education Sidney P. Marland, Jr., reported in the summer of 1972 that federal assistance to predominantly black colleges and universities had increased by 58 per cent, from $108 to $171 million in the previous three years and the preliminary estimate for the 1972 fiscal year was $200 million. Also, the number of black families with annual incomes of $10,000 or more, particularly from 1965 to 1970, increased sharply, although their number was proportionately lower than whites.

Much of the President’s new black support came from holders of federal contracts and grants, federal employees, or persons working in federally funded programs and projects. Among them were some former civil-rights activists, such as Floyd McKissick, former director of CORE and founder of Soul City, N.C., and Albert Sampson, former aide to Ralph Abernathy, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Among Nixon supporters were also several black entertainers, including former football-star-turned-actor Jim Brown, soul singer James Brown, and actor-singer Sammy Davis, Jr. Their endorsement of Nixon stirred deep resentment among many black leaders. “The President has bought them, and they have sold out,” Congressman Louis Stokes (D., Ohio) declared. Davis, of whom a picture embracing Nixon at the Republican National Convention in August was carried in newspaper and other publications across the country, was booed at the annual Black Expo in Chicago early in October.86

85 Lipset and Raab, op. cit.
Blacks strived for unity during the year, but the effort only underlined existing sharp divisions. This was dramatically demonstrated at the National Black Political convention, held in Gary, Ind., on March 10-12, and attended by over 4,000 delegates from across the country. The meeting was convened on the premise that blacks were beginning to hold the balance of power in a number of states; that it therefore was possible for them to form a political entity through which black political and economic demands could be realized or maximized. A key issue was whether blacks should continue working on their agenda within the two major political parties, or develop an independent black politics. Militants like Imamu Baraka, one of the three convention co-chairmen, wanted to set up a Black Political party, but initially agreed not to press the issue since this would polarize the convention. Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (D., N.Y.) indicated she was available as a candidate around whom blacks and others might rally.

NAACP entered the convention with a public attack on the proposed preamble to the National Black Political Agenda which preached racial superiority. The platform finally adopted called for "a permanent political movement, the reshaping of American institutions, proportional representation in political office, full employment, local control over police, reparations, and a guaranteed annual income." In a separate section passed in the closing hours when many delegates had already left, the convention adopted two resolutions that created widespread disagreement within the black community: one condemned the forced busing of school children in the name of integration and called for "supreme quality education for all our youngsters"; the other called for the cessation of all American economic aid in "supporting the fascist government of Israel"; advocated Israel's "dismemberment" and "self-determination for Palestinians."

In releasing the agenda to the press, the convention's two other co-chairmen, Gary's Mayor Hatcher and Representative Charles Diggs (D., Mich.), publicly dissented from the two controversial resolutions, as did Walter Fauntroy, the District of Columbia delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. After the convention, NAACP announced its total withdrawal from, and disassociation with, the convention. It attacked the two

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resolutions as "not only repugnant to our basic principles, but which we must vigorously and unqualifiedly oppose." The 13 black members of the U.S. House of Representatives, too, condemned the resolutions and released their own set of demands in a "Black Bill of Rights."

A steering committee charged with shaping all resolutions into final form released on May 19 a Black Political Agenda which somewhat softened the two controversial resolutions. The one on busing rejected as false the notion that black children were unable to learn unless they attended school with whites, and set as its goal "supreme quality education for all our children." The other resolution, essentially unchanged, condemned Israel's "expansionist policy" despite sharp criticism from Jewish leadership.90

The black unity sought at the convention therefore proved paper thin. In its aftermath, most nationally prominent blacks declined to support the candidacy of Mrs. Chisholm; blacks opposed other blacks in local contests, and there was little willingness to submerge differences for maximum black political effectiveness. However, the effort to keep alive the convention's political aims and its theme, "Unity Without Uniformity," continued at the first meeting of the National Black Assembly in Chicago, October 21-22. It was intended as a permanent body consisting of 427 members, who were chosen every two years. Less than half that number, among them only one black congressman, attended. NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference stayed away. Imamu Baraka emerged as the key figure and was later named the Assembly's secretary general, with responsibility for day-to-day detail. He had written an article that appeared in the October issue of Black World, denouncing most members of the Congressional Black Caucus and other black leaders. The Assembly did not endorse any political candidate, and it was unclear whether any resolutions were passed. By this time, too, the earlier enthusiasm of the black press for the Gary convention had evaporated. The Assembly came under criticism by the Chicago Defender and Jet magazine for failure to bring blacks together.91

The use or misuse of black power was sharply condemned during the year by a number of black leaders. Bayard Rustin continued to criticize "the growing tendency to apply 'black solutions' to social problems that cut across racial lines" and the "'infection' by black power of the rest of society with a 'new tribalism' that prevents development of a progressive movement."92

The most significant comment, however, came before the election from


Arthur A. Fletcher, former assistant secretary of labor in the Nixon administration and now executive director of the United Negro College Fund. Commenting on the clearly impending Nixon landslide and the sense of failure it engendered among black leaders, he criticized these leaders for playing "very poor politics" at a time "when sophisticated pragmatic politics should have been the order of the day." He contrasted the black role during the previous four years with that of organized labor and the Jewish community, two groups, he wrote, which disagreed on a number of administration policies, but which acted as groups in backing the President on issues they could support. Many blacks, Fletcher said, refused to take jobs in the administration. And those who did not isolate themselves politically were rendered powerless by criticism.93

Perhaps symbolically, former President Lyndon Johnson, at a symposium on civil rights at the University of Texas, in what was his last public appearance, interposed in a dispute between rival black ideological factions. Johnson, who had won his early political reputation as a congressional mediator, urged the participants to unite behind a "program of objectives" and take them to the President.94

BLACK EXTREMISM

In recent years a number of black groups and individuals dedicated to separatism or revolutionary violence, or both, gained national attention; but by 1972 virtually all were in sharp decline. Stokely Carmichael returned to the United States during the year after four years of self-imposed exile. He called for an All African Peoples Revolutionary party, but found no support in the black community. Angela Davis, who was tried for murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy, was found innocent. After her release from prison, she made personal appearances around the country, but, though a striking figure, her popularity was not translatable into political strength.95

The Black Panthers continued in decline and to the degree they were active, it was in electoral politics rather than revolutionary violence. During the summer Erika Huggins and Bobby Seale, Panther leaders who had been on trial for murder 16 months earlier in Connecticut, sought public office. Huggins was elected a member of the Berkeley (Calif.) Community Development Council, the city's anti-poverty agency, and Seale became a candidate for mayor of Oakland.

Only the Black Muslims, viewed with disfavor by the major black civil-rights groups, continued to remain influential with segments of the black community. Early in the year, a violent internal struggle appeared to be underway after a shoot-out in Baton Rouge, La., in which two policemen and two young Muslims died. The conflict revolved around the reaction of the growing Muslim youth movement to the distribution of wealth within the organization. The American Jewish Committee charged that the Muslims encompassed "a significant strain of anti-Semitism." Its official publication, Muhammad Speaks, on July 7 headlined a story on the political campaign, "Zionist Ring in Politicians' Nose." Because of its influence in the slums, AJC felt, it posed a greater problem for Jews than when it first came into prominence a decade earlier.96

DEFEAT OF WELFARE REFORM

The defeat of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) as a welfare reform measure and the growing movement to cut back on welfare in the states were further evidence of conservative trends working against the relief of the plight of the minority group population. A new version of FAP, originally proposed by President Nixon in 1969, had passed the House in 1971. As it came before the Senate in an election year, the bill set $2,400 as the minimum income for a family of four, but did not require states to maintain food subsidies for the poor. Also, to keep down government costs it raised to 67 per cent the tax of 50 per cent on earned income above $720. This meant that a person on federal relief would take home only 33 cents of every dollar earned above $720, and this would reduce the incentive to work. Besides, the new plan required all welfare mothers with children over the age of three to register for work, but did not guarantee a job or provide funds for day care.

The measure became caught in a squeeze between liberals, who wanted to make the plan more generous to the poor, and conservatives, who resented the increased cost of doing so and were worried about dangers of a guaranteed income to the traditional "work ethic." The President, himself, reinforced the latter view in his Labor Day speech. "We are faced this year," he said, "with the choice between the 'work ethic' that built this nation's character—and the new 'welfare ethic' that could cause that American character to weaken." The one, he argued, represented the traditional American ethic of striving and sacrifice and the other, a new and alien ethic of indulgence and passivity.

During spring 1972 Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and HEW Secretary Richardson had hammered out a compromise for a $2,600

minimum income, annual cost of living increases, and a 60 per cent tax on earnings. But the President, who was about to depart for Moscow, put the matter off until June 16, and by this time McGovern had put forward his own costly welfare-reform proposal. On his return the President chose to go with his less costly $2,400 "middle ground" plan, thereby creating an election issue. This angered liberal FAP supporters who, together with conservatives, voted to kill the measure in the Senate on October 4. In addition, on July 1, a "workfare" law (Talmadge Amendment) forcing welfare recipients to take jobs or face loss of benefits went into effect. Many welfare and employment officials believed that the current lack of jobs and the failure of training programs hampered the success of workfare.

BLACK CULTURE

If blacks met setbacks at the polls on a national level and from an economy-minded Congress, they were increasingly penetrating the culture as dancers, painters, poets, playwrights, and film producers. This came into focus at a four-day Black Exposition in San Francisco, which featured black poets who read their work; a drama festival that reflected the black experience of the 1960s, and a film festival offering nearly 60 presentations featuring the widely known work of Melvin Van Peebles and Gordon Parks, as well as younger film makers not yet seen on the commercial screen.

In a sense, 1972 saw an explosion of black films, many of them among the industry's top money-makers, such as Parks' Shaft and Van Peeble's Sweet Sweetback's Badass Song. There were black Westerns (Buck and the Preacher), black horror films (Blacula), black documentaries (Malcolm X), black social films (Sounder), black biographical films (Lady Sings the Blues), and numerous black exploitation films (Slaughter, Hammer, Trouble Man). Criticism of many of these productions by black organizations mounted during the year. It was charged that the "shuffling" menial black stereotype had been replaced by another demeaning stereotype, the "Supernigger," who possessed great physical strength but little brain power. Parks and others responded that the films were a success among blacks because they were portrayed, for the first time, as "winners."

There was worry, too, that many of these films presented pimps, pushers, and prostitutes as role models. Super Fly, one of the few technically superior films, featured a narcotics dealer as the hero. There was also danger that films designed to show the triumph of black good over white evil, often in a volley of bullets, would exacerbate racial tensions. "Only in wartime," Pauline

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Kael of the *New Yorker* observed, "have Hollywood movies used this primitive power to encourage hatred of race." In a number of theaters around the country these potential dangers moved managers to hire armed guards; but no outbreaks of violence were reported. Some black leaders asked that black review boards censor all black-theme films before production and preedit them before release. Roy Innis, national director of CORE, demanded that producers turn over part of their profits to the black community for scholarships and film education. During the winter Harlem leaders halted filming of *Come Back, Charleston Blue* until money was donated to black improvement funds.

**Quotas and Preferential Treatment**

The debate over the adoption of quotas to increase the number of women, blacks, and other minorities in jobs and other areas of American life to make our political processes more representative, which began in 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 137), became, in *Newsweek*’s phrase, "the sleeper issue" of the election. The Democratic party entered the year with a new set of presidential convention rules, narrowly approved in 1969, calling on every state party to take "affirmative steps" to encourage participation by members of minority groups, persons between the ages of 18 and 30, and women "in reasonable relation to their presence in the state." As a result of these reforms of the Democratic party’s Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, chaired by Senator McGovern, control of the Democratic convention and its outcome were taken out of the hands of traditional party forces and turned over to elements more representative of "new politics" liberalism. The Miami convention included far higher proportions of women, blacks, and youth. The political strength and influence of the lower-middle and working classes depending for representation on regular party leadership and labor officials were weakened.

The anti-Mayor Daley delegation from the ethnic stronghold of Chicago, which was approved by the convention as representative, included only three Poles and one Italian; New York’s delegation had only three representatives of organized labor, but had nine persons publicly identified with the Gay Liberation movement.

"New Politics" elements were frequently drawn from more affluent, leisured, and suburban elements, especially housewives and students. A *Washington Post* survey found that 39 per cent of the delegates had taken some postgraduate work, as compared to 4 per cent of the general population.

The annual incomes of 31 per cent of the delegates exceeded $25,000 while those of another 31 per cent fell between $15,000 and $25,000. In place of blacks from NAACP chapters or Democratic party organizations, there was a heavy infusion of militant leaders like Jesse Jackson.\textsuperscript{100}

Concurrent with these developments in the party, the year saw continued frustration with the results of a decade's effort to broaden the involvement of minorities and the victims of discrimination in American life. That women were disadvantaged was quite obvious. For example, the annual salary of 62.7 per cent of women on college faculties was less than $10,000, compared to 28 per cent of men.\textsuperscript{101} However, there were indications throughout 1972 that efforts were being made to rectify the situation. Many colleges and universities were broadening minority representation and hiring more women, frequently by the use of quasi-quota systems under HEW guidelines threat of withdrawal of federal funds. In September Columbia University received HEW approval of a 326-page affirmative-action plan indicating it would make "every effort" to add about 900 women and members of minority groups to its academic and nonacademic staffs by 1977. This followed HEW's freezing of $138 million in federal research contracts because of the university's failure to come up with an acceptable plan. In June City University of New York was threatened with loss of $13 million because it refused to make data on salary, sex, race, and "source of referral" of employees by name available to HEW's Office of Civil Rights.\textsuperscript{102}

Aside from pressures of this kind, the message from the federal government early in the year seemed to be to hire and promote more minorities and women, even if this meant some relaxation of standards. The State University at Stony Brook, N.Y., announced plans to fill 100 faculty vacancies in the next three years with blacks, of whom half would be women. The University of California, Berkeley, law school agreed to reserve 30 per cent of its fall admissions for minority group members. There were indications that HEW was hesitating to denounce universities for reverse discrimination because of the possible reaction by women and minority groups.

Standards and testing for hiring and promotion also sparked controversy. Minorities charged that civil-service tests were inherently discriminatory because they were culture-bound, not job-related, and therefore favored middle-class applicants. The courts seemed to be moving toward the interpretation that, once a statistical case of low employment of minorities was made, the test-giver must demonstrate that the test used was reasonably

\textsuperscript{100} Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, "The New Politics & the Democrats," \textit{Commentary}, December 1972.
\textsuperscript{101} New York \textit{Times}, October 8, 1972.
\textsuperscript{102} Goodman, \textit{op. cit.}
job-related. Civil service examinations came under attack in San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. In a case involving the Minneapolis fire department, whose hiring practices had effectively kept out blacks, the Court of Appeals, while not setting a definite quota, suggested that a lower court might properly order the department to fill 20 of its next 60 vacancies with black firemen.

In the spring the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a lower court which had ruled in favor of an NAACP contention that the New York City Board of Examiners be deprived of its authority to pass on school principals on the basis of written and oral tests. It found insufficient proof that the examinations were related to performance on the job. The lower court had found, also, that "white candidates passed at one and one-half times the rate of black and Puerto Rican candidates." The ruling froze appointments from existing "eligibility" lists and barred further tests for supervisors. "Acting" appointments were made by the Board of Education and community school boards.

The intergroup problems and conflicts in the New York situation were evident from the following: of 937 fully licensed principals, only 11 were blacks and one was Puerto Rican (another 40 were without license, tenure, or full principal's salary). While student enrollment in the city was 55 per cent black and Puerto Rican, only 4.2 per cent of the principals and 9 per cent of the teachers belonged to these groups. At stake were—in addition to principalships—money, 1,851 assistant principalships, 943 department chairmanships and, possibly, 62,000 teaching posts. At one point in the controversy, 80 black and Puerto Rican Fordham University trainees for principalships asked the Board of Education to give them a special examination so that they might step right into these posts. The Board refused.

Underlying this situation was black-Jewish conflict. The New York school system was 60 per cent Jewish, with a high proportion of Jewish educators in higher-level positions. Regardless of the outcome of court tests, it was clear that in big-city school systems throughout the country the opportunities were expanding for minorities and contracting for whites in the historic pattern of ethnic succession in American life.103

To many Americans, particularly to blue- and white-collar workers, however, a quota system was anathema. Beyond the immediate question of who got what jobs and promotions, some worried that the principle of quotas might become a permanent part of American life; that this would mean positions and promotions would be allotted on the basis of proportional representation of groups in the population, rather than in some reasonable relationship to qualifications or merit. Social critic Norman Podhoretz had

been warning of the danger of quotas to the viability of American society in a series of articles in *Commentary* in 1971 and 1972.

**Quotas and the Jewish Community**

The issue aroused deep anxieties among Jews in particular. Quotas had been used as a form of discrimination against them, a means of placing a ceiling on their opportunities and aspirations. Two specific developments moved the organized Jewish community to assume leadership during the year in an attack on the quota movement. For months HEW had been debating revision of its guidelines on the hiring practices of colleges and universities who received federal grants or contracts. These guidelines, according to numerous complaints addressed to Jewish agencies, encouraged or permitted the development of rigid quota systems for hiring minority or female employees.

In May six Jewish agencies met with HEW Secretary Richardson and Stanley Pottinger, director of the department's Office of Civil Rights, to discuss the issue. There was agreement, in principle, that affirmative-action programs, which the groups supported, were not intended to establish quotas prohibited by civil rights laws, and that the guidelines should be revised to make this clear. The agencies were invited to submit case material illustrative of what they believed to be dangerous trends resulting from misinterpretations of HEW contract compliance and affirmative-action programs by college, university, and some government officials.\(^{104}\)

The second development occurred at the Democratic National Convention in July. At a meeting of Jewish delegates and alternates concern was voiced about a story in the New York *Times*, quoting Walter Fauntroy as having said that Senator McGovern had pledged 10 per cent of federal patronage jobs to blacks, if he was elected. McGovern sent to the group a message repudiating the story—as did Fauntroy—but this never received news coverage. McGovern aides expressed concern that the public would believe the senator favored a quota system.

Early in August Philip E. Hoffman, president of the American Jewish Committee, wrote letters to both presidential candidates, urging them to "reject categorically the use of quotas" in "implementing vitally essential affirmative action programs." President Nixon responded that quotas were not an "appropriate means of achieving equal employment opportunity" and that "numerical goals, although an important and useful tool to measure progress which remedies the effects of past discrimination, must not be allowed to be

applied in such a fashion as to, in fact, result in imposition of quotas, nor
should they be predicated upon or directed towards a concept of proportional
representation." Nixon indicated he had asked all departments for a review of
programs "to insure conformance with these views." McGovern replied: "I
share the concerns you have expressed and reject the quota system as
detrimental to American society."\(^{105}\)

The exchange of letters between the American Jewish Committee and the
two candidates produced an intense public debate, especially when the Civil
Service Commission, on August 18, sent to every federal agency a
memorandum in which the key sections of the President's response to
Hoffman were included as a statement of governmental policy. A number of
black leaders feared that the presidential ban on quotas would slow down
affirmative action and the hiring of blacks and other minorities, at a time when
the government seemed to be pulling back on other civil rights fronts.

The American Jewish Committee came under sharp attack from
Congressman Stokes, chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. He called
the letters "high handed at best and racist at worst," and voiced deep concern
because the American Jewish Committee believes that "by crossing our
fingers, closing our eyes and hoping for the best, minority poor and
disadvantaged Americans will receive a fair share of opportunity." In an
effort to insure that there would be no slowdown on legitimate
affirmative-action programs, the American Jewish Committee Washington
office sought, and received, assurance in a letter from Robert Hampton,
chairman of the Civil Service Commission, that "there will be no letup in
efforts to eliminate discrimination and assure equal opportunity for all persons
under the Federal merit system."\(^{106}\)

In the course of the continuing public discussion the claim was made in
September that the Philadelphia Plan and similar programs designed to place
minority-group members in jobs in the construction industry were about to be
scrapped. This was flatly denied by the administration. However, officials of
civil-rights and women's organizations released a memorandum issued by
Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson on September 15, clarifying President
Nixon's policy on goals or quotas in hiring minorities and women and
reminding department heads that the administration's policies "do not
provide for quotas or proportional representation." It was possible, the memo
said, that in some cases policy directives may have been misinterpreted and
misapplied. Goals based on a percentage of an area's population, it added,
were not to be used in determining the hiring of minorities and women.\(^{106}\)

Despite denials, it was clear that the administration was pulling back from
earlier plans based on proportional representation. There were indications,

\(^{105}\) Ibid.

too, that this decision had been taken before the American Jewish Committee letter was written. A New York Times story, on December 19, on Office of Federal Contract Compliance officials, whose job it was to insure fair hiring practices by companies receiving federal funds, indicated the agency was receiving virtually no support or direction from the administration.

The administration's position during the year on quotas and preferential treatment was equivocal at best. Leonard Garment, special consultant to the President, argued that there was a practical difference between affirmative-action programs, which included numerical goals and timetables as to what was "realistically and reasonably attainable," and quotas, which required fixed results. "This ignores the fact," Newsweek wrote on September 18, "that such targets effectively put ceilings on the hiring of other workers not defined as minority-group members—as a quota would do.''

As the 1972 election neared, the administration began to retreat somewhat on this front. The phrase "affirmative action" was dropped from the party platform because it would be widely interpreted as another way of saying quotas. In a Labor Day radio address, the President said: "In employment and in politics, we are confronted with the rise of the fixed quota system—as artificial and unfair a yardstick as has ever been used to deny opportunity to anyone." However, Nixon was not alone in political jockeying on the quota issue. In an interview with the National Journal, Senator McGovern was quoted as boasting about the changes in the Democratic party convention rules: "The way we got the quota thing through was by not using the word 'quotas.'"

President Nixon's tough new line on quotas and growing criticisms of their use brought new HEW guidelines on university hiring on October 4. They stressed the need to avoid discrimination, placed greater emphasis on merit, stressed good-faith effort rather than rigid, numerical goals, and related affirmative-action results to availability of labor pools rather than to gross percentages of various groups in the population. A month later Pottinger announced that his office was investigating 15 allegations of discrimination against white male faculty members. He felt that action taken in a few cases of such "reverse discrimination" might quiet fears among white male teachers that their careers were jeopardized by the federal guidelines. At the same time he warned the federal program to enforce equal hiring and promotion opportunities was "losing ground" to a growing rhetorical backlash from male faculty members and administrators, and called for greater support of the program from the academic community.

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107 Washington Letter, op. cit.
109 Kemble and Muravchik, op. cit.
Equal Educational Opportunity

SCHOOL BUSING FOR DESEGREGATION

The election of 1972 may have been the first presidential race in the nation's history where education was a central issue. Much of the debate was on school desegregation and busing to achieve racial balance in the schools, despite the fact that most Americans, including a majority of blacks, were opposed to busing. Polls of white Nixon and McGovern supporters indicated opposition to "busing children to achieve race balance." Governor Wallace's landslide victory in the Michigan primary earlier was achieved largely because of his strong stand against busing.

In a check in 1972 of a number of communities, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found "widespread acceptance of desegregation" by students and teachers. More students were to be bused in only four sizeable cities—Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Jacksonville, and Augusta—as a result of desegregation plans. According to Secretary Richardson, only about 3 percent of the nearly 20 million American public-school children were bused in 1971 because of desegregation plans, and the figure was about the same for 1972. New busing was ordered under the Swann decision in 1971 as a means to "dismantle the dual system in the South" (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 129). Civil rights proponents were encouraged that Supreme Court Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist had denied requests for delays of busing in Augusta and Oklahoma City, respectively. Twelve of the 20 largest urban centers, with a total population of over 31 million, however, faced desegregation including the possibility of busing.

On June 14, a month after Governor Wallace's victory in the Michigan Democratic primary, Federal District Judge Stephen J. Roth ordered the busing of 310,000 Detroit children for desegregation in the fall, with blacks from the city going into the suburbs and whites from the suburbs moving to city schools. The order was stayed pending appeal to the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, thereby preventing implementation of the plan in the midst of the election campaign. The Roth decision broke the coalition between black Detroiters and white suburban automobile workers that had been the basis of liberal Democratic victories in the state for years. Senator Robert P. Griffin, a Republican who emerged during the year as a leading opponent of busing in the U.S. Senate, was reelected, in part on this issue. The year before, he had opposed Nixon's choice of Clement Haynesworth, considered a segregationist by civil rights leaders, for the Supreme Court.

111 Five Communities: Their Search for Equal Education (Clearinghouse Publication 37, December 1972).
On June 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth District stayed the January action of a federal district court ordering the predominantly black Richmond, Va., school district merged with two largely white suburban districts. It held the district judge had overstepped his authority in giving the suburban counties a share of responsibility for inner-city segregation. At year’s end, the Detroit and Richmond cases, together with suits in Indianapolis and Denver, were moving toward the Supreme Court. The Denver case, argued on October 12, was the first to come before the High Court appealing a busing order in a northern school system. The issue here was whether a city must desegregate all of the schools when discriminatory actions by school officials caused segregation only in certain schools (de jure) and others were racially segregated due to neighborhood residential patterns (de facto). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had affirmed a district court ruling only as to de jure segregated schools, reversing as to the de facto segregated ones. The case was seen as having broad implications for determining how much desegregation was required in communities that had never had dual systems.

The approach by the presidential candidates and their parties to busing was a matter of concern to many voters, although about the same percentage of white Nixon and McGovern supporters said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would improve opportunities for blacks. The Democratic party platform said busing “must continue to be available according to Supreme Court decisions to eliminate legally imposed segregation.” Psychologically more attuned to the public mood, the GOP platform flatly declared that the Republican party was “irrevocably opposed to busing for racial balance.” Refusing to join the anti-busers, McGovern worked hard to neutralize the issue, but did not succeed. In a speech before union shop stewards, in Detroit on September 22, he argued that the matter should be resolved by the courts. Emphasizing the need for “quality education for all children,” he stressed throughout the campaign that busing was one of the legitimate tools to achieve desegregation.

President Nixon sought to minimize the federal government’s role in desegregation, which had reached a peak during his first four years in office, and to shift responsibility to the courts and voluntary compliance. HEW, which in 1970 stopped enforcing the federal cut-off provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was ordered by a U.S. District Court shortly after the 1972 election to resume enforcement of the law.

In a message to Congress on March 17, the President proposed legislation calling for a moratorium on all court and government orders requiring additional busing until July 1, 1973, or until Congress set up permanent desegregation standards. He suggested, instead, additional funds for upgrading minority schools, indicating a continuation of the shift away from

113 Lipset and Raab, op. cit.
government supported desegregation to compensatory education programs. The evidence cited by the President in support of such programs was quickly disputed by a number of education experts in and outside of government.

Lawyers for the Nixon administration argued during the year for a reversal of the lower court ruling in the Richmond case. However, they were denied permission to enter the Detroit case on the side of the defendants. Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold filed a “friend of the court” brief in the Denver case opposing the transfer of students as overturning “long standing neighborhood school” policy. The brief argued that achieving equal educational opportunity required elimination of disparities in the schools rather than the dispersal of students. To some, however, the cure he advocated brought back memories of the “separate but equal” concept which the Supreme Court had struck down in 1954.

In his stand-in role for the President during the campaign, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew made a number of references to busing in his speeches. He told a Nashville audience that the administration wanted to put an end to all school busing for desegregation, and that the President’s proposal for a moratorium would do just that. However, as the election campaign progressed, the issue seemed to diminish in political importance, except for areas directly involved, and it was rarely mentioned by the presidential candidates. The reason for this was court delays in implementing busing orders and little new integration as school opened in the fall.114

In Congress, however, the matter remained a hot issue. On August 18 the House passed by a vote of 282 to 102 a tough anti-busing bill, somewhat stronger than the President had asked for. It prohibited court and federal agencies from requiring that any student be assigned to a school other than the one “closest or next closest” to his home that provided the proper grade level. It also permitted the reopening of school cases already settled by the courts, to make certain that they conformed to the restrictions in the legislation. Senate liberals and civil-rights groups called the measure “terrible and destructive” and “one of the most far-reaching and ill-conceived pieces of anti-civil rights legislation to come before Congress since Reconstruction.”115 Although the bill had the support of a majority of the Senate and the Nixon administration it was unable after three attempts to marshal the necessary two-thirds vote to break a filibuster by northern senators of both parties, and it died on October 12.

In a major radio address on October 25 President Nixon reaffirmed his anti-busing stand and said he would press the next Congress for passage of legislation to end “arbitrary, court-ordered busing of children out of their

neighborhoods." He reiterated his earlier position that the answer to inequities in the education system was to spend more money on learning and less money on busing. But civil-rights activists believed that, once the election was over, pressures for such legislation would be less intense.

SCHOLARS DEBATE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

During the year social scientists sharply debated the busing issue, as well as the usefulness of school desegregation for improving the opportunities of minority children. Several furnished scientific corroboration of the administration view. Harvard Professor David J. Armor, who had done research in the Boston METCO program, concluded from his findings and from data in reports on integration programs in four other Northern cities throughout the country that: "The available evidence . . . indicates that [mandatory or induced] busing is not an effective policy instrument for raising the achievement of black students or for increasing interracial harmony,"\(^{116}\) though it does lead to higher black-student enrollment in colleges. But he suggested that voluntary integration programs like METCO and the Hartford, Conn., Project Concern be continued and encouraged on an experimental basis by federal and state grants for "symbolic" and possibly long-range benefits.

Nathan Glazer launched a broader attack on school desegregation strategies.\(^{117}\) He criticized court decisions requiring large-scale busing for desegregation because it meant that white children were . . . being conscripted to create an environment which, it had been decided, was required to provide equality of educational opportunity for black children."

The burden of integration, he noted, often was borne by the lower middle class; the more affluent could flee to the suburbs or send their children to private schools. In his view, recent lower-court decisions on busing only tended to deepen alienation, for they made impossible community participation and community control.

Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan edited a collection of scholarly papers\(^{118}\) which reevaluated the Coleman Report (AJYB, 1967 [Vol.68], pp. 86–87). While the original findings were reaffirmed, the educational benefits of integration were found to have been somewhat less than was first reported. In a letter to the \textit{Public Interest}, Summer 1972 issue, Coleman, himself, held that the courts "had used inappropriately" the findings of his report—that academic achievement of children from lower


socio-economic backgrounds benefited from being in schools with children of higher socio-economic backgrounds—to order racial balance in the schools. Equal educational opportunity, he wrote, could not be provided by the state, for inequality originates in the home. This did not mean, of course, that state actions leading to increased racial or socio-economic segregation should not be corrected by the courts; but they should not do so on the mistaken assumption that this would create equal educational opportunity.

The most widely reported discussion, *Inequality*, by Christopher Jencks and seven other Harvard scholars, argued that, while school reform was not useless, it would not eliminate inequality in cognitive skills, nor economic inequality and poverty among adults. It could not change the economic social conditions outside the school. Schooling is important for the acquisition of basic knowledge and skills, they wrote, but spending more money on improving schools does not raise achievement or increase the likelihood that students will attend college. Desegregation, the authors declared, was somewhat more effective than raising revenues, but not much. (In an article, "Busing—The Supreme Court Goes North," in the New York Times for November 19, Jencks summarized the data from research studies on busing as a means of improving test scores of blacks. He wrote that even if six years of busing could cut the test-score gap between blacks and whites by 20 or 30 per cent—and the evidence here was not conclusive—this was "statistically insignificant" when spread over one or two years. Nevertheless, he concluded, the average effect was a gain.) Troubled by the possible effects of his analyses and conclusions, Jencks later said that his research did not justify cutting school expenditures, abandoning desegregation, or giving up efforts at school reform. The basic mistake, he again stressed, was the expectation that equality of educational opportunity could eliminate problems like poverty and injustice.

The "sobriety" and "second thoughts" about educational reform (to use Irving Kristol's terms) brought sharp rejoinders from integrationist scholars, civil rights leaders, and educators. Social psychologist Thomas F. Pettigrew of Harvard, who had helped provide the social science basis for many desegregation efforts in the 1960s, attacked Armor's research for its "methodological defects"; presenting an incomplete list of research findings on busing and emphasizing negative results Armor, he said, failed to mention at least seven controlled investigations that reported positive findings. Harold Howe 2d, former U.S. Commissioner of Education, argued that Coleman, Mosteller, Moynihan, and Jencks "present no clear case for or

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121 Psychology Today, November 1972.
against integration of the schools as an important social goal, although they suggest its limited usefulness as far as certain measurable outcomes of schooling are concerned." He held that, while these analysts made a worthwhile contribution to social-science methodology, their findings should "not supersede the moral and legal basis on which we have determined that segregated education denies equal protection of the laws."²²

Noting that the reforms under attack by some social scientists were developed specifically to deal with the special problems of slum schools, Bayard Rustin declared that the schools have not completely failed the black child. An indication was that between 1965 and 1970, a period when many innovative ideas were introduced, black college enrollment nearly doubled.²³

The small or no gains—depending on which social science views one accepted—of busing to achieve greater integration were purchased at a high price in 1972. The issue helped divide further an already strongly polarized society and open the door to reversing important desegregation gains made since 1954. Besides providing some politicians with the opportunity to capitalize on inflamed feelings, busing gave rise to some violence in the North. Late in October in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn, mainly Jewish and Italian parents, who shortly before had fled declining neighborhoods and schools, locked the doors and blocked the steps to the John Wilson Junior High School for three days and brought about an area boycott of schools in protest against the enrollment of 31 black and Puerto Rican seventh-graders who were bused to the school from nearby Brownsville. Pontiac, Michigan, the scene of violence in 1971 in a busing dispute, saw renewed violence on November 27, when five students were shot and wounded, one seriously, in a high school courtyard after a confrontation between black and white students.

PROPERTY TAX AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Second thoughts were being had, also, on the value of equalizing educational expenditures for local school districts as a means of assuring equal educational opportunity, following court decisions in California, Texas, Minnesota, and other states in 1971 and 1972 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 131). The Supreme Court agreed on June 7 to consider whether 49 of the 50 states violated the Fourteenth Amendment by relying largely on local property taxes to finance their school expenditures, thereby discriminating against children, often minorities, in poor communities.

Property tax reform, seen in 1971 as a bright hope for the poor and

oppressed, and included as a plank in the Democratic party platform in 1972, was attacked by Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Leslie Lenkowsky as putting "more money into the pockets of the largest group of college-educated, state certified, middle class professionals." They repeated the arguments drawn from the Coleman Report and Jencks that variations in academic achievement of schools could not be attributed to such "inputs" as facilities, teachers, and curricula. They pointed out, too, that the effect of lower-court decisions, like the Serrano case in California, might mean less money for schools in poor districts. Many central cities with large numbers of banks, factories, and other economic institutions, they indicated, provided a higher tax base and funded their schools more heavily than those in suburbia, so that suburban schools would be more likely to benefit from property tax reform. Daniel P. Moynihan made many of the same points in urging the courts to stay out of this issue. If they felt they must enter it on the side of the Serrano case, he argued, their ruling should be accompanied by an order that total expenditures not be increased, so that the people could decide whether to spend more money on education.

Suburbs, too, were worried about equalization formulas. They feared that, once money no longer was raised locally, control of the schools would be taken out of their hands. If property taxes were struck down, or modified in some way, money would have to be found elsewhere. A major factor in the political reaction in 1972 to educational expenditures was rising public resentment against high taxes. In the election, voters in four states — California, Colorado, Michigan, and Oregon — resoundingly defeated proposed state constitutional amendments that would have killed, or sharply limited, the property tax as a source of funds for public education. This threw the issue to the Supreme Court, which was expected to rule on it in the spring of 1973.

The arguments in support of equalization were marshaled most comprehensively by Robert Lekachman, professor of economics at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York. Although "equal dollars" for each child was not the same as genuine equality of opportunity, much less equality of outcome, he declared, the schools should not add to the environmental and genetic handicaps of children. "It is surely a nonsequitur," he concluded, "to suggest that because money alone does not guarantee literacy . . . attempts to rectify the legal and practical inequities that currently disgrace school finances are therefore unimportant."

124 "'Serrano' vs. the People," Commentary, September 1972.

125 "Equalizing Education—In Whose Benefit?", Public Interest, Fall 1972.

In a year of intense political discussion and reexamination of educational reforms, school decentralization, too, came in for its share of criticism. In an effort to deal with the low achievement of poor and minority children, New York City had been experimenting for three years with a decentralized school operation of 31 school districts. In East Harlem Community School District 4, a boycott by Puerto Rican and black parents shut down, or virtually emptied, more than half the area’s schools early in December to protest the inadequate education they felt their children were receiving. In May Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a member of the State Board of Regents and one of the architects of the school decentralization movement, said in a radio broadcast that school decentralization failed to improve education, charging that local school boards were more interested in power than in better schools. In testimony before the City Charter Revision Commission on November 10, he indicated willingness to scrap the entire idea. He asserted that the “selfish forces” responsible for failure included the “racial politics” of small groups and the United Federation of Teachers that protected teachers regardless of their quality. This could “only be at the expense of teaching . . . children to read and write and to speak correctly, and to think.”

A more mixed response to community control was Leonard J. Fein’s in The Ecology of the Public Schools: An Inquiry into Community Control. He argued that alongside community public schools should be established state-subsidized black parochial schools which could provide the values of black consciousness. Blacks would then have the choice of going to either school. However, Fein raised the question of whether, at a time when so many educational reforms were being challenged, it would be wise to fragmentize further educational effort to insure equal opportunity.

The reexamination of old premises by many of the new critics coincided with, and confirmed, the views of many Middle Americans that they were being forced to bear unduly the social and economic costs of programs devised by social scientists and intellectuals that did not work or, in fact, did harm. The new critics also provided a rationale for the Nixon administration to limit education and welfare expenditures and abandon efforts to achieve greater desegregation. In a highly publicized pre-election interview with Garnett D. Horner of the Washington Star-News, which was released only later, President Nixon said: “What we have to realize is that many of the solutions of the 60’s were massive failures. They threw money at the problems and for the most part they have failed. . . .”

A number of liberals were emerging with similar views. A distinguished group of Brookings Institution economists, including some of the Johnson administration's social engineers, reported in May that many of the reforms of that era had failed. In a book-length analysis of national priorities they concluded that the multiplication of dollars and programs brought no solutions for welfare reform, day care, and city finance, but multiplication of problems. The underlying reason, these scholars contended, was lack of knowledge.\textsuperscript{129} Others, however, were worried that this "crisis of confidence" would hinder efforts to find new ways of dealing with severe problems in intergroup relations and remedying racial inequities.

\section*{Civil Rights}

In response to criticism by the Congressional Black Caucus and other groups, the Nixon administration, early in 1972, issued its first official report on progress in civil rights and related social programs. Among its highlights were: the percentage of black students in all-black schools had dropped from 40 per cent in 1968 to 12 per cent in the fall of 1971; the Internal Revenue Service had halted tax deductions for contributions to segregated public schools; government aid to minority businesses will have risen from $200 million in 1969 to $505.8 million for 1973, and housing starts for low and moderate-income families under federally subsidized programs stood at 156,000 in 1969 and were expected to reach over 566,000 in 1973. In 1972 Congress also passed an Equal Employment Opportunities Act giving the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement powers it never had before. Under the Act, EEOC stepped up enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; its case-load rose from 33,000 in 1971 to 52,000 total entries in 1972.

The self-image of the Nixon administration in civil rights was one of "doing" rather than "talking." This estimate was challenged, as the year progressed and the administration campaigned against "forced busing," "forced economic integration," and eased its support of the Philadelphia Plan. The Washington Post for December 18, in its own evaluation of the civil-rights progress report, concluded that most of the achievements were small and grudging. It said Nixon did not assert leadership and encouraged "decent people and the middle" to turn away from the difficult civil-rights problem, thereby causing despair for minorities.

Symbolic of the position of strong civil-rights advocates after the election was the resignation of the Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh as chairman of

the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Since its inception in 1957, the Commission, which has no enforcement powers, had been a major civil-rights watchdog and gadfly. Perhaps the foremost "conscience" in the nation with regard to civil rights, Hesburgh had been openly critical of the Nixon administration in this area.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{Social-Club Discrimination}

Civil-rights groups actively seeking to curb social-club discrimination received a setback during the year. Representative K. Leroy Irvis, the black majority leader of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, had been denied admission as a guest at Moose Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg. He brought action against the club, charging that it had violated the equal-protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that this violation of his constitutional rights called for "state action," since the club held a Pennsylvania liquor license. On June 12 the case came before the Supreme Court, which ruled, by a vote of 6 to 3, that it was constitutional for a state to grant a liquor license to private social clubs, even though they practiced racial discrimination. It did not, however, make the issuance of such a license mandatory (\textit{Moose Lodge v. Irvis}, 407 U.S. 163 [1972]).

On July 31 the same Moose lodge was barred by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from denying admission to Representative Irvis as a guest based on race, for by opening its facilities to Caucasian guests, the court held, the club became, to that extent a place of public accommodation and therefore was in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an appeal of this decision on December 11.

The meaning of the two rulings by the Supreme Court appeared to be that fraternal organizations may practice racial discrimination in choosing their members, but may not in deciding whether or not to serve food and drink to guests. In developing the law on this issue, the Court left it to the discretion of a state to grant or deny a liquor license to a racially discriminatory club. The Maine Supreme Court, on December 11, upheld the validity of a state law which denied liquor licenses to clubs practicing discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. At year's end, the case was awaiting a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.

\textit{Violence}

The period under review saw the growth of a "politics of crime," as well as continuing widespread fear of crime. Much of the political discussion

\textsuperscript{130} New York \textit{Times}, November 17, 1972.
involved angry charges by candidates around the country and claims by the administration that it was winning the war against crime, rather than efforts to illuminate a complex social problem. In a radio address on October 15, President Nixon said he had fulfilled his 1968 pledge of law and order. "We have fought the frightening trend of crime and anarchy to a standstill." He cited as evidence the FBI crime index, which showed an increase of only one per cent during the first half of 1972, the closest the nation had come to registering an actual decline in 12 years. Senator McGovern and his advisors, however, denied the administration's claims. McGovern charged in October that the administration had brought pressure on police departments to falsify crime figures. James Vorenberg, who headed his panel on crime and justice, said at a press conference in October that the most significant aspect of the statistics was the steady increase of crime in 1972. He pointed out that, despite the President's promise to stem the tide, crime had grown considerably in the last four years.

Efforts to win the "law and order" vote continued at all levels. In October Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst told the International Association of Chiefs of Police at Salt Lake City that he did not like to see a major party's presidential candidate refuse to recognize their accomplishments in controlling crime. There were indications at the end of the year that politicians were beginning to prepare "law and order" campaigns for 1973 mayoralty elections in New York, Los Angeles, and other cities. "You know what a conservative is?" asked former Police Commissioner and new Philadelphia Mayor Frank L. Rizzo, "That's a liberal who got mugged the night before." 131

The facts on crime continued to be grim. While there was a drop in the increase of serious crime during the year, there was more violent street crime in such cities as New York, Boston, Memphis, and Denver. According to the FBI, 112 policemen lost their lives in 1972, down somewhat from 125 in 1971 but above 1970 and 1969 figures. Especially disturbing was the upsurge of crime and violence in the schools. During a 16-day period in the fall, at least 14 New York City teachers were robbed or assaulted inside their schools. There was a sharp increase, too, in suburban crime—5 per cent in the first half of the year. In February the U.S. Department of Commerce published a report estimating the national cost of ordinary crime at $16 billion. Small business suffered more severely than big business. 132

The statistics were barely indicative of the seriousness of the problem, since the method of collecting them varied in different parts of the country, and "victimization" studies showed that less than one-third of all crimes were reported. As serious as crime, itself, was the fortress mentality it engendered

among many Americans, with the resultant reduction in personal freedom and quality of life. A Gallup Poll survey published in January 1973 showed that half of all persons interviewed thought crime had gone up in their neighborhoods in 1972.

Inevitably, crime continued to drive a wedge between disadvantaged blacks and other minorities constituting a disproportionately large part of the prison population, and whites seeking protection in any way possible. There was some indication that part of crime and criminal violence—no one seemed to know how much—represented guerrilla warfare by some black militants. Early in the year, the police in New York announced they were hunting members of a small group calling itself the Black Liberation Army in the slaying of two policemen in the East Village on January 27. The New York Times of February 9 carried the story on the front page with a headline, "9 in Black 'Army' Are Hunted in Police Assassinations." And at the height of the election campaign, an October 17 Philadelphia Inquirer headline covering most of the top of a page read, "'Nationwide Link Sought in Chicago 'De Mau Mau' Slayings'" (p. 165).

Yet blacks clearly remained the major victims of criminal and even official violence. A sharp reminder of this was a report late in the year by a 12-member investigation commission on the deaths of two black students on the Baton Rouge, La., campus of Southern University after a confrontation with the police in November. The commission, headed by the state's attorney general who had been appointed by a liberal governor, laid the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the police, and turned its findings over to the local district attorney for possible criminal prosecution.

Violence involving largely black prisoners that had erupted in 1971, notably at Attica in New York, was analyzed by a nine-member commission headed by Robert B. McKay, dean of the New York University School of Law. It reported that the riot did not stem from a revolutionary conspiracy, but was rather a "spontaneous burst of violent anger" of a new breed of prisoners unwilling to accept the "petty humiliations and racism that characterize prison life." Going beyond its instructions, the commission came up with a seven-point program to restructure the state's prison system, with emphasis on prisoners' rights. The official report, together with several other analyses published during the year, indicated that the decision to crush the "revolution" at Attica, rather than preserve the lives of the inmates and hostages, was based on the belief that a strong stand had to be taken on the issue of law and order. As such, this too was a political decision based on "'the politics of crime.'"133

Accompanying public anger about crime was growing discontent with efforts to make the streets safe. Since 1969, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice dispersed over $2 billion in anti-crime grants. Despite public statements announcing progress, there were indications within the Nixon administration in 1972 of dissatisfaction with the program. A report on *Law and Disorder*, prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for the National Urban Coalition and released in November, indicated that most of the grants went to criminal-justice agencies for traditional purposes; few agencies had used the money to experiment with reforms.

The most promising sign of possible change, or at least improvement in public morale, was the rapidly developing movement of citizen involvement in the war on crime. It ranged from "courtesy patrols" in the black wards of Washington, D.C., and mothers of the child-safety patrol on Manhattan's East Side, to the 13 concerned fathers in Clear Lake City, Tex., who formed the unpaid Company N of the Harris County Sheriff's Reserves. On the whole, these were not vigilante groups, although there was concern that some might be. These groups sought to restore a sense of community through programs utilizing neighbors and inexpensive communication and lighting equipment. There was some evidence that in well organized neighborhoods efforts of this kind were cutting down on thefts.

**Extremism**

**GEORGE WALLACE**

The radical right found itself with no place to go in 1972 as a result of the President's "Middle America" and "Southern" political strategy. And in the process of emerging as a full-scale presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket until he was crippled by an assassination attempt, Governor Wallace moved closer to the political center. His candidacy in 1968 (AJYB, 1969 [Vol.70], pp. 97-100) had been backed by funds and the political organization of a coalition of racists, political extremists, and various antisemitic elements. By 1972 he and his key supporters attempted to put a wall between him and these groups.

In campaigning around the country, Wallace was less bellicose and much more moderate on the race issue. The "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever" theme was now replaced by a broader, populist appeal. In his Florida campaign he attacked some senators who, he said, took the nation into a "no win" war and permitted the U.S. to become a

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secondary power, as well as "welfare giveaways" and high taxes, which brought the average taxpayer to his knees and permitted the rich to enjoy tax loopholes. Wallace skillfully played on the dissatisfactions and resentments of the little man and the working man, who were angered by government policies and disturbed by certain directions American life was taking.\textsuperscript{135}

He emerged from the Florida Democratic primary in March with 42 per cent of the statewide vote. Humphrey, who came in second, had only 18 per cent and Senator Jackson 13 per cent, according to the Miami News. Two months later Wallace won 51 per cent of the Michigan primary vote, as compared with 27 per cent for McGovern and 16 per cent for Humphrey. A survey conducted by Daniel Yankelovich for the New York \textit{Times} (May 17) of a cross-section of Democrats, Republicans, and independents who voted for Wallace in the open primary in Michigan indicated they did so largely because of his opposition to busing, welfare, and high taxes.

At the end of May the New York \textit{Times}' tabulation of Democratic delegate strength gave Wallace 317 votes to McGovern's 503. He was ahead of Humphrey (305) and Muskie (160). However, it was generally conceded by this time that his support had peaked even before he was wounded. Thereafter he maintained silence regarding his choice of presidential candidate; but most political observers believed the bulk of his supporters threw their votes to President Nixon. At year's end Wallace, now fully disassociated from the American Independent party, was operating as a Democrat and presumably readying himself for a presidential bid in 1976. In a four-page letter to the Democratic National Committee on December 9, he urged the group to "listen to the people" and "unite on common ground to avoid another Presidential defeat."

\textbf{JOHN SCHMITZ AND THE AMERICAN PARTY}

Even before Wallace's Democratic party primary bid right-wingers found themselves without a leader. For a while some rallied around Republican Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio, but he aroused little interest in the primaries. Right-wing promoters also created a paper organization called Americans for Agnew in an effort to keep Agnew from being dropped from the Republican ticket. \textit{Group Research Report} wrote on September 18 that Agnew was used by the Nixon administration as liaison with dissident conservative Republicans dissatisfied with the President's leadership.

With Wallace out of the picture, the American party in its first national convention nominated lame-duck Congressman John Schmitz of California and Thomas Anderson as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates,

respectively. Both were members of the John Birch Society’s National Council, and many of the 2,000 delegates gathered in Louisville, Ky., on August 3 were Bircheres. In effect the Birch Society, which always had denied being a political party, was now running a presidential slate. Schmitz’s followers, according to a New York Times analysis, were a “dedicated, generally affluent group of white Americans who deeply believe that the Republic is threatened by a conspiracy masterminded by fat cat international financiers in league with China and Russia and protected from public view by a Com-symp American press.” The Anti-Defamation League charged the American party and Schmitz with “approving and distributing anti-Semitism.” The American party had adopted also a plank at its convention calling for prohibition of the sale of arms and of private banking loans to the State of Israel, and of the sale of Israeli bonds in the United States.

Although an election year provided an opportunity for both the extreme right and left to insinuate their ideas into the campaign, it was remarkably free of antisemitism. The right-wing press and anti-Jewish publications, such as Thunderbolt, Common Sense, Herald of Freedom, Washington Observer, and The American Mercury, together with the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 166–67), kept up a steady attack on Henry Kissinger, the President’s chief foreign-policy advisor. Kissinger was at times erroneously described as the son of a rabbi. The wooing of the “Jewish vote” was seen as reaffirmation of the bigot’s view that both major political parties were controlled by Jews and were lackeys of Israel.

Both the American Communist party and the Socialist Workers’ party ran presidential candidates whose campaigns were strongly anti-Israel. The latter called for the outright destruction of Israel, while the former stopped just short of this. The Anti-Defamation League charged both with having “crossed the line into outright anti-Semitism.”

The election results showed little success for extremist groups. Schmitz, who was on the ballot in 32 states, received only 1,200,000 votes, sharply under Wallace’s 10 million in 1968. However, a number of right-wing congressmen, including John M. Ashbrook (R., O.), John R. Rarick (D., La.), and John H. Rousselot (R., Calif.), the latter an avowed Bircher, were reelected.

In addition, the respectable Conservative party of New York, which elected Senator James L. Buckley in 1970, got twice as many votes on its line of the ballot for Nixon as the Liberal party obtained for McGovern. Summarizing

the situation of the radical right in 1972, veteran observer Milton Ellerin said that antisemitism was not marketable in America today, nor was it a lure for mass membership. On the whole, he noted, the right has been a staunch defender of Israel since the 1967 six-day war. "More affluent and more numerous than the followers of the hard core anti-Semites," Ellerin concluded, "the radical right . . . became an aborted phenomenon—a negligible force in contemporary America with little if any real potential for growth."139

MURRAY FRIEDMAN

139 "Is Anti-Semitism on the Rise?", Reform Judaism, October 1972.