

Jewish Identity and the Secular Achievements of American Jewish Men and Women

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Three questions are addressed concerning the relationship of Jewish identity to secular achievements. Are the secular achievements of American Jews related at all to the strength of their Jewish identity? Which has a stronger relationship to secular achievement, a religious or an ethnic Jewish identity? Do communal aspects or private, personal aspects of Jewish identity have the stronger relationship to secular achievements? Using the 2000–2001 National Jewish Population Survey, we find that educational attainment, labor force participation, and occupational achievements are related to several expressions of Jewish identity, even after controlling for the traditional sources of variation (age, gender, education, family status). Jewish identity, as expressed in terms of religion, ethnicity, communal commitment, and private attitudes and practices, is related to contemporary Jewish secular achievement, albeit differently for men and women.

Keywords: identity, secular achievement, Jewish.

INTRODUCTION

While there is controversy about the extent of secularization, whether it should be conceptualized as a linear or dialectical or otherwise changing phenomena, and how stable the process is (Goldstein 2009), secularization can be described as a narrowed or weakened influence of religion on secular arenas of action (Chaves 1994). A parallel individual measure of secularity would be how much the individual's religiosity or religious identification influences his or her secular pursuits. However, measuring individual-level secularity is usually based on responses to a series of questions about people's religious practices and beliefs, and/or whether they define their outlook as secular or religious (Kosmin 2007). We ask how much religious practice or identification is related to secular behavior, suggesting that when the two are related, secularity (and, by extension, secularization in the wider community) is incomplete.

As Taylor (2007) suggests, one of the characteristics of "A Secular Age" is that there are "multiple options to express the religious impulse" (Christiansen 2007:2) and, indeed, some studies have tackled the multidimensionality of religiosity (e.g., Pepper, Jackson, and Uzell 2010; Rinaman et al. 2009). Few studies, however, have actually studied how multiple or various expressions of religious identity are related to secular behavior (Evans and Kelley 2008; Hartman and Hartman 1996, 2009a; Read 2004). Lehrer (2009:225) has called for a "richer array of dimensions of religion" to be used in studies of the influence of religion. Since secularization may be accompanied by the privatization of religion (Casanova 1994), it is particularly useful to inquire whether religiosity has more impact on secular behavior when a person partakes of or identifies with the communal aspects of the religion rather than guarding the religion as a private

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belief system or practice. The ethnic functions of religion have long been recognized. Religion provides a community and a supra-mundane peoplehood with which to identify (Greeley 1972). But communal functions may be quite secular in nature, particularly when they concern mundane pursuits (e.g., sports activities, socializing, and child care). If religion is experienced primarily through ethnic identification, will it have more impact on (public) secular behavior than religion experienced religiously?

Previous research has related religion, and to a lesser extent, religiosity, to secular behavior. Research has been directed at demonstrating and trying to understand religious differences in education, particularly the negative effect of conservative Protestantism and the positive effect of being Jewish on educational attainment. Religious beliefs may lead to an avoidance of actions that prepare the student for higher education, and parents' religious affiliation might indirectly affect a child's education by negatively impacting value orientations towards education (Darnell and Sherkat 1997). The demographic practices of a particular religious group (e.g., Jews' lower fertility and lower rates of mother's employment when the child is young) may influence home investments in child quality, which in turn impact educational success (Lehrer 1999). Congregations, schools, friendship networks, and home environments in particular religions all affect educational aspirations and facilitate (or undermine) preparations for college and university life (Beyerlein 2004; Massengill 2008). The negative effect of conservative Protestant religion on education has "less to do with religious worldviews and orientations toward secular culture and more to do with networks and associations with significant others whose own educational attainment is low" (Massengill 2008:559). Religiosity heightens the effects of religious affiliation on demographic and economic behavior and religiosity's beneficial effects on health and well-being have indirect economic and demographic outcomes as well (Lehrer 2009).

The impact of religion on wealth accumulation, according to Keister (2003), is both direct and indirect. The direct effects of religion encompasses identifying valuable goals that are more or less resonant with wealth accumulation and the indirect effects include the shaping of demographic behaviors and developing competencies that lead to strategies of action either consonant or not consonant with wealth accumulation.

Religiosity is also related to gender roles (Read 2004) and specifically to women's labor force participation at particular stages of life (Evans and Kelley 2008; Gallagher 2003; Hartman and Hartman 1996, 2009a; Lehrer 1995; Read 2004; Sherkat 2000). For women, the effect of religiosity appears to be related to family roles and through them indirectly to labor force participation, though religion may also have a direct effect on labor force participation (Evans and Kelley 2008; Hartman and Hartman 2009a; Read 2004).

The relationship between religiosity and secular behavior varies both in terms of what aspect of religiosity is examined and the interaction of religion and gender. We develop a complex measure of Jewish identity that differentiates religious and ethnic, public and private ways of expressing the identity. We then determine the relationship between these measures of Jewish identity and American Jews' secular behavior and achievements by querying whether religious identity or ethnic identity has a greater relationship to American Jews' secular behavior and achievements. We then query whether public or private expressions of Jewish identity have a greater relationship to American Jews' secular behavior and achievements and conclude with an analysis of gender differences.

Of all religious subgroups in the United States, Jews might be the most interesting group for exploring the relationship between religion and secularism because of the clear presence of both religious and ethnic aspects of Jewish identity and the relatively high proportion of "nonreligious" American Jews (Cohen 2006; Klaff 2006). Identification as Jews appears to be primarily ethnic rather than religious, nominal, or symbolic for many (Gans 1979, 1994). Moreover, the relatively high secular achievements in both education and the labor force combined with the availability of the National Jewish Population Survey, which measures a variety of expressions of Jewish identity as well as secular behaviors and achievements, makes such a study possible.

Jews have been noted as the most secular of the religious groups in the United States (Kosmin and Keysar 2006; Sharot 2011). Among American Jewish adults (either self-identified or determined by parentage), nearly a third identify as secular, atheist, agnostic, humanist, or as having no religion (Keysar 2009; Mayer 2001). When asked if they would characterize themselves as secular or religious in their outlook, 42 percent of Jews characterize themselves as “somewhat secular” or “secular” (26 percent unequivocally characterize themselves as “secular”), a higher proportion than in any other established American religious group (Kosmin and Keysar 2006:43, Figure 3.4). Having a “secular” or “somewhat secular” outlook does not preclude involvement in the Jewish community and religious practice. There is, however, a fairly large minority of contemporary American Jews whose Jewish identification is minimal (approximately 24 percent, according to Klaff 2006). They do not identify with any particular denomination and many express little Jewish involvement or commitment to the Jewish people or religion (Cohen 2006; Klaff 2006). Having this nominal group of Jews allows us to test just how far secularity may go in a loosely coupled religious (cum ethnic—see below) population.

Two explanations are most prominent in accounting for secularity among American Jews. One is the mixture of ethnicity and religiosity in American Jewry (Cohen and Eisen 2000; Hartman and Kaufman 2006; Horowitz 2000; Kaufman 2005; Sharot 1997; Winter 1996, to name but a few). An individual may identify ethnically as a Jew without identifying with or practicing Judaism, the religion (Beit-Hallahmi 2007; Sharot 1997). However, “the historical identity of Judaism and the Jewish people has meant that a predominantly ethnic Jewish identity can be expressed only through religious symbols and practices, but the symbols and practices that were chosen by secularized Jews are those that relate the individual and his or her family to the themes of the continuation of the Jewish people and its historical emergence and struggles for survival” (Sharot 2011:210). Among contemporary American Jews, the range of identities is quite varied, coinciding with but not identical to denominational identity (Hartman and Hartman 2001; Klaff 2006). The long awareness of the intertwining of religious and ethnic Jewish identity has resulted in a fairly well developed methodology for probing ethnic and religious identity, although the very measurement of Jewish identity has been criticized by some (see Kaufman 2008).

A second source of secularity is the high level of (secular) education. Over half of American Jewish adults have attained a college degree, while more than a quarter have earned graduate degrees, a proportion higher than any other American religious group (Kosmin and Keysar 2006). American Jews’ high level of education, labor force participation, occupational achievement, and income have been the subject of inquiry by several scholars. Secular achievement may result from a cultural and/or religious background or “Jewish cultural capital” (see also Hurst and Mott 2006), social networking (see also Goldscheider and Zukerman 1984; Kadushin 2009), human capital handed down through the generations, or a product of external marginalization leaving other occupational and income options limited (Burstein 2007). Too much investment in Jewish cultural and social capital appears to have a negative impact on secular achievement (Chiswick and Huang 2008; Hurst and Mott 2006). One reason for the curvilinear relationship may be overabundant investment in particularistic Jewish cultural and social capital, which constitutes bonding capital rather than capital that facilitates bridging to the wider society (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000).

Recognizing the importance of gender, we examine the effects of Jewish identity on secular achievement for men and women separately. The processes of labor force participation and occupational achievement differ significantly by gender and women tend to be more religiously and ethnically identified (Hartman and Hartman 2009a; see also Collett and Lizardo 2009; Hertel 1995; Mueller and Johnson 1975; Rayburn 2004; Stark 2002; Walter and Davie 1998; Weber [1922] 1963; Woolever et al. 2006). The stronger religious identity of women compared to men might account for the greater impact of religiosity on women’s behavior, including primarily secular behavior such as labor force participation and occupational achievements.

METHODS

Data

Sponsored by the United Jewish Communities (UJC) and Jewish Federations, the National Jewish Population Survey (2000–2001)¹ constitutes the largest survey of American Jews ever to be collected. The survey was collected by telephone using random digit dialing techniques and a stratified sampling frame oversampling areas of high Jewish population density. Over 170,000 households were screened, resulting in 5,148 respondents, who received various versions of the questionnaire depending on their closeness to a number of criteria of Jewishness. The sample for this study includes 4,144 respondents who said that their religion was Jewish,² their parentage was Jewish, they were raised Jewish, and/or they considered themselves Jewish. We limit our analysis to adults age 25–64, which brings the number of respondents to 1,032 men and 1,065 women. The actual number who responded to specific questions about Jewish identity, labor force participation, hours of employment, occupation, and income varies, so some of our analyses are based on much smaller samples.

Indicators

Secular Behavior and Achievement

Secular behavior and achievement is measured by:

1. *Educational attainment* (highest degree attained);
2. *Labor force participation* (for women only, as the variation among men is small, with close to 90 percent of men in the labor force at the time of the survey);
3. *Hours of weekly employment* among those who are employed (again for women only, since about 90 percent of the men ages 25–64 were employed full-time);
4. *Employment in a “high-level manpower” occupation*, among those employed;³
5. *Annual income* for those employed full-time (35 or more hours weekly);⁴
6. *Occupational prestige*, measured by scores adapted to the 1990 Census categories from those originally developed for the 1980 Census categories of occupation (Nakao and Treas 1994). The scores have been adapted to the 2000 Census categories of occupation.⁵

¹ Information about the survey can be found in Kotler-Berkowitz (2006), UJC (2003), and on the website www.jewishdatabank.org.

² With the exception of Jews who claimed they were also adherents of a “noncompatible” religion such as a Christian denomination (for more details, see UJC 2003).

³ “High-level” occupations are defined as managerial/executive, business/finance, or professional occupations (Chiswick 2007). We use the 2000 U.S. Census classification. These are typically occupations that require an advanced educational degree.

⁴ There is a relatively high proportion of nonresponse on the income variable, but the nonresponse is largely random (rather than biased in any particular direction), at least for men (Chiswick and Huang 2008). Following common practice, we use the natural logarithm of the annual income.

⁵ The scores are adapted from Carl Fredrick’s work at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, per e-mail communication with Robert Hauser (of the University of Wisconsin, Madison), 12/4/2005. We gratefully acknowledge the sharing of these scores. Given the stability of occupational prestige scores, both over time and between genders (as summarized in Hauser and Warren 1997), this practice of adapting older scores is well established.

Jewish Identity

Starting from the premise that Jewish identity is multidimensional, multiple indices were needed that would reflect numerous types of expressions of Jewish identity.⁶ Most of these “expressions” of Jewish identity are practices that indicate a proclivity for “doing Jewish,” that is, behaving in ways that are grounded in Jewish practice, community, or heritage or expressing values that stress the importance of such “Jewish” practices, peoplehood, or heritage. Some are attitudinal in nature, reflecting predispositions or preferences that may guide behavior. Rather than superimpose our expectations of the dimensions as prior research would suggest, we allowed the data to cluster the indicators through a principal components varimax rotation factor analysis of over 20 survey questions, which resulted in a four-factor solution. These factors could be distinguished as reflecting primarily ethnic or religious Jewish identity, and whether they were usually expressed in a public or private setting. We briefly describe these factors below. See Table 1 for factor loadings.

Three variables were eliminated because they loaded highly on two or more factors, which would confound our testing of what type of Jewish identity is most related to secular achievement. For example, fasting on Yom Kippur had a high loading on both the private religious factor (reflecting personal ritual behavior) and the public religious factor (because the fast is usually accompanied by participation in the communal Yom Kippur prayer services and a communal breaking of the fast). Even with these precautions, some correlation between the factors remains (see Table 2), reflecting the “messy nuances” of Jewish identity (Mayer 2001) that do not rest easily in a single box of religion or ethnicity, public or private expression. The correlations, however, are low enough to accept these factors as separate indicators, and their covariance is also relatively low.

Public religious identity is calculated using factor scores that load on the “ceremony” factor: attending a seder (ritual meal on the Passover holiday), lighting candles to celebrate the holiday of Chanukah, attending synagogue the past year, placing a Mezuzah on any door in the home, and ever belonging to a synagogue. Lighting candles to celebrate Chanukah is a collective “ceremony,” “affirming membership in the social and cosmological order” (Alexander 1987:124). These religious practices are compatible with American society in that they can be redefined in modern non-supra-mundane terms, do not demand social isolation or a unique lifestyle, provide a “Jewish” alternative when such is needed in the broader American religious scene, and are performed annually or infrequently (Sklare 1971).

Private religious identity is calculated using factor scores that load on the “personal ritual” factor: they reflect more strict, daily, and personal commitment to ritual, such as keeping the dietary requirements of kashrut at home and lighting Shabbat candles every week.

Public ethnic identity is calculated using factor scores that load on organizational involvement in formal Jewish organizations other than synagogue, including attending Jewish Community Center (JCC) or Young Men’s/Young Women’s Hebrew Association (YM/YWHA) programs, and paying dues to a JCC or YM/YWHA or any other Jewish organization except a synagogue. Because these organizations bring a diverse lot of participants together, some of whom may not be Jewish (see also Kadushin 2009, on the nature of such Jewish social networks), the social capital reflected here is a bridging social capital.

⁶ Many scholars are dissatisfied with the common set of indicators used in contemporary surveys for measuring Jewish identity (see, e.g., Kaufman 2008). However, if one must use survey data (and obviously there are many advantages for doing so, given the larger sample size and greater representativeness of the national sample), the NJPS 2000–2001 has a wider set of indicators of many expressions of Jewish identity than its predecessors or smaller community surveys of Jews. It is, however, limited in that its construction was not designed precisely to test any theoretical understandings of Jewish identity and was limited in the extent to which it tapped into contemporary practices and concerns (see more on this in Hartman and Hartman 2003). Nevertheless, it is the best survey data available for the purpose.

Table 1: Jewish identity factors (principal components varimax rotation)*

Jewish Identity Indicator	Private Ethnic Factor (Personal Tribalism)	Public Religious Factor (Ceremony)	Private Religious Factor (Personal Ritual)	Public Ethnic Factor (Organizational Involvement)
Important that child's future spouse is Jewish	.826			
Important that grandchildren raised Jewish	.782			
Important that child's future spouse convert	.763			
Important to have friends sharing Jewish ways	.625			
Closest friends Jewish	.591			
Strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people	.517			
Held/attended Seder last Passover		.739		
Lit candles last Chanukah		.669		
Attended synagogue the past year		.631		
Mezuzah on any door of home		.574		
Ever belonged to synagogue		.539		
Keep kosher in home			.819	
Light Sabbath candles			.701	
Comfortable attending Orthodox services			.646	
Dues paid to JCC/YM/YWHA past year				.817
Attended JCC/YM/YWHA program past year				.755
Dues paid to any Jewish organization (not synagogue/JCC) past year				.696
% of variance explained	19.8%	14.9%	11.3%	11.3%

*Factor scores less than .35 not reported.

Table 2: Pearson correlation matrix for Jewish identity factors for men (above diagonal) and women (below diagonal) ages 25–64; covariance in parentheses

Factor Type	Private Ethnic	Public Ethnic	Private Religious	Public Religious
Private Ethnic (Personal Tribalism)	1	−.040 (−.031)	.021 (.019)	.077** (.079)
Public Ethnic (Organizational Involvement)	−.031 (−.024)	1	.015 (.011)	.083** (.067)
Private Religious (Personal Ritual)	.062** (.052)	−.023 (−.017)	1	.043 (.040)
Public Religious (Ceremony)	.060** (.053)	.049 (.038)	−.010 (−.009)	1

** $p < .05$.

Private ethnic identity is calculated using factor scores for measures of personal commitment to Jewish continuity and cohesiveness, or “personal tribalism,” including considering it important to have Jewish friends, placing importance on a child’s spouse being Jewish (or converting to Judaism) and on grandchildren being raised Jewish, and feeling personally connected to the Jewish people. The ethnic factors reflect five of the eight dimensions of Jewish ethnic identity noted by Cohen (2001): Jewish peoplehood (the sense of belonging to the Jewish people), tribalism (the sense of having a special relationship with and responsibility for other Jews), and commitment to endogamy, attachment, and affiliating with Jewish institutions.

Bridging social capital is reflected in the public ethnic and religious identity measures, while bonding social capital is reflected in the private religious and ethnic identity measures.

Control Variables

Denominational preference is measured by responses to the question: “Thinking about Jewish religious denominations, [what] do you consider yourself to be?” Respondents were grouped into Orthodox, Conservative, Reform/Reconstructionist, and “unaffiliated” (that is, unaffiliated with one of the major American Jewish denominations). Controlling for denominational preference eliminates confounding influences that might affect the expressions of Jewish identity. The denominations differ in the extent to which adherents see religion as a dominant influence on everyday behaviors, in their emphasis on ethnic and/or religious identity, and in the extent to which they value exposure and involvement in the broader (nonexclusively) Jewish world or universalism (Hartman and Hartman 2001). However, denominational affiliation is by no means monolithic.⁷ While the Orthodox score higher on all of the factors, they are most distinguished from the other groups on the private religious and private ethnic identity measures; they score almost the same as the Conservative and only slightly higher than the Reform on the public religious and public ethnic measures. All denominational affiliates score higher than the unaffiliated (Hartman and Hartman 2009a:134–38).

Age. Secular achievement may increase with seniority, reflected by age. Cohorts also differ in their employment patterns, particularly as regards women’s labor force participation (older cohorts are less likely to participate in the labor force, as are women in the childbearing and childrearing years) and occupational achievement (which tends to increase with age, although

⁷ See Klaff (2006) for a window on denominational complexity among Jews.

there are also cohort differences, as Chiswick (1999) and Chiswick (2007) have shown). Jewish identity also varies by age (Hartman and Hartman 2009a:139–40).

Educational attainment (highest degree obtained) is a secular achievement and we focus on it in the first regression analysis. When examining the labor force, occupation, and income variables, however, education becomes an independent variable.

Current marital status is coded as 0 = not married; 1 = currently married. Single women who are supporting themselves and/or their families are more likely to be in the labor force and may be more motivated and/or more able toward occupational achievement. When single with no children, women have fewer familial obligations; when single with children, there is a greater need for income. Married men, on the other hand, are known to be more active in the labor force and their occupational achievement is greater, presumably because they are more highly motivated to support their family and also have more “backstage wealth” that helps them to achieve (Hochschild 1989).

Number of children under 18 at home. Having young children at home suggests a family obligation and may curtail labor force participation and achievement both in the short and the long run, particularly for women. For men, having children may be a motivation to achieve higher income and occupational prestige.

METHOD

We conducted regression analyses with the secular achievement variables as dependent variables. In the cases of labor force participation and occupational attainment, we used logistic regression analyses (since the dependent variables were dichotomous); in the cases of education, hours of employment, income, and occupational prestige, we used ordinary least squares regression analysis. The four Jewish identity factors described above are the independent variables measured as standardized factor scores with a mean of 0. High scores indicate strong Jewish identities. Three dummy variables are included indicating denominational preference (Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform/Reconstructionist); the reference category is unaffiliated.

We cannot draw conclusions about causality from these data as the relationship may actually be interactive. While certain types of Jewish identity may alter motivations, opportunities, and proclivities for certain types of secular achievement, secular achievement itself may alter the strength of various types of Jewish identity. Such complex interrelationships might best be explored with longitudinal or qualitative interviews that trace the history of Jewish identity and secular achievement.

RESULTS

The regression of educational attainment is presented in three steps. The Jewish identity factors are entered in Model 1. Denominational affiliation measures are added in Model 2. To control for the differential age composition of the denominations, age is entered in Model 3. We do not control for marital status and number of children in this regression, as education likely precedes the family behaviors of marriage and childbearing (especially for women).⁸

All four Jewish identity variables are significantly related to men’s educational attainment (Table 3, Model 1). The personal ritual factor is significantly associated with educational attainment in a negative direction, while the public religious (ceremony) factor and ethnic (organizational involvement) factors are significantly associated with education in a positive direction. The

⁸ While a minority of women return to their schooling as nontraditional students (after the main childbearing years) (Hartman and Hartman 2009a:20–21), we do not have appropriate data to study that phenomena here.

Table 3: Regression analyses of educational attainment, men and women, ages 25–62

Independent Variable	Men						Women					
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 1		
	b	β		b	β		b	β		b	β	
Private Religious Factor (Personal Ritual)	-.113** (.039)	-.089		-.022 (.047)	-.017		-.020 (.047)	-.016		-.221** (.036)	-.173	
Public Religious Factor (Ceremony)	.140** (.036)	.120		.137** (.037)	.117		.137** (.037)	.117		.102** (.034)	.088	
Private Ethnic Factor (Personal Tribalism)	.078** (.037)	.065		.107** (.039)	.089		.102** (.039)	.085		.016 (.035)	.014	
Public Ethnic Factor (Organizational Involvement)	.125** (.044)	.087		.132** (.044)	.092		.123** (.045)	.085		.083** (.039)	.059	
Orthodox				-.380** (.131)	-.106		-.378** (.131)	-.106		-.166 (.130)	-.045	
Conservative				-.040 (.094)	-.015		-.042 (.094)	-.015		.023 (.085)	.009	
Reform/ Reconstructionist				.151* (.085)	.061		.155* (.085)	.063		.008 (.078)	.003	
Age							.005 (.003)	.043				
Constant	4.099** .034 (1027)			4.106** .046			3.894** .048			3.903** .042 (1204)		
R^2										3.913** .043		
(n)										4.466** .056		

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$.

strongest relationship is with the public religious (ceremony) factor ($\beta = .120, p < .05$), closely followed by the public ethnic (organizational involvement) factor ($\beta = .087, p < .05$). However, the effect of the personal ritual factor is reduced by four-fifths, and becomes statistically non-significant once being Orthodox is included in the model. The negative effect of being Orthodox is statistically significant ($\beta = -.106, p < .05$) and similar in magnitude to the effects of the two public identity factors. Controlling for age (Model 3) does little to change the relationship between men's Jewish identity or denominational preference and education.

The results suggest that the social capital reflected in the public ethnic factor of organizational involvement and in the public religious factor of ceremony have the strongest relationships to educational attainment. They also suggest that the effect of particularistic religiosity on educational attainment, which includes observances that separate and intensify bonding within a small family religious group, is negative. It is also probable that the kind of education more valued among the Orthodox (religious study in higher educational institutions of yeshiva) does not result in the higher doctoral and professional degrees of secular education.

For the women, the strongest effect is found between private religious identity and educational attainment. With a standardized coefficient (β) of $-.173$ ($p < .05$), the effect is more than twice as strong as the effect of any other Jewish identity factor, although both the public religious and ethnic factors are statistically significant. The negative effect is also much stronger for women ($B = -.221$) than for men ($B = -.113$). When controlling for denomination (Model 2), the negative effect of private religiosity remains strong ($\beta = -.150, p < .05$) and is stronger than any of the other effects including denomination. While age (entered in Model 3) adds to the explanation of the variance in women's education (older women have less education), age does not diminish the effect of the private religious factor, which remains strongly associated with women's educational attainment. Thus, for women, religion has a greater effect than ethnicity, and personal rituals and religious identification have a greater effect than the public expressions of identity. One reason may be the relationship between private religious identity and familial behaviors that include early marriage and childbearing (Hartman and Hartman 2009a), both of which may interfere with higher educational attainment.

We only present the results for women's participation in the labor force and hours of employment, since the majority of men are employed full-time and the small minority who are not employed are either in school or have extenuating circumstances. We conducted a logistic regression analysis of labor force participation (Table 4) and a linear regression of hours of employment (Table 5). The analyses are conducted in three steps, first with the Jewish identity factors as the only independent variables and then adding in the three denominational dummy variables and then adding in the more commonly measured influences on women's labor force participation and hours: education, age, marital status, and number of children at home.

In the first model (Table 4, Model 1), the two religious identity factors are related significantly to women's labor force participation; however, the effects are in opposite directions. With a regression coefficient of $-.279$ ($p < .05$), private religious identity (personal ritual) is related negatively to women's labor force participation, while public religious identity (ceremony) is related positively ($B = .180, p < .05$). Controlling for denomination hardly has any effect on the direction, magnitude, or significance of the identity factors. However, when education, age, marital status, and number of children at home are controlled, the significant effect of the personal ritual factor disappears, indicating that its effect is primarily indirect, through the family variables. That is, women who report a stronger private religious identity are more likely to be currently married and to have young children at home (Hartman and Hartman 2009a), both of which reduce the likelihood of women participating in the labor force. The stronger the public religious identity, the greater the likelihood of labor force participation; it is likely that communal involvements, both religiously and through labor force participation, reinforce each other as social capital. Among the control variables, education has the strongest effect; the higher the education, the

Table 4: Logistic regression analysis of labor force participation, women ages 25–64 ($n = 1,196$)^a

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B ^b	Odds Ratio	B	Odds Ratio	B	Odds Ratio
Private Religious Factor (Personal Ritual)	–.279** (.072)	.756	–.254** (.089)	.776	–.121 (.094)	.886
Public Religious Factor (Ceremony)	.180** (.071)	1.197	.171** (.074)	1.186	.192** (.078)	1.212
Private Ethnic Factor (Personal Tribalism)	–.114 (.073)	.892	–.116 (.078)	.890	–.091 (.082)	.913
Public Ethnic Factor (Organizational Involvement)	–.126 (.084)	.882	–.137 (.085)	.872	–.143 (.088)	.867
Orthodox			–.154 (.186)	.857	.147 (.304)	1.158
Conservative			.169 (.277)	1.184	.131 (.196)	1.140
Reform/ Reconstructionist			.010 (.167)	1.010	–.019 (.175)	.982
Education					.392** (.065)	1.480
Age					–.019** (.007)	.981
# Children Under 18 at Home					–.265** (.068)	.767
Currently Married					–.124 (.007)	.883
Pseudo- R^2		.031		.033		.113

^a R^2 is Nagelkerke. 75.9 percent cases predicted correctly in Model 3.

^bLogistic regression coefficients (B) equivalent to unstandardized regression coefficients.

** $p < .05$.

greater the likelihood of labor force participation. On the other hand, women are less likely to be participating in the labor force when they have children under 18 at home.

Hours of employment is related to three of the Jewish identity factors: negatively related to both the private religious (personal ritual) and ethnic (personal tribalism) factors, and the public ethnic (organizational involvement) factor. Once education, age, and family variables are controlled, only organizational involvement has a significant and negative relationship with hours of employment. Women who are strongly involved in Jewish ethnic organizations spend less time in the labor force possibly because of time constraints. Women who have more young children at home are employed fewer hours in the labor force, and women who are not currently married are more likely to be employed full-time (presumably having greater need to support themselves). The results are not surprising, nor is the inverse relationship with age (older women have fewer hours of employment).

Table 6 reports results of a logistic regression of occupational attainment; Table 7 reports the results of linear regressions of income and occupational prestige. We look only at those employed full-time to minimize the variation due to hours of labor force involvement. In these analyses, we present only the final model (the stepwise regression models are available from the authors upon request).

Table 5: Regression analysis for hours of employment, women ages 25–64 (*n* = 902)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	β	B	β	b	β
Private Religious Factor (Personal Ritual)	−.051** (.016)	−.106	−.039* (.019)	−.081	−.007 (.019)	−.015
Public Religious Factor (Ceremony)	−.010 (.015)	.010	−.015 (.016)	−.035	.008 (.015)	.018
Private Ethnic Factor (Personal Tribalism)	−.031 (.015)	−.031	−.032 (.016)	−.035	−.010 (.016)	−.023
Public Ethnic Factor (Organizational Involvement)	−.057** (.017)	−.104	−.059** (.017)	−.107	−.039** (.017)	−.071
Orthodox			−.044 (.057)	−.031	.022 (.055)	.016
Conservative			.043 (.037)	.044	.022 (.036)	.023
Reform/ Reconstructionist			.036 (.034)	.040	.023 (.033)	.026
Education					.004 (.012)	.010
Age					−.004** (.001)	−.090
# Children Under 18 at Home					−.093** (.014)	−.253
Currently Married					−.123** (.030)	−.151
<i>R</i> ²	.028		.031		.125	

p* < .10; *p* < .05.

We find a positive relationship between both religious and ethnic Jewish identity factors and occupational attainment for men. Attaining a “higher” occupation is positively related to the ethnic factors of organizational involvement and personal tribalism, and the private religious factor. Interestingly, the private religious factor has a stronger effect once the denominations are controlled, and in a direction opposite to the effect of being Orthodox or Conservative. Being Orthodox is negatively associated with all three measures of secular achievement (see Table 7 as well). A similar but smaller association is found for Conservatives in the occupational attainment model (Table 6).

These results might seem somewhat contradictory, since the Orthodox and Conservative tend to have stronger private religious and ethnic identities than the Reform or the unaffiliated (Hartman and Hartman 2009a). Hurst and Mott (2006) suggest there is a curvilinear relationship between investment in religious capital and occupational achievement, such that being highly invested in religious capital (a strong religious identity) undermines occupational achievements, but moderate religious capital is related to greater occupational achievements. Similarly, Chiswick and Huang (2008) find a “nonlinear effect of religious practice among Jewish men on their labor market outcomes” (2008:705). “[B]eyond some point, time and effort devoted to religious activities detract from the time and/or effort devoted to the labor market” (2008:705), or the demands of an Orthodox lifestyle are at odds with occupational achievement, or discrimination against the Orthodox affects their participation in the labor market. When we control for the Orthodox

Table 6: Logistic regression analysis of occupational attainment (managerial/business/professional occupation), employed men and women ages 25–64^a

	Managerial/Business/Professional Occupation			
	Men		Women	
	B ^b	Odds Ratio	B ^b	Odds Ratio
Private Religious Factor (Personal Ritual)	.199** (.094)	1.220	.072 (.095)	1.075
Public Religious Factor (Ceremony)	.085 (.069)	1.089	.009 (.080)	1.009
Private Ethnic Factor (Personal Tribalism)	.193** (.074)	1.213	-.054 (.081)	.947
Public Ethnic Factor (Organizational Involvement)	.191** (.091)	1.210	.216** (.086)	1.241
Orthodox	-.695** (.285)	.499	.139 (.322)	1.149
Conservative	-.318* (.188)	.727	.175 (.193)	1.191
Reform/Reconstructionist	-.169 (.165)	.844	.016 (.169)	1.016
Education	.411** (.062)	1.509	.727** (.070)	2.068
Age	.001 (.007)	1.001	-.002 (.007)	.998
# Children Under 18 (Home)	-.032 (.070)	.969	-.028 (.078)	.973
Currently Married	.147 (.158)	1.158	.141 (.150)	1.152
Constant	-1.225**	.294	-2.442**	.087
Pseudo-R ² (n)	.098 (970)		.173 (1032)	

^aR² is Nagelkerke. 63.0 percent of men's cases and 67.9 percent of women's cases predicted correctly.

^bLogistic regression coefficients (B) equivalent to unstandardized regression coefficients.

p* < .10; *p* < .05.

denominational preference, we control for the highest scores on Jewish identity, and the positive effect we see in the Jewish identity factors likely reflects the remaining relationship between Jewish identity and occupational achievement.

To illustrate the relative effects of Jewish identity and denominational preference on secular achievement, we calculated the mean occupational achievement (percentage having managerial, business, or professional occupations), mean occupational prestige score, and mean annual income for men employed full-time who had high factor scores on the two private Jewish identity factors (the factor scores were dichotomized into high and low). The means are reported by denomination in the first column of Table 8, adjusted for age, education, marital status, and number of children at home.

Occupational achievement among Orthodox men is not lower compared to other denominations when education is held constant (75.4 percent of the Orthodox are managers, in business, or professionals, compared to around 70 percent in the other denominations). However, occupational

Table 7: Regression analysis of occupational prestige and income, employed men and women ages 25–64

	Men			Women		
	Annual Income (Full-Time Employees)		Occupational Prestige	Annual Income (Full-Time Employees)		Occupational Prestige
	b	β		b	β	
Private Religious Factor (Personal Ritual)	.047 (.041)	.059	1.384** (.624)	-.072** (.036)	-.107	.767 (.517)
Public Religious Factor (Ceremony)	.043 (.031)	.057	-.014 (.479)	.002 (.029)	.003	.027 (.421)
Private Ethnic Factor (Personal Tribalism)	.066** (.033)	.086	1.827** (.503)	.004 (.030)	.005	.099 (.430)
Public Ethnic Factor (Organizational Involvement)	.029 (.038)	.033	.422 (.613)	.030 (.032)	.043	1.103** (.464)
Orthodox	-.258** (.115)	-.113	-2.993* (1.704)	.213* (.109)	.102	.543 (1.522)
Conservative	.090 (.079)	.054	-.992 (1.215)	.012 (.068)	.010	-.442 (.986)
Reform/Reconstructionist	.019 (.071)	.012	-1.064 (1.103)	-.036 (.060)	-.033	.544 (.901)
Education	.200** (.026)	.316	4.500** (.406)	.123** (.024)	.248	4.976** (.338)
Age	.006** (.003)	.083	.007 (.046)	.005** (.003)	.102	.050 (.037)
# Children Under 18 (Home)	.050* (.029)	.078	.199 (.486)	-.009 (.033)	-.014	.448 (.380)
Currently Married	.032 (.069)	.022	1.154 (1.083)	.023 (.055)	.022	.179 (.828)
Constant	10.101**		35.067**	10.088**		30.348**
R ²	.161		.145	.088		.199
N	(603)		(873)	(803)		(960)

p < .10, ***p* < .05.

Table 8: Occupation, income, and occupational prestige for men ages 24–64, employed full-time, scoring high on the private religious and ethnic factors by denomination, adjusted for age, education, marital status, and number of children in household

Denomination	Total (Adjusted) ^a	High Score on Personal Ritual (Private Religious Factor) ^a	High Score on Personal Tribalism (Private Ethnic Factor) ^a
<i>% Managers, Business, or Professional Occupation</i>			
Orthodox	75.4	64.5	81.2
Conservative	71.5	67.6	72.0
Reform/Reconstructionist	67.6	69.7	70.9
Unaffiliated	68.2	71.9	78.3
<i>Mean Occupational Prestige Score</i>			
Orthodox	56.7	51.3	60.6
Conservative	56.2	55.5	56.1
Reform/Reconstructionist	53.8	55.1	56.4
Unaffiliated	54.9	57.5	59.4
<i>Mean Annual Income</i>			
Orthodox	\$74,548	\$83,719	\$82,093
Conservative	\$106,844	\$142,989	\$123,702
Reform/Reconstructionist	\$95,707	\$88,741	\$96,309
Unaffiliated	\$94,174	\$100,151	\$90,241
<i>N</i>			
Orthodox	85	82	72
Conservative	231	132	137
Reform/Reconstructionist	329	120	132
Unaffiliated	258	127	64

^aMeans are adjusted for covariates in the general linear model, evaluated at the following values: age = 43.02; marital status = .52 (0 = not married; 1 = currently married); number of children under 18 in the household = .66; highest degree earned (grouped) at 4.1 (4 = B.A., 5 = M.A.).

achievement is lower among the Orthodox when the strength of personal ritual (the private religious factor) is taken into account (see the second column of Table 8). Only 64.5 percent are in this higher occupational group compared to, for example, 71.9 percent of the unaffiliated. In the other denominational groups, a comparison of the adjusted means for the total and for those with high scores on the personal ritual factor reveals only small differences compared to the large difference for the Orthodox (adjusted mean for the entire group is 75.4 compared to 64.5 for those who score high on personal ritual). We know the Orthodox have lower educational attainment. The lower occupational achievement among the Orthodox likely stems from lower educational attainment and a strong commitment to personal ritual, which apparently interferes somewhat with occupational attainment. The strong commitment to personal ritual may act as a bonding mechanism among the Orthodox, since almost all of them share this strong commitment. A strong commitment to personal ritual does not appear to have the same effect on occupational attainment among the Reform (the adjusted mean is 67.6 and the mean for those with a high score on personal ritual is 69.7) and the unaffiliated (68.2 compared to 71.9). We see a similar pattern when we look at the mean occupational prestige scores. Before we adjust for the score on personal ritual (first column Table 8), the prestige score for the Orthodox is 56.7, as high or higher than the mean score for the other denominations. But among those who score high on personal ritual, the Orthodox have the lowest prestige score (51.3). This strong personal religious identity does not have the same effect on the occupational prestige score of men who are Reform (55.1) or are unaffiliated (57.5).

When we look at the mean annual income for the different denominational groups, we see that the Orthodox report a lower income compared to the other groups whether or not Jewish identity is taken into consideration. A high score on the private religious factor is associated with a higher income among the Orthodox (\$83,719 compared to \$74,548 in the adjusted model); the higher income of those with high scores on personal ritual is also found among the Conservative (\$142,989) and to a lesser extent for the unaffiliated (\$100,151). But by comparison to the other denominations, the mean income for the Orthodox is lower among those scoring high on both the private religious and the private ethnic factors. Among those with high scores on the private ethnic factor, the mean annual income for the Orthodox is lower (\$82,093 compared to over \$90,000 for the other denominational groups).

The interaction between denomination and Jewish identity appears to be quite complex; denominational differences do not disappear when Jewish identity scores are held constant, nor do Jewish identity effects disappear when denomination is held constant (hence the significant effect of the private identity factors when denomination is controlled in the regression models).

The relationship between higher education and occupational attainment, income, and occupational prestige is stronger than any of the Jewish identity effects on secular achievement (Tables 6 and 7). In the logistic regression of occupational attainment, the education variable is only slightly stronger (odds ratio = 1.509) than the effects of the private religious (1.220), private ethnic (1.213), and public ethnic factors (1.210). But in the case of income and occupational prestige, the effect of education is about three times that of any Jewish identity factor. Of course, as we have seen above, Jewish identity is itself related to higher education, so there is an indirect effect of Jewish identity on occupational attainment through education. Age and family status have no significant effect on men's occupational achievements.

For women, Jewish identity appears to have less to do with occupational achievements than for men. Of the four Jewish identity factors, only the public ethnic factor (organizational involvement) is significantly and positively related to occupational attainment and occupational prestige, and controlling for education and family variables considerably reduces the size of the effect (in the case of income, the effect is no longer statistically significant).

As suggested above, involvement in Jewish organizations may provide social capital that enhances occupational achievement (and occupational achievement may provide the means to be involved by paying membership dues to belong to Jewish organizations). There is a negative relationship between personal commitment to ritual and annual income for women (for men the relationship is positive). Greater "familism" among women involved in domestic religious ritual may affect the extent and continuity of career commitment, but we do not have data to test this. On the other hand, we do not see a negative relationship between occupational attainment and being Orthodox, perhaps because there is a tendency for Orthodox women in the labor force to be employed in professional occupations disproportionately. These professional occupations offer greater occupational prestige and are higher paying (Hartman and Hartman 2009a).

Similar to men, it is women's education that is the strongest predictor of labor force outcomes, much stronger (double or triple the magnitude) than any of the Jewish identity or denominational effects. Again, the effect of Jewish identity is mediated through education. While age has a positive relationship with income, family status is not related to any of the indicators of labor force outcomes. Apparently, once in the labor force, human capital (which is what education most reflects) is the most important determinant of labor force outcomes for women.

Comparing the effects of Jewish identity on the secular achievement of men and women, the most striking feature is the smaller effect of most of the identity factors on women's occupational achievements. Some of this may be related to the greater difficulties all women share in attaining occupational achievements. When compared to men, especially with regard to income (see Table 7), the model accounts for less of the variation in women's income ($R^2 = .088$) than in men's ($R^2 = .161$). But some of this seems to be related to the difference in relationship between Jewish identity and secular achievement for men and women. Men's occupational attainment is

positively related to just about all of the factors, even when denomination, education, age, and family variables are controlled. Women's occupational attainment is related only to the public ethnic factor. Men's income is related positively to the public ethnic factor and, more weakly, to the private religious factor. The private religious factor is negatively related to women's income, though weakly. The net effect of the identity factors on women's income is small and negative. Men's occupational prestige is related positively to the private religious factor and the private ethnic factor; women's occupational prestige is related positively to the public ethnic factor. If the public ethnic factor represents social (Jewish) capital, then the effect of the Jewish identity factors for women's labor force outcomes is mainly through the social capital they garner through their associations with Jewish organizations. For men, there seems to be more of an ambition promoted through Jewish cultural as well as social capital.

DISCUSSION

Our first research question was whether Jewish identity is related to the secular achievements of American Jews. To test this we used regression analysis to predict education, labor force participation, and hours of employment of women, and occupational attainment, annual earnings, and occupational prestige for both men and women. Our dependent variables were indices of public and private expressions of religious and ethnic Jewish identity, and the more common predictor variables of education, age, and family status. The short answer to the question is yes. We found that the Jewish identity factors were related to educational attainment for both men and women. After the more common predictor variables were included in the models, Jewish identity was related to the greater likelihood of women's participation in the labor force, fewer hours of employment, achieving a managerial, business, or professional occupation, higher annual earnings, and a higher occupational prestige score. Jewish identity was related to men's occupational attainment, annual income, and occupational prestige.

The importance of the Jewish identity factors in explaining the variance in American Jews' secular achievements still raises the question of why Jewish identity matters when so many of the subpopulation of American Jews do not identify themselves as religious, as noted in the introduction. Is it primarily through Jewish cultural capital (religious identity) or Jewish social (ethnic) capital? Is it primarily through bonding Jewish capital (the private religious or ethnic factors) or bridging Jewish capital (the public identity factors)? And are the mechanisms the same for men and women?

The analysis gives us different answers for men and women. For women, bonding Jewish capital (the private religious identity factor) negatively impacts their educational attainment and labor force involvement, primarily through their influence on family behavior (age at marriage, at a childbearing, and number of children) (Hartman and Hartman 2009a). Once women are in the labor force, bridging social capital (organizational involvement) facilitates secular achievement. For men, both Jewish cultural and social capital have a positive effect on educational attainment, especially when bonding capital (being Orthodox) is controlled. There is a positive relationship of involvement in Jewish organizations (the public ethnic identity factor) with all of men's labor force outcomes, a stronger relationship than that found for women.

The effect of Jewish cultural and religious capital on secular achievement is different for men and women. Jewish culture and religion promote secular achievement for men. The private commitment to both religious and ethnic Jewish identity is related to secular achievement; a commitment to achievement that spills over to secular pursuits (see Hartman and Hartman 1996). Conversely, Jewish men who have weaker secular achievements are the ones who are more likely to intermarry, which is usually related to weaker ethnic and religious Jewish identity (Hartman and Hartman 2009b). For women, the negative effects of personal religious and ethnic commitment on secular involvement may be related to the emphasis placed on their domestic and particularistic

roles. Indeed, it is women who have been credited with much of the maintenance of strong ethnic and religious Jewish identity in Diaspora families, particularly in the United States (Prell 1999). This might explain why for women, Jewish identity seems to be less relevant to their secular achievement than it is for men. Historically, the Jewish culture/religion has not placed obstacles in the way of women's secular achievements, and de facto women were often the ones taking advantage of secular education and earning a livelihood in the secular labor force while their husbands furthered their religious training and studies (Hyman 1995). But "not placing obstacles" and promoting secular achievement are not equivalent, and this may explain some of the gender difference that we see.

Jewish identity remains important for secular achievement for both men and women and this begs the question of why. Consider these findings in the context of Smith's reconceptualization of secularization as a power dynamic that is embraced (or rejected) in varying degrees by actors with competing interests (Smith 2003).⁹ With their history of marginalization in the struggle for assimilation, American Jews may have embraced cultural and social capital to an unexpected degree. In support of this theory are numerous references in Smith's seminal work, *The Secular Revolution* (2003), to the social marginalization of American Jews throughout American intellectual and economic history as explanations for their separation from the dominant establishment. Thus we add the social and historical context of the particular religion to the factors that must be considered in the relationship between religion and secular behavior.

If indeed this marginalization is a major factor in the explanation of the persistent impact of Jewish identity on secular behavior among American Jews, we should expect to see a differential impact across communities, according to how "embattled" as a minority Jews are. Indeed, incorporating region into our analysis of the impact of Jewish identity on secular behavior is our next line of research.

Clearly, Jewish social capital is at work in promoting the secular achievements of American Jews (Goldscheider and Zukerman 1984; Lehrer 1995, 2009) as illustrated by the effect of the public ethnic factor on secular achievement. Further, the secular nature of many Jewish social networks attests to the marginalization American Jews endured but did not allow to hinder their progress (Kadushin 2009). But there is more to explore about this social capital. Are these social networks characterized by the kinds of attributes Burt (2005) shows as favorably promoting entrepreneurial success? Which of these networks provide bridging opportunities that translate into greater secular achievements? We can and need to collect more data on the specific Jewish networks individuals participate in to better understand the impact of Jewish social capital on their secular behavior and achievements. Such an approach might also provide an explanation of how the networks and associations of conservative and mainline Protestants affect their secular achievement (studied by Beyerlein 2004; Massengill 2008). Specific social networks may act differently for different religious groups, just as we found that specific Jewish identity factors appear to have differential effects across the different Jewish denominations.

The operationalization of secularity in this article is arguably limited. For most people, labor force involvement is a mundane behavior and therefore an appropriate measure of secular behavior. However, for the very religious, one's vocation may express a religious calling (consider Calvinism in Weber's Protestant ethic). We have no information in this survey indicating what the respondent sees this behavior as expressing. We also have no direct question related to secularity (though our personal religious indicator includes the opposite and more commonly asked indicator—the importance attached to religion). We are therefore inferring the relationship between religious (and ethnic) identity and secular behavior, rather than measuring it more directly. Future surveys would do well to include more direct measures of secularity, such as the ARIS question: "Is your outlook mainly religious or secular?" (Kosmin and Keysar 2006).

⁹ We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of thought.

A related question might be whether primarily “ethnic” and/or “cultural” (i.e., not “religious” per se) identification with a religious group should be construed as secularity. If the identification is with the contemporary group or contemporary activities, rather than a transcendent peoplehood or a historical heritage, should we then consider the attachment secular? If one identifies as a Jew but not with Jewish beliefs, is one’s attachment to Jews secular? Is attachment and identification to a group that others consider religious, but that the identifier defines as secular (or ethnic), religious or secular in nature? Thus, to what extent can we meaningfully talk about “secular Jews?” As Kaufman (2008) discusses in more detail, and citing much of the contemporary discussion on this topic, Jewish identity is difficult to deconstruct into neat “secular” and “religious” compartments. Yet, if we want to understand the relationship between Jewish identity and what seems to be primarily secular behavior (e.g., labor force achievements), we need to have a better understanding of what individuals consider a secular or religious identity. We doubt that this is problematic only for Jews in contemporary society.

Finally, we think that the possibility of different relationships between religious identity and secular behavior should be pursued for men and women. Certainly, different gender roles are promoted in conservative Christian evangelical circles (e.g., Gallagher 2003; Sherkat 2000), although de facto behavior is not as differentiated as the ideal and obstacles to women’s labor force participation are ignored when necessity demands. What is the difference between the effect of official theological teachings and actual behavioral norms in a community of believers? How does the strength of men’s and women’s religious identities factor into this effect? Jewish women have stronger Jewish identities on almost every indicator of identity we have derived; yet those identities do not seem to have as strong an effect on their secular achievements as men’s Jewish identity has on theirs. Do women compartmentalize the “religious” and “secular” more compared to men? Is the effect of men’s Jewish identity reinforced by certain types of Jewish communal involvement that overlap with their labor force achievements?

While complex, we think these are avenues worth pursuing in order to better understand the relationship of contemporary religious identity to secular behaviors. In this article we have used the example of how Jewish identity is related to labor force achievements to show the complexities of measuring, analyzing, and interpreting the relationship between religious identity and secularity. While further refinement is certainly necessary, one conclusion is especially important to retain: Jewish identity, as expressed in terms of religion, ethnicity, communal commitment, and private attitudes and practices, is related to contemporary Jewish secular achievement, albeit differently for men and women.

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