

Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections, 2000–2080

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THIS STUDY ARTICULATES different scenarios for the development of Jewish population worldwide up to the year 2080.¹ The results are presented in full awareness that forecasting, in demography as in any other field, tends to underestimate the range of possible developments. Slow and gradual trends occasionally clash with sudden breaking points—geopolitical revolutions, technological innovations, even environmental catastrophes. One intriguing phenomenon in recent decades—whose consequences are still not fully clear—is globalization, the growing political, economic, and technological integration between different regions and levels of the world system that makes local communities increasingly dependent on events and trends that stand at great geographical distance. If world society is becoming more fluid and less stable and predictable, this is even truer of world Jewry, given its wide geographical spread and dependence on external circumstances.

Long-term transformations of Jewish population and society—especially over the course of the 20th century, which witnessed the *Shoah* and

¹This article reflects prolonged research at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The idea of projecting new population estimates for each of the major Jewish communities worldwide was initiated by the late Professor Uziel O. Schmelz, who actively participated in establishing the conceptual and technical framework. Preparation of the projections was made possible through a grant from the Philanthropy and Education Fund in memory of Jean and Charlotte Abramovici, the Israel Humanitarian Foundation, New York. We gratefully acknowledge the encouragement of Marvin Sirota and Stanley J. Abrams. Most of the population projections presented here were managed by Dalia Sagi, whose assistance in the project was invaluable. Benjamin Anderman, Ester Basan, and Judith Even helped at various stages of data collection, processing, and editing. Dr. Hania Zlotnik, head of mortality and population statistics, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The United Nations, and Dr. Thomas Buettner of the same division, kindly provided unpublished materials on mortality models. Ari Paltiel, Dorit Tal, and Yifat Klopstock of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) kindly provided unpublished materials relevant to the project. Responsibility for the contents of this article rests solely with the authors.

Israel's independence—defy conventional forecasting. Crisis and resilience, continuity and change, have continually reordered Jewish realities, as centers of Jewish life rose, fell, or were transformed. While such a complex history renders problematic all approaches to figuring out the future, the alternative position—fatalistic indifference to that future—can be dangerous. Population projections, which depend not only on biological-demographic factors but also on the cultural and psychological impact of group identity, provide necessary background for the discussion of critical Jewish policy issues.

Since we cannot predict the full spectrum of future developments, our approach extends over time the path of trends presently observed among Jewish populations, allowing for change within the limits of what currently appears to be a reasonable range of variation. After reviewing the main directions and mechanisms of global Jewish population change since the end of World War II, we will present alternative projections for world Jewry and for each of six major geographic regions over the 21st century.² The main focus is the period 2000–2020, since current trends are more likely to provide guidance for the immediate future than for later in the century. Nevertheless, population projections for 2030, 2050, and 2080 are also provided to illustrate, if only roughly, the nature of possible changes in the longer term.

JEWISH POPULATION TRENDS, 1945–2000

Size of Jewish Population and Factors of Change

After the loss of six million in the *Shoah*, world Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945.³ Over the subsequent 55 years world Jewry grew, but the rate of growth gradually slowed, and the population size attained did not even approach prewar numbers.⁴ It took about 13 years to add one million Jews to the post-*Shoah* total, but another 38 years to add a second million. World Jewish population grew by 782,000 during the 1950s, 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the

²Previous issues of the AJYB contained detailed overviews of Jewish population trends worldwide. See, for example, Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 1997," AJYB 1999, vol. 99, pp. 543–80. A short summary of the current update appears below, pp. 484–95.

³In this study we consider the conventional date of May 1, 1945, as the ending point of World War II and the beginning of the postwar period.

⁴The estimates reported here provide rough orders of magnitude only, and in no way can be considered absolutely accurate or definitive. Several of the estimates revise previous work by us and by other authors.

1980s, and 282,000 in the 1990s (see table 1). The diminished returns (until the 1990s) reflected a progressive decline of the Jewish natural increase—the difference between Jewish births and Jewish deaths—and a generally negative balance of accessions to and secessions from Judaism. Thus world Jewry had average annual growth rates of 0.18 percent in the 1970s, 0.04 percent in the 1980s, and 0.22 percent in the 1990s—hence virtually zero population growth.

One major contributing factor to these demographic trends was an “effectively Jewish” birthrate generally lower than total birthrates in the same locales.⁵ One reason was the moderate-to-low fertility level among Jews. This was exacerbated, for European communities, by a significantly distorted age composition resulting from high child mortality and very low birthrates during World War II. Indeed, these postponed effects of the *Shoah* on Jewish population are equal to or greater than those directly generated by genocide.⁶ Another factor was the rapid increase of marriages between Jews and non-Jews in Diaspora communities, particularly since the 1960s, and the non-identification as Jews of most of these couples’ children.

Jews have constituted a solid majority of the population in the State of Israel since 1948, while being a small minority in the rest of the world. From the outset, sharp demographic differences emerged between these two main typological components of world Jewry. Israel’s Jewish population consistently increased, from approximately half a million in 1945⁷ and one million in 1950, to nearly 4.9 million in the year 2000. Meanwhile, Diaspora Jewry declined from 10.4 million in 1945, to 10.2 million in 1960, and to an estimated 8.3 million in 2000. This divergence reflected patterns in international migration, vital statistics, and Jewish identity. During the whole 1945–2000 period there was a net migration transfer of over 2.1 million Jews from the Diaspora to Israel. Diaspora Jewry produced an estimated natural increase of 800,000 until about 1970. Since then, however, the balance of Diaspora Jewish births, deaths, and identification changes has been consistently negative, wiping out all of the previously accumulated natural increase. In Israel the natural increase (and, to a minor extent, conversions) significantly added to Jewish population size. Over the 55 years considered here, the total Jewish population growth in Israel of over 4.3 million was split about equally between a positive

⁵The “effectively Jewish” birthrate includes all children identified as Jewish according to the “core” Jewish population definition (see below).

⁶Sergio DellaPergola, “Between Science and Fiction: Notes on the Demography of the Holocaust,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 10, no. 1, 1996, pp. 34–51.

⁷Palestine Government, Department of Statistics, *Vital Statistics Tables 1922–1945* (Jerusalem, 1947); Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1977).

TABLE 1. WORLD, DIASPORA, AND ISRAEL JEWISH POPULATION, BY MAIN FACTORS OF CHANGE, 1945–2000 (ROUGH ESTIMATES, THOUSANDS)^a

Region and Factors of Change	1945– ^b 1950	1950– 1960	1960– 1970	1970– 1980	1980– 1990	1990– 2000	1945– 2000 ^c
Total world							
Initial Jewish population	11,000	11,297	12,079	12,585	12,819	12,868	11,000
Final Jewish population	11,297	12,079	12,585	12,819	12,868	13,192	13,192
Difference	297	782	506	234	49	324	2,192
Diaspora							
Initial Jewish population	10,438	10,283	10,220	10,078	9,601	9,151	10,438
Final Jewish population	10,283	10,220	10,078	9,601	9,151	8,310	8,310
Difference	–155	–63	–142	–477	–450	–841	–2,128
Israel migration balance	–389	–513	–280	–218	–39	–677	–2,116
Natural and other change ^d	234	450	138	–259	–411	–164	–17
Israel							
Initial Jewish population	562	1,014	1,859	2,507	3,218	3,717	562
Final Jewish population	1,014	1,859	2,507	3,218	3,717	4,882	4,882
Difference	452	845	648	711	499	1,165	4,320
Diaspora migration balance	389	513	280	218	39	677	2,116
Natural and other change ^d	63	332	368	493	460	488	2,204
Yearly rate of change %							
World	0.57	0.67	0.41	0.18	0.04	0.25	0.33
Diaspora	–0.32	–0.06	–0.14	–0.48	–0.48	–0.96	–0.41
Israel	13.47	6.25	3.04	2.53	1.45	2.76	3.97

^aBeginning-of-year estimates unless otherwise stated.^bMay 1.^cProvisional estimates based on periodic update of world Jewish population data.^dBalance of births, deaths, and Jewish identification change.

migration balance, on the one hand, and natural and other population changes occurring locally, on the other.⁸

Since the beginning of the 1990s the new circumstances emerging from the end of the (former) Soviet Union (FSU) allowed for large-scale Jewish emigration. This also set the stage for return or first-time access to Jewish identification among people whose families had significantly assimilated out of Judaism. Migration to Israel, the adoption there of somewhat higher levels of fertility, and the passage to a more explicit Jewish identification among new immigrants from the FSU—through spontaneous rediscovery or formal conversion—translated into a somewhat higher pace of population growth for Israel and for world Jewry.

Jewish Migration and the World System

International mobility, besides reshaping the geographical map of world Jewry, has changed the environment within which Jewish life has developed. Since 1945 nearly five million Jews, including their non-Jewish family members, moved between countries—mostly between different continents. This amounts to an average yearly mobility rate of nearly 1 percent of the total Jewish population over a period of more than 50 years—a very high rate in international comparison. The general thrust of these changes was the massive movement out of countries and societies where the position of Jews had long been precarious and subject to discrimination, toward societies with a better balance of political freedom and socioeconomic opportunities.

Jewish international migration developed over time in a typical wave-like pattern that was push-dominated, that is, responsive to crisis. Since 1948 there have been several periods of intensive Jewish immigration. The first major wave occurred in the wake of Israel's independence, between May 1948 and 1951, and the last, since the end of 1989, with the great exodus from the FSU. The suddenness and range of yearly variation was greater than commonly observed in other large-scale migrations. Insofar as Jews were granted a possibility to leave, many migrated from predominantly Muslim countries in Asia and Africa, and from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Migration propensities were lower or very low from western countries and from Israel—the main recipient countries of Jewish migration—but fluctuations over time reflected changing circumstances in each country of origin. Over the period 1948–1996, Israel

⁸The estimates reported here slightly revise those for the 1970s quoted in U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population," *AJYB* 1982, vol. 82, pp. 277–90.

TABLE 2. JEWISH POPULATION BY MAJOR REGIONS, ABSOLUTE NUMBERS, AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, 1948–2000 (ROUGH ESTIMATES)

Region	Number (thousands) ^a			Percent ^a			Percent change		
	1948 ^b	1970 ^c	2000 ^c	1948 ^b	1970 ^c	2000 ^c	1948 ^b – 1970	1970– 2000	1948– 2000
Total world	11,185	12,585	13,192	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.5	4.5	17.9
Diaspora	10,535	10,078	8,310	94.2	80.1	63.0	–4.3	–17.8	–21.1
Israel	650	2,507	4,882	5.8	19.9	37.0	285.7	94.3	651.1
North America ^d	5,100	5,700	6,062	45.6	45.3	46.0	11.8	6.4	18.9
Latin America	520	515	422	4.6	4.1	3.2	–1.0	–18.1	–18.8
Europe ^e	1,700	1,335	1,145	15.2	10.6	8.7	–21.4	–14.2	–32.6
FSU ^f	2,200	2,151	468	19.7	17.1	3.5	–2.2	–78.2	–78.7
Other Asia ^g ,									
North Africa ^h	870	183	29	7.8	1.5	0.2	–79.0	–84.2	–96.7
South Africa ⁱ ,									
Oceania ^j	145	194	184	1.3	1.5	1.4	33.8	–5.2	26.9

^aRevised estimates based on periodic update of world Jewish population data. Figures for 2000 provisional. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

^bMay 15.

^cBeginning-of-year estimates.

^dU.S.A., Canada.

^eEuropean Union, Rest of West Europe, East Europe other than FSU.

^fFormer Soviet Union, European and Asian parts.

^gAsian parts of Turkey included in Europe.

^hIncluding Ethiopia.

ⁱSouth Africa, Zimbabwe, and other sub-Saharan countries.

^jAustralia, New Zealand.

absorbed 63 percent of total Jewish migrants, varying between a high of 84 percent in 1948–52 and a low of 34 percent in 1983–88.⁹

Primarily as a consequence of international migration, the geographical map of world Jewry changed significantly (see table 2). The Middle East, North Africa, Ethiopia, the FSU, and other parts of Eastern Europe and the Balkans saw most of their Jews moving out. Other Jewish communities that experienced significantly negative long-run migration balances included Latin America and South Africa, and to a lesser extent countries in Western Europe such as the United Kingdom. Major re-

⁹Sergio DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel," in Elazar Leshem and Judith T. Shuval, eds., *Immigration to Israel: Sociological Perspectives* (New Brunswick, 1998), pp. 51–92.

cipients of Jewish migration in the West, besides Israel, were the U.S., France, Canada, Australia, and, more recently, Germany. The overall effect of these changes was a significant concentration of the Jewish presence in more advanced societies: over time, there emerged a significant correlation between, on the one hand, the size of Jewish population, its share of the total population, and its propensity to stay permanently in a country, and, on the other, major indicators of that country's socioeconomic development and quality of life. After many centuries spent in comparatively less developed and peripheral parts of the world system, over the last decades the Jews were increasingly associating with the societal forces of the world system's core countries. As part of this process, Israeli society itself—quite apart from the unique cultural-ideological effects of Zionism—rose during the second half of the 20th century from a small and underdeveloped society to a more serious and stable geopolitical and economic global presence. This strengthened Israel's capacity to attract new immigrants and retain old residents. In the year 2000, 46 percent of world Jewry lived in North America, 37 percent in Israel, and 17 percent in other countries.

Dramatic changes also emerged in the social structure of other Jewish communities at the end of the 20th century. The older dispersed geographical distribution in smaller localities was replaced by a massive tendency to concentrate in major metropolitan areas. Currently over 50 percent of world Jewry live in only six major urban areas: Greater New York, Los Angeles, and Southern Florida in the U.S., and Greater Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem in Israel. Two-thirds of all Jews worldwide live in about 20 large metropolitan areas. The total populations of these cities are typically very large, dense, and heterogeneous, and many of the inhabitants have extensive transnational connections. All of these features fit with the changing socioeconomic stratification of Jewish populations. The Jewish populations, with some variation between countries, generally include high percentages of college and university graduates. A massive movement out of the older Jewish occupations in trade and industry has led to growing concentration in management, and even more in academic, liberal, and technical professions. Thus Jews in urban centers all over the world—with due attention to the structural differences inherent in their being a majority in Israel and minorities elsewhere—became more and more similar in social class, and possibly also in cultural outlook and political interests and behaviors.

The Changing Jewish Family

Sweeping changes have affected the family in more developed societies over the last decades. In some respects Jewish communities anticipated

the general changes while in others they were slow to catch up. The family has long functioned as the cornerstone of Jewish society. But the conventional roles of marriage and procreation in the family have undergone unprecedented erosion over the last few decades under the impact of individualism. Observed changes included delayed marriages, higher rates of permanent non-marriage, more frequent cohabitation, rising rates of divorce, low birthrates, growing proportions of births out of marriage (the latter still uncommon among Jews), increasing numbers of one-parent households, and accelerating intermarriage. Children of intermarriage have shown comparatively weak Jewish identification, while the propensity of the non-Jewish spouses to convert to Judaism has declined relative to the total number of such marriages.¹⁰

Wide gaps prevailed between Jewish family trends in Israel and outside it. In Israel, more conservative patterns led to comparatively frequent and younger Jewish marriages, in contrast to higher frequencies of postponed marriage in the Diaspora. Marriage across religious lines occurs only rarely in Israel. Elsewhere around 1990, frequencies of mixed marriage surpassed 70 percent in Russia, Ukraine, and several smaller western Jewish communities, reached 50 percent in the U.S. and (based on older evidence) France, close to 40 percent in the United Kingdom, and probably above 30 percent in Canada and Australia. Divorce rates among Jews were lower than among the total population of the same countries, but the gap has narrowed considerably in recent years, reflecting more Jewish divorce. Jewish divorce was less frequent in Israel than in the largest Jewish communities worldwide. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate of 2.6 children per woman (regardless of marital status) was nearly double that observed for most Diaspora communities (0.9–1.7 children). Significantly, affiliation with Judaism was normally automatic for nearly every Jewish child born in Israel. In other countries, a majority of out-married Jewish parents preferred another religious or ethnic identity for their children, leading to major percentage losses in the potential size of the new generation.

The Jewish population's current age composition reflects the prolonged effect of these demographic patterns (see table 3). The data on age presented for major geographical areas are based on available sources and, wherever direct information was lacking, hypotheses on similarity or dissimilarity with neighboring Jewish populations.¹¹ In Israel, and to a lesser extent in the now nearly depleted communities in Asia and Africa, higher

¹⁰See the overview in Sergio DellaPergola, "Recent Trends in Jewish Marriage," in Sergio DellaPergola and Leah Cohen, eds., *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies* (Jerusalem, 1992), pp. 65–92.

¹¹Detailed sources are listed in DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 1997."

TABLE 3. JEWISH POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS AND MAJOR REGIONS, 1995^a

Region	Total ^b	Total %	0–14	15–29	30–44	45–64	65+
Total world	13,020	100.0	20.8	18.8	22.3	22.2	16.1
Diaspora	8,498	100.0	17.6	16.1	23.6	24.2	18.5
Israel	4,522	100.0	26.9	23.8	19.8	18.0	11.5
North America	6,052	100.0	19.2	16.1	24.8	23.2	16.8
Latin America	433	100.0	16.8	21.9	17.7	24.5	19.1
Europe	1,133	100.0	15.6	16.4	23.9	23.8	20.3
FSU	659	100.0	7.1	10.3	17.4	34.3	31.0
Asia, Africa	29	100.0	22.8	18.2	19.3	20.6	19.1
South Africa, Oceania	192	100.0	17.8	19.9	20.6	23.1	18.5
<i>% in Israel^c</i>		34.7	44.8	44.1	30.8	28.4	24.8
<i>% in North America^c</i>		46.5	42.8	39.9	51.7	48.9	48.5
<i>% in other countries^c</i>		19.8	12.4	16.0	17.5	22.7	26.7

^aProjections baseline. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.^bThousands.^cOut of world total in age group.

birthrates generally followed by high rates of retention of Jewish children within the Jewish community resulted in higher percentages of children and youth. However among Jewish communities in Europe, Latin America, South Africa, and Oceania, and—to an extreme extent—in the FSU, lower birthrates and the effects of out-marriage on the Jewish identity of children produced markedly older age compositions. International migration, primarily a movement of younger people, also contributed to the aging of the sending countries and to the stability if not rejuvenation of the receiving countries.

By 1995, Israel included only about 35 percent of the world Jewish population, but it had over 44 percent of all Jews younger than 30. And while North American Jewry constituted over 46 percent of the world Jewish population, it had a smaller percentage of Jewish children and younger adults than Israel. Communities elsewhere, which made up about 20 percent of world Jewry, had only 12–16 percent of the younger age groups. Israel's share of the worldwide pool of Jews aged 65 and over was just 25 percent, versus 48 percent in North America and 27 percent in the aggregate of other communities.

Jewish Identity and Population Boundaries

Defining "Jewish" population is not a simple matter, since Jewish identification has undergone widespread transformation over time. Viewing the process sequentially, many Jews passed from an all-encompassing and exclusive religious community, to voluntary membership in a cohesive ethnic group, to maintaining a loose individual relationship with Jewish culture, to the final loss of even that faint last distinctive residue.¹² These changes reflected increased opportunities for equality, mobility, and interaction with others, and, eventually, greater acceptance of Jews by their non-Jewish counterparts, in a context of secularization. Both a cause and a consequence of these changing circumstances, the already-noted spread of intermarriage led to a growth in the number of families composed of both Jewish and non-Jewish members.

Jewish demography, which is based on the empirical data of population censuses and sociodemographic surveys, has to consider the various criteria for counting and defining the population in Jewish households. The so-called "core" Jewish population includes all those who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by that respondent as Jews. This approach is intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic. Reflecting subjective feelings about identity, it broadly overlaps but does not necessarily coincide with Halakhah (Jewish religious law) or with other normatively binding definitions. Furthermore it does not depend on any measure of a person's Jewish commitment or behavior—in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The core Jewish population includes all those who converted to Judaism by any procedure, or joined the Jewish group informally, and declare themselves to be Jewish. It excludes those of Jewish descent who formally adopted another religion, as well those who did not convert out but currently refuse to acknowledge their Jewish identification.

The "enlarged" Jewish population in these same households includes the sum of (a) the core Jewish population; (b) persons who have themselves adopted another religion, even though they may claim still to be Jews ethnically; (c) other persons with Jewish parentage who claim not to be Jews; and (d) all of the respective further non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). For both conceptual and practical reasons, this definition does not include any other non-Jewish relatives living elsewhere in exclusively non-Jewish households.

¹²Sergio DellaPergola, "Arthur Ruppin Revisited: The Jews of Today, 1904–1994," in Steven M. Cohen and Gabriel Horenczyk, eds., *National Variations in Jewish Identity: Implications for Jewish Education* (Albany, 1999) pp. 53–83.

Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants—the Law of Return—further widens the possible boundaries for the analysis of Jewish demography and identity. This law extends its provisions to all current Jews, their Jewish or non-Jewish children and grandchildren, as well as to their respective spouses, thus defining a significantly larger population than the core and enlarged Jewish populations defined above.¹³ It is difficult to estimate what the total size of the Law-of-Return population might be. Since many non-Jewish descendants of Jews identify only marginally or not at all with anything Jewish, what the Law of Return defines is less a real population than a theoretical concept—though a significant one for Jewish discourse.

The following data provide some notion of the divergent results obtained, in major Jewish population centers, from using different definitions of Jewish identification. In the U.S. in 1990, the core Jewish population was estimated at 5,515,000, as opposed to an enlarged Jewish population of 8,200,000—including households without any core Jews—a difference of 49 percent.¹⁴ In the Russian Federation in 1994, the respective figures for households with at least one core Jew were 409,000 and 720,000—a 76-percent difference.¹⁵ The gap between core and enlarged figures grew rapidly since the 1970s in most world Jewish communities, reflecting the increasing effects of assimilation, although there have been countries, such as Mexico in 1991, where the difference between core and enlarged definitions barely reached 5 percent.

The problem of defining Jewish population will probably become more complex over time, making it increasingly difficult to reach a common understanding about criteria for inclusion or exclusion. Thus while Jewish population estimates for the present, and projections for the future, may create an impression of a clear-cut community, in reality group boundaries are getting more blurred and unstable. In any case, the estimates and projections in this article generally refer to the core Jewish population, unless otherwise specified.¹⁶

¹³For a concise review of the rules of attribution of Jewish personal status in rabbinic and Israeli law, including reference to Jewish sects, isolated communities, and apostates, see Michael Corinaldi, "Jewish Identity," chap. 2 of his *Jewish Identity: The Case of Ethiopian Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1998).

¹⁴Barry A. Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg, Nava Lerer, Ariella Keysar, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1991).

¹⁵Mark Tolts, "Jews in the Russian Federation: A Decade of Demographic Decline," in *Jews in Eastern Europe* 3 (40), Winter 1999, pp. 5–36.

¹⁶We do not deal here with "lost tribes" or with crypto-Jews, categories that may have some relevance in long-term historical-demographic analysis.

JEWISH POPULATION PROJECTIONS, 2000–2080

Data and Assumptions

Modern population projections seek to illustrate the long-range implications of specific demographic trends for population growth.¹⁷ Projections need to be based on a good understanding of the mechanisms of population change. This in turn requires: (a) explicit or implicit theoretical guidelines for making assumptions about future changes in demographic trends; and (b) a wealth of accumulated data on the demographic composition and on the main factors of change among the studied population. With the improvement in projection methods and a better understanding of demographic processes, good demographic projections have predicted actual developments quite accurately, at least within a 20–30-year range.¹⁸ For example, studies done 20 years ago predicted that continuation of the demographic trends of the 1970s would lead to significant erosion of Jewish population size in the Diaspora.¹⁹ Longer-term projections are shakier, especially since they are subject to broader political, socioeconomic, and cultural developments that stand outside the field of demography proper. The new set of demographic projections

¹⁷Population projections are carried out routinely by the United Nations and numerous other research bodies. See, e.g.: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Projections to 2150* (New York, 1998), and Wolfgang Lutz, ed., *The Future Population of the World: What Can We Assume Today?* (London, 1996). For an evaluation of methods and accuracy performance see two essays in the Lutz volume, Tomas Frejka, "Long-range Global Population Projections: Lessons Learned," pp. 3–13, and Wolfgang Lutz, Joshua R. Goldstein, and Cristopher Prinz, "Alternative Approaches to Population Projection," pp. 14–44.

¹⁸Henri Leridon, "Six milliards . . . et après?" *Population et sociétés* 352 (Paris, 1999) pp. 1–4.

¹⁹See U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981). This influential study projected the Jewish population as of 1975 through 2010. Regarding the Jewish population in the United States see U.O. Schmelz, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," *AJYB* 1983, vol. 83, pp. 141–87. For a more recent set of global Jewish population projections discussing aggregate change in Diaspora communities, see Sergio DellaPergola, "The Jewish People Toward the Year 2020: Sociodemographic Scenarios," in Anat Gonen and Semadar Fogel, eds., *Israel 2020, Masterplan for Israel in the 21st Century: The Macro Scenarios: Israel and the Jewish People* [Hebrew] (Haifa, 1996), pp. 155–87. See also: Vivian Klaff, "Broken Down by Age and Sex: Projecting the Jewish Population," *Contemporary Jewry*, 1998, pp. 1–37; and, related to our current study, Sergio DellaPergola, Mark Tolts, and Uzi Rebhun, *World and Regional Jewish Population Projections: Russian Republic, 1994–2019 (Interim Report)* (Jerusalem, 1996), and Uzi Rebhun, Sergio DellaPergola, and Mark Tolts, "American Jewry: A Population Projection," in Roberta Rosenberg Farber and Chaim I. Waxman, eds., *Jews in America: A Contemporary Reader* (Hanover, N.H. and London, 1999), pp. 33–50. Projections of the Jewish and total populations in Israel are routinely carried out. See CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, vol. 50, 1999.

presented here addresses the expected evolution of Jewish population worldwide, and in each of several major regions, over the period 2000–2080.

We projected Jewish population using the demographic cohort-component method. The basic idea is simple. The Jewish population of a given region at a given time reflects the Jewish population at an earlier point of time, plus the number of Jews born in the time interval, Jewish immigrants to the region, and accessions to Judaism, less the number of Jewish deaths, Jewish emigrants from the region, and secessions from Judaism. In the global synthesis, the negative and positive migration balances offset each other.

In the case of a group like the Jews, who operate as a religious or ethnic subpopulation in their countries of residence, change of identification may significantly affect population size. Several studies have shown increasing numbers of people not born Jewish who had converted to Judaism, and of people who were born or raised Jewish but currently preferred another religio-ethnic identification. Most of these accessions to and secessions from Judaism are likely by-products of interreligious marriage, and such marriage may also have a long-term effect on the number of newborn who are identified or raised Jewish. In our projections, the gains or losses arising from intermarriage were all incorporated with the levels of Jewish fertility.²⁰ The projection's base population was the distribution of Jews in each country and region by sex and by five-year age groups, estimated for the year 1995. All available data on the size and composition of world Jewish population were compiled, and if the data related to base years other than 1995, they were processed to bring them to the common 1995 baseline. The projections were prepared for the Jewish population of Israel and for 19 other major countries, or groups of neighboring countries, in the Diaspora: the United States, Canada, Central America, Argentina, Brazil, Rest of Latin America, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Rest of European Union, Rest of West Europe, Rest of East Europe and the Balkans besides the FSU,²¹ Russian Federation, Rest of FSU in Europe, FSU in Asia, Rest of Asia, North Africa, South Africa, and Oceania. For each geographic unit, six alternative projections were

²⁰This is one of the methodological differences between our projections and those of Schmelz in *World Jewish Population*. In the latter, age-specific assimilation rates were assumed for each age group in the Jewish population. Another difference between the two sets of projections concerns the levels of life expectancy assumed. While Schmelz assumed a constant life expectancy according to the levels of the mid-1970s, we assumed a gradual increase in accordance with the observed trends over the last decades. A further difference involves the levels of international migration expected. In both cases they reflect a possible extension of the situation prevailing in the 1970s and the 1990s, respectively.

²¹Results for Europe outside the European Union and outside the FSU will be presented jointly.

prepared providing lower and upper ranges for the size and composition of the Jewish population over the projection period. Three sets of projections evaluated the influence of different fertility levels in the absence of international migration; three more projections added the assumed effects of international migration to each of those same fertility assumptions. While the data presented cover selected years over a span of 80 years, the results of the projection are also available for five-year intervals.²²

The projections relied on the following assumptions:

MORTALITY. Jews have been historically at the forefront of the transition to lower mortality. Consistent with the patterns in more developed countries, we assumed continuing health improvements leading to gradual increases in life expectancy—that is, of the average number of years a person is expected to live after reaching a given age. Towards the end of the 1990s, the actual life expectancy at birth among Israeli Jews was about 76 years for men and 80 for women. The steady tendency, observed since the 1970s, has been a regular rise by nearly one year of life every five calendar years. The few studies available about life expectancy among Jewish communities in the Diaspora revealed very similar results. Therefore, we applied the same initial levels of life expectancy to the majority of Diaspora Jews. Extending the same trend over time, by 2080 life expectancies were anticipated to approach 90 years for Jewish men and 93 years for Jewish women worldwide. In the FSU, where life expectancy was recently estimated at 69 years for Jewish men and 73 years for Jewish women, lower survivorship levels were assumed. Assuming improvements at a pace similar to other Jewish communities, by 2080 life expectancy there would reach 78 years for Jewish men and 82 years for Jewish women.²³

FERTILITY. Jews were among the forerunners in the general transition toward lower and controlled levels of fertility. After a period of recovery following World War II, particularly in North America (the baby boom) and in Western Europe, Jewish fertility in the Diaspora receded to very low levels. According to the projection's medium version, we assumed steady continuation, throughout the projection period, of Total Fertility Rates (TFR) prevailing during the 1990s in each of the 20 geographic units considered.²⁴

²²A more detailed publication of the present projections and further scenarios is planned by the authors. The software package used for the projections was *PEOPLE: A User-Friendly Package for Making National and Sub-National Population Projections*, Version 3.0.

²³Experts on mortality agree on the expected continuing increase in life expectancy, particularly at older ages. There is, however, disagreement about the possible upper boundaries of the length of human life. See James W. Vaupel and Hans Lundström, "The Future of Mortality at Older Ages in Developed Countries," in Lutz, *Future Population of the World*, pp. 278–95.

²⁴The TFR is a measure of the average number of children expected to be born per woman, assuming indefinite continuation of current age-specific fertility levels. Current

Higher and lower Jewish TFR levels were also projected, respectively 0.4 children above or below the medium fertility.²⁵ These rates reflect the "effectively Jewish" fertility and account for possible losses or gains of Jewish children as a consequence of mixed marriage. Average fertility levels are the weighted product of very different modes of family formation that may exist within a Jewish population, along the continuum between the most to the least religiously attached. Fertility increases or decreases over time may reflect changes: (a) in the actual number of children born; (b) in the patterns of religious affiliation of the children of mixed marriage; or (c) in the respective share within a Jewish population of various sectors whose fertility levels are markedly different.²⁶

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION. Since the early 1990s, international migration, primarily the exodus from the FSU to Israel and other western countries, became again a major factor of Jewish demographic change. A first set of projections, focused on the expected buildup of internal Jewish population changes in each region, assumed a zero balance of international migration. A second set of projections, based on mobility trends observed during the late 1990s, allocated Jewish migrants in two stages. For those areas with a negative migration balance—primarily the FSU but also most Jewish communities in Latin America, other countries in East Europe, Asia, North and South Africa, and the U.K.—we calculated detailed measures of the incidence of emigration (net of immigration) for each age and sex. These age- and sex-specific rates were determined principally (but not only) according to the observed number of Jewish emigrants during the 1990s relative to the 1995 base population of each region, and the composition by age and sex of those who went to Israel. These same net emigration rates were applied to the average Jewish population remaining in the region in each five-year span of the projected period. The computed numbers of Jewish migrants reflecting the

medium Jewish TFRs for the various geographic regions were determined as follows: Russia, Rest of FSU in Europe, and Germany, 1.1; FSU in Asia, 1.3; U.S., Argentina, Brazil, France, Rest of European Union, Rest of West Europe, Rest of East Europe and the Balkans, 1.5; Canada, Rest of Latin America, U.K., Rest of Asia, South Africa, and Oceania, 1.7; Central America, 2.1; North Africa, 2.3; and Israel, 2.5.

²⁵These higher or lower fertility levels were assumed to be attained since the outset of the projection rather than gradually from current levels. Therefore, the projected results should be interpreted as the lowest and highest possible under the given range of assumptions.

²⁶The assumption is generally accepted that fertility will remain at current low levels in the total population of more developed countries. See Ron Lesthaeghe, "A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions," *Population and Development Review* 9, no. 3, 1983, pp. 411-35; Dirk van de Kaa, "Europe's Second Demographic Transition," *Population Bulletin* 42, no. 1, 1987; Wolfgang Lutz, "Future Reproductive Behavior in Industrialized Countries," in Lutz, *Future Population of the World*, pp. 253-77.

assumed Jewish emigration rates in each five-year period were then added up and proportionally divided between the areas with a positive migration balance, in accordance with the trends observed during the late 1990s. The receiving countries include Israel, the U.S., Canada, Germany, Rest of the European Union, and Australia.²⁷

It should be noted that fixed emigration rates produced varying absolute numbers of expected migrants because of the changing Jewish population size of sending countries. Three areas—France, Rest of West Europe, and Rest of Asia—were assumed to have a zero migration balance. It should be reiterated that, as the projections concern the core Jewish population, we only considered the potential impact of Jewish migrants. Non-Jewish migrant members of Jewish households were disregarded, though they tend to constitute a growing percentage of all migrants.²⁸

In the different sets of projections presented below we assumed similar changes in life expectancy across all regions, uniformity of change in fertility behaviors—whether decline or growth—and a global spread of international migration. Different scenarios may result from recombining the assumptions about fertility and migration in each region in different ways.

World Overview

In the hypothetical absence of international migration, if effectively Jewish fertility rates continue at approximately the current (medium) levels, Jewish population worldwide would increase moderately from 13.1 million in the year 2000 to 13.8 million by 2020.²⁹ Thereafter, the total

²⁷The assumed distribution of Jewish migrants among regions with a positive net migration balance was as follows: Israel was first allocated 54 percent of all migrants below the age of 40, and 46 percent of the migrants aged 40 and over. The remaining migrants were subdivided regardless of age as follows: U.S., 63 percent; Germany, 25 percent; Canada, 7 percent; Oceania, 3 percent; European Union, 2 percent.

²⁸As our allocation method of projected migrants is based on current net migration balances, it may somewhat underestimate the future volume of emigration. Indeed, emigration from countries with a currently positive migration balance, primarily Israel but also some western countries, may continue even after emigration from the current main suppliers such as the FSU fades away. Projections with further assumptions about possible future developments in Jewish international migration will be presented in a later and more detailed version of this study. For an overview of global trends, see Hania Zlotnik, "Migration to and from Developing Regions: A Review of Trends," in Lutz, *Future Population of the World*, pp. 299–335.

²⁹Jewish population estimates for the year 2000 in tables 1–3 derive from periodic updates based on local sources and the assessment of ongoing demographic changes, namely international migration. Projections for the year 2000 in tables 4–8 were independently obtained from the 1995 baseline and the various assumptions mentioned above. There are minor discrepancies between the two sets of data. For the world's total Jewish population the estimates in tables 1 and 2 fall between the medium and high projections listed in table 4 and following.

number of Jews would pass 14 million at the beginning of the 2030s, and 15 million around the year 2080. Thus, by the end of the entire projection period, world Jewry would be 17 percent larger than it is today.

This overall increase masks very different trends in Israel and the Diaspora. Due to its above-replacement-level fertility, the Israeli Jewish population would gradually increase to about 6 million by 2020, slightly less than 8 million by 2050, and over 10 million in 2080—twice its size today. The picture for the Diaspora is quite different. There, current low fertility levels combined with an already old age composition—despite the ongoing increase in life expectancy—would inevitably lead to shrinkage in Diaspora Jewry as a whole, and in each country and region individually. According to the medium assumption without migration, the Diaspora Jewish population would decline from 8.3 million in 2000, to 7.8 million in 2020, 6.5 million in 2050, and 5.2 million in 2080. A plurality of the total Jewish population would live in Israel before the year 2020, and an absolute majority would live there by the middle of the century.

Projection results incorporating international migration are reported in table 4. Reflecting our conservative assumptions about the continuation of international migration at current levels, we expect such migration to have little impact on Jewish population change. As the major reservoir of the FSU becomes depleted, the volume of migration is expected to decline. Reflecting immigration and the birth of children of immigrants, Israel's population would be 300,000 bigger in 2020, 400,000 bigger in 2050, and 500,000 bigger in 2080, or 5 percent more than without migration. By 2080, the cumulative impact of migration on population size would range between 400,000 at lower fertility levels and 600,000 at higher fertility levels. As against such moderate expected impact of migration, different fertility assumptions generate a significantly wider range of scenarios. In 2020, Israel might have 5.6–6.3 million Jews without migration, versus 5.8–6.6 million with migration.³⁰ By 2080, the range would be 7.2–13.7 million without migration versus 7.6–14.3 million with migration. In other words, a difference of 0.8 children between the lower and the higher levels of fertility assumed here, would produce double the Israeli Jewish population.

As for Diaspora Jewry as a whole, in the absence of migration and according to lower or higher fertility levels, it would be 7.3–8.3 million in 2020, 5.3–7.8 million in 2050, and 3.4–7.7 million in 2080. The impact of international migration would lower the projected totals to 7.2–8.1 million in 2020, 5.2–7.5 million in 2050, and 3.3–7.3 million in 2080.

³⁰According to the CBS projections, Israel's Jewish population in 2020 (with migration) will be 6.1–6.5 million. Our projections therefore outline the same trend, but the range of variation is slightly greater.

TABLE 4. JEWISH POPULATION PROJECTIONS ASSUMING MIGRATION RATES AS OF LATE 1990s AND VARIOUS LEVELS OF FERTILITY, BY MAJOR REGIONS, 2000–2080 (THOUSANDS)^a

Region	2000	2010	2020	2030	2050	2080
Medium fertility						
Total world	13,109	13,428	13,847	14,125	14,480	15,574
Diaspora	8,235	7,863	7,619	7,250	6,251	5,016
Israel	4,874	5,565	6,228	6,876	8,230	10,558
North America	6,065	6,025	5,980	5,763	5,036	4,094
Latin America	420	394	364	335	277	199
Europe	1,125	1,084	1,030	962	795	609
FSU	413	163	62	22	2	0
Asia, Africa, Oceania	212	196	183	168	141	114
% in Israel ^b	37.2	41.4	45.0	48.7	56.8	67.8
% in North America ^b	46.3	44.9	43.2	40.8	34.8	26.3
% in other countries ^b	16.5	13.7	11.8	11.5	8.4	5.9
Lower fertility						
Total world	12,944	12,935	13,002	12,825	12,026	10,887
Diaspora	8,137	7,586	7,161	6,589	5,153	3,336
Israel	4,807	5,349	5,841	6,236	6,873	7,551
North America	5,991	5,810	5,617	5,234	4,146	2,716
Latin America	414	379	341	303	229	134
Europe	1,112	1,047	971	878	659	409
FSU	410	160	60	22	2	0
Asia, Africa, Oceania	210	189	172	152	116	77
% in Israel ^b	37.1	41.4	44.9	48.6	57.2	69.4
% in North America ^b	46.3	44.9	43.2	40.8	34.5	24.9
% in other countries ^b	16.6	13.7	11.9	10.6	8.3	5.7
Higher fertility						
Total world	13,273	13,916	14,698	15,498	17,286	21,653
Diaspora	8,332	8,140	8,084	7,957	7,544	7,320
Israel	4,940	5,777	6,614	7,541	9,741	14,333
North America	6,138	6,239	6,349	6,328	6,086	5,985
Latin America	425	410	387	369	333	287
Europe	1,138	1,121	1,090	1,052	954	883
FSU	416	166	64	24	3	0
Asia, Africa, Oceania	215	204	194	184	169	165
% in Israel ^b	37.2	41.5	45.0	48.7	56.4	66.2
% in North America ^b	46.2	44.8	43.2	40.8	35.2	27.6
% in other countries ^b	16.5	13.7	11.8	10.5	8.4	6.2

^aProjection baseline: 1995. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.^bOut of world total.

The impact of migration, while surely significant at the regional level, does not affect the leading trends inherent in fertility, mortality, and Jewish identification. The impact of migration may be decisive in the FSU, where by 2080, according to the medium fertility projection without migration, there might be about 100,000 core Jews, whereas continuing at current emigration levels the Jewish population would disappear altogether. In North America, the expected impact of a positive migration balance would raise the projected totals by about 150,000 throughout the period 2000–2080. Elsewhere the impact of migration would range between a few thousands to a few tens of thousands.

In spite of an expected long-term decline in numbers, North American Jewry, with a medium projected population of close to 6 million in 2020, would constitute an even larger share of the Diaspora than it does today, due to the younger age composition of North American Jews as compared to most other Diaspora communities such as those in Europe. Over the last two decades in North America, large baby-boom cohorts were concentrated in the most procreative ages. A second echo effect of the baby boom might be seen around the years 2005–2020, as many of the children of the baby boomers themselves reach reproductive ages.

Therefore, significant demographic erosion would probably affect North American Jewry only after the 2030s. In the absence of migration it would decline to 4.9 million by 2050, and to about 3.9 million by 2080. Migration would raise the Jewish population to about 6 million in 2020, and then it would drop to 5 million in 2050, and 4.1 million in 2080. From mid-century on, the pace of decline in the size of the North American Jewish population will coincide with that of the rest of Diaspora Jewry, and thus its relative share will remain unchanged. The Jewish populations in European countries and in the FSU will diminish more significantly due to their older age composition and lower levels of fertility. Trends among Latin American Jewry and in Asia, Africa, and Oceania point in a similar direction, although at least until the middle of the century Jewish population decline there will be moderate.

Alternative assumptions about decline or increase in Jewish fertility would obviously affect the evolution of the Jewish population. In the lower-fertility version, the number of Jews in the world would remain little changed over the next two decades, after which it is expected to decline gradually to 11.8 million by the year 2050, and to 10.6 million by 2080. This diminution reflects the smaller increase expected in the number of Israeli Jews as compared to the medium version, along with the more rapid decline among Diaspora Jewry. Even in this scenario, however, Israel is expected to be home to the largest Jewish concentration and to have the majority of world Jewry at about the same time as in the medium projection. According to the lower fertility assumption, North

American Jewry will decline to approximately 5 million by the year 2030 and to half that, 2.5 million, by 2080. Latin American Jewry and the Jewish communities in Asia, Africa, and Oceania also would be half their current sizes by the year 2080.

An increase in the levels of Jewish fertility, on the other hand, would result in substantially greater numbers of Jews in the world—14.7 million in the year 2020, 17.2 million in 2050, and up to 21.4 million by 2080. Thus a century after the *Shoah*, the Jewish people might approach its pre-World-War-II size, and later could even rise to higher figures unprecedented in Jewish history.³¹ According to this projection, Israel's Jewish population would grow to 6.3 million by 2020, 9.3 million by 2050, and 13.7 million by 2080. North American Jewry would peak at 6.2 million in 2020 and maintain this level for another decade, after which a modest, gradual decline is projected, to 5.8 million in 2080. A similarly modest decline over the next 80 years is also anticipated, according to this assumption, for the Jewish population of Europe. Among Jews in the FSU, even an increase in fertility would still be much below the replacement level, and, given the already distorted age composition of a reversed pyramid shape, the size of FSU Jewry is expected to decline. Latin American communities, as well as those in Asia, Africa, and Oceania, would be expected to grow in the event of a fertility increase. The direction and pace of change in the balance between Israel and the Diaspora in the higher version is very similar to those in the medium and lower versions.

While these scenarios portray different possible paths of demographic evolution for world Jewry, the final outcome depends significantly on possible fluctuations in Jewish fertility which, as noted, reflect among other things the patterns of identification of children born to out-married Jewish parents. International migration, though merely the transfer of people from one place to another, may also marginally affect world Jewish population size. Indeed, the higher fertility levels in Israel mean that the higher the share of world Jewry in Israel, the faster Jewish population would grow.

As for demographic change at the regional level, table 5 specifies ten countries with major Jewish communities and nine other regional Jewish population aggregates. The data refer to the projection with international migration and medium fertility levels. Three main patterns emerge. Israel is the only country where, under the continuation of present circum-

³¹Even if this becomes true in absolute numbers, the percentage of Jews in the total world population was irreversibly cut down by the *Shoah*. It was over 8 per 1,000 inhabitants on the eve of World War II, and is currently around 2 per 1,000. See below for future projections.

TABLE 5. JEWISH POPULATION PROJECTIONS ASSUMING MIGRATION RATES AS OF LATE 1990S AND MEDIUM FERTILITY, BY DETAILED REGIONS, 2000–2080 (THOUSANDS)^a

Region	2000	2010	2020	2030	2050	2080
Total world	13,109	13,428	13,847	14,125	14,480	15,574
Canada	368	375	381	375	348	313
United States	5,697	5,650	5,600	5,388	4,688	3,781
Central America	54	56	56	56	53	47
Argentina	193	171	149	130	96	55
Brazil	98	93	87	80	67	50
Rest of South America	75	75	72	67	61	47
France	520	502	482	455	380	299
United Kingdom	272	253	238	221	183	137
Germany	85	106	108	103	87	65
Rest of European Union	136	131	127	121	105	85
Rest of Europe (non-FSU)	111	92	75	61	39	22
Russia	249	115	49	19	2	0
Rest of FSU in Europe	131	37	10	2	0	0
Rest of FSU in Asia	34	11	3	1	0	0
Israel	4,874	5,565	6,228	6,876	8,230	10,558
Rest of Asia	21	21	21	21	21	19
North Africa	7	5	3	2	1	0
South Africa	86	70	57	44	25	10
Oceania	99	100	101	100	94	85

^aProjection baseline: 1995. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

stances, steady Jewish population increase is expected. In four areas—Canada, Central America, Germany, and Oceania—population would increase until 2020, but demographic aging would subsequently generate population decline. In all of the remaining areas, steady decrease is expected after 2000, though at different rates. Regional findings are discussed below in greater detail.

Table 6 provides a synopsis of the changes expected in Jewish population size among world Jewry, in Israel, and in the Diaspora, according to the medium projection with international migration. The small and declining overall expected impact of international migration leaves natural increase and identification changes as the primary factors determining Jewish population change. Such change will continue to be negative for the Diaspora as a whole, and may follow a cyclical pattern due to the alternation of larger and smaller cohorts at reproductive ages (see below).

TABLE 6. WORLD, DIASPORA, AND ISRAEL JEWISH POPULATION PROJECTIONS, BY MAIN FACTORS OF CHANGE, ASSUMING MIGRATION RATES AS OF LATE 1990S AND MEDIUM FERTILITY, 2000–2080 (THOUSANDS)^a

Region and Factors of Change	2000–2010	2010–2020	2020–2030	2030–2050	2050–2080
Total world					
Initial Jewish population	13,109	13,428	13,847	14,125	14,480
Final Jewish population	13,428	13,847	14,125	14,480	15,574
Difference	319	419	278	355	1,094
Diaspora					
Initial Jewish population	8,235	7,863	7,619	7,250	6,251
Final Jewish population	7,863	7,619	7,250	6,251	5,016
Difference	–372	–244	–369	–999	–1,235
Israel migration balance	–105	–49	–28	–34	–29
Natural and other change ^b	–267	–195	–341	–965	–1,206
Israel					
Initial Jewish population	4,874	5,565	6,228	6,876	8,230
Final Jewish population	5,565	6,228	6,876	8,230	10,558
Difference	691	663	648	1,354	2,328
Diaspora migration balance	105	49	28	34	29
Natural and other change ^b	586	614	620	1,320	2,299
Yearly rate of change %					
World	0.24	0.31	0.21	0.12	0.24
Diaspora	–0.46	–0.31	–0.50	–0.74	–0.73
Israel	1.33	1.13	0.99	0.90	0.83

^aBeginning-of-year estimates. Projection baseline: 1995. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

^bBalance of births, deaths, and Jewish identification change.

The rate of yearly growth for Israel's Jewish population is expected to diminish, falling below 2 percent after 2000 and below 1 percent after 2020.

Changes in Age Composition

Significant changes are bound to occur in the age composition of Jewish populations (see table 7). In the event of continuing international migration and depending on different fertility assumptions, by the year 2020 the proportion of children under age 15 is expected to be 21–26 percent of the Jewish population in Israel (27 percent in 1995), and 11–16 percent of the total Diaspora communities (18 percent in 1995). The elderly population, aged 65 and over, would make up 14–16 percent in Is-

TABLE 7. JEWISH POPULATION AT AGES 0–14 AND 65+ ASSUMING MIGRATION RATES AS OF LATE 1990S AND VARIOUS LEVELS OF FERTILITY, BY MAJOR REGIONS, 2000–2080 (PERCENTAGES)^a

Region	2000		2020		2050		2080	
	0–14	65+	0–14	65+	0–14	65+	0–14	65+
Medium fertility								
Total world	19.5	15.7	18.2	20.7	17.5	25.8	17.6	28.8
Diaspora	16.0	18.2	13.5	25.8	11.6	34.0	10.4	41.2
Israel	25.4	11.5	24.0	14.5	22.1	19.5	21.0	23.0
North America	17.0	16.5	13.7	25.2	11.6	33.6	10.4	41.0
Latin America	15.7	19.6	13.9	24.5	11.7	35.9	10.9	41.4
Europe	14.5	20.6	12.4	27.8	10.9	36.6	9.9	42.8
FSU	5.6	35.3	2.4	59.2	1.0	72.0	-	-
Asia, Africa, Oceania	17.0	17.8	15.0	24.8	13.2	32.2	12.2	37.6
% in Israel ^b	48.4	27.3	59.2	31.5	71.5	43.0	81.0	54.0
% in North America ^b	40.4	48.6	32.6	52.5	23.1	45.3	15.5	37.4
% in other countries ^b	11.3	24.2	8.2	15.9	5.4	11.7	3.5	8.6
Lower fertility								
Total world	18.5	15.9	15.4	22.1	13.7	31.0	13.6	36.0
Diaspora	15.0	18.4	10.5	27.5	7.5	41.3	6.1	52.6
Israel	24.3	11.7	21.3	15.5	18.3	23.3	16.9	28.6
North America	16.0	16.7	10.7	26.9	7.5	40.8	6.1	52.5
Latin America	14.5	19.8	11.1	26.2	7.9	43.3	7.0	52.0
Europe	13.5	20.9	9.6	29.5	7.0	44.1	5.8	54.3
FSU	4.9	35.6	1.3	60.7	0.2	79.7	-	-
Asia, Africa, Oceania	16.0	18.0	12.1	26.4	9.2	39.0	7.9	47.7
% in Israel ^b	48.9	27.3	62.3	31.5	76.4	43.0	86.2	55.2
% in North America ^b	40.0	48.6	30.0	52.5	19.0	45.3	11.2	36.4
% in other countries ^b	11.0	24.2	7.7	15.9	4.6	11.7	2.6	8.4
Higher fertility								
Total world	20.5	15.5	20.8	19.5	21.2	21.6	21.3	23.4
Diaspora	17.0	18.0	16.2	24.3	15.6	28.2	14.7	32.5
Israel	26.4	11.4	26.3	13.7	25.5	16.5	24.7	18.7
North America	18.0	16.3	16.5	23.8	15.7	27.8	14.8	32.3
Latin America	16.8	19.3	16.5	23.1	15.4	29.9	14.9	33.2
Europe	15.5	20.4	15.0	26.2	14.9	30.5	14.2	33.9
FSU	6.2	35.1	3.5	57.6	2.2	64.5	-	-
Asia, Africa, Oceania	18.0	17.6	17.6	23.3	17.1	26.8	16.4	29.9
% in Israel ^b	47.9	27.3	57.1	31.5	67.8	43.0	76.7	53.0
% in North America ^b	40.6	48.6	34.3	52.5	26.1	45.3	19.1	38.2
% in other countries ^b	11.5	24.2	8.6	15.9	6.1	11.7	4.2	8.8

^aOut of Jewish population in each region. Projection baseline: 1995. Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

^bOut of world total in age group.

rael (11.5 percent in 1995), and 24–27 percent in the Diaspora (18.5 percent in 1995). Low levels of fertility combined with longer life expectancy will age the Diaspora Jewish population, a trend that will accelerate as we move further into the second half of the 21st century. Although the higher fertility levels in Israel will somewhat moderate this process, Israel will also experience a decline in the proportion of children under the age of 15, while the proportion of elderly is expected to grow. According to the medium projection, by the year 2080 more than 40 percent of Diaspora Jews will be 65 and over. According to the medium and lower scenarios, Israel, like all Diaspora communities, will eventually have more Jewish elders than children. A rise in fertility is the only way for Israel to continue having more children than old people.

Another important finding is the changing distribution of different age groups across world Jewry. Already today, approximately 48 percent of all Jews 15 years old or younger live in Israel, a figure expected to rise, depending on fertility behavior, to 57–62 percent of the world total by the year 2020. In other words, within the next two decades Israel will most likely be home to the absolute majority of the world's Jewish children. By 2080, extending present demographic trends, 77–86 percent of all Jews under age 15 will be living in Israel. Since Israel will have a growing overall share of world Jewry, the proportion of Israelis aged 65 and over, out of the total of the world's Jewish elderly, is expected to rise too. Under each of the alternative assumptions, however, Israel will have comparatively fewer elders than its total share of world Jewish population.

The projection's medium version shows a decline in the proportion of children in most Diaspora communities and an overall convergence toward aging. Since this process occurs at the same time that the total size of the Diaspora diminishes, led by declining numbers of Jewish children due to continuing low fertility, the age composition of North American Jewry will change very rapidly. The proportion of children will drop from 17 percent in 2000 to 14 percent by 2020, and the share of the elderly will rise from 17 to 25 percent, largely because baby boomers will be turning 65. By the year 2020, the age compositions of North American and European Jewry are expected to be very similar. Overall, according to the medium-fertility assumption, the relative shares of the two extreme age groups, children and older persons, are expected to converge in the various Diaspora communities. By the year 2020, the group that is 65 and over is projected to be larger than the group that is 15 years or younger in all Diaspora communities. This movement toward an inverted age pyramid will accelerate as we move further into the century. Israel, too, is expected to undergo a process of aging, though much more slowly than in the Diaspora. Thus the proportion of those aged 65 and over among Israel's Jewish popula-

tion, which was 5–10 percent lower than in Diaspora communities in 2000 (with the exception of the FSU), would be 15–20 percent lower by 2080.

If fertility levels decline, the proportion of children among the North American Jewish population will diminish to 11 percent by the year 2020 and to only 6 percent in 2080. This would be an exceptionally quick decrease in the proportion of Jewish children, though in other communities, such as in Europe, the percentage will be even lower. Nevertheless, because of its large size, the Jewish community of North America would remain the home of the absolute majority of Diaspora Jewish children. Toward the end of the projection period, by 2080, North American Jewry would also host the second largest share of elderly Jews, following European Jewry, which would be more than 50-percent elderly.

Increasing fertility would moderate but not prevent the decline in the proportion of children among North American Jewry, which would drop from 18 percent in 2000, to 16–17 percent in 2020, and 15 percent in 2080, as the proportion of elderly would grow from 16 percent in 2000, to 24 percent by 2020, and over 30 percent by 2080. In other Diaspora communities, too, higher fertility would lead to no more than a slow decrease in the proportion of Jewish children.

In the higher version of our projection, North American Jewry is anticipated to experience the most significant changes in age composition. From initially being the Diaspora region with the highest percentage of children, by 2080 its share of children would resemble the average for Diaspora communities. Similarly, from initially hosting a comparatively low proportion of elderly, North American Jewish communities will have a share of elderly persons similar to the rest of world Jewry, with the exception of Israel.

The United States and Canada

Toward the year 2000, the Jewish population in the U.S.³² and Canada³³ was moderately increasing thanks more to continuing immigration than to natural increase. The future demographic development of North American Jewry will depend on the present generation's ability to transmit a Jewish identity to the next, and this, in turn, will depend on ongoing patterns of marriage and child-rearing. According to

³²Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," AJYB 1992, vol. 92, pp. 77–173.

³³Jim L. Torczyner and Shari L. Brotman, "The Jews of Canada: A Profile from the Census," AJYB 1995, vol. 95, pp. 227–60.

a follow-up study of the 1990 NJPS, more than 50 percent of born Jews who married during the late 1980s did so with a partner not born Jewish and who did not convert to Judaism. Among all existing mixed marriages with children at home, 18 percent of the children were raised as Jews only, 25 percent as Jews and Christians, 33 percent as Christians only, and 24 percent with no religion.³⁴ This implies a loss of at least 20 percent in the potential number of children who would have joined the Jewish population at a given level of fertility in the absence of mixed marriage, and a consequent fall in the level of “effectively Jewish fertility.” The reported frequency of mixed marriage being lower for Canada than for the U.S., effectively Jewish fertility levels are assumed to be somewhat higher.

The results of the medium projections discussed above for North American Jewry suggest a somewhat different demographic evaluation for Canada than for the U.S. When the two communities are examined separately, the number of Jews in Canada is anticipated to increase, though very modestly, in the next two decades. Thereafter, it will decline to 313,000 in the year 2080, reflecting an overall 15-percent decrease relative to its size in 2000. By contrast, the U.S. Jewish population is expected gradually to decline throughout the projection period. At the beginning, the pace of decrease is likely to be slow—from 5.7 million in 2000 to 5.6 in 2020—but with the fading away of the baby-boom generation it will accelerate, resulting in a Jewish population of 4.7 million at mid-century and 3.8 million in 2080. Over the projection period, the U.S. Jewish population is expected to shrink by a third, more than twice the percentage loss for Canadian Jewry. Thus the relative share of Canada within total North American Jewry will increase slightly.

Around 2010, the size of the Jewish population in the U.S. and Israel is projected to converge. The different demographic trends of the two main centers of world Jewry—decline in the U.S. versus increase in Israel—will then lead to a widening gap in the respective populations. Israel is projected to have a Jewish population almost double the size of the U.S. by 2050, and three times as large by 2080. As for Canadian Jewry, given the modest demographic change anticipated relative to stronger decrease in other Diaspora communities, it is bound to become, by 2080, the third largest Jewish community in the world, or the second within Diaspora Jewry next to the U.S., though significantly smaller.

³⁴Bruce A. Phillips, *Re-examining Inter-marriage: Trends, Textures, Strategies* (Los Angeles-New York, 1997).

CHANGING WEIGHT OF JEWISH RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS³⁵

The assumptions made in the preceding projections for U.S. Jewry reflect the average of very different behaviors among specific segments of the Jewish community, as defined by religious-ideological orientation. Demographic and sociocultural trends clearly differ between Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and other and nondenominational Jews. Likewise, many American Jews have shifted their denominational preferences and, accordingly, their lifestyles and demographic characteristics. Thus, an attempt was made to assess separately the future demographic prospects of each of the major denominational groups within U.S. Jewry. According to the 1990 NJPS, the distribution of American Jews aged 18 and over by denominations at birth was 23 percent Orthodox, 34 percent Conservative, 26 percent Reform, and 17 percent other and nondenominational. The distribution of current denominational preferences reported was 6 percent Orthodox, 35 percent Conservative, 38 percent Reform, and 21 percent other and nondenominational. These changes are mostly due to the large number of Jews who switched their ideological preferences—usually from denominations committed to rigorous observance of Jewish tradition to those allowing more personal freedom.

In the past, the group of Jews identifying themselves Orthodox at birth incurred the strongest erosion. The share of those who in 1990 declared they were raised in Orthodox homes was 44 percent among Jews aged 60 and over, 19 percent among those aged 40–59, and 12 percent among those aged 20–39, pointing to a narrowing preferential basis over time. Hence, a plurality of the older age group, whose family roots were usually abroad, was raised in an Orthodox environment. In America, the Conservative movement grew the most among the second generation, attracting many people with an Orthodox background. It became the movement in which the largest share of Jews below age 60 were raised, and the current preference of a plurality of those aged 60 and above. The plurality of Jews younger than 60 years old in 1990 expressed a preference for the Reform movement. At the same time, that part of American Jewry not identifying with any of the three major denominations is quickly growing among the younger generations.

To sharpen the analysis, the two partially overlapping, yet different, notions of *retention* and *resilience* should be clarified. *Retention* is the pro-

³⁵Parts of this section appeared in somewhat different form in Sergio DellaPergola and Uzi Rebhun, "American Orthodox Jews: Demographic Trends and Scenarios," *Jewish Action* 59, no. 1, Fall 1998, pp. 31–33.

portion of those born or raised within a given Jewish denomination who prefer the same denomination at a later stage in life; *resilience* is the ratio between the number of those who currently identify with a denomination and those born/raised within that denomination. Here, losses due to non-retention of old followers may be partially compensated by gains of new joiners. In 1990, reflecting trends that operated several decades back, both retention and resilience indexes were lowest among the Orthodox, moderate among the Conservative, and highest among the Reform and the aggregate of other and nondenominational. Among the 20–39 age group in 1990, resilience indexes were 51 percent for the Orthodox, 90 percent for the Conservative, 117 percent for the Reform, and 116 percent for the other and nondenominational—the two latter figures indicating actual expansion. Interestingly, both retention and resilience indexes for the Orthodox and Conservative were much higher for younger cohorts than for the older. Apparently these movements are finding ways to keep their children within the fold. (Losses to the Orthodox identification were significant among adults born or raised in Orthodox homes during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s.) Preference shifts across denominations often occur in connection with marriage or residential mobility. In 1990 a significant proportion of Jewish adults below the age of 40 were still unmarried, and many of these were likely to move from locales with strong Jewish infrastructures to places with weaker ones, with possible implications for future denominational preferences.³⁶

Looking to the future, assuming no further passages between denominations, existing differences in age composition and fertility behaviors should be considered. The average number of children ever born to Jewish women who were 40–44 years old in 1990 was 1.6.³⁷ The figures by denomination—adjusted for Jewish identity of the children of mixed marriages—were 3.7 for the Orthodox, 1.6 for the Conservative, 1.5 for the Reform, and 1.0 for the other and nondenominational. Taking these figures as future TFRs would result in the rise of the Orthodox segment (both children and adults) from 7 percent of total U.S. Jewry in 2000 to 10 percent in 2020 and 19 percent in 2050. The Conservative denomination would lose a significant portion of its current share, dropping from 32 percent in 2000, to 29 percent in 2020, and down to 26 percent by mid-century. The proportion of Reform Jews would remain stable up to 2020,

³⁶Sidney and Alice Goldstein, *Jews on the Move: Implications for Jewish Identity* (Albany, 1996); Uzi Rebhun, "Changing Patterns of Internal Migration 1970–1990: A Comparative Analysis of Jews and Whites in the United States," *Demography* 34, no. 2, 1997, pp. 213–23.

³⁷Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry," p. 122. These estimates refer to all Jewish women regardless of marital status.

after which it would modestly decline to 34 percent by 2050. No changes would be expected in the relative share of Jews with other or no denominational preferences up to 2020, which would decline to 22 percent by 2050. The changing share broken down by denomination would be more salient among Jewish children. Orthodox children below the age of 15, who in 2000 accounted for approximately 10 percent of all Jewish children in the U.S., would be expected to reach 22 percent in 2020 and as much as 44 percent in 2050. The concurrent expected decline in the absolute size of U.S. Jewry would mean that Orthodox Jews, who counted about 400,000 persons in 2000, would amount to about 560,000 in 2020 and 890,000 by 2050. All the other denominations would be expected to suffer substantial numerical losses, according to the hypothesis of full denominational resilience.

If, on the other hand, interdenominational passages continue as observed among the NJPS younger adults aged 20–40 in 1990, the share of Orthodox Jews would grow only minimally to 9 percent by mid-century. The share of Conservative Jews would decline somewhat more significantly as compared to the previous scenario, to 28 percent in 2020 and to 25 percent in 2050. By contrast, the Reform movement would increase its share of American Jewry to 39 percent in 2020 and 41 percent in 2050. The proportion of other and nondenominational would remain almost unchanged. Under this scenario of continuing switches in ideological preferences, all denominations would experience absolute quantitative decreases ranging from moderate to very substantial.

The significance of a religiocultural movement need not be related to the size of that movement. For example, the comparative smallness of the Orthodox movement obscures the role it has played as a supplier of Jewish services, such as day-school education, to the entire American Jewish community. Nevertheless, a group's viability is in many respects determined by its underlying demographic trends. The larger or smaller size of a group, coupled with a much younger or older age composition, will have a definite impact on the scope and quality of interactions within the group and on its outside-oriented activities. One decisive factor for the future size of Jewish denominations in the U.S. will be their ability to retain their younger generations.

Israel

As noted, projections of Israel's population indicate continuing substantial growth moderated by an expected decline in immigration. As past Jewish population growth largely depended on large-scale and heterogeneous immigration, Israel's demographic composition and trends initially reflected socioeconomic and cultural diversity that had developed

in the Diaspora throughout the centuries. Of particular significance, patterns of cultural and socioeconomic modernization were different among immigrants from different continents. Over time, the main demographic variables for groups with different geographic origins—such as age at marriage and the number of children born—underwent a process of convergence.³⁸ Groups with higher fertility abroad lowered it in Israel, while those with lower fertility abroad raised it. At a slower rate, Israeli society was reducing educational and economic gaps. On the other hand, demographic variations were and continue to be associated with levels of religiosity within the Jewish population and with socioeconomic and cultural differences between the Jewish, Arab, and other segments of the total Israeli population.

RELIGIOUS, TRADITIONAL, AND SECULAR

It is not easy to categorize the Jewish population in Israel by degree of religious observance, since Jewish ideological-cultural differences tend to operate along a nuanced and multidimensional continuum.³⁹ One indirect way to estimate the size of different groups is by looking at the number of pupils enrolled in the diverse educational networks that officially operate in Israel—State, State religious, and Independent (*haredi*, sectarian Orthodox).⁴⁰ In 1998/99, the distribution of pupils was: State—70 percent; State religious—19.5 percent; Independent—10.5 percent.⁴¹ Considering the larger family size of the more religious population groups, their share of the total population is actually smaller. Indeed in a national survey of religious attitudes in Israel in 1993, 14 percent defined themselves as strictly observant, 24 percent as observant to a great extent, 41 percent as somewhat observant, and 21 percent as totally nonobservant.⁴² Another national survey, conducted in 1991/92, revealed a somewhat different picture: 15 percent called themselves religious (including *haredi*), 11 percent traditional-religious, 34 percent

³⁸U.O. Schmelz, Sergio DellaPergola, and Uri Avner, "Ethnic Differences Among Israeli Jews: A New Look," AJYB 1990, vol. 90, pp. 3–204.

³⁹Perry Kedem, "Dimensions of Jewish Religiosity in Israel," in Zvi Sobel and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, eds., *Tradition, Innovation, Conflict: Jewishness and Judaism in Contemporary Israel* (Albany, 1991), pp. 251–72.

⁴⁰*Haredim* are generally categorized by their strict interpretation of Jewish law, their rejection of secular culture, and their ambivalent attitude to the present Jewish state—which, in the case of some, is hostile. See Charles S. Liebman, ed., *Religious and Secular* (Jerusalem, 1991).

⁴¹CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, vol. 50 (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 22–28.

⁴²Shlomit Levy, Hana Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, *Beliefs, Observances and Social Interaction Among Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem, 1993).

traditional-not-so-religious, and 40 percent not religious.⁴³ In light of these data, one can roughly estimate the more religious part of Israel's Jewish population at about 25 percent—about 7 percent *haredi* and 18 percent “national religious”—and the majority, ranging from moderately traditional to very secular, at about 75 percent.

Keeping in mind that these are only estimates, we will attempt to evaluate the prospective demographic growth of the different ideological-cultural segments of Israeli Jewry. One in-depth study of the demography of Jerusalem in 1995 used the average number of children born to the inhabitants of various types of neighborhoods as proxies for the underlying Jewish population segments. The respective TFRs were 6.4 children in areas where 70 percent or more of residents voted for religious parties—a proxy for the *haredi* segment; 4.4 in areas with a religious vote of 40–70 percent—a proxy for the “national religious” segment; and 2.4 in areas with a religious vote below 40 percent—a proxy for the moderately traditional to very secular.⁴⁴ The ensuing annual rates of Jewish population growth due to natural increase only were, respectively, 3.6 percent, 2.3 percent, and 1 percent.

If the same rates of growth can be applied to the countrywide distribution of Jewish population segments by religiosity (always keeping in mind that the distribution prevailing in Jerusalem is markedly different from Israel's total) the *haredi* share would grow from 7 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2020 and 17 percent in 2050, the “national religious” would grow from 18 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2020 and 24 percent in 2050, and the moderately-traditional-to-secular majority would drop from 75 percent in 2000 to 68 percent in 2020 and 59 percent in 2050.

Such estimates operate within the constraints of the grand totals for Israel's medium population projection with migration, already discussed above and obtained without reference to ideological divisions. Since separate projections for each population segment would generate higher totals, this constraint implies a gradual slowing down in the current rates of demographic growth for each segment. Alternatively, the projection implies continuation of the existing trend, but with a net transfer from the more to the less religious segments of Jewish population in Israel.⁴⁵ In either case this projection of observed trends would produce a significant—yet not truly revolutionary—change in the relative share of different religio-cultural groups until the middle of the 21st century.

⁴³CBS, *Time Use in Israel: Time Budget Survey 1991/92* (Jerusalem, 1995).

⁴⁴Sergio DellaPergola and Uzi Rebhun, *Summary of Jerusalem Population Projections 1995–2020* [Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 1999).

⁴⁵Levy, Levinsohn, and Katz, *Beliefs, Observances and Social Interaction*, p. C-1.

JEWS, ARABS, AND OTHERS

Population projections that consider various scenarios for the Arab and other minorities in the State of Israel generally point to a continuation of very rapid demographic growth. The main factor at work here is the continuing fertility gap between Israeli Muslims, whose TFR of 4.6 is significantly lower than in the West Bank and Gaza, though higher than several other Arab countries,⁴⁶ versus Jews (and Christians), whose TFR is 2.5–2.7. These traditionalist Muslim family patterns continue in a context of significant modernization, involving improvements in educational attainment, employment status, and standard of living. The question of demographic interest is whether, and when, the higher fertility of Israeli Muslims will converge toward that of the Jews, as has already happened among the Israeli Christian Arabs and Druze. Demographic scenarios will vary according to the timetable for such a possible development.

Assuming gradual convergence to the current levels of Jewish fertility, Israel's non-Jewish population of 1.3 million in the year 2000 would grow to 2.1 million in 2020 and to 3.7 million in 2050. If TFRs continue at present levels, non-Jews would reach 2.3 million in 2020 and 5.3 million in 2050. Adding these figures to the estimated higher and lower Jewish population projections, Israel's total population of 6.2 million in the year 2000 would grow to 7.8–8.9 million in 2020,⁴⁷ and 10.4–15 million in 2050.⁴⁸

One further aspect of Israel's demographic future has to do with the absorption of non-Jewish members of households who have recently immigrated under the Law of Return, mostly from the FSU but also from Ethiopia and other countries. These persons are recorded either under their other religious affiliation, or as "unclassified." People in the latter group generally have at least partial Jewish parentage, and an unknown number of them might, in the course of time, formally apply for Jewish identification. The number of "unclassified" approached 150,000 in 1999 and might increase to several hundreds of thousands due to continuing immigration and some natural increase in Israel. Since, in the preceding projections, these persons were not included as Jews, they constitute a further potential source of growth for the Israeli and global Jewish population.

⁴⁶The TFRs are currently estimated at 5.7 in the West Bank, 7.4 in Gaza. See Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *The Demographic Survey in the West Bank and Gaza* (Ramallah, 1997). According to UN estimates, the TFR was 4.0 in Syria, 3.4 in Egypt, 2.9 in Kuwait.

⁴⁷CBS projects a total population of 8.2–9 million for Israel in 2020.

⁴⁸Our projections ignore the additional factor of temporary (non-Jewish) foreign workers in Israel, roughly estimated at 200,000 in 1999, including the undocumented. Many of these may become permanent residents, thus further augmenting Israel's total population.

Demographic developments among the total Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza—roughly approaching 3 million in 2000—must also be taken into account. If fertility declines gradually to levels similar to those of Israel's Jews, that population would grow to 5.7 million in 2020, and 11.8 million in 2050; if current fertility levels continue, it would grow to 6.6 million in 2020 and to 22 million in 2050. The total number of inhabitants in the whole piece of land extending between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River—including Israel's Jews, Arabs and others, and the Palestinians—would then grow from 9 million in 2000 to a total of 13.5–15.5 million in 2020, and 22.2–37 million in 2050.

Admittedly, some of these figures defy imagination and cannot be taken seriously. Some feedback mechanisms will undoubtedly intervene to modify current trends. The high population densities implicit in these projections, however, unveil a possible course of demographic development with problematic consequences for the land's "carrying capacity" and for the optimal equilibrium between human, economic, and environmental resources.⁴⁹ These trends also foreshadow serious social and political challenges for the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Other World Regions

LATIN AMERICA

The Jewish population in Latin America has been subject to the patterns of frequent economic and political instability typical of most countries in the region. Since the 1960s, more Jews have emigrated out of the region than immigrated into it.⁵⁰ Countries where the impact of emigration was particularly high included Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay, and, more recently, Colombia. Greater stability prevailed in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile (aside from the 1970–73 period). Some of the latter communities, as well as the smaller one in Panama, in fact absorbed some of the Jewish emigration from the former group of countries. Continuing security concerns⁵¹ and socioeconomic uncertainty support the assumption that emigration will continue.

Significant variation in Jewish demographic and identification patterns

⁴⁹It stands to reason that these concepts imply an upper boundary, which, however, is not easily quantifiable.

⁵⁰U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demography of Latin American Jewry," *AJYB* 1985, vol. 85, pp. 51–102.

⁵¹Both for Jewish individuals and for Jewish institutions, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires against the Israeli embassy in 1992 and the AMIA headquarters in 1994.

prevailed in different communities. Among the factors that enabled particular communities to preserve a strong and, to some extent, isolated pattern of Jewish life were the timing of immigration, and the socioeconomic and ethnocultural characteristics of the majority population. Mexico was an example of a Jewish community still preserving a comparatively young age composition and relatively low rates of out-marriage, though it too was affected by emigration.⁵² Argentina stood at the opposite demographic end, with a larger proportion of elderly, higher rates of assimilation, and frequent bouts of increased emigration. Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay represented the whole range of intermediate situations. Hence, future Jewish population prospects are not identical for each country and regional division in Latin America.

According to the projection with continuing emigration and medium fertility (see table 5), Argentina would see its Jewish population shrinking from about 200,000 in the year 2000 to about 150,000 in 2020, 100,000 in 2050, and 55,000 in 2080. Even in the event of no emigration, and according to the lower and higher fertility scenarios respectively, Argentine Jewry would decrease to 171,000–195,000 in 2020, 129,000–192,000 in 2050, and 83,000–188,000 in 2080. The Jewish population in Brazil, whose recent Jewish fertility has rapidly declined,⁵³ would be reduced, according to the medium fertility scenario, from about 100,000 today to less than 90,000 in 2020, less than 70,000 in 2050, and 50,000 in 2080. Communities in Central America and in the rest of South America look more stable demographically, though they are bound to decrease in the longer run, albeit at a slower pace. To a great extent, the future of these communities, and of Latin American Jewry as a whole, will be determined by the amount of political and socioeconomic stability in the region.

EUROPE

The current process of political and economic integration, including the planned eastward expansion of the European Union, suggests that the continent's various Jewish communities will develop along similar demographic lines. Certain basic differences, though, should be acknowledged. The Jewish population of France grew rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s following immigration from North Africa, and kept a rather stable profile thereafter.⁵⁴ The number of Jews in the United Kingdom

⁵²Sergio DellaPergola and Susana Lerner, *La población judía de México: Perfil demográfico, social y cultural* (Mexico-Jerusalén, 1995).

⁵³René Daniel Decol, "Imigrações urbanas para o Brasil: o caso dos Judeus," Ph.D. diss., Campinas, 1999.

⁵⁴Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem-Paris, 1984).

has steadily decreased since the 1960s due to aging and some emigration.⁵⁵ German Jewry grew rapidly through the 1990s thanks to immigration from the FSU, which, however, joined a heavily aged and out-married community.⁵⁶ Jewish communities in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and some smaller states all received some Jewish immigrants, compensating, to varying extents, for the ongoing internal demographic erosion.⁵⁷ In Eastern Europe, primarily Hungary and the Balkans, Jewish demographic trends were especially hurt by the postponed effects of the *Shoah* and by the relatively poor economic and civil-rights situation in the broader society. Emigration and a negative balance of births and deaths also brought a decrease in the Jewish population of Turkey.⁵⁸

With this background, the size of European Jewry is bound to decrease under each of the scenarios considered here, though the profile of different countries may differ substantially. Under the medium-fertility-with-migration assumption, French Jewry would experience slow but steady decline from 520,000 in 2000, to 480,000 in 2020, to 380,000 in 2050, and 300,000 in 2080 (see table 5). Jewish population decrease would be quicker in the United Kingdom, to about 240,000 in 2020, 180,000 in 2050, and 140,000 in 2080. Jews in Germany, on the other hand, would experience continuing growth to a peak of about 110,000 in 2020, followed by a decrease which would reflect exhaustion of the migration reservoir in the FSU and German Jewry's high average age and extremely low fertility. The aggregate of Jewish population in other European Union countries would also slowly decline, to less than 130,000 in 2020, 95,000 in 2050, and 85,000 in 2080. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Jewish population is bound to diminish faster.

While international migration, especially from the Mediterranean basin and Eastern Europe, generally meant significant Jewish population increases for communities in Western Europe, the more recent migration balance was negative—with the noted exception of Germany. The future of Jewish life in the region depends on a change in the general migration trends, or on a reversal of the very low fertility patterns prevailing in the general society, neither of which seems likely. In the event of lower or

⁵⁵Stephen Miller, Marlena Schmool, and Antony Lerman, *Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews: Some Key Findings of the JPR Survey* (London, 1996); Marlena Schmool and Frances Cohen, *A Profile of British Jewry: Patterns and Trends at the Turn of the Century* (London, 1998).

⁵⁶Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland, *Mitgliederstatistik; Der Einzelnen Jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbände in Deutschland* (Frankfurt, annual).

⁵⁷Sergio DellaPergola, "Jews in the European Community: Sociodemographic Trends and Challenges," *AJYB* 1993, vol. 93, pp. 25–82.

⁵⁸Shaul Tuval, "The Jewish Community in Istanbul 1948–1992," Ph.D. diss., Jerusalem, 1999.

higher fertility scenarios, European Jewry outside of the FSU would range between 971,000 and 1,030,000 in 2020, between 659,000 and 954,000 in 2050, and between 409,000 and 883,000 in 2080.

FORMER SOVIET UNION

Mass emigration is the fundamental demographic fact of the Jewish population in the FSU. The size of the FSU core Jewish population diminished from 1.5 million in 1989 to an estimated 440,000 in 2000. The continuing excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births contributed about 200,000 of the total loss of nearly 1.1 million. These trends were not spread equally across the 15 FSU republics, for various reasons. Assimilation tended to spread earlier in the Russian Federation than in the other Soviet territories, the western parts of the FSU suffered more intensely the direct and postponed consequences of the *Shoah*, and the cultural and socioeconomic conditions of the Jews reflected regional variation within the FSU.⁵⁹ The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 greatly enhanced the effects of different ethnocultural, political-military, and economic realities in different local contexts, significantly affecting the volume and pace of the great exodus. This internal differentiation, as well as the nature of the available data sources for various parts of the FSU, suggest a separate view of Jewish population trends for three major regional divisions: the Russian Federation, the other six European republics of the FSU (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the three Baltic states), and the eight republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The differences between them, however, involve particulars, not the overall demographic picture and its likely consequences.

Jewish population projections concerning the FSU should take into account emigration patterns and internal demographic evolution. Jewish emigration has been highly selective by republics and regions, with much higher propensities to leave from the more peripheral and problematic regions in the FSU and within the Russian Federation, and lesser mobility from the more central and comparatively more attractive regions, particularly the Greater Moscow area.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the trends of pervasive low fertility, out-marriage, and an aging population rapidly

⁵⁹Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry on the Eve of the Holocaust: A Social and Demographic Profile* (Jerusalem, 1998); Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry Since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (New York-Westport, Conn., 1987).

⁶⁰Mark Tolts, "Demographic Trends of the Jews in the Three Slavic Republics of the Former USSR: A Comparative Analysis," in S. DellaPergola and J. Even, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1993* (Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 147–75; Mark Tolts, "The Interrelationship between Emigration and the Sociodemographic Trends of Russian Jewry," in N. Levin Epstein, Y. Ro'i, and P. Ritterband, eds., *Russian Jews on Three Continents* (London, 1997), pp. 147–76; Tolts, "Jews in the Russian Federation."

spread out from Russia to all the other republics. Looking first at the projected course of Jewish population without considering emigration, depending on lower or higher fertility levels, the FSU total would be reduced to 339,000–377,000 by 2020, 169,000–218,000 by 2050, and 51,000–161,000 by 2080. Regarding the Russian Federation alone, medium fertility levels would have the Jewish population reduced to 188,000 in 2020, 85,000 in 2050, and 45,000 in 2080. The respective figures would be 125,000, 76,000, and 30,000 for the Jewish population of the other FSU republics in Europe, and 45,000, 30,000, and 20,000 for the Jewish population in the Asian republics.⁶¹

A more realistic projection takes into account continuing emigration at current age-specific rates, relative to the Jewish population in the republics of origin. The assumption is that the current determinants of migratory push will continue to operate in the foreseeable future, and that no administrative or political barriers will intervene to prevent emigration—though in fact there were such barriers until the late 1960s and during the 1980s. For the total of the FSU, this would produce a sharp decline to 160,000–166,000 Jews in 2010, 60,000–64,000 in 2020, 22,000–24,000 in 2030, 2,000–3,000 in 2050, and virtually none by 2080. Examining the three regional components separately, according to the medium assumption Russian Jewry would go down to 115,000 by 2010, 40,000 by 2020, 19,000 by 2030, and would then gradually disappear (see table 5). In the rest of the FSU the process of Jewish extinction would proceed even faster. In the European republics there would remain 37,000 Jews in 2010 and 10,000 in 2020, while in the Asian republics there would remain 11,000 in 2010 and 3,000 in 2020.

While these scenarios unequivocally point to the demise of the once large Jewish presence in the FSU, a final word of caution is in order about the complex question of Jewish identification. As noted, all of the data reported here refer to a core Jewish population whose frame of reference is a concept of ethnic identity (*natsyonalnost* in Russian) and whose documentation relies on official censuses, vital statistics, and passport registrations. Local surveys have shown that Jews may have been recorded under another nationality, thus underreporting the actual Jewish population according to ethnic or religious criteria.⁶² It has been consistently assumed, though, that such underreporting involves a relatively minor share of the total Jewish population. The existence of a broader periphery of non-Jews of Jewish origin has also been acknowledged. Incorporation into the Jewish mainstream of some of these peripheral fringes

⁶¹Since the baseline of the population projections is 1995, emigration that occurred between 1995 and 2000 is ignored.

⁶²Sidney and Alice Goldstein, *Lithuanian Jewry 1993: A Demographic and Sociocultural Profile* (Jerusalem, 1997).

might, to some extent, expand the future Jewish population size in the FSU and help postpone a demographic decline which, under continuation of the present circumstances, seems headed toward extinction.

ASIA, AFRICA, OCEANIA

Since the end of World War II, Jewish population changes in Asia, North and South Africa, and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) were determined mainly by international migration. The large historical Jewish presence nearly disappeared from the countries of older settlement, from the Maghreb through Egypt to Ethiopia, while it increased (to a far lesser extent) in Australia and New Zealand. The recent political changes in South Africa stimulated an outflow of Jews, speeding up the numerical decline of that community.⁶³ Australia was one of the main recipients of that and other Jewish migrations.⁶⁴

Continuation of current trends would bring an end to the Jews in North Africa, a further shrinking of South African Jewry to half its current size, and a moderate increase in the Jewish population of Australia and the Oceania region (see table 5). The latter increase, however, seems bound to peak around 2020, as the low fertility and aging typical of that Jewish community would eventually more than compensate for continuing immigration at current levels. Oceania might have 88,000–108,000 Jews in 2020 and 70,000–113,000 in 2050. As for the projection of a small but comparatively stable Jewish presence in the “Rest of Asia” region, it was assumed that the remnants of the Jewish population in Iran will further shrink, and that the Jewish presence might moderately increase in countries of Southeast Asia that, for a variety of reasons, have attracted significant numbers of Israeli visitors and sojourners. In the course of time, with the expected further economic growth of Japan, China, and other countries in the region, and the possible development of their economic relations with Israel, a Jewish presence in those parts of Asia might become somewhat more permanent.

⁶³Allie A. Dubb, *The Jewish Population of South Africa: The 1991 Sociodemographic Survey* (Cape Town, 1994); Barry A. Kosmin, Jaqueline Goldberg, Milton Shain, and Shirley Bruk, *Jews in the “New South Africa”: Highlights of the 1998 National Survey of South African Jews* (London, 1999).

⁶⁴William D. Rubinstein, “Jews in the 1996 Australian Census,” *Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal* 14, no. 3, 1998, pp. 495–507.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD JEWRY

Effects on the Global Jewish Presence

The different Jewish population scenarios presented above carry far-reaching implications for the future of world Jewry. While the significance of Jewish culture and society clearly transcends the quantitative dimensions analyzed in this study, demographic trends deeply impinge on the relationship between Jews and other people, on the internal functioning of the Jewish community system, and, ultimately, on Jewish survival.

The scenario of medium fertility with international migration continuing at present levels shows that a minor increase in world Jewish population may occur, from 13.1–13.2 million in 2000, to 13.9 million in 2020, 14.5 million in 2050, and 15.6 million in 2080.⁶⁵ For 2020, the expected variation in Jewish population size ranges between 12.9 million in case of lower fertility without international migration, and 14.7 million in case of higher fertility with international migration. In 2050 the projected variation in world Jewish population under the same conditions ranges between a low of 12.7 million and a high of 17.3 million, and in 2080 the range would be between 10.6 million (lower fertility without migration) and 21.6 million (higher fertility with migration). Although expected stability in Jewish population size is one main finding of our projections, it is not the only possibility. Modest deviations from currently observed levels of Jewish fertility could conceivably bring a global Jewish population decrease, or a significant Jewish population increase. The percentage expected to live in Israel out of total world Jewry, starting from 37 percent in 2000, would increase according to the various scenarios to 43–45 percent in 2020 and would surpass 50 percent after 2030, approaching 54–57 percent in 2050, and 64–69 percent in 2080. The respective share of world Jewry living in North America would change from 46 percent in 2000, to 42–43 percent in 2020, 34–35 percent in 2050, and 24–28 percent in 2080. The overall weight of Jewish communities in other countries would steadily decline.

⁶⁵When reading these figures it is interesting to consider the performance of Jewish population projections for the year 2000 based on 1975 data reported by Schmelz, *World Jewish Population*. Based on a Jewish population baseline for 1975 of: World, 13 million; Diaspora, 10 million; Israel, 3 million, Schmelz's projected low-high estimates for 2000 were: World, 11.8–12.9 million; Diaspora, 7.4–8.2 million; Israel, 4.4–4.7 million. Our 2000 Jewish population baseline was: World, 13.15 million; Diaspora, 8.28 million; Israel, 4.87 million (see table 2). In other words, Schmelz's higher assumptions were reasonably close to the target.

Focusing first on the expected effects of these demographic changes on the global Jewish presence, it may be useful to compare Jewish population projections to similar projections for the total population routinely processed by the United Nations.⁶⁶ Table 8 illustrates changes expected in the number of Jews per 1,000 inhabitants of the world's major regions. The range of results reflects the lower and higher fertility and migration scenarios discussed above. In the year 2000 the Jewish global presence constituted about 2.2 per 1,000 of a total population just above 6 billion people. By 2020, when the world total population may reach 7.1–7.9 billion, Jews would be 1.8–1.9 per 1,000 inhabitants. By 2050, out of a world total population expected to increase to 7.3–10.7 billion, the Jewish presence would be 1.6 per 1,000 inhabitants.

The relative weight of Jewish population is quite different in specific areas, starting with the major difference between Israel and the Diaspora. In the aggregate of Diaspora communities, the share of Jewish population is expected to diminish by half, from 1.4 per 1,000 population in 2000, to 1.0–1.1 in 2020, to 0.7 per 1,000 in 2050. In North America, where the share of Jews is by far higher than in any other region outside of Israel, it is expected to diminish from 20 per 1,000 in 2000, to 16–17 per 1,000 in 2020, and 12–13 per 1,000 in 2050. In Israel, too, because of the faster growth of the Arab and other communities, the Jewish share of total population is expected to diminish from 787 per 1,000 in 2000 to 725–748 per 1,000 in 2020, and 641–658 per 1,000 in 2050. In Europe outside the FSU, the share of Jews out of total population is expected to remain fairly stable at 2 per 1,000 or slightly less, due to the parallel population shrinkage expected among both Jews and non-Jews in the low scenario. In the FSU, the share of Jews among total population is expected to diminish in any case, and, as noted, it would dwindle to zero were international migration to continue at its present intensity. In the aggregate of Asia and Africa, bound to constitute 75–77 percent of the world's total population in 2020 and 2050, the Jewish presence would be negligible. In Oceania the weight of Jewish population would shrink from the current 3.3 per 1,000 to 2.4–2.7 per 1,000 in 2020, and 1.9–2.2 in 2050.

The common denominator of all projections is a general decline in the expected share of Jews among the total population, as a consequence of a slower growth or diminution of Jewish population at a time of contin-

⁶⁶United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects, The 1998 Revision*, vol. I: *Comprehensive Tables* (New York, 1999). See also: Wolfgang Lutz, Warren Sanderson, Sergei Scherbov, and Anne Goujon, "World Population Scenarios," in Lutz, *Future Population of the World*, pp. 361–96; Joop De Beer and Leo Van Wissen, eds., *Europe: One Continent, Different Worlds: Population Scenarios for the 21st Century* (Dordrecht, 1999).

TABLE 8. JEWS PER 1,000 TOTAL POPULATION ACCORDING TO VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS^a, BY MAJOR REGIONS, 2000-2050

Region	2000		2020				2050			
			Without Jewish migration		With Jewish migration		Without Jewish migration		With Jewish migration	
	Lower	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower	Higher
Total population ^b	6,055	7,095	7,904	7,904	7,095	7,904	7,343	10,674	7,343	10,674
Jewish population ^c	13,150	12,931	14,648	14,648	13,002	14,698	11,847	17,159	12,026	17,286
Jews per 1,000 of total:										
Total world	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Diaspora	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Israel	787.3	725.2	739.3	739.3	735.2	747.6	640.7	647.8	651.8	657.7
North America	20.3	16.2	16.5	16.5	16.7	16.9	12.3	12.7	12.8	13.1
Latin America	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3
Europe	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.8
FSU	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0
Asia, Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oceania	3.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2

^aJewish population: Lower and Higher fertility assumptions (see text). Total population: Low and High projections, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects, The 1998 Revision*, vol. I: *Comprehensive Tables* (New York, 1999).

^bBillions.

^cMillions.

uing substantial growth of population in general. The implications of these changes are obviously different for Israel and for the Diaspora. But in both cases the expected reduction in the weight of Jewish population as a share of the total society portends tougher competition with other groups in the allocation of resources and the defense of group interests. The impact of projected demographic trends, therefore, tends to weaken the standing of Jews locally and globally.

Effects on the Jewish Organizational Framework

Population change carries significant implications for Jewish service delivery locally, nationally, and internationally. Many such services are attuned to specific age groups, each characterized by special needs. The extent of the provision of formal and informal Jewish education is determined, among other factors, by the size of younger age groups. At the opposite end of the age ladder, services for the elderly reflect the changing size of older age cohorts. In between, younger and middle-age adults tend to be interested in the fundamental needs of family and economic activity.

Our population scenarios clearly point to a process of Jewish aging, though the specific extent of this trend may be quite different in particular countries and regions. The growing demand for the allocation of resources to cover the needs of the elderly at a time when the number of Jewish adults at productive ages is declining, can be expected to generate tougher competition with other fundamental services, such as Jewish education. Toward the later stages of the projection, the imbalance of the Jewish age composition in most countries outside of Israel could become so overwhelming as to endanger the effective functioning of Jewish community services.

Demographic trends in Israel different from those in other major Jewish communities imply a shifting global balance of mutual relations and a change in where decisions are made. As part of a stronger global focus on Israeli society, the chief responsibility for ensuring adequate Jewish education and cultural continuity among future generations will gradually pass from the Diaspora to Israel.⁶⁷ And, to the extent that a growing share of world Jewry will reside in Israel, Israeli society will be asked increasingly to rely on its own productive and intellectual resources, and less on the material and moral help that has long come from the Diaspora. While the extent or intensity of the Diaspora-Israel relationship

⁶⁷Sergio DellaPergola, *World Jewry Beyond 2000: The Demographic Prospects* (Oxford, 1999).

need not be affected by demographic change, the donor-recipient relationship will in all likelihood evolve to reflect the rise or decline of major centers of Jewish life. Israel will increasingly have to take up a supportive role in relation to shrinking and aging Jewish communities elsewhere. And, in the wake of emerging demographic realities, North American Jewry—long the backbone of the world Jewish community system—might find itself more concerned with internal needs and less available to aid other Jewish communities.

A further consequence of demographic trends for Jewish life is that differential population growth may not only reflect but also enhance religious, ideological, and cultural differences within a community, sharpening existing cleavages, especially those of a denominational-ritual nature, and those stemming from the large-scale absorption of immigrants. Thus demographic developments may have much to do with the great challenge of preserving unity while acknowledging diversity, both within the Jewish camp in Israel as well as in the United States and other Diaspora Jewish communities.

For its part, the Jewish population of Israel faces complex problems related to the regional development and geopolitical equilibrium of the Middle East. The Jewish/others demographic balance both within Israel and in relation to its adjacent populations is bound to affect Israeli strategic thinking and decision making.

CONCLUSIONS

Demographic projections are not prophecies. Rather, they reflect changes expected in a population if it develops according to certain assumptions about demographic variables. The projections presented here used “realistic” assumptions; they reflect recent sociodemographic trends among the Jewish populations of different countries and regions, including the expected effects of current levels of international migration and of changes in Jewish identification. Only conditions of stability or moderate change were considered in our alternative scenarios. While substantially expanding the range of scenarios would produce a more lively and provocative overview, learning from the possible implications of present trends is a contribution both for social scientific research interested in the Jewish group in comparative theoretical perspective, and for applied research aimed at Jewish community planning and policy making.

The demographic projections discussed above tend to follow a linear path, though we know for sure that history, and Jewish history in particular has not followed such a straight-line course. In reality the direction of political, socioeconomic, and other processes may suddenly shift,

as it has so often in the past — particularly in the 20th century. Based on past experience it is likely that the world system's geopolitical balance will continue to change both globally and within specific regions.⁶⁸

One imponderable of major relevance for world Jewry is the possible outcome of the ongoing political process in the Middle East and its demographic consequences. Peace might generate significant economic benefits for the region that, in turn, might stimulate Jewish migrations of varying magnitude to and from Israel. If peace does not come to the Middle East, on the other hand, there might be heavy long-term economic and social costs for Israeli society, accompanied, perhaps, by large-scale emigration. Similarly, other changes in the world geopolitical equilibrium could happen anywhere, affecting the position of Jews.

Even if no such unexpected shift occurs, one important goal of population projections is to outline undesirable developments that may emerge from the indefinite continuation of present demographic trends, and to stimulate thoughts about possible policy interventions that might prevent the scenarios from becoming reality. The findings presented here hint at enormous challenges — for example, the balance between the young and the elderly within world Jewry, the balance between Israel and Diaspora Jewries, and the balance between Jewish and non-Jewish populations in Israel. Such issues, with their human, cultural, economic, and environmental implications, should elicit serious thinking and sophisticated response.

⁶⁸For three different general approaches to the question see: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996); Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Age of Transition: World-System Trajectory, 1945–2025* (Binghamton, 1996); and Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, 1997).