

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Palestine Imbrolio

Monty Noam Penkower

Touro College
Victor J. Selmanowitz Chair
of Modern Jewish History
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FOREWORD

In 1981, at the initiative of the founder and president of Touro College, Dr. Bernard Lander, the Touro Graduate School of Jewish Studies opened its doors to admit an initial class of ten students. Today, the Graduate School maintains campuses in both New York and Jerusalem, with a combined enrollment of 300 students (the majority studying in Jerusalem). Approximately fifty graduate courses are offered each semester, leading to a Master of Arts degree in Jewish Studies.

On May 5, 1996, the Graduate School marked yet another significant milestone in its development. Through the generosity of Dr. Livia Straus, prominent educator and Judaica scholar, and her husband Dr. Marc Straus, noted oncologist and published poet, the Graduate School established the Victor J. Selmanowitz Chair of Modern Jewish History. The Selmanowitz Chair is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Livia Straus's brother, a man of diverse talents and myriad interests, a master of many disciplines. Dr. Victor Joel Selmanowitz was a brilliant and caring physician, pioneering medical researcher, distinguished professor, experienced world traveler, and an expert on subjects ranging from art and photography to Jewish genealogy. He served as Director of Research at the Orentreich Foundation in New York, Professor of Dermatology and Vice-Chair of the department of Clinical Dermatology at the New York College-Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital, and Chief Dermatologist at the Francis Cardinal Cooke Residence for Handicapped Children.

The Graduate School is proud to announce the appointment of Monty Noam Penkower as Victor J. Selmanowitz Professor of Modern Jewish History, and pleased to present to you the text of Professor Penkower's Inaugural Lecture, distinguished by his characteristic blend of impressive scholarship and masterful style.

Michael A. Shmidman
Dean
Touro Graduate School of Jewish Studies

Monty Noam Penkower

Professor Monty Noam Penkower is an internationally recognized scholar of the modern Jewish experience. After completing his B.A. at Yeshiva University and his M.A. and Ph.D. at Columbia University, he taught at Bard College before joining Touro College as an Associate Professor in 1974. In 1980, he became Professor of History and in 1996 Victor J. Selmanowitz Professor of Modern Jewish History in the Graduate Department of Jewish Studies. He has also taught at City College, Rutgers University, and Stern College, and in the graduate History departments of New York University and Yeshiva University.

Professor Penkower is a prolific author in American and in modern Jewish history. His extensive publications include The Federal Writers' Project: A Study in Government Patronage of the Arts (1977); The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (1983); The Emergence of Zionist Thought (1986, rev. 1991); and The Holocaust and Israel Reborn: From Catastrophe to Sovereignty (1994). He received the B'nai B'rith-A.D.L. Merit for Educational Distinction and the second Samuel Belkin Memorial Literary Award from Yeshiva University. He has been awarded grants from numerous institutions, including the Eleanor Roosevelt Foundation; the Harry S Truman Library Institute; the Hoover Presidential Commission; the American Philosophical Society; the American Council of Learned Societies; the National Foundation for Jewish Culture; the Littauer Foundation; the Andrew Mellon Foundation; the National Foundation for the Humanities; the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture; and the Herzl Foundation. At present, he is writing a study of Anglo-American foreign relations regarding Palestine during World War II.

Professor Penkower has served as a consultant to the United States Holocaust Memorial Council; the National Endowment for the Humanities; the A & E History Channel; the Holocaust Survivors' Memorial Foundation; Holocaust Publications; and the National Jewish Book Council. He currently is a member of the Academic Council of the American Jewish Historical Society and of the Jewish Book Annual editorial board. He also has participated as the historian designate for the first public Holocaust memorial to be created in New York City, sponsored by the Holocaust Memorial Committee of Brooklyn. He is a member of the Organization of American Historians, the Association for Jewish Studies, and the American Jewish Historical Society.

Introductory remarks by Professor Monty Noam Penkower on inaugurating the Victor J. Selmanowitz Chair in Modern Jewish History at Touro College, May 5, 1996.

The award of an academic chair is a singular honor in the field of higher education. Understandably, I ask your indulgence, ladies and gentlemen, in thanking but a few individuals who have made possible tonight's milestone in my professional career.

First and foremost among them are Dr. Livia and Dr. Marc Straus, whose generosity and understanding led to the establishment of this chair in memory of Dr. Victor Joel Selmanowitz. A compassionate physician and healer of world renown, a prolific writer and researcher, a devoted son and grandson, brother and uncle, Victor Selmanowitz had a thirst for knowledge that was boundless. As I wrote to his sister, Livia, and brother-in-law, Marc, I shall do my best to bring further credit to a distinguished name.

My appreciation is extended, as well, to Dr. Bernard Lander, founder and president of Touro College, and to Dr. Michael Shmidman, dean of its graduate school in Jewish Studies, for selecting me as the occupant of Touro's first academic chair. I also wish to acknowledge Dr. Lester Eckman, long-time friend and colleague, for establishing the contact which ultimately resulted in tonight's celebration.

A loving family, beginning with my eshet chayil Yael, offers constant reminders of what is most important in life. Those who constitute our immediate circle of Penkowers, Roths, and Krauts, represented here tonight by Ariel, the only one of our children not now in Israel, make each day a wondrous affirmation. My brother Jordan, my sisters and brothers-in-law Andrea and David Rosen and Sharon and Joseph Kaplan, together with nephews and nieces, have also provided encouragement throughout the years.

Ever since my initial teaching post back in the tumultuous spring of 1968 at City College, I have learned much from my students. To those present tonight and those to follow, I continue to pledge myself to what Alfred Kazin, in his journals, observed of John Dewey: "a man can give his whole life to purposive teaching and to make of it a moral as well as an intellectual example." At a time when Smithsonian Institution administrators shy away from objective treatment of our government's use of atomic bombs against Japan in

August 1945; when local Polish officials are erecting a mall 30 meters from Auschwitz; when phrases like "ethnic cleansing" enter the common vocabulary--all those engaged in the struggle to honor decency and truth must proclaim that the infinite preciousness of life requires daily affirmation.

Finally, even chaired professors lay claim to their own teachers and trusted counselors. With ineffable joy, I acknowledge the presence here of my first mentors, cherished parents Rabbi Murry S. and Lillian Stavisky Penkower. May we continue to share much nachat for many years to come. At Yeshiva College, Rav Aharon Soloveitchik, Professors Yitz Greenberg, Louis Feldman, Sidney Braun, David Fleischer, and Seymour Lainoff were eminent models.

Last but most significant, during my graduate years at Columbia University, William E. Leuchtenburg reflected the finest traits of prodigious research, incisive analysis, and a limpid prose style. I know of no other distinguished scholar who had both the grace and good fortune to dedicate his latest volume, a retrospective of essays on the FDR years, to as many as 89 different acolytes -- and I am proud to be listed among them. To this exemplary human being, as a modest token of profound gratitude, the inaugural Victor J. Selmanowitz lecture is dedicated.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Palestine Imbroglia

by

Monty Noam Penkower

To William E. Leuchtenburg

"The world has lost an inspired leader and fighter for freedom and peace, America a great President and noble son, and the Jewish people a true friend and most powerful champion," cabled Zionist avatar Chaim Weizmann to Eleanor Roosevelt on April 13, 1945. The sudden death one day earlier of the thirty-second chief executive of the United States, while sitting for his portrait in Warm Springs, Georgia, stirred the Jewish Agency for Palestine to a similar eulogy: "We recall at this tragic hour his unswerving sympathy for the Jewish people in their cruel trials and tribulations at the hands of the common enemy and his staunch support of Zionist aspirations." Over the London offices of the Jewish Agency, the Zionist blue-and-white flag flew at half-mast; in a memorial service at Carnegie Hall, preeminent Jewish tribune Stephen Wise deemed "this beloved and immortal figure" a "Zaddik", one of the upright. Even Irgun leader Hillel Kook, right-wing critic of the American Zionist establishment, listed FDR among "our staunchest friends." ¹

Jews across the country, the strongest fulcrum for Franklin D. Roosevelt's unprecedented string of electoral victories, joined fellow citizens at the time in reacting to his passing with an unprecedented outpouring of emotion, reverence, even awe. Aside from an appreciation of FDR's fundamental compassion for the common man, they had taken particular pride in the Jewish members of the administration's inner circle, as well as comfort from his unwavering struggle against their people's quintessential adversary, Adolf Hitler. Only decades later, with historians documenting the U.S. government's callousness when confronted by the Holocaust, did that same community come to reevaluate the protean individual who (along with his allies) had deemed European Jewry expendable

during its bleakest travail. Leo Jung echoed the subsequent sentiment of many co-religionists when, in a public dialogue with the humanist philosopher Sidney Hook, the nestor of the American Orthodox rabbinate exclaimed: "God was not responsible for the Holocaust. It was Roosevelt's fault!"²

A half century after the guns of World War II fell silent and the world peered into the abyss which had consumed two-thirds of Europe's Jews, including 1.5 million children, one related issue still calls for full scholarly inspection. What stance did the elusive Roosevelt take vis-a-vis the Palestine imbroglio? While incontestable evidence has mounted of negligible White House effort to provide relief and rescue to the single collective entity targeted for murder in that global conflict, what of Jewry's most logical and accessible haven, the biblically covenanted Promised Land? In the final analysis, had Zionists legitimate reason that April, 1945, for showering encomiums upon the fresh memory of the always-flexible master of policy and politics?

Prior to the war's eruption, Roosevelt had quietly sought areas around the globe for mass resettlement of Jews and others seeking to escape Nazi rule. Unprepared to question U.S. restrictive immigration quotas at the time of mass unemployment and rising Jew hatred, FDR had asked Isaiah Bowman, the American territorial specialist at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and current president of Johns Hopkins University, to explore the possibilities of large migration to South America. Bowman responded to the request, which came on the heels of Kristallnacht, with an optimistic report about the Portuguese colony of Angola. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who had pressed the president to call the international Evian Conference some months earlier to check rising American public opinion on behalf of refugee aid after the German annexation of Austria, trumpeted Angola as a "supplemental Jewish homeland." Seeing the concept as a way to enlist Jewish effort, Roosevelt wrote to his British counterpart for support. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Edward Halifax decried the scheme, however, and at most proposed that private organizations pursue the matter.³

At this point, Roosevelt chose not to challenge London regarding the contentious Palestine dilemma. Although expressing admiration for Zionist efforts there, he accepted State's long-held view that the Palestine Mandate, assigned to His Majesty's Government

(HMG) by the League of Nations in 1922, was for the sceptre'd isle to administer. At HMG's request, Palestine as possible haven was ruled out for discussion at Evian. Traditionally hostile officials at the State Department responded in noncommittal fashion to pro-Zionist letters and delegations seeking the intervention of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Personal doubts also surfaced in FDR's memorandum to Chamberlain regarding the advantages of Angola receiving a large-scale immigration of Jews: "Even if the political difficulties could be overcome, it is doubtful whether Palestine could absorb and maintain the necessary influx of population." ⁴

Understandably, a bold plan advanced by Edward Norman for resettling Palestinian Arabs in Iraq seized Roosevelt's imagination. This non-Zionist, president of the American Economic Committee for Palestine, had drawn the attention of some in the State Department. In mid-October, 1938, Roosevelt himself showed "tremendous" interest when former Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, a long-time progressive Zionist whom FDR fondly termed "old Isaiah," briefed him about the idea. In a talk with the British ambassador, FDR raised the possibility that the two governments could convene a conference of the Arab princes and request that they appropriate \$200 million. While farms would be bought for all Arabs who wished to leave Palestine, this fund would primarily be used for the digging of artesian wells to improve agricultural production in the entire Middle East. Presumably, the Arabs would then make their peace with the Zionist endeavor.

The Britishers' skeptical response to FDR's feeler was not long in coming: HMG or anyone else could not promote an Arab-Jewish accord "primarily by economic sops or financial help however generous." Still, the president wrote Brandeis in December that even if Transjordan were not feasible, 200,000-300,000 Arabs "can and must be moved from Palestine to Iraq." In his judgment, \$300 million would be needed to carry out the voluntary transfer, the Jews perhaps raising one-third of the funds and the rest covered by two loans from the British, French, and American governments. ⁵

By early 1939, FDR sensed the widening gulf between Jew and Arab over the Holy Land. Not only had there been a Palestinian Arab revolt, aided by the surrounding Muslim states since its outbreak in April, 1936, against any further mandatory concessions to Jewish

hopes there, but Roosevelt had recently received an unequivocal letter from Saudi Arabian monarch Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud opposing Jewish settlement. Concomitantly, the pro-Palestine Federation had convened an American Christian Conference on Palestine to emphasize that the persecuted Jews of Germany, Poland, and Rumania merited the Promised Land as their "natural place of refuge." Kristallnacht led the federation's membership to urge the American government to intervene in the Palestine question directly. In a separate demarche, 51 senators, 154 representatives, and 30 governors endorsed a petition of the ad hoc National Emergency Committee on Palestine, which pressed the president to "take action" against British obstruction of the Jewish "national home" officially noted in the mandate. ⁶

The British actually tried to preempt an American reaction against projected restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine by combining the restrictions with the Norman plan that interested Roosevelt. The new legislation, London argued in a secret aide-memoire to State, would soon restore peace and confidence in the Promised Land, allowing Jews in due time "to induce the Arabs to agree to a development in Trans-Jordan on the lines which the president has advocated." FDR had tried to delay adoption of the legislation in its final form, which set a maximum entry of 75,000 Jews into Palestine for the next five years (thereafter with Arab consent), and pledged a further severe whittling down of the Balfour Declaration's pledge of 1917. He privately greeted the May, 1939, White Paper with "a good deal of dismay." The Mandate, Roosevelt informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull, intended--and so gathered "the whole world" in 1920--"to convert Palestine into a Jewish home which might very possibly become preponderantly Jewish within a very short time."

The president refused to air his thoughts publicly, however. State stood by the recommendation of its Near Eastern division chief, Wallace Murray, that the White Paper was "a reasonable compromise" in view of British strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as HMG's need of "cementing its position" in that area given the present ominous state of international affairs. At most, the White House would not officially approve HMG Command Paper 6019. ⁷

Jews in the United States, as elsewhere, could not halt this denouement. The

American Zionist Bureau, serving the country's four major Zionist groups, had obtained the signatures of 28 senators to a statement that evoked "humanitarian and Christian principles and impulses" to attack this repudiation by England of the "moral obligation" embodied in the Balfour Declaration; a similar protest by over 200 congressmen followed. Yet, for all the personal persuasion of Brandeis, Wise, and Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter, Roosevelt seconded the State Department's narrow interpretation, articulated by Murray, that the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 enabled Washington to intercede concerning modifications in the mandate only when American interests were directly affected. The Nazi blitzkrieg against Poland on September 1, 1939, which unleashed World War II, thus found the doors to Palestine newly bolted and Jews powerless in a world, as Weizmann put it, "divided into places where they cannot live and places where they cannot enter." ⁸

Weizmann took heart from his first meeting with Roosevelt, a half-hour interview in the Oval Office in February, 1940. Conceding that American Jewry's sentiment for Palestine was generally very strong, FDR wondered if other countries, such as Colombia, might also absorb refugees and the Arabs might be placated with "a little baksheesh." He agreed with the World Zionist Organization president that a report (supplied him at Brandeis's advice) by the U.S. Agriculture Department's soil conservation expert Walter Lowdermilk, envisioning an annual influx into the Promised Land of 50,000 Jews with ease for years to come, demonstrated that the Jews "had done very well." Still, the White House occupant did not intervene over Parliament's enacting soon thereafter the White Paper's land regulations, which prohibited Jewish purchase henceforth in 64 percent of Palestine and set restrictions within another 31 percent. While such liberal-minded newspapers as the Springfield Republican and the Atlanta Constitution and Nation magazine criticized these "palpably unjust" laws, Roosevelt was just then much involved in peace efforts intended to block Soviet-German domination abroad, check isolationists like Senator Arthur Vandenburg and aviator Charles Lindbergh at home, and assure American security. ⁹

Nor did Zionist prospects advance in the United States throughout the remainder of that year. In a confidential memorandum to FDR, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, Jr., touted Ibn Saud as a counterpart to Pope Pius XII in "the Mohammedan world." Jewish Agency Executive chairman David Ben-Gurion, concluding that American Jewry

could play a decisive role in influencing the mandatory's policy, failed that autumn in urging public pressure across the U.S. for a Jewish army against the Axis threat to the Mediterranean. He discovered that Zionists and non-Zionists alike feared anything that might strengthen antisemitic attacks against "a Jewish war", and sought to do nothing that might embarrass the Roosevelt administration or HMG. Worried over Arab hostility, the State Department itself had prevailed upon the American Red Cross not to accept the United Palestine Appeal's offer of \$25,000 for the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) after the deadly Italian aerial bombardment of Tel Aviv and Haifa. ¹⁰

The White House occupant maintained his reticence on Palestine in 1941, and clearly distanced himself from Jewish concerns. Notwithstanding calls from the new American Palestine Committee, which included 3 members of the cabinet, over 150 members of congress, and 15 governors, for "large-scale colonization of Jewish refugees" in the Promised Land, Roosevelt pointedly skirted the Yishuv's military and other pro-Allied efforts in a message to the Hadassah women's Zionist organization. He offered no solace in response to Palestine Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog's personal plea for intervention against the remorseless assault on European Jewry, despite increasing news bulletins of Nazi atrocities in occupied Europe. Even as FDR initially encouraged a private request from the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (which held a major Saudi oil concession) for government aid to maintain the stability of Ibn Saud's dictatorship, he informed Wise that with Palestine a "British" problem, the administration could only advise England of its "deep interest...and our concern" for the grim plight of Jews currently facing a German invasion in the Middle East. ¹¹

Inching towards global conflict, the administration trod warily. Waging since September an undeclared war against German submarines in the Atlantic and arranging urgent aid for Stalin via Lend-Lease, Roosevelt had narrowly secured a Selective Service Act and a revision of the Neutrality Act from congress. He keenly sought to guard against going to war with the country divided, and wished to do nothing to confirm the charge of both native isolationists and Nazi officialdom that the Jews as a group were driving the United States into World War II. Accordingly, FDR steered clear of controversial issues like Jewry's fate abroad and Palestine, whose large absorptive capacity he continued to

doubt. State hewed to its traditional immigration-restriction and pro-Arab line, the Division of European Affairs quickly squelching support for a plan to transport 300,000 Rumanian Jews across Turkey to Syria or Palestine. The country's entry into the Allied camp after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor suggested no betterment for Zionist hopes, Weizmann cautioned his colleagues in London: "America is fighting for her life, not for ours." ¹²

In the crucial months that followed, FDR continued to shy away from a definite stand regarding the Palestine quagmire. His wife privately thought that the White Paper policy "just seems to be cruelty beyond words" when all but one of the 769 Rumanian Jews aboard the Struma drowned outside Turkish waters after the British had refused them entry into the Promised Land; echoing the Foreign Office, Welles responded that Gestapo agents on such voyages posed an ever-present danger. Following the Biltmore Conference resolutions of May, 1942, which brought the different established American Zionist parties under the ideological roof of Palestine's creation as a postwar Jewish commonwealth, Roosevelt sent a message to American Palestine Committee chairman Senator Robert Wagner of New York extolling the Yishuv's great development during the last two decades as "a perfect example of what can be accomplished by a free people working in a democracy." Yet support from the White House for Zionist political ambitions in Palestine, notwithstanding proven Arab loyalty to the Nazi cause in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, went wanting. ¹³

Erwin Rommel's successful drive towards Alexandria that June sparked State to seek presidential approval for a declaration announcing, for the first time, the American government's attitude towards the Middle East and Palestine in particular. Worried over reports from their representatives abroad that Zionist agitation for a Jewish army to defend Palestine was being used by Nazi propaganda to win Arab support, the Near Eastern division drafted a statement affirming the Atlantic Charter principle of self-government, and expressing the desire that a political solution for Palestine would be reached through agreement between its Arab and Jewish communities. FDR rejected the draft on the ground that "if we pat" either Arab or Jew "on the back, we automatically stir up trouble." Berle, Murray, and associates would have to settle for the president's approval of an

American mission to the Near East, primarily to "gain more active support for the peoples of this area" for an Allied victory.¹⁴

Against the dire threat from Rommel, Weizmann unsuccessfully pressed Roosevelt to approve a large Jewish military force in Palestine, to be led by British general Orde Wingate. Repeating British fears that the Egyptian army might turn against them, the president preferred to wait about ten days before issuing a statement about the force. Weizmann thought this response smacked of a traditional British placating of the Arabs, but FDR informed Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., that if the British could keep Cairo and Alexandria from falling, and if 50,000 rifles and 10,000 machine guns could be gotten to the Jews, Wingate would be his choice as well. The former commander of the Hagana "special night squads" during the 1936-39 Arab revolt would not receive the nod from his own military superiors, however. Tanks of the first U.S. armored division were rushed at Roosevelt's order to the Eighth Army under Montgomery at El Alamein, which eventually proved essential in reversing the Afrika Korps' advance. As for concurrent, mounting news about Hitler's "Final Solution" of the "Jewish Question," FDR issued a message on July 21 to a Madison Square Garden rally warning that all perpetrators of these atrocities would face definite retribution after the Nazi defeat.¹⁵

While Roosevelt and State awaited the findings of Lt. Col. Harold Hoskins, the former OSS staffer chosen by State for the mission to the Near East, the department tried in its own fashion to counter the pro-Zionist public mood. Two subcommittees attached to its Office of Post-War Planning, with special advisor Bowman exercising considerable influence, leaned to a binationalist Palestine and Jewish resettlement elsewhere after the war. In like vein, having first noted Hitler's systematic persecution of the Jewish people, Secretary Cordell Hull used the 25th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration to urge a wider objective: "We must have a world in which Jews, like every other race, are free to abide in peace and honor." It did not help, in the Near Eastern division's opinion, to have Wendell Willkie return from a global trip (including the Middle East) on behalf of the president and to announce that "the doors of Palestine must be opened to the Jewish peoples of Central and Eastern Europe after the war"; that prominent individuals and senators endorsed full-page advertisements of the Committee for a Jewish Army, organized by Hillel Kook (alias

Peter Bergson) and other members of an Irgun delegation from Palestine; and especially that 63 senators and 182 representatives signed a statement that "millions of homeless Jews" should be enabled to reconstruct their lives in Palestine after the war. ¹⁶

Roosevelt, for his part, entertained a novel approach. On December 3, 1942, immediately after world Jewry had observed a day of fasting and prayer for their murdered families in Europe, FDR indicated his own plan to the pro-Zionist Morgenthau. While Jerusalem would be run by a joint religious committee of Christians and Jews, a "barbed wire" would be put around Palestine. Its Arab residents would gradually be moved to many available lands in the Middle East (shades of his 1938 proposal to the British), with a Jewish family entering the Holy Land each time an Arab left. As to the "2-3 million" Jews still left in Europe, these and other refugees could be spread out in such places as Colombia's Upper Amazon region and Ecuador. His postwar focus also explains why the American chief executive concurrently told a Jewish delegation, in search of immediate action to counter the unprecedented slaughter abroad, that New York governor Herbert Lehman would head relief operations in a defeated Germany and that the mass murderers would be held strictly accountable in the long run. ¹⁷

By the time Roosevelt received a final report by Hoskins, the administration's stance on meaningful aid to European Jewry had crystallized. FDR and Hull raised no protest when Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden candidly warned the pair in February, 1943, that the acceptance of the threatened Bulgarian Jews might well lead Hitler to make similar offers for Poland and Germany, raising the problem of enemy agents and the fact that "there simply are not enough ships and means of transportation in the world to handle them." The Bermuda Conference that April, like its Evian predecessor a facade for actual inaction, saw the Anglo-American governments confidentially agree not to challenge each other's restrictive quotas as regards Palestine and the U.S. or to embrace rescue measures for the singular target of Germany's implacable hatred. FDR also thought it "extremely unwise" to send large numbers of Jews to safety in temporary North African camps, echoing the anxiety of his State and War Departments about Muslim unrest. Indeed, the War Department's Middle East intelligence section embraced a totally pro-Arab position for Palestine, and concluded that the Cameroons should be the place of shelter for those

survived the war.¹⁸

Hoskins's findings carried considerable weight. His three-month tour of the Near East had led this member of the board of trustees of the American University of Beirut to make several recommendations: a politically independent federation of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan; abolition of the British and French mandates there; technical U.N. assistance to the new organization; an eventual federation of the Arab states if desired; little or no change in the present boundaries; a binational state in Palestine; the transfer of the holy places to the United Nations; and a brief Anglo-American declaration to be issued along the lines of State's mid-1942 draft. Bowman, William Yale, and others on the relevant State Department subcommittees, who remained skeptical of Palestine's capacity to receive a large number of Jewish refugees, equated Zionism with Nazi lebensraum, and advocated Angola for postwar settlement, felt vindicated. Roosevelt himself approved Hull's support for the Hoskins's suggestion about a joint statement to still agitation over Palestine. An April message from Ibn Saud, vehemently denouncing Zionism, brought FDR's confidential reply to what he told the cabinet was "a fine letter" with assurance along the lines of the suggested declaration.¹⁹

Bowman's perspective aided Roosevelt when long-time Zionist Winston Churchill expressed his personal interest in having Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the former Italian possessions in Libya, serve as potential colonies affiliated with a future Jewish state in Palestine. At Roosevelt's request, Bowman prepared two detailed reports which advised that the Palestine question or Libyan settlement be kept in abeyance until the war's end in view of the limited possibilities in both countries and "violently adverse" political reactions throughout the Arab world. At a White House luncheon on May 22, 1943, Roosevelt told the British prime minister of Bowman's thought that Jews should be thinly dispersed throughout the globe to avoid Gentile antagonism, remarked on the unsuccessful effort of world Jewry's large contributions to balance Palestine's large export-import deficit, and appeared to champion a solid Arab bloc around the southern and eastern end of the Mediterranean. Churchill and Vice President Henry Wallace countered that evening with Transjordan's possibilities for the Jews, but Bowman's influence had made a lasting mark at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.²⁰

While State's subcommittees worked toward their final conclusion, the American president chose to tackle the Palestine conundrum on two fronts. In a private meeting with Weizmann arranged by the sympathetic Welles, FDR agreed with the Jewish statesman's plea for a Arab-Jewish conference at which he and Churchill would be present, dismissed the Arabs' contribution to the Allied war effort, and seconded the possibility that Jews could contribute financially to Arab progress in the entire Middle East region. Roosevelt also endorsed Welles's suggestion on that occasion that an emissary be sent, with Churchill's approval, to Ibn Saud to see if any basis of a settlement could be found. A heartened Weizmann did not know that three days earlier, FDR had also approved Hoskins's proposed Anglo-American declaration to silence agitation over Palestine during the war. After some discussion, the British seconded both Roosevelt's idea for a Hoskins visit to the Saudi leader and the issuance of the joint statement at the end of July. ²¹

American Zionist leaders foiled the proposed joint statement at the last minute, obtaining crucial help from Morgenthau, Frankfurter, and Roosevelt advisor and major speech writer Samuel Rosenman. FDR and Churchill had been "incensed" by the full-page advertisements of Kook's Committee for a Jewish Army and particularly the demand of the Revisionist New Zionist Organization during the prime minister's May visit to Washington, "Mr. Churchill, Drop the Mandate!" Though that broadside, which attacked the Colonial Office for obstructing the Jewish effort in Palestine and quoted the late Lord Wedgwood's view that America should accept the mandate, had been publicly criticized by Weizmann in London as "most unfortunate," the two warlords had neither forgotten nor forgiven. Still, the U.S. War Department's final decision not to endorse State's pressure for the Anglo-American declaration caused Hull to retreat. Meeting in Quebec to decide on a cross-channel invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe the next spring, Roosevelt and Churchill ultimately agreed on August 22, 1943, that the question be held "in abeyance" and discussed further from month to month as the war situation developed. ²²

Oil presented a new factor that the president certainly had to consider in 1943. With War Department intelligence estimating that U.S. reserves were adequate for only fourteen years at the current rate of consumption, as well as the critical wartime need for 100-octane aviation gasoline, the president on February 18 formally declared Saudi Arabia eligible for

Lend-Lease as "vital to the defense of the United States." In like vein, that June he approved a Petroleum Reserves Corporation and the construction of a pipeline in Arabia up to Haifa on the Mediterranean Sea. He also suggested to Berle that the government obtain a bloc of oil territory in Saudi Arabia -- where lay the richest of such deposits, agree to pay Ibn Saud a flat rental for the land, and then propose to him what no one had yet done: to pay the king a flat royalty per barrel at the going rate, similar to that currently paid anywhere else. (On these grounds, too, FDR would approve State and War Department requests the next year that military equipment be granted to Saudi Arabia through the Lend-Lease program.) He invited two of Ibn Saud's sons to the United States, and told a press conference in October that the oil situation was "well in hand," immediately acknowledging with praise the king's gift of a Damascus blade. Privately, Roosevelt told a delighted Prince Feisal that his father should not part with all right, title, and interest in and to the oil of the country.²³

The behavior of some American Zionists, moreover, increasingly grated on the president, especially their militant advertisements damning the Bermuda Conference and the White Paper policy. Roosevelt expressed shock upon being informed by Bowman of statements by Zionists asserting that a Jewish state would strengthen Jewish culture in those countries where Jews were already established. In addition, Washington circles had it that Rosenman felt "extremely upset at the uncompromising attitude" of established Zionists like Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver during the American Jewish Conference. When Joseph Proskauer, president of the American Jewish Committee (which counted Rosenman as a member), announced his organization's withdrawal from the conference in September on the grounds that the unambiguous resolution for Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth should not have been approved by the delegates during the war -- "it may carry with it embarrassment to the governments of the United Nations" -- some observers of the Capitol scene thought that this dissatisfaction reflected White House opinion. That the committee's call for an international trusteeship over Palestine would closely resemble the private views of FDR and State only strengthened this hypothesis.²⁴

In an interview with returning emissary Hoskins that same month, Roosevelt echoed the conclusions of Bowman, Yale, and others. Hoskins's report that Ibn Saud would refuse

to attempt a settlement with the Jewish Agency and especially with Weizmann, who allegedly had tried to bribe the king with Roosevelt's approval, soured the president on Zionism. While no agreement existed between American Zionists and non-Zionists as to Palestine's future capacity to absorb refugees, FDR agreed, according to Hoskins's account, that any substantial addition could at best only be accomplished slowly, preceded by considerable expenditures of time and money. Given, Roosevelt asserted, the wish of many European Jews to remain in their countries of origin and "the large number" of Jews massacred abroad, the postwar pressure on Palestine might be substantially lessened. As for those who wished to leave Europe, he still sought to have at least a certain number settled in the Andean portions of Colombia. A Jew, a Christian, and a Muslim would govern Palestine as "a real Holy Land," Roosevelt conjectured. The British could be told of these opinions when Hoskins visited London the following month.²⁵

At this point, Roosevelt and Churchill had clearly parted ways on Palestine. Weizmann's subsequent explanation that the "bribe" possibility had been broached to him on separate occasions by Ibn Saud's one-time confidant H. St. John Philby and by Churchill himself, failed to placate FDR completely. Yet the Zionist commitment of HMG's prime minister, who had just sent FDR an unpublished, antisemitic poem on "The Burden of Jerusalem" by Rudyard Kipling, remained steady. It was not necessary to see Hoskins during the latter's visit to London, Churchill informed the Foreign Office: "My opinions on the question are the result of long reflection, and are not likely to undergo any change." In a long talk with Weizmann that October, he pledged that "after they had crushed Hitler they would have to establish the Jews in the position where they belonged." He would fulfill Balfour's legacy; the Jews would get compensation and be able to judge the criminals of World War II; he would "not budge" from his public utterances on Palestine. They had to produce "something new" instead of the White Paper, and he leaned to partition, mentioning the southern Negev area and Transjordan. "On the day of reckoning," Churchill firmly assured the Zionist standard bearer, he would remember that the Arabs had in some instances "made things difficult" for the Allies. He would never forget that "God deals with the nations as they deal with the Jews."²⁶

The American president's restless mind suggested still another tack. In an attempt

to cool the steaming Palestine caldron, FDR dispatched Morris Ernst, one of his close friends, to see Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley that fall. According to Ernst's subsequent version of the secret mission, Roosevelt wished the British to join the United States and a few other countries in admitting 100,00-200,000 Jews after World War II; Zionist opposition later killed this prospect. Stanley's contemporary record is quite different, far more consonant with FDR's Palestine agenda at the time. As Stanley told the Foreign Office, FDR wanted somehow to evoke Protestant church interest in the United States and Great Britain to counterbalance the interest of Jews and "Mohammedans" in the Holy Land. "More precise and more dangerous" was the White House occupant's second proposal, Stanley's memorandum continued, that an international commission publicly declare how many Jews could actually be admitted to Palestine after the war and at what cost. The expense, in Roosevelt's opinion, would stagger the American taxpayers, who would then lose much of their enthusiasm for Zionism. For the dissenting Stanley and Whitehall, especially given a British cabinet committee's leaning toward a partitioned Palestine, this feeler and the Hoskins trip really aimed to stem the Republican capture of the Jewish vote in the 1944 presidential election.²⁷

The latter presented itself as a distinct possibility in view of mounting public criticism of the American government's inaction during the Holocaust, yet fundamental Palestine policy would not be altered. With no dissent from Roosevelt, a beleaguered Hull understandably overrode Wallace Murray's objection in deciding to press the British to extend the White Paper's immigration quotas beyond the March 31, 1944, deadline. Pressure from various influential quarters, including the Senate and Morgenthau, also propelled FDR to approve at last a War Refugee Board for the rescue and relief of "the victims of enemy oppression." At the same time, Roosevelt had Bowman caution a sympathetic First Lady about the numerous dangers inherent in Zionist aspirations. Shortly thereafter, Yale's final draft, combining the territorial subcommittee's conclusions favoring an international trusteeship run by Britain with the president's proposal for a three-man ecclesiastical board to supervise religious and social services in the Holy Land, reached Bowman. Palestine's establishment as an independent state or as part of an independent Arab unity or federal state could follow, the document concluded, when "the fundamental

fundamental causes of Arab-Jewish conflict are eliminated." ²⁸

The interest of Roosevelt and State to silence debate over Palestine found the War Department as most valuable ally in February 1944, when pro-Zionist congressional resolutions headed for passage. Hull had actually raised no objections when news of this projected action first crossed his desk, and so a bipartisan coalition supportive of unrestricted immigration into a future Jewish Palestinian state began hearings on the matter in both houses. With the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee about to vote, Hull suddenly asked Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff George Marshall for their reaction. The two military chiefs heard G-2 intelligence warn of a consequent adverse effect upon the North African campaign and of possible Muslim sabotage to the Iraq pipe lines and other vital Allied sources, leading Stimson to write to the committee chairman in this vein against the resolution. State and Roosevelt unsuccessfully pressed Stimson to make the letter public, but Marshall brought about postponement of the matter with confidential testimony before that committee. Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. suggested to FDR that the 1943 joint Anglo-American statement now be revived. On March 8, Roosevelt gave the green light to Stettinius, soon to depart with Bowman and Murray for London. ²⁹

Shocked by the postponement of the two resolutions, American Zionists led by Rabbis Wise and Silver, sought to deflect the danger done to their cause by securing a public utterance from Roosevelt. The interview on March 9 commenced with FDR berating the two clergymen for asking him "to let millions of people be killed in a jihad" - exactly his words to Wallace only days earlier. Roosevelt also noted Ibn Saud's anger at Weizmann's "putative bribe" and Bowman's skepticism about Palestine's absorptive capacity. He finally authorized the pair to state that the American government had never approved the 1939 White Paper; that the president was happy that Palestine's doors "are today open to Jewish refugees"; and that "full justice" would be done vis-a-vis the Jewish National Home, for which the government and the American public "have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees." ³⁰

State's regional experts, taken aback by Roosevelt's apparent volte-face, moved

quickly to offset the Zionists' triumph. Bowman and Murray, with Hoskins's input, got Hull's approval of a draft statement for the forthcoming London talks. Receiving Roosevelt's authorization, State secretly wired the Arab capitals "that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews." War Refugee Board director John Pehle requested Stettinius to ask the British, during the London trip, at least to announce that temporary camps in Palestine would be open to all Jewish refugees, who would be "returned to their homelands" after the war. But Wallace understood the prevailing realities far better, writing in his diary: "The President certainly is a waterman. He looks one direction and rows the other with the utmost skill." Thus, Murray succeeded in checking an additional pro-Zionist release proposed by Wise and Silver for Roosevelt's use. The two Zionist leaders were informed instead that FDR's statement on March 24 about Axis persecution, which also referred to the systematic annihilation of European Jewry and the feasible possibilities of helpful countermeasures, represented "a reaffirmation of my deep and abiding sympathy for the Jewish people."³¹

State's Near Eastern experts, encouraged by a meeting of minds with their counterparts in London, maintained their consistent stance on Palestine. While Foreign Office officials ruled out a joint statement because it might well "irritate rather than calm" the Zionists in the United States, they also espoused a binational state of communal Arab and Jewish governments under an international trusteeship; Pehle's suggestion went nowhere. When the Republican and Democratic party platforms unequivocally embraced Zionist aspirations in an election year, State chose to sidestep a Wise-Silver effort to have Hull openly oppose Palestine's partition. The administration, Stettinius informed a Zionist representative, was committed by the Democratic platform. At the same time, he added, Roosevelt could make a statement only when London was ready to do the same, "and that would not be until the end of the war in Europe, or shortly before that."³²

The inexorable press of events would not afford FDR such luxury of time to maneuver, however. Hearing that Republican presidential hopeful Thomas Dewey intended to "make quite a play" on Palestine in seeking New York City's crucial Jewish vote, Rosenman suggested that his chief urge Churchill to ease up on the White Paper. Indeed,

on October 12, Dewey heartily endorsed his party's platform on Palestine, promising to work together with Great Britain if elected "to achieve this great objective for a people who have suffered so much and deserve so much at the hands of mankind." Two days earlier, Stimson publicly withdrew the War Department's earlier objection to the proposed Palestine resolution, indicating that political rather than military considerations should determine the issue. The respected former under secretary Welles and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes spoke out for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine as part of the future peace settlement.³³

Not to be outdone, campaigner Roosevelt decided to weigh in with a letter to Senator Wagner on October 15, 1944, to be read to the forty-seventh annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA). Expressing "satisfaction" that his own party's Palestine plank accorded with "the traditional American policy" and hewed to "the spirit" of the Four Freedoms, FDR averred that efforts would be made to effectuate this policy "as soon as practicable." In a most concrete pledge, he concluded: "I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if reelected I shall help to bring about its realization."³⁴

Memoranda from Murray about Arab hostility, the jeopardizing of incalculable Saudi oil concessions, and known Soviet opposition to Jewish statehood, along with advice from Ambassador Averell Harriman in the Soviet Union, persuaded Roosevelt that "it would be a mistake to have the Palestine Resolution reintroduced at this time." Stettinius (now secretary of state) relayed this decision to Wise and to House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Sol Bloom on November 15. When Wagner telephoned a week later to ask if State entertained any objections to reintroducing the resolutions in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Stettinius repeated Roosevelt's judgment. The president would meet some time in the future with high representatives of other governments, Stettinius added, "and he was hopeful that at that time he could be helpful in arranging a suitable solution."³⁵

FDR's intervention after his successful run for a fourth term did not, in itself, prove sufficient to stem the tide running in favor of the resolution's passage. Wise accepted the president's desire to leave the matter "in his hands for a while," but Wagner wished for a

public explanation from the White House. Hearing that the senior senator from New York and other senators were pushing for the bill, Roosevelt wrote Wagner on December 3 that the one million Jews who wish to go to Palestine were more than matched by the "seventy million Mohammedans" who "want to cut their throats the day they land." "At this juncture no branch of the government will act," Roosevelt warned, and thus "hurt fulfillment" of "American hopes" for Palestine. Wise wired Stettinius of his Zionist organization's willingness to have the resolutions shelved; Silver, however, visiting the secretary with Wagner, argued that the resolutions did "nothing more" than reiterate the Democratic campaign platform. Stettinius ultimately had to testify before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in closed session against the bill, requesting those members present not to tie Roosevelt's hands with a resolution that would inflame the entire Middle East. By a very close vote of 10-8, the members ultimately agreed to postponement only after State issued a statement that passage would be "unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation."³⁶

The Zionists also failed to obtain a separate State release that its recent statement did not affect the president's October message to Wagner. You "must have confidence" in Roosevelt, Stettinius told a visiting group led by Wise: "The president and I are doing everything possible to relieve the suffering of the Jews of the world." That same day, Roosevelt received from Stettinius the gist of an anti-Zionist memorandum by Murray "for background purposes." The discord over the resolution's denouement between adherents of Wise and Silver, who resigned as co-chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, delighted the administration forces. Privately applauding State's handling of the resolutions, Roosevelt expressed to Stettinius the hope that he would not have to get into the subject again "for some time." Accordingly, the secretary decided it "inappropriate" at the year's end to forward to FDR a suggested plan of action for Palestine, drafted by Murray in light of the projected meeting of the Big Three at Yalta.³⁷

As the new year dawned, Roosevelt indicated to his cabinet that he would meet with Ibn Saud on his forthcoming trip abroad "and try to settle the Palestine situation." Yet Stettinius, having relayed to the president doubts about Walter Lowdermilk's Jordan Valley Authority proposal that could allow Palestine to absorb at least 4 million Jewish refugees,

soon passed on worrisome news about the Saudi Arabian monarch. Upon finally signing the Alexandria Pan-Arab protocol, the desert king had urged Arab states to defend Palestine against Zionism; he himself would be "honored to die on the battlefield" as a champion of that country's Arabs. Roosevelt also received advice from James M. Landis, the U.S director of economic operations in the Middle East, and William Culbertson, head of a special American economic mission to the Middle East, against pursuing the Jewish commonwealth objective.³⁸

The Zionist case did not go by default. On January 10, 1945, Roosevelt assured Wagner that he remained determined to help bring about the early realization of the Zionist objective set forth in the message of October 15, 1944, to the ZOA. Wagner quickly dispatched a lengthy letter for FDR's consideration, noting that "civilization cannot in conscience refuse to the survivors the right to reestablish themselves amongst their own people" in "an undiminished and undivided Palestine," "to which the Jews have clung through the centuries with an almost unbelievable tenacity." The solution, he declared, lay in the victorious United Nations quickly transferring masses of Jews to Palestine after the war and the Anglo-American alliance agreeing, within the framework of a general peace settlement, to make generous provision for the future political and economic welfare of the Arab countries.³⁹

Two weeks later, Stephen Wise pressed Roosevelt to tell Churchill not to close Palestine's doors to Jews and to support the Jordan Valley Authority plan. "Would you be willing to put a fence around Palestine," setting at rest Arab fears of Jewish "infiltration" into Transjordan and the surrounding countries?, Roosevelt queried his White House visitor. "Yes," Wise replied. "You keep the Arabs out and we will keep the Jews in." Not long thereafter, FDR departed for the arduous voyage to the Crimea.⁴⁰

Roosevelt's last trip abroad, at least as regards Palestine's destiny, had the force of personal revelation. While that explosive issue was not discussed at the Yalta Conference, Churchill privately expressed his steadfast commitment to the Zionist dream, and Stalin raised no objection to Jewish statehood. However, in a long meeting with Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy north of the city of Suez on February 12, FDR failed to move the aging Sunni Muslim chief of state. Jewish refugees should either return to their prewar homes

or be given refuge in formerly Axis territory, the monarch began. Poland might be a case in point, Roosevelt rejoined: "The Germans appear to have killed three million Polish Jews, by which count there should be space in Poland for the resettlement of many homeless Jews" [sic]. His majesty then went on to attack Zionism at length, refusing to consider Roosevelt's idea of increased Jewish immigration into Palestine or irrigation projects to improve Arab living conditions "if this prosperity would be inherited by the Jews." Arabs and Jews could never cooperate, he categorically argued, and Arabs would choose to die rather than yield their lands. Shocked at Ibn Saud's unbending hostility, a frail Roosevelt sailed homeward soon thereafter.⁴¹

Now greatly impressed by the intensity of Arab feeling on the Palestine question, Roosevelt began to rethink the wisdom of his public pro-Zionist statements. In a rambling speech to Congress at the end of February about his trip, FDR ad-libbed that he had learned more by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes about the "Muslim problem, the Jewish problem" than he could have learned "in the exchange of two or three dozen letters." A few days later, during an informal luncheon with Hoskins, Roosevelt fully agreed that a Jewish state in Palestine could only be established and maintained by force; the 15-20 million Arabs of the region would win out. When the first lady praised the Zionists' "wonderful work" in parts of Palestine, her husband retorted that, except for the coastal plain, the country looked "extremely rocky and barren" as he flew over it. He thought that the State Department's plan of international trusteeship sacred to three religions, raised that afternoon by Hoskins at the suggestion of State's Gordon Merriam, might well be given to the U.N. after the new organization had been set up to work out problems along these lines. A week later, the president received letters from five Muslim leaders, sent simultaneously at Ibn Saud's initiative, asserting the Arabs' full claim to Palestine.⁴²

Thrown into consternation by FDR's public off-hand remark about Ibn Saud, the Zionists sent Wise to investigate. "I most gloriously failed where you are concerned," Roosevelt admitted that morning of March 16. The king had kept saying that he was "too old to learn about new things--trees, water, Jews"; he believed that there was no such thing as a "man-proof fence to keep the Jews in." The Jews could only take comfort in the knowledge, Roosevelt suggested, that Ibn Saud might die soon. "You are a minister of

religion," he pressed Wise. "Do you want me to encourage five or six hundred thousand Jews to die?" The Jews in Palestine would rather die than give up, his guest retorted, but the president repeated that, despite Churchill's wish, he could not "ram it through." The one possibility was to have the American and British heads of state put the matter up to the proposed U.N. Security Council. Roosevelt finally authorized Wise to tell the press that the president stood by his October 15th pronouncement on Zionism. ⁴³

Yet not long thereafter, Roosevelt confided to two sympathetic American Jewish Committee officials his conviction that Jewish statehood was "impossible of achievement" at present. The "proper Jewish objective," in the president's opinion, was to obtain, through a world organization, assurance of Jewish rights everywhere. "Gravely concerned" about the matter, he urged them to do their best "to moderate the sharpness of the propaganda of the extreme Zionists." ⁴⁴

The presidential pronouncement via Wise threw State into dismay, and it hastened to reassure Arab capitals of Washington's true intentions. Anxious that Roosevelt's announcement on March 16 would undo considerably the good effect of his recent meeting with Ibn Saud, might lead to actual bloodshed in the Near East and even endanger the "immensely valuable" American oil concession in Saudi Arabia, and might well result in "throwing the entire Arab world into the arms of Soviet Russia," Murray jumped into the breach. In a last memorandum as director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs before becoming U.S. ambassador to Iran, Murray recommended that State could propose but one reply under the circumstances. With White House approval received on March 24, secret cables went out over Roosevelt's signature noting that his statement to Wise referred only to "possible action at some future time," and reiterating the official stance of State that "no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews." ⁴⁵

Roosevelt communicated with Ibn Saud on April 5, 1945, in like vein. Previous assurances had been given his "great and good friend," and their "memorable conversation" during the meeting on Egypt's Great Bitter Lake, in which the Arab ruler had given "so vivid" an impression of his views on the Palestine question, had included the chief executive's pledge that he would take no action "which might prove hostile to the Arab

people." The following day, Murray's deputy recommended that Roosevelt publicly endorse the official State position. "If we were actually to implement the policy which the Zionists desire," Paul Alling added, "the results would be disastrous." A statement for that purpose was drafted on April 12, to be issued by the president with the impending visit to the White House of the regent of Iraq. This never came to pass, for that very afternoon Roosevelt breathed his last. ⁴⁶

Conclusion

At the time of his death, FDR had bequeathed no clearly formulated Palestine policy to his successor. Faced with the Palestine dilemma, Roosevelt chose to temporize. As with so many other controversial issues that arose during his long tenure, he exhibited a penchant for studied ambiguity, assuring both Jew and Arab of his sympathies. During 1943 and 1944, guided by specialists like Hoskins and especially Bowman, the president's cryptic views on Palestine actually veered toward State's anti-Zionist standard. At play were his varied anxieties concerning the war effort, Saudi Arabian oil, Palestine's absorptive capacity, British sensibilities, and a Muslim jihad against the small Yishuv. Public pledges in late 1944 and early 1945 to support Zionist aspirations were balanced with confidential promises through the State Department to Muslim rulers. A self-confident liberal who sought to eschew solutions by force, and thus would be shocked at Ibn Saud's unyielding stance during their only direct encounter, FDR focused on some future form of international Palestine trusteeship and thinly dispersed settlements of Jews the world over to avoid antisemitism. This postwar concern, also reflected on Secretary Hull's 1942 declaration of Jewish equality everywhere and the 1943 London mission of Morris Ernst, was noble in itself. As policy during the anguished years of the Holocaust, however, when the relentless press of Hitler's death machinery against the Jewish people met with a diplomacy of postponement, it can at best -- be judged naive.

Despite the president's well-meaning efforts, he erred seriously in thinking that the deep conflict which then existed between Arab and Jewish nationalisms could be overcome by his negotiation, charm, and power of persuasion. No need really existed for sending the

biased Hoskins to put the question to Ibn Saud, given the king's previous letters and all State Department reports corroborating the desert leader's searing enmity for Zionism. Indeed, when queried earlier in March 1943 by State as to the wisdom of such a visit, Moshe Shertok, head of the Jewish Agency's political department, had immediately dismissed the idea. Ben-Gurion especially thought that Weizmann had squandered the unique opportunity of his one-hour talk that June with the president, suggesting that his chimera "definitely invites our failure and absolves him from an obligation toward us." ⁴⁷

American wartime intelligence, which decisively influenced the administration's position, left much to be desired. Surely questionable were such assertions as the strong desire of Jewish refugees to return to prewar homes, Hoskins's warning since mid-1943 of imminent Arab-Jewish armed conflict in Palestine, and the equation of Zionism with totalitarian doctrine. In fact, while a number of Arab nations sided with the Axis, the Yishuv contributed singularly to the Allied victory. ⁴⁸ The certainty of experts like Murray, Bowman, and Yale notwithstanding, Palestine's capacity to absorb Jews would exceed these mandarins' firm predictions, nor would overt espousal of Zionism exacerbate antisemitism in the United States. Arab oil deliveries would not be in great jeopardy, while the Soviet regime would support a Jewish state after World War II.

The government's Palestine policy reflected the response of the Roosevelt administration to the Holocaust. Its contemplated joint Anglo-American statement, intended since 1942 to stifle discussion on Palestine, paralleled the democracies' silence about rescue in general. ⁴⁹ A persistent position explains the refusal to challenge the British White Paper at the 1943 Bermuda Conference, to support the opening of North Africa and Libya for the large-scale admission of Jews, or to favor temporary havens in Palestine. Thus, too, the War Department and then State directly interceded with FDR's blessing to halt certain passage of congressional resolutions, rooted in the tragedy of the Holocaust, which favored Zionist objectives in the spring and winter of 1944.

Jewry's unique tragedy under the swastika did not command any priority in Washington deliberations on Palestine, that people's most obvious haven. Rarely was the Holocaust even mentioned by State's territorial and political subcommittee members. Their position, reiterating FDR's official line, called for the complete defeat of Adolf Hitler.

Alas, as Warsaw Ghetto chronicler Emmanuel Ringelblum noted in his diary as early as February 1941, that eventuality might witness the victor's arrival, "declaring, 'We have conquered!' -- to our graves." ⁵⁰ American Jews, overwhelmingly supportive of Zionism since mid-1943 and united (as were increasing numbers of their fellow citizens) against the White Paper, ⁵¹ therefore could not move the individual in whom they placed their greatest hopes. Roosevelt remained to the end, as Vice President Wallace put it, "a waterman" looking in one direction and rowing in another with supreme skill.

While telling people what they wanted to hear, the chief executive's private view regarding the cause and cure of antisemitism did not augur well for a ravaged Jewry. FDR's proposal to Churchill that Jews be dispersed throughout the world to avoid Gentile hostility, following Bowman's suggestion, accorded fully with the president's earlier comment to the French resident general in Rabat that the number of North African Jews in the white-collar professions should be "definitely limited" to their percentage in the total native population. This step, Roosevelt had declared, would "further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints [*sic*] which the Germans bore toward the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc. were Jews." ⁵²

FDR harbored an equally fixed stance vis-a-vis Palestine's ability to absorb large numbers of Jews. Echoing advisors at State, he questioned the Promised Land's export-import deficit, raising the issue with Churchill in May 1943 and three weeks later in his talk with Weizmann. While the British prime minister did not reply at the time, the Zionist leader countered that such reports were incorrect. Any country that received new immigrants was bound to spend money on development and therefore would have a negative trade balance. Had not this occurred in the first days of American colonization? Some loans made by Americans had not been repaid, the outstanding one being to the Jew Hayim Solomon, as the president himself recalled. But if one estimated the monies spent for Palestine's development and the assets created thereby, and took into account the production of Palestine, Weizmann added, then the balance of trade was far from being unfavorable. Following the president's request, Weizmann had a confidential memorandum prepared to corroborate this point. ⁵³ Yet, as FDR confided to his wife after the trip to

Yalta, his suspicions lingered to the end.

A few understood sooner than most that Roosevelt's dexterity meant many promises but little in the way of tangible performance. The president had asked Emanuel Celler "not to make waves" against the proposed joint Anglo-American statement, and indicated that he had a private agreement with Churchill whereby Jews could secretly enter Palestine despite the White Paper. There was no truth in this confidence, intended merely to calm the Brooklyn Jewish congressman, Celler discovered months later. And State continued to assure Arab leaders precisely as Roosevelt had cabled Ibn Saud in May 1943 along the lines of that joint declaration. "A duplicitous son-of-a-bitch," railed Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, upon reading these confidential telegrams in January 1946.⁵⁴

Not privy to such sources, Zionists cast State Department and British obduracy as twin villains while maintaining faith in Roosevelt as hero. Their tributes at his sudden passing were as genuine as they were misplaced. The president never made the public commitment to the large Jewish fighting force that he had promised Weizmann in July 1942, and his "platonic interest," to quote the British socialist leader Harold Laski, did not strengthen its cause until Churchill pressed FDR in August 1944 to support a much scaled-down Jewish brigade from the ranks of the Yishuv.⁵⁵ Most significantly, the gates of Palestine, the only country readily available on a large scale to rescue the particular victims of Hitler's demonic obsession, remained closed.

Now a new chief executive was about to grapple with the Palestine imbroglio. To his cabinet, Harry S Truman declared on April 12, 1945: "I want to do everything just the way President Roosevelt wanted it." For Palestine, at least, the difficulty of ascertaining prior policy would soon become evident. Understandably, both Secretary Stettinius and Rabbi Wise lost little time in presenting their respective versions of Roosevelt's position.⁵⁶ Yet it would be up to the thirty-third president. With his own mind open on this most troublesome issue, the White House stand on Palestine was an enigma. It would not remain one for long.

Notes

1. Palcor, Apr. 16, 1945; Stephen S. Wise, "The Victorious Leader," Congress Weekly, Apr. 20, 1945, 6-8; The Answer, Apr. 1945.
2. Arthur Morse, Why Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy (New York, 1967); Henry Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New Brunswick, 1970); Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Urbana, 1983); David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York, 1984); Sidney Hook, Out of Step (New York, 1987), p. 354.
3. Nov. 16 and 12, 1938, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Diaries, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter FDRL), Hyde Park, New York; Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 91-97; Butler memo, Nov. 15, 1938, 840.48 refs. 900 1/2, RG 59, State Department files (hereafter SD), National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington, D.C. For an early study of Roosevelt's position, see Selig Adler, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Zionism - The Wartime Record," Judaism 22 (1973), 265-76. On November 9-10, 1938, Germany unleashed a savage pogrom against its Jews, which destroyed more than 900 synagogues, looted 7,500 Jewish businesses, killed 91 Jews, and deported 30,000 Jews to concentration camps. This "night of broken glass" (Kristallnacht) was followed by fining the Jewish community 1 billion Reichsmarks and speeding up the "Aryanization" of all Jewish property. For the vacuous Evian Conference, see A.J. Sherman, Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1939 (London, 1973).
4. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, pp. 20-21, 105. "I understand that there is only room in Palestine for another 150,000 Jews," the president had told Wise, suggesting that "it would be wiser for the Jews to find some other territory which is big and unoccupied than to have all these difficulties in Palestine." Joseph to Ben-Gurion, Feb. 5, 1938, L22/63, Central Zionist Archives (hereafter CZA), Jerusalem, Israel. For FDR's other preferences concerning mass havens in the postwar period, see Henry L. Feingold, "Roosevelt and the Resettlement Question," in Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust, eds. Y. Guttman and E. Zuroff (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 123-80. For State's traditional pro-Arab stance, see Philip Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919-1945 (Philadelphia, 1978) and Frank Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Washington, D.C., 1949).
5. Rafael Medoff, "American Zionist Leaders and the Palestinian Arabs, 1898-1948." Ph.D. Dissertation, 1991, Yeshiva University, New York, chap. 6.
6. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1938 (Washington, D.C., 1954), vol. 2. pp. 994-98; Reuben Fink, ed., America and Palestine (New York, 1944), p. 59; Hertzl Fishman, American Protestantism and a Jewish State (Detroit, 1973), pp. 65-68.
7. British embassy aide-memoire to the State Department, May 15, 1939, 867N.01/1599 1/2, SD, NA; FRUS, 1939, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp. 737, 757-58; Murray to Hull, May 15, 1939, 867N.01/1599, SD, NA. For British strategic concerns tied to the White Paper, see Michael J. Cohen, "The Egypt-Palestine Nexus, 1935-1939," in Michael J. Cohen, ed. Bar-Ilan Studies in History III, Modern History (Jerusalem, 1991), pp. 67-79.
8. The Jewish National Home in Palestine: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 78th Cong. 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1944; rpt., New York, 1970), pp. 422-77; Fink, America and Palestine, pp. 56, 60-61; Breslau report, ZOA Administrative Committee, Oct. 15, 1939, Zionist Archives and Library (hereafter ZA), New York (now transferred to the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem); Meyer M. Weisgal and Joel Carmichael, eds. Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands (London, 1962), p. 237. The Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, had pledged Great Britain for the first time to facilitate the creation of a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. For Murray's continued narrow interpretation, see Murray to Hull, June 17, 1940, 867N.01/1714, SD, NA.

9. Weizmann-Roosevelt talk, Feb. 8, 1940, Z4/15463, CZA; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York, 1979), pp. 214-18. For the president's first favorable view of Lowdermilk's ideas, see Roosevelt to Brandeis, Dec. 13, 1939, President's Personal File (hereafter PPF) 2335, FDRL.

10. Mar. 18, 1940, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Diaries, FDRL; David Ben-Gurion, "I Try to Arouse U.S. Zionists," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, Feb. 7, 1964, p. 12; Silver to Davis, Oct. 31, 1940, file 192b, Robert Szold MSS., ZA. For Ben-Gurion's success in radicalizing American Zionists soon thereafter to embrace a postwar platform demanding Jewish statehood in Palestine, see Monty Noam Penkower, The Holocaust and Israel Reborn: From Catastrophe to Sovereignty (Urbana, 1994), chap. 2.

11. New York Times, Mar. 28, 1941; Roosevelt to Pool, Oct. 18, 1940, PPF 3025, FDRL; Apr. 29, 1941, OF 700, Palestine file #3, FDRL; Investigation of the National Defense Program (Washington D.C., 1948), pp. 24707-61; Roosevelt to Wise, June 9, 1941, Box 68, Stephen Wise MSS., American Jewish Historical Society, Waltham, Mass. In July 1941, FDR blithely turned down the State Department's request for Lend-Lease assistance to the Saudi king as "a little far afield for us!" He reversed this decision in February 1943. Robert Lacey, The Kingdom (New York, 1981), pp. 261-63.

12. Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, chap. 11; Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, p. 149; N.A. Rose, ed. Baffy: The Diaries of Blanche Dugdale, 1936-1947 (London, 1973), p. 189.

13. E. Roosevelt to Welles, Mar. 13, 1942, and Welles to Roosevelt, Mar. 14, 1942, Z4/15463, CZA; Extraordinary Zionist Conference in New York, 1942, Stenographic Protocol, ZA; "The United Nations and the Jewish National Home in Palestine," American Palestine Committee dinner, May 25, 1942, ZA. For pro-Nazi Arab activity, including the former Mufti of Palestine Haj Amin el-Husseini, see Howard M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, 1936-1954 (New York, 1972), chap. 5.

14. FRUS, 1942, vol. 4, pp. 538-40, 543-44, 25-26.

15. Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, pp. 14-15; Perzlweig to Easterman, July 23, 1942, file 177a/86, World Jewish Congress Archives, New York (currently transferred to the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio).

16. Near East and Territorial Subcommittees, 1942 files, Isaiah Bowman MSS., Milton Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.; FRUS, 1942, vol. 4, pp. 548, 557-58; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Nov. 2, 1942; Edwin Johnson statement, Congressional Record, Jan. 14, 1943, vol. 89, pt. 9, A125.

17. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Diaries, Dec. 5, 1942, vol. 5, FDRL; Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, pp. 85-86. German Jewry's worsening plight in 1938 had first led Morgenthau to urge Roosevelt to begin a search for postwar havens. But a vacation trip to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee's small DORSA refugee settlement in Santo Domingo, together with Weizmann's eloquence, convinced Morgenthau by 1941 that only in Palestine could the harried Jews of Europe find security. Morgenthau memo, Nov. 16, 1938, vol. 151; Nov. 21, 1938, vol. 152, both in Morgenthau Diaries, FDRL; Isaiah Berlin interview with the author, July 1, 1976.

18. Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, chap. 4.

19. Hoskins report, Apr. 20, 1943, confidential files, State Department, Box 5, FDRL; Meetings, Apr. 30, and May 14, 1943, Territorial Committee, Box 59, Harley Notter MSS., RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, pp. 773-88; June 12, 1943, Harold Ickes Diaries, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

20. FRUS, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 176-79; Bowman to Roosevelt, May 22, 1943, Box 98, President Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), FDRL; Bowman to Pasvolsky, May 24, 1943, Pasvolsky file, Bowman MSS.; John Blum, ed. The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry Wallace, 1942-1946 (Boston, 1973), pp. 210-11, 188, 266-77. Wallace had been

responsible earlier for Walter Lowdermilk's 1939 survey of Palestine's future absorptive capacity, and was much taken by his associate's Jordan Valley Authority proposal.

21. Memo, June 12, 1943, Z 5/1378, CZA; conversation, June 21, 1943, Z 5/666, CZA; FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, pp. 790-92, 796.

22. I first revealed the entire development in "The 1943 Joint Anglo-American Statement on Palestine," in Melvin I. Urofsky, ed. Herzl Yearbook, vol. 8 (N.Y., 1978) pp. 212-41.

23. Strong memo to Marshall, Aug. 5, 1943, 092/Palestine, RG 218, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Investigation of the National Defense Program (Washington, D.C., 1948); Berle-Roosevelt conversation, June 10, 1943, Adolf Berle, Jr., MSS., Box 255, FDRL; Press Conference, Oct. 5, 1943, PPF 1-P, vol. 22, FDRL; Ickes Diaries, Oct. 3, 1943, Library of Congress. In the two years after Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease order, an estimated \$33 million worth of cash, goods and bullion reached the Saudi kingdom from the U.S. government--on top of oil revenues. Lacey, The Kingdom, p. 263. For U.S. efforts to secure Middle Eastern oil during the last years of World War II, see Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947 (New Haven, 1980), chaps. 4-6. Also see Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939-1949 (Chapel Hill, 1980), chap. 4.

24. Bowman to Taylor, June 23, 1947, Myron Taylor MSS., FDRL; Campbell to FO, Sept. 12, 1943, Foreign Office files (hereafter FO) 371/34160, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Kew, England; Waldman memo, Sept. 13, 1943, Z4/15072, CZA; Proskauer statement, Sept. 1, 1943, Chronos, American Jewish Committee Archives (hereafter AJC), YIVO, New York. Rosenman had also participated in drafting the committee's 1943 Statement of Principles in favor of an international trusteeship after the war. See Zionist-non-Zionist confidential files, Nov.-Dec. 1942, AJC, New York.

25. Hoskins's memo for Roosevelt, Sept. 27, 1943, PSF, Saudi Arabia, Box 41, FDRL; memo of Oct. 28, 1943, misc. notes file, Bowman MSS., FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, pp. 811-14.

26. Morgenthau to Roosevelt, Nov. 13, 1943, PSF, Palestine, Box 36, FDRL; Rudyard Kipling, "The Burden of Jerusalem," first published in its entirety by me in Moment 4 (June 1979), 51-52, and expanded upon in Penkower, The Holocaust and Israel Reborn, chap. 8; Churchill to Law, Nov. 11, 1943, PREM 4, 28/3, PRO; Weizmann-Churchill conversation, Oct. 25, 1943, Chaim Weizmann Archives, Rechovot, Israel. For Philby's earlier efforts in this regard, see Elizabeth Monroe, Philby of Arabia (London, 1974 ed.), pp. 160-61, 214-15, 218-23.

27. Ernst address, Apr. 22, 1950, American Council for Judaism files, ZA; Nov. 20, 1943 memo, FO 371/35042, PRO.

28. Murray to Hull, Nov. 26, 1943, 867.00/686, CF, SD, NA; Hull to Halifax, 867N.01/2056, SD, NA; Bowman memo, Jan. 7, 1944, E. Roosevelt file, Bowman MSS.; Memo, Jan. 26, 1944, Near East file, Bowman MSS. For the creation of the U.S. War Refugee Board, see Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, chap. 5.

29. FRUS, 1944 (Washington, D.C., 1965), vol. 5, pp. 563-87; Murray to Stettinius, Feb. 10, 1944, 867N.01/2-1044, SD, NA; Feb. 14, 1944, and Mar. 17, 1944, Henry Stimson Diaries, Sterling Library, Yale University.

30. Blum, ed. The Price of Vision, pp. 310, 313; Wise's account, Mar. 9, 1944, minutes, copy in FO 371/40135, PRO.

31. Mar. 16, 1944 draft, Near East file, Bowman MSS.; FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 589-91, 599; Pehle to Stettinius, Mar. 20, 1944, 867N.01/32044, SD, NA; Blum, ed. The Price of Vision, p. 313; Murray to Hull, Mar. 23, 1944, 867N.01/2306, SD, NA. Pehle's request came just when Hungarian leader Miklos Horthy halted the German deportations to Auschwitz-Birkenau and offered to release to the West all Jewish children under 10 having a visa, as well as emigration to Palestine for every Jew having the necessary visa. See Penkower, The Jews Were

Expendable, pp. 196-99.

32. FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 600-604; file, Apr. 1944, FO 371/39985, PRO; memos of July 6, 7, and 15, 1944, 867N.01/7-644, 867N.01/7-744, and 867N.01/7-1544, SD, NA; Stettinius to Goldmann interview, Aug. 9, 1944, Z5/394, CZA.
33. Rosenman to Roosevelt, Sept. 16, 1944, Samuel Rosenman MSS., Box 9, FDRL; FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 617-18.
34. Roosevelt to Wagner, Oct. 15, 1944, 867N.01/12-1244, SD, NA.
35. FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 619-41.
36. Boxes 738 and 229, Edward Stettinius, Jr., MSS., University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.
37. FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 644-48, 655-57.
38. Blum, ed. The Price of Vision, p. 420; FRUS, 1945 (Washington D.C., 1969), vol. 8, pp. 678-87; Culbertson memo, Jan. 22, 1945, Box 176, Stettinius MSS. A Near Eastern Division memorandum had also advised Roosevelt at this time that the possibility of Ibn Saud's altering his position re Palestine was "so remote as to be negligible." Jan. 9, 1945 memo, 890F.001/1-945, SD, NA. For the Lowdermilk proposal, which attracted many New Dealers like Wallace because of its relation to the Tennessee Valley Authority, see Walter Clay Lowdermilk, Palestine: Land of Promise (New York, 1944).
39. Wagner to Roosevelt, Jan. 13, 1945, Robert Wagner MSS., Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
40. Memo, Jan. 23, 1945, and Wise to Roosevelt, Jan. 24, 1945, confidential papers, presidential file, ZA.
41. Mar. 16, 1945, memo, Z5/387, CZA; FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 687, 689-90, 2-3. The most detailed account would subsequently be written by Roosevelt's interpreter on that occasion, William A. Eddy, FDR Meets Ibn Saud (New York, 1954). One year later, Ibn Saud's recollection of the meeting had Roosevelt declaring, "I tell you frankly that I neither ordered nor approved the immigration of Jews to Palestine, nor is it possible that I should approve it." Richard Crossman, Palestine Mission: A Personal Record (New York, 1947), p. 157.
42. Emanuel Neumann, In the Arena (New York, 1976), pp. 207-8; FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 690-93. For the First Lady's gradual shift to a strong embrace of Zionism, see my essay "Eleanor Roosevelt and the Plight of World Jewry," in Penkower, The Holocaust and Israel Reborn, pp. 271-88.
43. Memo, Mar. 16, 1943, Z5/387, CZA.
44. Naomi Cohen, Not Free to Desist (Philadelphia, 1972), pp. 295-96.
45. FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 694-97, 703-4.
46. Ibid., pp. 698-703.
47. FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 761; Shertok to Goldmann, Aug. 30, 1943, S25/73, CZA.
48. Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, chap. 1.
49. Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, passim.
50. Jacob Sloan, ed., Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emmanuel Ringelblum (New York, 1974), p. 125.

51. Penkower, The Holocaust and Israel Reborn, chaps. 3 and 6.
52. FRUS, 1943, Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca (Washington, D.C., 1968), pp. 608, 611.
53. FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 793; Jewish Agency London executive, July 5, 1943, CZA; "Memorandum on Palestine's Colonization and Trade Balance," July 1943, Z.6/18/6, CZA.
54. Celler to the author, Jan. 26, 1977; Frank Buxton interview with the author, July 10, 1979. For a similar reaction by another American member of this inquiry committee upon reading the confidential record, see Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (New York, 1947), pp. 36-42. The White Paper remained in force, and only 52,000 Jews reached the shores of Palestine during the war (including 12,000 "illegals" allowed to remain) within its limited quota of 75,000. Yehuda Slutzki, "The Palestine Jewish Community and Its Assistance to European Jewry in the Holocaust Years," in Moshe Kohn, ed. Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust (Jerusalem, 1971), p. 417.
55. Laski's remarks in Jewish Agency London executive, Oct. 13, 1943, Weizmann Archives; Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable, pp. 23-24.
56. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Presidential Diaries, Apr. 12 and 14, 1945, vol. 7, FDRL; Jacob Schechtman, The United States and the Jewish State Movement: The Crucial Decade, 1939-1949 (New York, 1966), pp. 119-20.



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