Even when one writes a local history—with the requisite narrative of a particular sequence of events, the biographies of individuals and families, and the rise of homegrown organizations and institutions—it is difficult to identify those qualities that set apart the Jewish experience in one given locality from that of Jews in other, similar places. Indeed, local histories, with their singular focus, often avoid comparative analysis, offering instead vague references to broadly distinguishing local characteristics. We rarely are able to assess what it is that fosters the rise of local identities and stereotypes such as those perpetuated in literature and common parlance.

Much as social historians may try to base themselves on empirical information, it is all too easy to move from a description of life in one place—a given town, let us say—to an ideal-typical or composite image of life in towns in general. Often enough we read of “Jewish life in the shtetl,” for example, as if the collective singular noun “shtetl” contained all the information required to describe an entire class or range of Jewish communities, spread across many provinces and political boundary lines. Local loyalties and social networks, however, have been known to be extremely persistent, as studies of landsmanshaftn (organizations of immigrant fellow-townsmen) demonstrate.¹ This tends to undercut the assumed interchangeability of small Jewish communities, even if similar patterns are observed to be replicated.

Much the same may be said to apply to cities, for it is not unusual to speak of Jews and “the urban experience” in a generalized sense, even though scholars over the past several decades have produced some first-rate social histories of individual urban Jewish communities as well as studies that focus upon the provinces as counterurban social realms.²

I pair “the shtetl” and “the urban experience” consciously and deliberately, not only because each has served as a cultural icon in modern discourse, but also because both images were products of the urbanization of Jewish society and, moreover, were created to serve as counterfoils for one another. Empirical, plural shetlekh were turned into the emblematic and singular shtetl when modern Hebrew and Yiddish writers (sitting in cities like Warsaw or Odessa) needed to construct an image of a Jewish realm unto itself (a realm, as Isaac Bashevis Singer once put it, of “physical and spiritual...
poverty")—the typical Jewish town being projected as the polar opposite of the progressive orientation and "otherness" of modern city life.4

These twinned images then acquired currency beyond the world of belles-lettres and became common coin. Taken as a matched pair of opposing metaphors, shtetl and city very aptly symbolized, respectively, "tradition" and "modernity," as well as a host of associated concepts and qualities: the parochial and the cosmopolitan; "community" and "society"; rootedness and rootlessness; on the one hand, the collective and, on the other, both the individual (radically alone) and "the masses"( the potential source of a new, urban collectivity). Here, for instance, we find the paradigmatic juxtaposition reflected in the words of a Jewish immigrant writing to the editor of the New York Yiddish daily Der Forverts (Forward):

My heart pounded with joy when I saw New York in the distance. It was like coming out of the darkness when I left my town. I came to the Big City where I sensed the freedom and became a proletarian.5

Yet despite the mutual negation intended by this categorical juxtaposition, it can be argued that the shtetl metaphor has survived virtually intact within its urban counterpart, judging by what has been written about "the Jewish urban experience." Much of the fiction as well as the sociological, social historical and memoir literature on Jews in large cities (such as New York and Chicago) tends to focus on residential neighborhoods—ostensibly insular spaces of social intimacy and ethnic integrity. Such accounts illuminate the crucial role of the big city's patchwork neighborhoods in defining a Jewish urban space, rather than engaging the wider range of issues posed by urban life, as Jews have experienced them.6

(Among the notable exceptions are such books as Moses Rischin's classic study of the Jews in New York, The Promised City, which transcends its focus on the Lower East Side by examining the connections between the lives of the immigrants and the politics, economics and culture of the city. In urban fiction, Saul Bellow's Mr. Sammler's Planet also breaks with the dominant neighborhood motif, partly by placing the main action on Manhattan's Upper West Side—not an outer-borough enclave nor the historical sanctum sanctorum of the Lower East Side—and partly by denying the characters a supportive set of positive, extended-family relationships inside the bounds of a safe, familiar territory.)7

Neighborhood clearly and easily takes the iconic place of the shtetl for many of the same reasons that initially motivated Hebrew and Yiddish writers to conjure up the small Jewish provincial town: given the city-based realities of rapid cultural shifts and massive social dislocation, a definably Jewish narrative could not be easily imagined in a large, undifferentiated urban space. Isaac Bashevis Singer may have exaggerated somewhat in describing Yiddish literature as a genre stuck in its small-town origins (particularly if we consider that, unlike prose, modern Yiddish poetry did indeed develop an urban sensibility), but he was not completely wrong when he said: Mendele, Sholom Aleichem, Raisin, Bergelson, Fuchs, indeed almost all the Yiddish writers, wrote for the shtetl and about the shtetl, even though the majority of Jews lived in large cities. For some strange reason Yiddish literature has shied away from the metropolis. There is very little in Yiddish about Petersburg, Kiev . . . Chicago, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia. . . . Jewish life is one vast astounding adventure occurring all over the world, particularly in the metropolis, themselves up in a ghetto.8

By analogy, much of what we habituate toward the realm most easily associated with Jews, has presented a visually and palpably function within the larger urban landscape. In its provincial, rural setting, writers' image of immigrant-generated, defined space held urban chaos at bay, and its imputed. The juxtaposition but it does still rely on the inner space of the Jewish neighborhood motif around to position in particular corners of the city, the grand city, and whose character was

The focus on neighborhoods and the representation of minorities goes beyond mere urban neighborhood could sometimes be losing any of its familiar character. Brownstone streets of his boyhood neighborhood motif around to position in particular corners of the city, the grand city, and whose character was

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Beyond the world of belles-lettres and opposing metaphors, shtetl and "modernity," as well as a host of the one hand, the collective and, and "the masses" (the potential distance. It was like coming out I City where I sensed the freedom

As Moses Rischin's classic study transcends its focus on the Lower East Side—and partly by place—neither an outer-borough en-

The focus on neighborhoods as the venue for the particularistic urban experience of minorities goes beyond mere nostalgia, however. Like the shtetl before it, the urban neighborhood could sometimes be described in wholly negative terms, without losing any of its familiar character. Alfred Kazin, for example, who had enshrined the

The upper West Side had presented to me a face strained, shadowed, overcrowded . . . and hanging over the street too many colossal apartment houses into which the sun did not shine, too great a show of garbage pails in front of every door. . . . The West Side as a whole was ethnic territory, foreign, "Jew land," the cheaper side of town, and the last stand of all exiles, refugees, proscribed and displaced persons . . . so many old European habits, hungers, complaints; so much Jewishness, blackness, clownishness, vulgarity, old age, amazement, ugliness, anxiety.

Whether positive or negative, the apartness of neighborhood and those who populated it somehow remained the dominant idea. By the same token, for the most part it is only the Jewish neighborhood that has been cast in the Jewish imagination as an urban Jewish space, as if not much about the urban experience is pertinent to Jewish social history once we have stepped outside the residential or occupational ethnic niche. With one partial exception, to which the bulk of this essay is devoted, no city as a whole has been imagined as a Jewish space: a "home," in the way that a shtetl or neighborhood is conceived as a home. The fact that urban space as such is not "worthy" of historicizing or folklorizing in the modern Jewish imagination is reflected in the virtual lack of Jewish monuments in American cities, a matter to which we will return at the end of our discussion.
The exception to which I have referred is New York City, which, for a time (especially in the immediate post—Second World War decades), was repeatedly portrayed by Jews and non-Jews alike as a city animated and transformed by its Jewish presence. In popular culture, this notion was most famously stated by comic Lenny Bruce, who flatly pronounced all New Yorkers “Jewish,” whereas if you were from Montana—even if you were Jewish—you were nonetheless “goyish.”

But this was just the tip of a postwar conceptual iceberg. New York reminded Isaac Bashevis Singer of Warsaw, because of all the Jews there. Writer and social critic David Bazelon, who came to New York in 1943 at age twenty, later recalled: “To the kid from Chicago, New York was an astoundingly bright new world, filled with Jews of marvellous variety: like a supermarket kind of candy store, with versions of heritage.”

Sociologist Daniel Bell credited the Jewish presence for the large middle-class entrepreneurial class in New York—“probably the largest middle-class aggregate in any urban center of this country”—and went on to explain the ramifications of this presence:

Unlike the traditional, small-town, Protestant middle class, [this one was] sharp, shrewd, and like as not, cynical. And yet, because so many of these businessmen were Jewish, it was a middle class that hungered for culture and self-improvement. The chief contribution of the Jews to the City of New York . . . has been in their role as “consumers of culture.” The large symphony orchestras, theaters, trade-book publishing, the avant-garde magazines, the market for drawings and paintings—all have, as their principal audience and consumer, the Jewish middle class. And this was made possible largely by the entrepreneurial wealth of small-unit firms.

Political scientist Hans Morgenthau, putting it more broadly, felt that “there is so much that is specifically Jewish here. You expect to run into Jews continuously: you always expect to be touched by the emanations of Jewish life. How else could it be in a city one of whose main ethnic characteristics is Jewishness?”

Journalist Midge Decter, originally from St. Paul, who had come to New York as a college student and settled there, working at such publications as Harper’s, Midstream, and Commentary, was able to make the following comparison:

If I had been living in St. Paul . . . , I would certainly have sent [my children] to a Talmud Torah [Hebrew school]. I would have had no choice. Living in New York meant living in a Jewish culture anyway [where her children could grow up believing that] everyone was Jewish . . . , that they were members of the majority culture.

“New York is a Jewish city,” one visitor from Britain stated boldly. “It is loud and bright and un-Anglo-Saxon (compare it with Boston, for example), it is the wrong part of home, . . . Golders Green or the Whitechapel Road when you expected . . . Regent Street.”

Yiddish poet Judd Teller, turning the city literally into Jewish space, likened New York’s “big-city streets . . . gaping solemnly” to a traditional Jewish home, “waiting for men’s return from holiday prayers,” with “a cantor’s liturgy” in the wind. Somehow it is difficult to imagine such a statement about Philadelphia, Boston or Los Angeles, to say nothing of Chicago—or even Rome. What did I know then? I was a city. It was The City.”

Identifying themselves fully with this exception, also imagined that “Jewishness” could be said . . . to embody the dismantling of the “American Dream,” it was a city. It was The City.

By the same token, New York: WASP and Jewish New Yorkers a well as in cultural affairs—in the feminine—can be regarded as the idiom of those doctrines, the members of those classes, the mark of measure of influence in the interwar years.

The [Jewish boys] had another quality, distracting sociability, there were boys that turned them inward and all the way from a more advanced barbarian. They were at home in the city and its teeming.
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Angeles, to say nothing of Chicago (“Hog Butcher for the world,” in the words of the most famous poetic rendering of that city—not very fitting for a “Jewish” city).  

Martin Shefter, noted scholar of urban politics, observed that Jews had made themselves particularly at home in the regnant ideology and power structure of postwar New York:

WASP and Jewish New Yorkers acted together—in the political and economic realms as well as in cultural affairs—in the decades following World War II. . . . The doctrines associated with the postwar national and world orders—internationalism, liberalism, modernism—can be regarded as the ideology of this WASP-Jewish coalition. . . . In the name of those doctrines, the members of the WASP-Jewish coalition came to exercise a remarkable measure of influence in American political, economic, and cultural life.

By the same token, New York became the model upon which many postwar urban Jewish writers based their image of “the city.” “I had no desire to get to Jerusalem,” reminisced Lionel Abel, “no expectation of living in Athens, little interest in Rome. . . . What did I know then of Paris? My whole aim was to live in New York. . . . It was a city. It was The City.”

Identifying themselves fully with the gritty, abrasive, brittle unquietness of it, they also imagined that “Jewishness” (not Judaism) and urban-ness were inherently overlapping qualities, thus doing for the Big Apple what their Yiddish and Hebrew predecessors had done for the shtetl.

“The life of New York,” wrote critic Robert Warshow somewhat hyperbolically, “can be said . . . to embody the common experience of American Jews.” Note that the premise here is not that Jewish life (for example, ethnic neighborhoods) in New York has been typical of the American Jewish experience—though perhaps that, too, is implied; more, the argument is that “the life of New York”—urgent, mobile, metropolitan, crammed-in, achievement-programmed—has given Jews their most typical American experiences and endowed them with a group character.

It is conceivable that one reason why Jews (especially in the world of arts and letters) so predictably projected an image of themselves as “homo urbanicus,” is that non-Jewish observers had picked up on this image and Jews found it complimentary or somehow appealing. Sociologist Robert Park had equated “the marginal man, the first cosmopolite” with “the emancipated Jew.” “As no other city is, New York is their home,” declared Fortune magazine: “And surely it can be said that Jewish elan has contributed mightily to the city’s dramatic character—its excitement, its originality, its stride, its unexpectedness.”

Anatole Broyard, the New Orleans-born, Brooklyn-reared writer, evoked the following picture of the Jewish-identified, urban, verbal and intellectual intensity that he encountered in his boyhood school days in Brooklyn:

The [Jewish boys] had another advantage: While I was essentially cheerful, filled with a distracting sociability, there was a brooding sadness in the most brilliant of the Jewish boys that turned them inward and made them thoughtful. I saw them as Martians, creatures from a more advanced planet. Next to them I would always be a southerner, a barbarian. They were at home in the city in a way I wasn’t. Their racing minds were part of its teeming.

To put this all into the proper perspective, however, we need to take two things into account. First, it was usually only after 1940 that one hears the refrain of New York’s
Jewishness. As a rule, reflections on the years that preceded the Second World War took note of the great distance (social, cultural and psychological) that Jews—young, native New Yorkers, not immigrants—had to travel in order to make it out of the ethnic backwater and into “their” (not “our”) city: Manhattan. The smart, cosmopolitan, un-Jewish culture of Manhattan’s East Side and its bohemian correlate in the Village were far removed indeed from the suffocatingly ethnic, blue-collar and lower middle-class experience of the Jewish neighborhoods (which is why, of course, they were so alluring). Manhattan’s un-Jewish pleasures and qualities are fully attested to in the memoirs of non-Jewish writers, but the irony here is that non-Jews also tended to find Manhattan a dramatic and exotic revelation—though for opposite reasons. As journalist Mary Cantwell would recall:

What I wanted to do, more than anything, was find the Ilium that presented itself whenever one drove down the West Side Highway at dusk and saw the lights going on in the skyscrapers and the sun dropping into the Hudson. What I found, however, was infinitely more interesting: all Europe, a bit of Asia, some of Africa, and three centuries dropped indiscriminately on one small island.

Although some observers have pointed to much earlier examples of symbolic Jewish “claims” upon the city as a whole (citing, for instance, the massive public funeral for Sholem Aleichem in 1916, during which the procession marched through thronged streets from the Bronx through Manhattan and into Brooklyn), this ought not to be taken as paradigmatic. The repeated assertions we have read that, stepping out of the Bronx or Brooklyn, one was venturing onto alien ground—apparently the typical experience of second-generation New York Jews—ought to caution us not to infer too much from isolated early incidents.

Second, the conceit of laying symbolic claim to the city as a Jewish space was never meant literally. The mechanism involved in making this metaphorical assertion was one of deliberate selectivity, almost identical to the artful, trompe l’oeil devices that turned the typical East European shtetl—complete with church spires, Gentile inhabitants, local government officials and other evidence of the non-Jewish world—into an exclusively Jewish pastorale of the imagination.

Even allowing for this sort of poetic license, however, the Jewish “colonization” of New York could only be a very partial rendering of reality. Much of this perception depended on the eye of the beholder. Thus, the “Jewishness” of New York and the “New Yorkishness” of the Jews are images that are limited by a specific time frame (the first postwar decades) and by a “reality check” that tells us that such characterizations stand somewhat closer to the frivolous than to the profound. Still, the intriguing question here is: Why did New York alone merit this sort of attachment? Why, once they had “arrived” in the postwar city, did Jews find it so congenial as to suggest “home” to them? Why did Jews of the second generation choose to identify themselves with the city as a whole, and what, precisely, were they identifying with?

The empirical reality underlying any answer to these questions is, undoubtedly, the sheer number of Jewish inhabitants in New York (about 2.1 million at the end of the 1950s, or more than one-third of all the Jews in the United States), and the relatively high proportion they comprised of the city’s total population (about 27 percent). No other city in history, ever, anywhere in the world, had ever contained a Jewish com-
preceded the Second World War and psychological distance) that had to travel in order to make "our" city: Manhattan. The city, its East Side and its bohemianism especially, was a perfect example for the Jews: a majority culture argument.

Jews constituted a large presence in certain neighborhoods and boroughs: 36 percent of the Bronx population in 1950; 34 percent of Brooklyn's inhabitants in the same year; 17 and 14 percent respectively in Manhattan and Queens. But their presence throughout the city rested not only on residential statistics. Workday concentrations in places of employment and certain sectors of commerce and manufacturing must be included as well. In 1957–1958, comparisons of the occupations of heads of families, sorted according to religious preference, showed that in New York City, where Jews comprised only 30 percent of the pool as compared with 46 percent for Catholics, only 6 percent of the Catholic heads-of-household were owners, managers and officials, whereas Jews accounted for 23 percent. (An additional 18 percent of the Jews were engaged in clerical and sales work, compared to 10 percent among Catholics.)

At the end of the 1960s, it has been claimed, Jews still owned about 80 percent of the city's small business and manufacturing firms in the city.

In addition, this "presence" was tangibly felt in political clubs, the public school system, the university campuses, the judiciary, the arts, as well as the media, entertainment and publishing world. The ubiquitous presence of Jews in certain parts of city life made it possible for Dan Wakefield, a young journalist fresh out of Columbia in 1955, to assume (erroneously) that his new lady friend who worked in publishing was Jewish—"based on the fact that she had dark hair and was highly intelligent." It was not an unreasonable assumption for Wakefield to have made in New York, though it might not have occurred to him in his native Indianapolis.

Numbers and "presence" assured that Jews would have a major stake in city affairs. The question might be raised as to whether their Jewishness counted at all with regard to their involvement in economic, political and cultural activities, when compared with their functional presence as employees and employers, residents, taxpayers, PTA members, students and theater-goers. But this question is more or less beside the point here. What, if not the untrammeled opportunity to function in any given capacity, was the gift that the immigrants and their children sought from the city? And was not this goal itself a product of their collective history and social experience?

The point, rather, is that their massive numbers and wide (but also concentrated) distribution throughout the city allowed Jews to embrace a vision of the city as a whole, without at the same time losing a sense of themselves as a defined group. A perfect example is the closure of New York City public schools for the Jewish High Holidays, a practice that went into effect in 1960. At that time, Jewish pupils constituted 33 percent of total school enrollment, Jewish teachers accounted for 45 percent of the faculty, and Jews were a majority among school principals. Thus, though they were acting in "non-Jewish" capacities, this ostensibly nonethnic civic presence went hand in hand with group recognition.

In sum, the tendency to draw attention to the "ethnic experience" of Jews as something pertaining mainly to residential clustering on familiar streets is too narrowly drawn to adequately assess the urban Jewish lifestyle. The Jews themselves, in calling postwar New York home (even, or especially, when they exaggerated the case),...
were calling attention to their ability and desire not to be limited to an ethnic niche or ghetto. The life of the city as such was pertinent to the life that Jews developed and sought to maintain. At the same time, it must be recognized that if this applies generally to Jews in cities, the greatest optimal conditions for this embrace of the urban life existed in New York.

With the Depression and the war behind them, Jews found that New York afforded them the chance to seek two urban utopias: the one being a cosmopolitan democracy, with full, unhindered participation in the life of a world-city, regardless of one's descent and the disadvantages of past discriminations; the other being an “ingathering,” an unprecedented establishment of a Jewish community so massive as to offer the Jewish people a potential “world capital.” Some combination of the cosmopolitan ethos, favoring civic integration, and the parochial one, favoring tribal fealty, exists in every Jewish community; but only in New York could both elements come simultaneously to the kind of fruition that appeared to be evident in the affluent postwar years, a time when New York attained a new level of worldwide cultural prestige and commercial dominance.

Both of these Jewish urban utopias were germinating for decades before the postwar period, and it is this lengthy preliminary period that might explain the intensity of the embrace once it appeared to be consummated. I find these utopian elements eloquently captured in two poems by immigrant writers from the first half of the twentieth century: the first, “Nyu-york” (“New York”), by Hebrew poet Shimon Ginsburg, and the second, “Do voynt dos yidishe folk” (“Here lives the Jewish People”), by the prominent Yiddish writer and poet, H. Leyvik (Leyvik Halpern).

Ginsburg’s poem opens with verses describing the overpowering immensity of the city, threatening in its very scale, but it goes on to develop themes alluding to the city as the site for human redemption, with clear implications for the individual who joins his fate with that of the city. The following passages are drawn from the poem’s conclusion:

The night train carries me across Williamsburg Bridge . . .
Strands of flickering lights beckon and call to one another.
In that instant, my soul, too, plunges into the night, seeking its sisters,
the flames, kindled like itself, to light the night world . . .
And all that night long a new song welled up within me,
the burden of New York passed and became a hymn of faith . . .
Upon returning next day to the city . . .
I turn and behold yet another giant bridge,
stretched out frozen on its harpstring limbs . . .
like the strings of God’s own lyre,
waiting in latent, confident expectancy for that Unseen One to come and play the great song of the future.33

Here the harps that the exiled Jews once hung by the rivers of Babylon, destined to remain silent in bondage and lamentation, are reincarnated in the form of the Brooklyn Bridge, its “strings” taut with expectancy, power and divine benediction. If

Babylon symbolized the beginning instrument (“God’s own lyre”) of a humanistic, humanistic future.

H. Leyvik alluded to a different kind of a Jewish ingathering. Walking in his mind’s eye he saw:

Fantastic gates—rising from a sea upward to the sky,
Gates—on a sea, glowing, sp,
Here lives the Jewish People . . .

Such grand visions, while perhaps difficult to fathom the view adopted in later years was the best that one could hope for, the lifestyle were joined to those of the overwhelming geographical scale.

But this perception, seemingly to us the unstated, conditional aspect of the utopian (if the Bible is any judge) and as long as social and economic conditions existed, and as long as the Jewish numeri and a Jewish space. When both conditions between Jews and the city were brought together in the 1960s, when Jews increased or away from the metropolitan area, effects of the urban crisis, and with it, the positive image of New York.

The Jews of New York, no longer citizens—and possessing the affects of a long-term numerical slide, etc. From 2.1 million in the city in 1
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Babylon symbolized the beginning of exile, this rendering of New York as the instrument ("God's own lyre") of redemption signals a reversal of exile in a universalist, humanistic future.

H. Leyvik alluded to a different but equally vivid sign of redemption: the vision of a Jewish ingathering. Walking the immigrant district of lower Manhattan, in his mind's eye he saw:

Fantastic gates, soaring columns,
rising from all the dilapidated stands
upward to the far and empty New York sky.
Gates—on all their cornices
glowing, sparkling signs, inscribed:
Here lives the Jewish People.

Such grand visions, while perhaps intended only poetically, nonetheless help us to fathom the view adopted in later years that, for the Jews who lived there, New York was the best that one could hope for on God's earth. Their fate, their culture, their lifestyle were joined to those of the city, both through civic integration and through the overwhelming geographical concentration of members of the Jewish people.

But this perception, seemingly sanctioned by frequent assertion, in fact should alert us to the unstated, conditional aspects of the claimed linkage. Jews are a fickle people (if the Bible is any judge) and a footloose bunch (if history is any measure). As long as social and economic conditions promoted a widely defined civic integration, and as long as the Jewish numerical presence remained high, New York could remain a Jewish space. When both conditions were brought into question, the linkage between Jews and the city was brought into question, too. This would indeed occur starting in the 1960s, when Jews increasingly moved out of the city (either to the suburbs or away from the metropolitan area altogether), when New York began to feel the effects of the urban crisis, and when strained intergroup relations threatened to offset the positive image of New York as a city historically open to all comers.

The Weakened Embrace

In 1959, three reports were published that raised serious questions about the quality of life in New York. The New York Metropolitan Region Study, a nine-volume report, contained predictions of a loss of population and a loss of jobs in both trade and manufacturing. *Newsweek* followed this up with a report on what it called "Metropolis in a Mess," and *The Nation* published an issue on "The Shame of New York." "New York," it began, "is a sprawling, voracious monster of a city. It covers 315 square miles; it is crammed with some 8 million people. At least a million . . . live in packed squalor, six and ten to a room. . . . Symbolically, perhaps, there are in New York more rats than people—an estimated 9 million of them."

The Jews of New York, no less susceptible to quality-of-life concerns than other citizens—and possessing the affluence to consider other options—were on the verge of a long-term numerical slide, a trend that would accelerate over the coming decades. From 2.1 million in the city in 1958 (and some 2.6 million all told in the eight-county
metropolitan area—the five boroughs plus Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk), the Jewish population fell by 1990 to just over one million in the five boroughs (with half a million less in the wider metropolitan area than before)—and this included an influx of more than 100,000 newcomers from Israel and the former Soviet Union.36

A people with so much invested in the urban experience and in New York City in particular could not sustain that investment once the interweaving of its particularist ethos and its civic ethos began to unravel.

In the decades that followed 1950, the population of New York City remained fairly stable in total size, but changed dramatically in composition. The steady and large-scale influx of Puerto Rican and black inhabitants (which was followed by a further influx of immigrants from the Caribbean, Latin America and Asia) was more than offset by a steady outflow of white residents, mainly from the middle class.37

In his study of the population history of New York City, Ira Rosenwaike found that non-Hispanic whites began leaving the city in significant numbers (almost half a million) during the 1940s, but this trend accelerated in the 1950s, when net outmigration of this group reached 1.24 million. Over that same period, the suburbs closest to New York City—northern New Jersey and Nassau and Suffolk counties (Long Island)—gained an equivalent number of residents (1.25 million). From 1960 to 1970, another million left the city, and while only 40 percent of the out-migrants resettled in the immediate environs, the suburban population (including northern New Jersey) grew by 763,000.

The process by which more affluent and longer-resident groups moved steadily from the central parts of the city toward its periphery, and then beyond, into the suburbs, was not necessarily causally related to racial issues, since the pattern was well established before the 1950s and the same pattern soon also began, in turn, among black, Puerto Rican and Asian New Yorkers. Nevertheless, it was the exit of so many middle-class white residents and an accelerating in-migration of non-whites, mostly from lower economic strata, that prompted the colloquial expression, "white flight."

Moreover, not only were residential patterns in and outside the city seen to perpetuate class and status distinctions, but it became clear that ethnic and racial distinctions (group clustering in separate areas) were similarly perpetuated. In the 1940s, we read in one report, only 7.5 percent of African Americans in Brooklyn lived in areas where they constituted more than 80 percent of the population. Between 1940 and 1950, Brooklyn's black population almost doubled and the number of white residents slightly declined; but five times as many black people lived in segregated communities in 1950 as had been the case during the previous decade. Nathan Kantrowitz's study of New York's residential segregation patterns found that at the beginning of the 1950s, blacks moving into white areas were generally middle-class people entering high-status white neighborhoods, but by 1960, neighborhoods where black people resided had few white residents and no high-status whites.38

Although Kantrowitz argued that segregation by social class and ethnic or racial group was natural or at least inevitable (richer Jews segregated themselves residentially from poor Jews, richer blacks from poorer, Italians from Irish, and white-black segregation was no different in kind than these other patterns), others did not agree. One scholar, who voiced a common view, noted, "The growth of the suburbs was more than simply a measure of the failure of the big city as a place to live. It was also

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New York City, the Jews, and "The American Dream."39 On the conservative side, the social consequences (for white America's cities).40

In all of this, Jews were part of the pattern. The Jewish population of the city's inner ring—mainly in the five boroughs plus Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk)—was already declining. But trends began to follow non-Jews, and in the 1950s, the 10 percent decline of white non-Hispanic Jews compared to the 50 percent decline of the city's Jewish population as a whole.

Jewish population in the city proper: 465,000 (1960); 770,000 (1990). Jewish population in the suburban counties: 465,000 (1960); 770,000 (1990).39

After 1970, the decline of the city was precipitated by an influx of Jews from the suburbs. On the other hand, continued diminishment of the city's population ended the same forty-year period with a loss of almost 900,000, or about 40 percent. Jewish population in the city proper: 465,000 (1960); 770,000 (1990).

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It was suggested at the time that the Jews were particularly prone to leave the city and its environs, because they were both renters, not homeowners, and, moreover, they "reacted to black residential patterns more violently than did other white communities."

Marshall Sklare criticized Jews for being "obtainable to being the cause of their own problems," arguing that their rapid departure amounted to being the cause of the city's collapse.

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**Table 1. Non-Hispanic White Population of New York, 1950-1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>465,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>770,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>465,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>770,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>770,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Although Kantrowitz argued that segregation by social class and ethnic or racial group was natural or at least inevitable (richer Jews segregated themselves residentially from poor Jews, richer blacks from poorer, Italians from Irish, and white-black segregation was no different in kind than these other patterns), others did not agree. One scholar, who voiced a common view, noted, "The growth of the suburbs was more than simply a measure of the failure of the big city as a place to live. It was also
In New York City, the Jews, and "The Urban Experience" -

Eli Lederhendler

a dangerous example of the continuation of racial segregation and racial antipathy in America.\textsuperscript{39} On the conservative side, Irving Kristol voiced his apprehension over the social consequences (for whites) entailed in their wholesale abandonment of America's cities.\textsuperscript{40}

In all of this, Jews were participants as well as partial exceptions to the common pattern. The Jewish population of the city continued to grow in the 1950s (due to both in-migration and natural increase), whereas the rest of the white, non-Hispanic population was already declining. By the end of the 1950s, however, Jewish population trends began to follow non-Jewish trends. The figures in Table 1 summarize and compare the decline of white non-Hispanic population in New York City and the parallel decline of the city's Jewish population.

Jewish population in the city declined rather steeply from 1957 to 1970, showing a loss of almost 900,000, or about 42 percent. Some (though clearly not all) of this decline may be accounted for by a shift from the city to the three suburban counties of Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk, where the Jewish population rose during those years from 465,000 to 770,000.

After 1970, the decline of the Jewish population began to slow down (partly due to an influx of Jews from the Soviet Union); the rest of the white population, on the other hand, continued to diminish rapidly. In all, the size of the Jewish population by 1991 was 51.5 percent of its size forty years earlier; the non-Hispanic white population ended the same forty-year period with only 46 percent of what it had started with (see Table 1).

It was suggested at the time that Jews were among those white New Yorkers who were particularly prone to leave changing neighborhoods. Jews, for one thing, tended to be renters, not homeowners, and thus were less prepared to "fight" for their homes; moreover, they "reacted to blacks moving into their neighborhoods much less violently than did other white communities . . . [and simply] moved out."\textsuperscript{41} Sociologist Marshall Sklare criticized Jews for their lack of rootedness in their urban neighborhoods, arguing that their rapid disappearance from former ethnic strongholds was tantamount to being the cause of their own urban crisis.\textsuperscript{42}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Non-Hispanic White and Jewish Population of New York City, 1950–1991 (millions)}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Non-Hispanic white & Jewish \\
\hline
1950 & 6.87 & 2.00 \\
1957 & 6.03 & 2.14 \\
1970 & 5.24 & 1.23 \\
1981 & 3.70 & 1.14 \\
1991 & 3.16 & 1.03 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The participation of Jews from the city in “white flight,” by all accounts, was significant and the Jewish presence in the suburbs burgeoned. But the figures in Table 1 suggest the possibility that the impact of suburbanization on the Jewish community in the city was not as great as it was on the white population in general. It would appear, too, that Jews did not lead the way into the suburbs, but rather followed other city residents after a lag of almost a decade.

Data from the 1958 New York Jewish Population Study tend to confirm this pattern. Jews increased their share of the total city population and of the white population from 1940 through 1957. If we compare the citywide figures to those in several key neighborhoods, we find similar results. In neighborhoods like East Flatbush-Brownsville, in Brooklyn, where the Jewish population fell significantly after 1950, the Jewish share of the white population fell more slowly. In areas like Manhattan’s Upper West Side, where there was no loss, or in places where the loss of Jewish population was slow, such as Tremont in the Bronx, Jews actually increased their share of the white population from 1950 to 1957.43

Thus, it is clear that Jews did not lead the trend toward suburbanization, but rather followed the trend. Finally, among Jews—but not among non-Jews—the main wave of redistribution to the suburbs was largely “spent” by 1970, after which the pattern continued more moderately, and was somewhat blunted by in-migration.

Looking at the eight-county metropolitan area, from 1950 to 1970, the non-Hispanic white population of the metropolitan area went from being 78 percent urban to only 38 percent urban. At that point, the Jews, at their lowest urban ebb (61.5 percent), were still mostly concentrated in the city, at a rate over one-and-a-half times that of whites in general.

Some of the reasons for the relatively delayed Jewish suburbanization in the 1950s may be traceable to the high concentration of “Jewish” jobs in Manhattan and in the city generally, rather than to any subjective affinity for the city (bearing in mind that most people continued to live within short commuting distance from their place of employment). The same line of reasoning would also help to illuminate the relative stabilization of the New York Jewish population after the mid-1970s. Once the city began to recover from the fiscal crisis of those years, certain developing economic sectors, in which Jewish New Yorkers were prominently represented, began to grow. These sectors included financial and corporate services; communications, media and advertising; education and research; and health and social services.45

In terms of other, less tangible ramifications of Jewish urbanism, one might entertain two interrelated hypotheses:

1. The relatively high urban profile among Jews in the New York area would tend to involve Jews more personally and directly in any events or developments taking place in New York City, even if these did not happen to involve them as Jews, per se. This might be expected to apply both to urban affairs taken broadly and to mutual frictions that built up between groups in the city.

2. The delay in Jewish suburbanization may have tended to expose them, more than other non-Hispanic whites, to the atmosphere of crisis that developed in the city during the 1960s. This matter of timing would seem to apply, for example, to questions of neighborhood “succession.” The higher the share of the white population accounted for by Jews—and that share went up as other white residents left the city—

New York City, the Jews, and “The City Entire.” Jews (far more than blacks, Puerto Ricans, or other non-Hispanic whites) have often felt like soldiers in that 

the more we can expect to find changes in racial composition. Jews (“white flight,” did so at a stage when the cumulative effects on the Jewish community might explain, for instance, why the Jewish population of the city was not as great as it was on the white population in general.)

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it was “their” city .... [Yet] if someone had asked me in 1939 what I thought of New York, I would have been puzzled .... quite as if I had been asked what I thought about my family .... I no more imagined that I would ever live—or be able to live—anywhere but in New York than I could find myself a more fashionable set of par-
ents. 47

Note the contrasting lament about the impossible character of life in the city in the following passage by writer Marshall Berman (who in the 1980s coined the term “urbicide” to describe the devastation of New York’s worst neighborhoods). Berman, who still found New York a “thrilling” place, felt that the power exerted by images of the past made it difficult to imagine a “new social contract” with the city:

The experience of looking back to New York in the summer of 1961 is a little like Philip Larkin’s poem about pictures of England in August 1914. The poet’s refrain, “Never such innocence again.” Those of us who lived through the 1960s and 1970s in New York often felt like soldiers in that Great War: under fire for years, assaulted from more direc-

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tions than we could keep track of, pinned down in positions from which we couldn’t seem to move. These were years when violence, and violent death, became everyday facets of city life. . . . [A]ll the tensions that have been seething throughout American society—tensions between races, classes, sexes, generations—have boiled over instantly on the sidewalks of New York. 48

Or, to cite another example, this was the stark prediction of Brooklyn journalist Jim Sleeper:

New Yorkers seem to sense that on the other side of the current upheavals, the city’s once-vibrant, predominantly white ethnic and proletarian political culture—progenitor of the New Deal, the 1939 World’s Fair, Hollywood, the interracial Brooklyn Dodgers, municipal unions, myriad boheminas, and even the early Levittowns . . . will lie dead or dying. 49

Once again, it should be stressed that imagining New York as a Jewish-friendly space was always a selective reading of the truth and, as we have seen, it was not typical of the pre–Second World War period (despite some early signs of this embrace). At the other end of the chronological parenthesis, by the 1970s, the nexus between Jews and New York had already waned: this, despite the fact that Jews still made New York their home in disproportion to other white ethnics, and despite the fact it was in the 1970s that New York finally elected Jews as mayors (Abraham Beame in 1973, and Ed Koch in 1977). Amid the glitter of Broadway and the clamor and din of Wall Street, Jewish talent and Jewish dealmakers seemed to ride the storm. But the community that had produced them was already in decline, its passion for civic culture blunted, its self-assertiveness more strident because more defensive. Ascendancy in politics accompanied a sense of transiency in reality. This paradox is also reflected in the physical symbolism of the city, to which we turn in conclusion.

### A City With a Jewish Shrine

The possibility of perceiving an entire city as a “Jewish space,” a place that could send utopian shivers through poets’ souls—even if the concept shaped only one generation—hinges in part on physical representations of the Jewish presence. As I hinted earlier, this is primarily a symbolic matter and is related to the question of monuments or landmarks. For the most part, American ethnic groups are well represented by such physical symbols (although that is not the case for Jews, by and large):

In New York City parks there are statues of Beethoven, Simon Bolivar, Robert Burns, Columbus, Garibaldi, Goethe, Dante. Don Quixote, Albert Bertel Thorvaldsen (the Danish sculptor), Verdi and Giovanni da Verrazano. . . . Virtually every city has similar statues, each a small monument to the efforts of immigrant communities to achieve recognition. 50

One of the signs that New York could occupy a special place in the Jewish imagination is that, like very few places in the world, New York offered its Jewish inhabitants a local “sacred” spot. This in itself would place New York in a select category of Jewish places. (One thinks immediately of Jerusalem, of course; Uman in Ukraine, site of pilgrimage to the grave of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav, comes to mind as well.)

New York Jews may not have a . . .

This shrine is not theirs alone, but other American shrine.

John Higham, in an elegant essay, originally dedicated to . . . adopted and transformed by the . . . alizing their own saga. 51 Even EL a national park and museum of Miss Liberty’s central symbolic . . .

The Statue is indeed the possessive argument by noting the special of Jewish community. It was, after the monument in New York harbor as Higham has reminded us, becon migrant-built America. In the case their “share” of the Statue becon United States.

Apart from this “family” link of the Sephardic poet, the Statue fun the Jews of America) in a way that the Jews’ only physical anchor in are summoned up by Bunker Hill, Catholics have St. Patrick’s Cathete (Temple Emanu-El never function Fifth Avenue location notwithstanding Reform Jewish congregation—oralal.) New York’s Chinese, the Chinatown; the Jews no longer “. . .

If Jews turn to any site as a American Jewish saga, it is certa: torch and facing the Manhattan skation, therefore, Miss Liberty alone for Jews and what Jews have becon.

It is typical that in 1961, when anniversary, the special advertising New York Times Magazine was e course, drawn from the Lazarus in photograph of the Statue of Liber masses” in steerage with their pr onement exercise. The Orthodox un Yeshiva) and Miss Liberty were to with its various undergraduate and was, according to the commemorate of [the] dream” representative.

More recently, the point was cl Museum of Jewish Heritage—A
New York Jews may not have a Western Wall, but they do have the Statue of Liberty. This shrine is not theirs alone, but it is definitely theirs, if only because they have no other American shrine.

John Higham, in an elegant essay, once described the process by which this monument, originally dedicated to American independence and the republican ideal, was adopted and transformed by the immigrant masses of America into a shrine memorializing their own saga. Even Ellis Island, restored in recent years and reopen as a national park and museum of American immigration, has done little to detract from Miss Liberty’s central symbolic role as the visual embodiment of “the golden door.”

The Statue is indeed the possession of all Americans, but I wish to extend Higham’s argument by noting the special affection for the “mother of exiles” that exists in the Jewish community. It was, after all, a Jewish poet whose words were chosen to grace the monument in New York harbor (years after they were written, and long forgotten, as Higham has reminded us), because those words best articulated the creed of an immigrant-built America. In the customary “American way,” Jews are proud to have their “share” of the Statue become a part of the sacred common symbolism of the United States.

Apart from this “family” link between Jews and Miss Liberty, via Emma Lazarus, the Sephardic poet, the Statue functions for the Jews of New York (and by extension, the Jews of America) in a way that no other monument on American soil does. It is the Jews’ only physical anchor in the history of their country. No Jewish associations are summoned up by Bunker Hill, the Alamo or the fields of Gettysburg. New York’s Catholics have St. Patrick’s Cathedral; Jews in New York have no central synagogue. (Temple Emanu-El never functioned for New York Jewry as that kind of symbol, its Fifth Avenue location notwithstanding, because it has always been only a sectarian, Reform Jewish congregation—one among many—not a common Jewish “cathedral.”) New York’s Chinese, though so many live in Queens today, still have Chinatown; the Jews no longer “have” the Lower East Side in quite the same way.

If Jews turn to any site as a symbolic confirmation of their city’s role in the American Jewish saga, it is certainly to the crowned statue in the harbor, lifting its torch and facing the Manhattan skyline. Unrivalled in the Jewish American imagination, therefore, Miss Liberty alone stands in Jewish minds for what America has been for Jews and what Jews have become in America.

It is typical that in 1961, when Yeshiva University celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary, the special advertising supplement published in honor of the event in the *New York Times Magazine* was entitled “Yearning to Breathe Free,” the phrase, of course, drawn from the Lazarus inscription. The magazine cover bore a page-length photograph of the Statue of Liberty, while smaller illustrations compared “huddled masses” in steerage with their proud descendants: college graduates at a commencement exercise. The Orthodox university’s Jewish studies school (the Etz Chaim Yeshiva) and Miss Liberty were both inaugurated in 1886. By 1961, the university, with its various undergraduate and graduate divisions and its five thousand students, was, according to the commemorative supplement, an “example of the ultimate realization of [the] dream” represented by “the great Lady.”

More recently, the point was clearly not lost, either, on the designers of the new Museum of Jewish Heritage—A Living Memorial to the Holocaust, located in...
Battery Park City, just across the harbor from Liberty Island. One enters the museum on the ground floor, where the exhibits illustrate Jewish life in Europe before the Holocaust. Proceeding up to the second floor, one encounters the display cases and accompanying documentation that summarize the destruction of European Jewry. One then continues up to the third floor, where the reconstruction of Jewish life after the war is showcased—the main emphasis being given to the State of Israel and American Jewry.

At this point, having reached the end of the exhibit area, one is confronted with a symbolic, culminating sight: From the small foyer on the third floor where one awaits the elevator to leave the museum, the visitor looks through windows (the only windows thus far encountered) directly at the Statue of Liberty, as if it, too, were in a glass display case, epitomizing the Jewish rebirth. It becomes, in this way, the coda for the entire epic and, in this sense, once again, the Statue is identified as a symbol with specific Jewish resonance.

The distinction ought to be noted, however, between the shrine that Jews identify with and the sort of site that other groups possess. St. Patrick’s, for example, expresses the power and the glory of God and the Roman Catholic Church; but it surely also represents the in-dwelling presence of the Church’s faithful within the city. The cathedral is the seat of a great archdiocese, its arms and institutions reaching into every corner of the city. It is, therefore, a powerful statement of “here-ness”: we are here, this is what we have built.

The Jews have identified, instead, with a symbol that captures the moment of their arrival at the gates of the city. It is not inside the city but only its threshold. In effect, Jews are fated to celebrate (and commends to others’ notice) merely the fact of their coming, rather than any concrete act, achievement or ongoing presence. Caught, as it were forever, in the act of immigration, the Jews have no other tangible connection to the city that became their undisputed world center, other than themselves. If they leave, they leave very little trace behind them. Their arrivals are full of hope and imagination—a moment to be remembered and celebrated—but their presence in the city is conveyed in more ambivalent tones. It is conditional and transient: an “urban experience” that can be passed over in retrospective regret almost as much as it can be affirmed in positive terms.

This, perhaps, is a fitting testament to the vulnerability of the urban utopias that animated the Jews in their moments of greatest identification with their city.

Notes


4. On the selectivity that operates, see Steven J. Zipperstein, Der imazhjun shtetl: der tsukunft un der geltung of a Jewish settlement (New York: 1982).


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Island. One enters the museum to wish life in Europe before the encyclopedia displays and icons of European Jewry. Construction of Jewish life after the State of Israel and the shrine that Jews identify with their city. The cathe-

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en the construction of the image of the Jewish shtetl, see Dan Miron, Der imazh fun shtetl: dray literarishe shiduray (Tel-Aviv; 1981), 21–138.


14. Hans Morgenthaler, quoted in Rosenberg and Goldstein (eds.), Creators and Disturbers, 82.
15. Midge Docter, quoted in ibid., 351, 359.
25. Kazin, A Walker in the City; idem, New York Jew; Howe, Margin of Hope; Podhoretz, Making It.
29. Ibid., 22.
40. Hoover and Vernon, *Anatomy of a Metropolis*, 13, 84. In the 1950s, more than 80 percent of workers lived inside the same “zone” of the metropolitan area in which they worked (the five boroughs constitute one “zone”) followed by the “inner ring” of suburbs and finally an “outer ring”.
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46. Louis Harris and Bert E. Swanson, Black-Jewish Relations in New York City (New York: 1970), 21, 25.