Reinventing World Jewry: How to Design the World Jewish Polity

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Summary Statement and Recommendations

Introduction

World Jewry is at a turning point. This is an unmistakable aspect of the mid-1990s regardless of whether one appreciates the opportunities of the future or regrets the loss of past arrangements. In some respects, Jews are pulled in both directions, but the fact itself is unmistakable.

Look at the record of this decade so far. The last great Jewish community in distress has opened up, both for the freedom of Jews to live Jewishly in their countries of origin and the freedom to emigrate elsewhere. Israel has entered into a peace process with the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria which, in turn, has opened the doors to the state's full acceptance by the rest of the world. Israel's economy entered a period of very rapid growth.

On the other hand, assimilation and intermarriage in the diaspora reached new highs. The struggle between those who want Israel to abandon its Jewish character and become a "normal" state and those who want it to remain a Jewish state connected to the Jewish people worldwide, took on new intensity. In the last analysis, the Jewish world is dividing into two camps: those who seek normalization "like all the nations" and those who seek the way to perpetuate and cultivate Jewish civilization.

All of this has had pronounced effects on organized Jewish life whether in Israel, in the organized Jewish communities of the diaspora, or in the world Jewish organizations which link the two. The response of the leadership in all three spheres has been to foster constitutional change, restructuring, and reorganization:

In 1992, Israel's Knesset changed its Basic Law to provide for the direct election of the prime minister and added Basic Laws establishing clear human rights protections under the constitution and expanding the judicial review of other branches of government.

- Two years later the victory of a new slate in the Histadrut elections led to a major reorganization of that venerable institution and Israel's health care system was reorganized.
- The Jewish Agency for Israel was restructured internally to expand its Board of Governors, to change the organization and governance of the departments, and even to transfer traditional tasks to the Israeli government.
- In the United States, American Jewry entered into a process of restructuring that points toward a consolidation of the Council of Jewish Federations, the United Jewish Appeal, and the United Israel Appeal into the new broad-based organization that could speak in the name of American Jewry in new ways.
- In the former Soviet Union, organized Jewish communities sprang up throughout the country as soon as it became permissible for Jews to organize freely.
- European Jewry as a whole has begun to explore new continent-wide intercommunity contacts.

In the wake of all of these and similar developments in other countries, world Jewry as a whole has begun to face the prospect of reinventing itself as old tasks and functions have become obsolete and new ones now demand attention. This report outlines the institutional and functional basis of the world Jewish polity today and proposes an institutional basis for restructuring the world Jewish arena based on the tasks and functions it must be prepared to undertake.

The Goals, Functions, and Principal Institutions of the World Jewish Polity

The great practical questions of governance are:

a. What should be done?
b. Who should do it?
c. How should it be done?
d. In many cases, where should it be done?
e. For or to whom?
f. Who should pay for it?

g. How should those involved in the foregoing work together to achieve common tasks?

Increasingly, the last is one of the most important questions. There is evidence that at least since the beginning of the modern epoch, with the growing interdependence of peoples and their institutions and societies, it has become even more complex.

Some Fundamentals

1.1 There is a world Jewish polity that is identifiable as such. It serves a Jewish population that has organized itself into a series of concentric circles, willy-nilly, consisting of all those in the world who subjectively define themselves as Jews or who are recognized as Jews by their respective communities. It is activated by those who are in some way affiliated with organized Jewry through some organization or institution and is led by those who are active in Jewish life in some way.

1.2 Those who are so connected, active in, or follow the activities of the organizations or institutions of the world Jewish polity do so on three planes. The first is through Jewishness or identification with the Jewish people. The second is local organizational affiliation with organizations that themselves are parts of the world Jewish network at one or more steps removed. The third consist of those who participate or follow the world Jewish arena.

1.3 Because of today's crisis of Jewish identity and survival, whereby the old religious and communal models are no longer compelling for so many people born Jews, a more or at least different associational model may be able to contribute something to the resolution of this problem. At least in part this model can be found through the fostering of a sense of Jewish citizenship, locally, countrywide, and worldwide.

2. There are several organized means of connecting with the world Jewish polity. The most common are the world associations of local and countrywide organizations. At the heart of the polity, however, are five entities: the government of the State of Israel, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the World Zionist Organization, the Joint Distribution Committee, and the World Jewish Congress.

3. Many of the connections that hold the world Jewish polity together are non-organizational, including networks that involve international travel and telephoning by Jews to friends and family around the world, reading or watching Jewish printed or visual materials about different communities, ham radio connections and more recently satellites, fax, global Jewish computer communications and the like. All of these are important. Most are independent and few are subject to any kind of hierarchial structuring but remain networks whose use and entry is dependent upon voluntary choice by individuals.

4. The past century has seen a growing compression of the world into an ever smaller compass. Not only have travel and communications become easier and more widespread, but interdependence has grown by quantum leaps. This has implications for the Jewish people by increasing the ease of communication among Jews worldwide. The need for that communication is also greater since Jews are located in more places and farther apart geographically than ever before. At the same time, they are able to communicate with each other more easily than ever before and to be in touch with every part of the Jewish world almost instantaneously. More and more have connections throughout the Jewish world, or at least across long distances within in it. Increasingly individual Jews, Jewish families and Jewish communities are dependent upon resources in other communities whether it is religious direction from Israel or whether it is just for inspiration from the American Jewish experience, or whether it is an "Israel experience" as a means of strengthening Jewish identity.

5. Despite the plethora of organizations and organizational activities, a mojority of world Jewry seem to be unaware of them. For most Jews, knowledge of their local involvements is all they know about organized Jewish life, if that. In some cases, they also know about the countrywide confederations of organizations to which their local bodies, or the equivalent, belong. Relatively few even know of the existence of most of the institutions and organizations that guide the world Jewish polity and have even less knowledge of what they do, who their leaders are, and how they spend the funds available to them. It is a constant effort to acquaint them with even the bare minimum of knowledge required for anything that might be described as citizenship. A deliberate and assertive effort must be made to develop that sense of citizenship and provide the knowledge based upon which it must rest. It may be that even the emotional base will have to be strengthened because of the problems of assimilation abroad in the Jewish world today.

6. Nevetheless, an institutional structure has developed and has generated a network of linkage more or less involving most of the existing organizations and institutions. World Jewry functions even if its functioning is not widely understood by the Jews of the world. While a continuing effort must be made to acquaint more Jews with it, it will continue to function. Those involved in it must help it to function with the maximum possible democracy, efficiency, and effectiveness.

7. Not only is this necessary for the health of the Jewish people and its body politic but it has become increasingly reasonable in a world that has become fare more interconnected than ever before, where dispersed groups survive primarily by formal association and identification and all the informal elements that are part of both. Moreover, the world is more accepting of such phenomena as ethnicity that crosses state borders, national sentiment that is not limited to particular territories, and the existence and maintenance of state-diaspora relationships, all critical components of Jewish peoplehood or nationhood. The Jewish people now has a better opportunity to maintain worldwide unity than it has had since the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE. It is up to the leaders and

activists in the Jewish world, those who are connected or can be brought to consciousness of this new reality to make the most of it.

8. We can identify the following as the tasks and functions that are performed by the institutions which collectively provide the governance of the world Jewish polity. They are:

a. nation-building
b. the development of Israel
c. relief and rescue of Jewish communities in need
d. fighting anti-semitism
e. representing collective Jewish interests in world affairs
f. mobilization of leadership and activists to undertake these and other functions
g. governance functions in the world Jewish polity
h. assuring that there are appropriate bodies for the carrying on of the functions
i. raising funds to cover the costs of these functions
j. oversight of the organizations and institutions handling the functions
k. developing appropriate inter-organizational relations both among the authorities that comprise the world Jewish polity and the local, countrywide, regional, and worldwide arenas.

9. These functions are divided among organizations and institutions operating in four different arenas local, countrywide, regional, and worldwide, either general purpose governance institutions or institutions and organizations specialized according to interests, territorial communities, subdivisions of the Jewish people, or functions.

10. The five major bodies of the world Jewish polity are:

a. the government of the State of Israel
b. the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI)
c. the World Zionist Organization (WZO)
d. The World Jewish Congress (WJC)
e. the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC).

They are constituted by or dependent on a number of other bodies, including other worldwide organizations, organizations with a certain worldwide character, some regional bodies, and individual country organizations.

To take one example, Keren HaYesod is nominally a division of the WZO that raises the funds in most of the world upon which the WZO and JAFI are quite dependent. One countrywide Jewish community, that of the United States, has reorganized outside of Keren HaYesod. The functions performed by the KH are performed in the United States by the United Jewish Appeal and the United Israel Appeal, which serve the same backup purposes for JAFI, only with less focus on supporting the WZO and with full responsibility for funding the JDC. The UJA is a creature of two founding partners, the

UIA and JDC, and works to collect funds through 200 plus local Jewish community federations. In fact, UJA has only limited responsibility for raising the funds. Most of the money is raised by the local federations coordinated overall by the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF). After funds are raised through the UJA and the local federations, they are transmitted to the two founding partners. When the funds are transferred to JAFI, oversight functions are placed in the hands of the United Israel Appeal. UIA is responsible for transmitting them to Israel and overseeing the way they are spent. In the other countries, the Jewish community fundraising for JAFI is conducted within the Keren HaYesod framework. Canada is the only major countrywide Jewish community to combine the Keren HaYesod and American systems. In Canada, the local federations raise the funds and transmit them to Canadian United Israel Appeal, which is formally a part of Keren HaYesod but actually quite independent in a manner similar to American UJA. In most countries, Keren HaYesod relies on a combination of external (Israeli) and internal fundraisers who conduct an annual campaign for Israeli (read WZO and JAFI) needs alone.

Or, to take another example, WJC is dependent upon the representative boards or their equivalents in the countries outside of the United States. There and in some other countries, out of necessity it operates on its own. Thus, for the most part, it is dependent upon the voluntary affiliation of these representative boards and voluntary membership in the other bodies for its constituency and on them and connected wealthy individuals for its funding.

11. Each of these inter-organizational arrangements is generally good. Their level of specialization generally is high enough to avoid extensive conflicts. However, cooperation between them often is antagonistic cooperation, at times reflecting a deeper underlying hostility that manifests itself on specific issues.

12. In addition, while the very top leadership of the Big Five overlaps considerably, as we move down into the lower ranks and out into their supporting organizations, specialization requires individual allocation of time and resources that place limits on other involvements, but in addition, talent, interest, and orientation play their role. Thus there are those leaders and activists who are particularly interested in specific fields of activity.

12.1 First of all, leaders of the State of Israel must live in Israel and have chosen to go into Israeli public life, which is party-political.

12.2 JAFI has leaders from the two channels of the partnership that govern it. One channel includes fundraisers, philanthropists, and community builders, and other, political activists. Those who seek to publicly represent the Jewish people and those who represent their organizations are significantly different types of leaders. There is a perennial tension between them that constantly must be overcome in an ad hoc way.

12.3 JDC voluntary leadership is essentially American (although the professional staff constitutes a world Jewish civil service), often involving people who either do not have the high interest in Israel or the resources to reach equivalent position in JAFI, as well as those who are especially interested in relief and rescue operations.

12.4 WZO leadership is more overtly political and is divided into four groups: those from Israel who are chosen by their political parties, those from the Zionist parties outside the United States who often hold leadership positions in their communities as well, those from the old line Zionist parties inside the United States who generally do not because they lack serious constituencies, and those representing organizations relatively newly affiliated with the WZO who do not see themselves as political in the classic party sense. Arza, Arzenu, Merkaz, WIZO, the World Sephardic Federation and the World Maccabi Union, all of which spread beyond the United States, are of the latter type. The fact that the WZO leadership is not monolithic should help encourage cooperation with the other partners.

12.5 WJC leadership is much less involved with JAFI, as such. They are primarily interested in Jewish foreign relations (anti-Semitism, Jewish-Christian relations, etc.). Unlike JDC and WZO, they are not very influential with regard to the State of Israel except at WZO's very highest levels. Their influence was much greater when the Communist bloc existed and so much of the Third World was closed to Israel. Now that the Communist bloc has collapsed, and opposition to Israel in the Third World has so much diminished, the representatives of the State of Israel undertake many of those tasks, and the WJC has had to search for new ones.

13. This group of organizations has developed on an ad hoc basis which, in every case, answered to certain objective and subjective needs developed over a period of at least 100 years or in some cases more. As such, it is not going to be easily changed and must serve as a starting point for any realistic changes that are proposed. On paper, the match between organizations and functions is quite good and there should be no problem in making it better. In reality, however, the problem is more difficult given the demands of leaders for power, prestige, and position which particularly in this network, often focus on the search for good publicity. This is generally true of the world of politics and voluntary organizations and particularly of Jewish organizations, where the competition for recognition is intense. It makes any rationalization or sorting out of functions especially difficult. Thus any recommendations designed to improve the present arrangements must be framed to consider not only objective issues of structure and function but also the political and psychological issues involved. The following options are designed to do that.

Recommendations

Our recommendations will encompass five sets of issues: 1) structural; 2) functional; 3) budgetary; 4) coordination; 5) consciousness-raising.

At this stage, we can suggest specifics only in connection with structural issues and can only do so in the following way:

a. Present options and recommendations with regard to structural issues.
b. Recommend the establishment of a representative commission to consider functional issues.
c. Indicate that once the other issues are sufficiently resolved, it will be necessary to recommend appropriate steps to confront budgetary issues.
d. Suggest lines for future development of coordination issues and recommend establishment of a representative commission to consider them in detail.
e. Recommend the development of steps for raising the consciousness of Jews with regard to the world Jewish polity and their places as citizens within it.

Table 1 suggests a matrix of steps from conceptualization to implementation with regard to all five issues.

Table 1

FROM CONCEPTUALIZATION TO IMPLEMENTATION

Issues/Steps	Concept	Recommendations	Acceptance	Implementation
Structural	JCPA Report	JCPA Report	Each Entity	All Entities
Functional	Representative Commission	Representative Commission	Majority of Entities	All Entities
Budgetary	Select Committee	Select Committee	Major Entities	Major Entities
Coordination	JCPA Report	Representative Commission	Each Entity	All Entities
Consciousness Raising	JCPA Report	JCPA Report	Majority of Entities	Designated Entities

1. The most detailed recommendations are with regard to future structural arrangements necessary to improve the organization of the world Jewish polity. Here we have been able

to give the matter considerable thought on the basis of our analysis and we suggest several options, each based on a different concept, and make recommendations according to each option. For all of these recommendations, all of the relevant entities will have to review them and negotiate their acceptance together and each will have to work to achieve their implementation.

2. With regard to the functional recommendations, on the basis of our findings we believe that whether by change or by design, the present distribution of functions is as adequate as any realistic alternative, hence we do not recommend any basic changes. At the same time, coordination can certainly be improved, especially with regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States, most especially between the Israeli government's Lishkat Ha-Kesher and JAFI. Moreover, once decisions are made in the structural arena, we recommend a representative commission should be established based upon the knowledgeable people involved in the problem, and that it should further review what is being done and what needs to be done in light of any changes in structure and/or in the field, and recommend what should be done and by whom. Acceptance of their recommendations will need to be by each entity -- if not every one, than a majority of them -- and all entities will have to be involved in implementation.

3. Our recommendation on budgetary issues is that a select committee be established including the voluntary and professional leaders of the entities involved plus some expert assistance to develop appropriate concepts of budgetary responsibility and to make recommendations for their achievement. Acceptance of those recommendations will essentially be the province of the major entities, those who provide the lion's share of the budget, but implementation will require all entities.

4. Issues of coordination are addressed in general terms in this report. It sets forth a concept of coordination that is essential for a world Jewish polity to function. A representative commission should be appointed at the appropriate time to take that concept in its fullness and from it derive recommendations for concrete steps to achieve greater coordination. Each entity will have to accept those recommendations and all will have to work together on their implementation.

5. Several recommendations are made with regard to citizenship and consciousness-raising. They will have to be fleshed out by educational experts in conjunction with selected leaders from each entity. All will then have to work together in their implementation. Thus this report should serve as the beginning of a process that will involve those entities that have a place in the world Jewish polity and their leaders in building the "final product" which, as in every other dynamic situation, will undoubtedly continue to develop after it is in place. This process should, however, lead to a new or modified "product" being put in place.

1. Structural Recommendations

Regarding the structural options, let us first summarize the conditions which the options have to reflect:

1.1 We have already identified the government of the State of Israel as the most powerful of the five organizations, controlling a politically sovereign state with all that entails, a budget incredibly larger than the total expenditures of all the rest, raised by taxation enforced by law, a growing share of the Jewish population of the world, and an ideology of centrality reinforced by appropriate beliefs as to Israel's centrality at present and its likely greater centrality in the future. On the other hand, as a politically sovereign state under present world conditions, Israel cannot serve the Jewish people in all of its needs to the satisfaction of all Jews. It has already been demonstrated that world Jewry cannot be mobilized unless it has a share of the action. It cannot have that share only through a functioning state which properly guards its political independence to the point where it has no room for seriously influential representation from the diaspora, even on the part of the Jews whom it considers part of its basic constituency.

2. By the same token, the World Jewish Congress cannot perform this integrating function even if it were totally rebuilt as an organization. It is the farthest removed from the other four in terms of its structure and functions and is essentially limited to representation and negotiation on issues of Jewish foreign policies. It is the least represented among the Big Five in other areas and has by far the smallest budget.

3. The World Zionist Organization is part of the Jewish Agency because in its entire history, it could not become the single or major representative of the Jewish people that its sought to be and is now far weaker as an organization than it was in the late 1920s or even the early 1970s.

4. Even the Joint Distribution Committee, whose budget is slightly more than a tenth of that JAFI, would be inappropriate in playing that integrative role. First of all, not only are the State of Israel and JAFI, which includes the WZO, far larger than the JDC, but the JDC is strictly an American organization and its voluntary leadership cannot be considered representative of the rest of world Jewry and certainly not of the State of Israel. If that were changed to make it more representative, it would suffer from the same problems as JAFI. Moreover, should the JAFI budget be shifted, in part, to the JDC, an appropriate enlarged structure would have to be established to manage it, probably including many of the same people who staff the structure of JAFI today.

5. This leaves the Jewish Agency for Israel. It has by far the largest budget of any voluntary Jewish organization in the world and, after the State of Israel the largest Jewish budget. It is the only body that is broadly representative, including senior Israeli politicians and community leaders from the diaspora. Although it does not formally include as many of the representative organizations designed to represent the Jews to the world as does the WJC, many such representatives have entered JAFI on the WZO side

of the partnership. Thus the only potential candidate for playing the lead role in the world Jewish polity is JAFI unless there were to be a very substantial restructuring of organized world Jewry, designed from "on high" yet acceptable to bodies that clearly have their own purposes interests and the means to maintain themselves.

Our first recommendation then, is that we recognize JAFI's critical position at the nexus of the world Jewish network and play to its strengths in whatever is done, recognizing that JAFI is the principal body around which to leverage the rest of the network into more effective operations.

Option 1. Continue Incremental Development. One way to do that is to continue down the incrementalist path with more deliberate efforts on the basis of formal plans to develop the world Jewish polity. Had this been done earlier, it is very likely that such plans would have been resisted and had little success. Working on the kind of ad hoc, incrementalist basis that world Jewry has followed until now, has lead to substantial and often unrecognized progress. Had no World Zionist Organization been established in 1897, it is unlikely that the State of Israel would have been achieved. The establishment of the state in 1948 was clearly a prerequisite for what has developed worldwide by giving the Jewish people an anchor, a power position from which they could make other subsequent choices which not only focused their attention but inspired them to contribute to undertake a level of voluntary activity not seen elsewhere in the world. That includes the raising of the substantial funds which, although we know that they represent only a fraction of the potential available, still represent a level of voluntary contributions not hereto foreseen. Moreover, a viable sense of successful Jewish peoplehood was a direct result of the Zionist enterprise.

Meanwhile, the great migration of the Jewish people coupled with the destruction of the older European centers led most of the Jewish world, certainly all of its principal parts, to make a new beginning on an essentially equal basis to rebuild their local and countrywide communities. The consolidation of these new Jewries, in the interwar and the first postwar generations was a necessary preparatory step for beginning to develop world Jewish institutions. It was also during that period that the JDC, JAFI, WJC, Keren HaYesod, UIA, CJF, UJA and most of the federations in the United States were founded. Moreover, in many of the older communities, representative boards or the equivalent were also founded during this period. At the same time there was developed a slowly growing congeries of organizations and institutions for relief and redevelopment purposes in the diaspora and to fund the development of the Jewish people in the land of Israel and then in the state.

Still it was not until the 1970s that real steps could be taken to develop effective worldwide institutions that were truly multi-country or that substantial attention could be turned to those organizations and institutions that existed and relations among them strengthened on a coordinated basis. What we have now, has developed incrementally out of the foregoing experiences. It is not without its tensions and problems but assigned tasks are fulfilled and there is a reasonable amount of coordination. What is absent is a

higher level of effectiveness where there is overlapping, and a lack of planning for the future which may or may not be possible.

Allowing things to develop on an incremental basis, then, is not unreasonable to avoid conflicts and will allow more people to achieve leadership positions and to specialize according to their interests and capabilities. They may not even cost appreciably more money, although presumably there are some savings to be gained through more coordination because it will spare the Jewish people the cost of maintaining the additional organizations that are inevitable under such circumstances. Even that is not certain since we now know that what might seem to be possible savings gained from consolidation of organizations are lost because other organizations have to become larger to take over their responsibilities and thus cost more, and not only a little bit. Larger organizations not only mean more staff and operating costs but also lead inevitably to more complex structures and those who are entrusted with managing those structures require larger salaries and stronger support staffs for increased responsibilities. So even what are apparently obvious savings are not in any respect guaranteed.

At the present time there are coordinating committees linking the institutions and organizations involved where there is a perceived need. One step might be to increase their number and give them more teeth. This could be done as part of incremental development. At the very least, there should be committees appointed by JAFI and every other organization within the network to enhance coordination in practical ways and it must be a very high level committee. The JAFI committee should be charged with budgetary oversight over JAFI allocations and JAFI transfers to other members of the network. Through the budgetary process, the committee should be empowered to examine connections.

Option 2. A Leadership Council for the Big Five. A second option would be to establish a leadership council involving the presidents of the four leading organizations an an equivalent figure from Israel, that can meet whenever is necessary to coordinate activities and whose unanimous decisions would be binding on all five organizations. The council should have a limited but well defined sphere of jurisdiction, a very small secretariate preferably located within the office of the secretary general of JAFI. The permanent members of the council should be able to delegate participation in meetings to appropriate senior officials of their organizations, either other ministers, or other officers, or directors-general. The directors-general themselves should form a parallel body which can meet more regularly. This option would allow incremental developments to continue to take place under monitored conditions and could provide for a greater measure of coordination and planning.

Option 3. An assembly of major world Jewish bodies should be established. This option would be modeled after the United Nations. It would have three principal governing institutions.

First would be an assembly of all the major Jewish world organizations. All organizations would be treated equally. They would meet once a year and discuss problems of worldwide Jewish concern and would recommend courses of action. The Assembly would be the equivalent of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The second body would be a leadership council equivalent to the UN Security Council. The five major organizations would be permanent members and a limited number of other members of the Assembly would be selected for set terms from different categories of organizations. Each category would have to agree among themselves as to who would be represented when. Each of the five permanent members could have, perhaps, limited veto powers that could suspend action on certain measures (e.g., a suspensive veto able to delay action for a year). This body would make actual decisions that would have to pass it with an appropriate majority, including the five current members and a majority of the rotating members. The five permanent members acting unanimously would have a veto.

The third institution would be the secretariat, headed by a secretary general with a small staff to undertake the business of the world body.

Option 4. Broadening JAFI. JAFI is undergoing a process of additional reorganization at this time, designed to expand the membership in each of its governing bodies to include other groups from the Jewish world. A fourth option would be to expand the JAFI governing institutions so as to include those organizations left out at present. Right now, the State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization are represented as are the fund-raising organizations and, through them, community representatives of those countries such as the United States and Canada. The JDC and the WJC are not formally represented although they are indirectly represented by voluntary leaders who are otherwise appointed. It would be necessary to include them in the JAFI executive as well as on the Board of Governors and the Assembly. Other organizations could be included in the Assembly and/or the Board of Governors. This would strengthen the appropriate existing institution and include the others within it. The question is can they achieve any discipline, even voluntary discipline among the member organizations and will the others accept JAFI's role in all of this. If they would, this would move along the whole process of building a world Jewish polity substantially.

Option 5. Strengthening the representational base of the world Jewish polity. Option five is predicated on the adoption of a combination of options three and four but with a system of representation based on countries and upon any existing organization. This system would involve one or another or some combination of two systems. The countrywide Jewish communities in the world would be represented in the governing bodies of JAFI, with the number of representatives from each based on their Jewish population. For example, for the Assembly there could be one representative per 50,000 Jews or major fraction thereof. Under this arrangement, in an Assembly of at least 300 members, American Jewry would have approximately 108 representatives, Israel 84, the United Kingdom 6, France 12, South Africa 2, Australia 2, and so on. Additional representatives could be allocated in three bases: fundraising achievements, a special bonus for Israel,

and a bonus for a regional organization and cooperation. In other words, if the Jewish communities of the various republics that formerly comprise the Soviet Union and now comprising the CIS would come together in a single organization including their countrywide organizations, they would get some appropriate increase in their collective representation. The same would be true for the members of the European Community. If we assume a ten percent bonus for each, we would still have a smaller assembly than at present, no more than 350-400 members including fractional numbers. So we could actually lower the threshold of representation if we wished. Similar formulas could be devised for the Board of Governors. Within the larger country delegations, local communities and organizations could be represented with appropriate formulas. For example, it would still be possible to maintain the division between the WZO, UJA and Keren HaYesod if deemed desirable. Representation could be broadened and the formula could include representation of organizations as well.

Under either of the Jewish Agency-centered options, JAFI's role has to be expanded to at least provide some kind of financial support for the functions of the other Big Five organizations in such a way that would guarantee the appropriate primacy of the organization in its proper sphere(s). Thus JDC would retain primary responsibility for relief and rehabilitation, WJC primary responsibility for the fight against anti-Semitism, with other Jewish problems "allocated" to the appropriate functional bodies.

2. Functional, Budgetary, and Coordinative Recommendations

2.1 The functions of the world Jewish polity should be those matters of worldwide concern for the Jewish people or those aspects of Jewish concerns that have a worldwide or substantial multi-country dimension. Most of them are identified among the eleven listed earlier. In an immediate sense, very little needs to be done to change this list. However, there does need to be a reordering of some of the priorities on it.

For the moment, for example, the development of Israel is becoming more a responsibility of the government of Israel and private enterprise within the state or outside of it and seems likely to need less public investment. Indeed, the public bodies engaged in developmental tasks in the past often give the appearance of looking around for new projects of dubious economic and even less esthetic or environmental value in order to keep themselves alive. Since Israel has been the subject of a substantial push from diaspora Jewry, especially American Jewry, toward privatization, it would be a mistake for primarily diaspora-funded Jewish public bodies to insist on playing a greater role in development efforts than is warranted for the sake of self-preservation, especially since the major public role, that of planning and developing infrastructure and maintaining certain environmental and social controls, is best, and indeed can only be undertaken by the governments of Israel.

Relief and rescue operations, on the other hand, will continue to be a Jewish people-wide responsibility, subject to new considerations, the extent to which such operations will be needed at any given time, and the ability of the various instrumentalities of the Jewish people to coordinate their activities and share in the effort. There a major effort must be made to improve the present situation. It is to be hoped that any restructuring of the world Jewish polity would have that in mind as one of its principal objectives.

One of the few functional areas to which the major institutions of the world Jewish polity have given too little support and in recent decades even less than in an earlier period culminating at the 1950s, is that of Jewish culture and higher education. This is partly because other tasks have been more urgent, partly because the leaders of the world Jewish polity after 1970 have not always been as capable as they could or should be in appreciating the importance of Jewish culture and higher education. It has taken them more than a little time to realize that there is a role for the world Jewish polity to play in improving Jewish education at lower levels and even there much needs to be done to appropriately define and delineate the worldwide functions of the world Jewish polity in connection with pre-school, elementary, and secondary Jewish education.

Even less has been done with regard to higher or tertiary Jewish education and culture. In a sense this is ironic because those are the two functions that are most appropriately worldwide in scope and lend themselves to worldwide efforts because local and countrywide efforts, except in a very few Jewish communities, have been too weak in and of themselves or relying on their own resources. It is true that certain limited efforts have been made within the world Jewish polity, whether in connection with the establishment, support, and governance of the universities in Israel or with organizations such as the World Union for Jewish Studies, the International Center for the University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, or the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. All except the last, however, have been initiatives from outside of the mainstream of the world Jewish polity. The first has never acquired the recognition it should have from the polity's leaders, the second at one point had a modest amount of recognition but has not been supported appropriately, even in consideration of the limited resources available, while the third was essentially a one-time effort that continues to exist on the momentum of that effort but is constantly being reduced in significance for budgetary reasons alone. Some of the slack has been taken up by private bodies, especially private foundations, Jewish organizations on a local or countrywide basis or outside of the Big Five in the world arena, or even by non-Jewish sources. But this is not adequate and more of an effort must be made on the part of the mainstream institutions of the world Jewish polity themselves if that polity is to be more than simply a congeries of institutions concerned with Jewish survival and will also be concerned with the quality of Jewish life.

JAFI in particular could take a more active role in higher education and culture and should. The WZO used to and indeed in the 1970s launched a number of major initiatives in the higher education and cultural spheres. Most if not all have since perished because of changes in leadership whose interests have differed and reductions in available

funding. If WZO no longer has the funds to undertake these tasks, then JAFI must. The JDC could expand its role as provider of seed money in these areas.

Our second recommendation is to *establish a task force* of professionals and voluntary leaders, with a few knowledgeable academics *to determine what is not being done under the present system and what needs to be done, or needs to be done better.* Because we see the many places and situations where various institutions and organizations are rubbing against each other, what we might call "squeak points," and we see how so many decisions are made on a political (not necessarily a partisan but not according to any "objective" standards either) basis, we assume that there are truly problematic areas of operations or functions not undertaken. However, these are feelings, frequently born out of frustration. We do not really know if there are such problems.

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE WORLD JEWISH POLITY

Functions	Is now	Should be
Relief and Rescue	GOI*, JAFI, JDC	Same
Defense (Physical and Anti-semitism	GOI, WJC	Same
Education	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO	Same
Culture	GOI, WZO	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO
Social Welfare	GOI, JAFI, JDC	Same
Building Israel's Economy (Development)	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO	Same
Religious	GOI, JAFI, JDC, WZO	Same
Interest Aggregation	GOI, WZO, WJC	Same

*GOI - Government of Israel

In recent years research, for this project and others that we have undertaken in related areas and in political science, public administration, and economics on equivalent topics, indicates that these major problems are normal problems of power and prestige that manifest themselves in any political arena and which occur between departments within organizations, perhaps less visibly, as well as between organizations and institutions where they become more visible because they are more exposed. These are matters of cultural rather than structural change and maybe even personality change in some cases, if they are subject to change at all. Certain kinds of structures will tend to minimize them and others to maximize them, but we find little or no evidence of either kind of structural impact in this case, especially since in many cases these political, cultural and personality-based tensions and squeak points are given a certain added meaning or momentum because of real ideological differences which, however papered over by a certain rhetoric of partnership, still do exist and are very real.

This taskforce will need to look not only at the functional questions per se but also at budgetary issues and issues of coordination that accompany them. How will we pay for what we do? How much should we pay for different functions, at least in what proportions? And given the fact that different bodies will be involved in administering the same functions or providing the same services, how are they best coordinated?

In a sense this can only be done once the structural relationship has been agreed upon and the appropriate bodies buy into it. In part, however, even these structural arrangements may depend upon certain guidelines for the functional, budgetary, and coordinative frameworks.

3. Consciousness-Raising

3.1 A serious effort must be made to *develop a sense of citizenship in the world Jewish polity among Jews.* This must be done not only by placing a greater emphasis on Jewish education, but especially by emphasizing civic education including more knowledge about how the world Jewish polity and its components work. It should be presented in such a way that it will generate a sense of excitement about it and interest in being part of it.

3.2 More effort needs to be put into *fostering personal connections and communications across the world Jewish polity.* This includes support for "Israel Experience" programs of all kinds and for all ages. It also includes investment in improving the global Jewish computer network, a global television network, and global satellite communications among other things.

How to Proceed

After a series of consultations with the principals involved, essentially the Big Five plus whatever representatives of their constituents and affiliates they want to bring in, a working conference on the future of the world Jewish polity should be called at which time there should be review of this report and a discussion of the options presented. The conference should be held in Jerusalem, preferably in July 1994, perhaps following the Jewish Agency Assembly. Invited should be the leaders of the various principal organizations, academic specialists, and various other civic and economic leaders or activists of the Jewish people. The number should be kept limited so that the group will have a chance to have serious discussions and an exchange of views hopefully with the point of reaching some kind of consensus as to how to proceed further.

There should then be a period in which the representatives of the various bodies involved should have a chance to discuss the results of the conference with their respective bodies in preparation for a larger congress or assembly to be called by the President of Israel, thereby lending it the authority of the state for what should be the first concrete, formal steps toward whatever kind of reconstitutive act will emerge. That congress should be broader-based, with representatives from all the relevant countries, communities and organizations. At that point, if the congress produces acceptable results, such meetings and negotiations as are necessary can be pursued through the usual manner.

I

State and Diaspora in a Renewed Jewish Polity

The Jewish people is a great people that too often confounds those who know it with its intimacy and localisms. It is global in scope and all too often parochial in content. It transcends time and space, yet its members and leaders operate as if they were all sitting around a kitchen table among family. Its true character is embodied in these paradoxes. Here we will look at the organizational dynamics of the world Jewish polity and its communities in the post-World War II period, one and a half generations into the postmodern epoch.

State and Diaspora: World Jewry in the New World Context

The environment of the contemporary Jewish polity is marked by the twin realities of restored Jewish statehood and an extensive Jewish diaspora based upon voluntary community structures transformed by modernization, especially in the post-World War II era. It is easy to describe these as twin poles -- the state and the diaspora -- but that is oversimplified. The diaspora itself is too variegated to fit under one label. In addition, too

many diaspora communities are dependent upon the state for their Jewish survival. Too many Jews in the state look to the diaspora communities for support or opportunity in one way or another. On one hand, the two are very different in their structures, in their functions, and in their concerns -- a difference which at least at the moment is growing. At the same time, both the positive and negative trends in contemporary Jewish life shape elements of the population in both to the point where serious Jews in both have more in common with each other than they have with their less seriously Jewish brethren.

Moreover, both state and diaspora are being affected by the larger world, by the new postmodern phenomenon of the changing state system. We are in a period in which the modern ideal of the nation state has been eroded by a reality in which there are very few true nation-states in the world. The old view is giving way to the idea of the citizen-state in which all those legitimately located within the state's territory expect equal standing and entitlement. In an era of welfare state humanism, the citizen state is further giving away to the service state, whereby anybody who is found within the boundaries of a particular state and has normal human needs, has a certain entitlement to having those needs met as part of his or her human (as distinct from political) rights. These needs have been variously defined, ranging from basic health care to more far-reaching entitlements.

This new situation has dual consequences for the Jewish people. In the diaspora it means that Jews may more freely make their Jewishness a major focus of their identity. Hence we have moved from the days when the French Revolution began the emancipation of Europe's Jews with the slogan "to the Jews as men, everything; to the Jews as Jews, nothing," to a postmodern version of the Hellenistic politeuma, a polity within a polity, for those who want it. Those diaspora Jews who want to are developing a kind of dual citizenship as citizens of the states of which they are a part and at the same time citizens of the Jewish people. On the other hand, for those Jews who want to assimilate fully or partially, who ignore their Jewishness and do not seek Jewish ties, they are able to do so with impunity. No pressure, or at least very little, will be applied on them to identify as Jews, not only in the New World where significant pressure to remain Jewish has never been a reality, but also in the Old World where it was until very recently.

This new phase unquestionably has been stimulated by the existence of the State of Israel in both positive and negative ways: positively because Israel has provided a new national focus for Jewish identity to challenge the strictly religious focus which had become the accepted understanding of Judaism on the part of both Jews and gentiles in the Emancipation era, and negatively by focusing the attention of the enemies of the Jews on the Jewish people as a whole whom they see as serving the State of Israel wherever Jews are found.

While this new situation has strengthened the diaspora's recognition of the necessity to maintain its ties with Israel and its legitimate ability to do so, it is also beginning to challenge the very foundations of the Jewish state in the sense that the world, especially the West, is becoming less and less willing to accept the idea of a national state on more than merely circumstantial grounds, that is to say, one that serves and represents a

particular ethnic, religious, or cultural group because they represent the predominant population locally. The legitimacy of a state to provide special support to maintain the identity of the dominant ethnic group, especially when a religious component is involved in that effort, is increasingly suspect. Ten years ago, these were merely dark clouds on Israel's horizon, but now they have come closer as the peace process has made Israel, as a state deemed to be Western, that looks to the West, and is engaged in a struggle with another nation that challenges the very existence of Jewish nationality, particularly vulnerable to the consequences of this trend.

At the same time, as Israel becomes more a part of the common world culture, its own Jews have more choice as to whether to be Jewish in any significant way or to treat their Jewishness merely as an accident of birth. The very Jewishness of Israel as a Jewish state has been challenged from within as well as from without as many Jews, especially the most vociferous ones, follow a common modern penchant of some Jews to think of themselves as universal men, part of a world civilization, and to dismiss their Jewishness as at most incidental and at worst a burden. The reconciliation of Jews and Arabs that is presently taking place only reinforces the possibility of making that choice in Israel as well as in the rest of that world.

Kinship and Consent: The Shape of the Postmodern Polity

Today new voices have been raised claiming that we have reached "the end of history," not as Hegel saw it but in the incipient triumph of the liberal democratic political order. As Jews who have witnessed several putative ends to history, we have in every case wisely recognized that the Messianic Age is yet to come, so we are not likely, at least as a collectivity, to be taken in by this latest proclamation of the end. Nor is it entirely certain that the world political order will end in the liberal democratic model as it developed in the modern epoch. The postmodern polity seems to be not only a matter of consenting individuals living within the framework of a political compact designed to protect their rights, but one in which there has been a revival of the political interests of primordial groups. The new political structures now developing are faced with the problem of combining kinship and consent. The demands of primordial groups for a political role within a democratic state must at some point involve a more complex political compact combining individual and group rights, what is sometimes referred to these days as a social contract. Each polity will have to make its own combination of the two.

The new world Jewish polity begins, as in the past, with the kinship of all Jews. Today, however, if not in earlier times, we must understand that the primordial group can only exist as a polity by virtue of the consent of its members to recognize their obligations to each other and to it. Primordial ties still link the Jews of Israel with those of the diaspora, but increasingly those ties will and must rely upon consent as well. Jews always have been and remain a covenantal people, whose political and social compacts somehow fall within the framework of the classic covenants of Jewish peoplehood. Thus it is not

surprising that the religious bond remains the most powerful one in two senses: as the one with the widest reach and at the same time the one that provokes the most intense commitment. On one hand, some two-thirds of the Jews in the world identify themselves through religious ties, however casual. On the other, the centers of Jewish energy today are increasingly to be found among those who are zealously religious.

At the same time, the bonds uniting Jews continue to be more than religious. We nominally refer to them as national and cultural. In fact, all three are outgrowths of a kind of tribal sense of kinship which survives among very sophisticated people as a powerful force based on perceived collective experiences. In today's world, the Jews benefit from the trend which once again recognizes the legitimacy and appropriateness of primordial ties. At the same time, today's world demands that every individual be free to choose whether or not he or she will accept the bonds of his or her primordial group. If they wish, they can choose for themselves a different set of ties. We see this most clearly in the not-immediately-political realm of intermarriage. Jews and non-Jews are making choices, mostly by default, regarding their links with the Jewish people. This is a phenomenon that will not go away unless, Heaven forbid, Jews once again become such a pariah people that none will have us. In a world which hallows individual choice, nothing -- not religion, not culture, not nationality -- can prevent a significant amount of intermarriage and other forms of shifting identities once there is propinquity between Jews and non-Jews.

How is the Jewish polity to cope with this? It is, in essence, a crisis of citizenship. Just when it is possible to think of oneself as a citizen of a world Jewish polity even outside of Israel, the very underpinnings of Jewish citizenship are being eroded and the Jewish polity must confront the question of how it copes with that reality.

Citizenship is one of the two great constitutional problems of the contemporary world Jewish polity. The other is organizational. How does the Jewish polity foster a sense of Jewish citizenship? In part by creating an organizational framework through which the various segments of the Jewish people will remain linked to one another at a time when their ways of life are so different, of institutions which can be mobilized to foster a sense of Jewish citizenship among those eligible or who need to be made eligible.

Pluralism and Federalism:
Constitutional Constraints on Excessive Diversity

If being Jewish has moved from a matter of inevitability to a matter of choice, it is a choice made increasingly through pluralistic forms. This, too, is not surprising. In the general world, pluralism has become accepted as a desideratum. Pluralism is a reality among Jews as well, though not all Jews accept its legitimacy. On the other hand, pluralism cannot and should not be an end in itself. It is too amorphous and has no standards other than the norm of plural expression itself -- any claim for the right of self-

expression becomes as legitimate as any other, a position incompatible with Judaism or any monotheistic religion which, by its very nature, is based on certain norms. In the general world, increasingly pluralism is both maintained and harnessed through federalism, through the structured organization of power on the basis of combining self-rule and shared rule, through multiple centers of power and self-expression linked constitutionally within appropriate common frameworks. In terms of formal political institutions, the federalist revolution is sweeping the world; some 70 percent of the world's population now lives within federal systems or in political systems partially utilizing federal arrangements.

Beyond the organizational dimension, the world may also be discovering the virtues of federal liberty as opposed to the deficiencies of natural liberty. In the case of the latter, everyone is presumed to be able to do as he or she pleases, subject only to the constraints of nature and the problems of hurting others; in practice a form of moral anarchy, made particularly problematic by the fact that most of the time we cannot know if our actions are hurting others. Under conditions of federal liberty, on the other hand, people come together and bind themselves by covenant to a particular moral and civil order and then are free to live up to the terms of the covenant. Federal liberty is the liberty advocated by the great modern political thinkers and statesmen who were quite aware of the problems of democracy where natural liberty prevailed. A Jewish polity, committed as it is to the basic norms of Jewish civilization, can only survive on the basis of federal liberty.

Pluralism is a reality for Jews. Federal liberty is part of the historic Jewish heritage since it represents the biblical understanding of liberty. So, too, are federal institutions, beginning in the biblical days of the tribal federation. Today the Jewish people is reconstituting its polity along federal lines because it must. Many voices in Israel still talk in centralistic terms, seeing Israel as a kind of queen bee, an unrestrictedly dominant center to which diaspora Jews will pay homage and bring their checks. (In most cases these same Jews want Israel to be internally centralized as well by restricting or eliminating serious local liberty and pluralism.) In fact, however, the demographic character of the world Jewish polity is such that the world's largest Jewish community is in the diaspora in what is still the world's most powerful country. Other diaspora communities, even if far less powerful than the American Jewish community, still make their own choices. What has developed as a result is an institutional means of accommodating the reality of a politically sovereign state and a highly disparate group of voluntary diaspora communities. The result is a network of multi-country Jewish organizations, the most important of which is the Jewish Agency for Israel, the fulcrum of the emerging network.

This new organizational network is vital because as in most such things, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. An organized framework and institutional structure adds a focus and drive that unorganized numbers cannot. On the other hand, organization is not enough. In a world in which the growth of expectations for individual self-fulfillment in place of collective goals is the norm, not only are organizational structures but federal liberty itself at risk. Some of the consequences for Jews have been well noted.

Assimilation, demographic decline, secularization, and, on the other hand, religious extremism are all matters about which much has been said and written. Despite the progress we have made organizationally, our polity seems to rest on a bed of shifting sand. In a sense, it is up to the organizational network of the polity to put roots down into the sand so as to hold those shifting sands together.

Critical to these changes are the power shifts that have taken place in the world in the wake of World War II. Power has shifted from Europe to what were formerly the peripheries of Europe, including the United States of America, the former Soviet Union, and now Japan and East Asia. For Jews, power has shifted from Europe to Israel, North America, and the English-speaking Southern Hemisphere. Thus, of the ten largest countrywide Jewish communities in the world, only two are on the European continent, exclusively in Europe, while six are located in lands that 150 years ago had less Jews than a middle sized city in Eastern Europe before the Holocaust.

The Spread of Organized Jewish Life

Although 90 percent of all Jews in the world live in the 11 largest countrywide communities, between 85 and 94 countries have organized Jewish communal life. At least 80 have permanent communities, that is to say, indigenous Jews who apparently have no intention of leaving the country and maintain communal institutions. Up to another 14 have transient ones, that is to say, outposts of Israel or American Jewry whose Jews originate in one or both of those countries and are there on a temporary basis for diplomatic, business, or military reasons, yet maintain some form of Jewish communal life for themselves. There are another 21 countries known to have Jewish residents but no organized Jewish community life. No doubt there are Jews to be found in other countries as well, if one were to look more closely, but they need not concern us here.

Almost all of these communities have undergone reconstitution since World War II and many underwent an earlier reconstitution during the modern epoch. Especially in the not quite 200 years covered by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Jewish communities throughout the world went from organic to associational ones in their structure, that is to say, from communities organized by those born into them along traditional lines to ones organized along formal lines as a modern voluntary or quasi-voluntary associations whose members choose to identify with them on an individual basis.

Five forms of association emerged during the modern epoch. The *consistoire* model in France and the French-speaking countries; the *cultesgemeinde* model in Germany and the German-speaking countries; the united congregations plus a representative board model of the United Kingdom and the British Empire; the independent congregational model of the United States; and the *landsmanschaften* plus *kehillah* model of Latin America. Worldwide, the nineteenth century saw the reemergence of a civil structure for the Jewish polity, initially in the form of a network of *shtadlanim*, then through several *shtadlanic*

organizations led by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, and finally in the form of mass-based organizations claiming to speak in the name of world Jewry, of which the first and most successful was the World Zionist Organization. The WZO gave birth to three of the four others that today form the pentagon of the world Jewish polity: the State of Israel, the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the World Jewish Congress. Each of these was an adaptation to the conditions of modernity in its particular environment.

In the postmodern epoch, which can be said to have begun in 1948 with the reestablishment of the State of Israel, all of these underwent a further reconstitution. First and foremost was the emergence of the renewed Jewish state which by its nature became the most important Jewish community and a dominant, if not the dominant, player in the world Jewish polity. In each diaspora community there was a double movement to eliminate whatever non-voluntary arrangements remained from the modern epoch and toward federated models of community organization, locally and countrywide.

In the United States, for example, by now the largest and most powerful diaspora community, the independent congregational framework remained but within an overarching structure dominated by powerful local community federations that provided or supported the provision of almost all non-congregational services within each local community and were responsible for raising the major share of the funds for Israel and Jewish communal needs. These local community federations were linked through the Council of Jewish Federations, which became extremely powerful in relation to the United Jewish Appeal, the United Israel Appeal, and the Joint Distribution Committee, as well as the various "national" organizations serving American Jewry countrywide, some of which were actually initiated by CJF.

These new federated structures emphasized the civil rather than the religious dimension of Jewish life. The transition was particularly evident in France (and other *consistorial* countries) where the Consistoire, which once had a near monopoly on Jewish life, with government backing, had to share power first with the CRIF, the representative board of French Jewry for community relations purposes founded at the height of World War II, and later with the Fonds Social Juif Unifie, initiated as the major social service and fundraising body of French Jewry with the assistance of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in the aftermath of the war. The rise to power of the federation movement in the United States and the FSJU in France reflected the shift within the civil sector from political and community relations bodies to social service and fundraising institutions, often with the active support of Israel. This shift was to make itself manifest in the emergent world Jewish polity.

The relative position of communities like Great Britain, where such a shift did not take place and the religious bodies, on one hand, and representative boards, on the other, retained leading roles, declined. In countries like South Africa, where the South African Jewish Board of Deputies managed to secure a major role in fundraising for Jewish purposes, Jewish education, and social service delivery, the transformation assured the continued hegemony of the representative board. The communities of Central Europe,

which had always been more comprehensive, did not have this problem of adaptation. To them the real problem was the shift from government-supported to voluntary structures.

At the beginning of the second postwar generation, even the Latin American Jewish communities began to move toward federated models, linking first the various country-of-origin communities and increasingly the network of schools and community centers that were coming to represent the heart of the community. More secular than any other set of Jewish communities in the free world, they had almost no congregational structures to contend with in the organizational realm. Rather, they had powerful older elements from the immigrant days, based on countries-of-origin, the division between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and to some extent the political divisions among the Jews who settled in them.

The Domains of Authority in the Jewish Polity

Since the very beginning of the Jewish polity in biblical times, authority and power within it have been divided among three domains, referred to since the Second Commonwealth as the *keter torah* (literally, the crown or domain of Torah), *keter kehunah* (the crown of priesthood), and *keter malkhut* (the crown of civil rule). *Keter torah,* initially the domain through which God's word could be communicated to the Jewish people, became over time the domain which controlled the interpretation and explication of the constitutional foundations of the Jewish polity (*Adat Bnai Yisrael* in the Bible). Originally the domain of the Prophets, it later became the domain of the sages and rabbinical authorities. The *keter kehunah,* originally the domain of a hereditary priesthood and since the destruction of the Temple the domain of religious officiants of all kinds, developed into the channel through which the people reached out from their immediate personal and collective concerns to the transcendent Power. The *keter malkhut*, originally in the hands of elders and magistrates (*zekenim* and *nesiim*), then judges and kings (*shoftim* and *melakhim*), and after that patriarchs (*nesiim*) and *parnasim*, was the domain responsible for handling the civil affairs of *Adat Bnai Yisrael*.

These domains have undergone many adaptations in the long course of Jewish history but they have continued to constitute the basic framework for the institutions of the Jewish polity and power-sharing within those institutions. No Jewish community can exist as a fully articulated community without them. Even where individual congregations constitute the community, they are governed by rabbis *(keter torah),* congregational boards (*keter malkhut*), and hazanim *(keter kehunah)* through power-sharing arrangements of one kind or another.

In today's large communities, these *ketarim* are represented by complex institutions and institutional networks. In France, for example, where matters are relatively simple, the FSJU and the CRIF constitute the *keter malkhut*; the Consistoire and other synagogue federations, the *keter kehunah*; and the Chief Rabbi, the *keter torah*. The same pattern

exists in Great Britain with the Board of Deputies and the Jewish Welfare Board, the United Synagogue, and the other synagogue federations, and the Chief Rabbi and *batei din* occupying the three *ketarim,* respectively. In the United States, matters are more complicated but the division is equally clear. The *keter malkhut* consists of the local federations and their countrywide expressions. The *keter kehunah* consists of the local congregations and their countrywide congregational bodies, and the *keter torah,* of the great rabbis, seminaries, and academic institutions serving the community.

Israel, too, in effect maintains this three-fold division. We can view the civil governmental institutions of the state as the *keter malkhut,* the local religious councils as the *keter kehunah,* and the chief rabbis and *batei din* as the *keter torah.* In sum, while, from the political perspective, the State of Israel has a fully articulated set of institutions similar to those of other states, from a Jewish perspective its civil institutions are principally those of the *keter malkhut,* while, because of the special character of the state as a Jewish state, there are important state-sponsored and quasi-state institutions giving expression to the other two *ketarim* as well. As in the past, expressions of the *keter kehunah* are overwhelmingly local in both Israel and the diaspora.

For over half a millennium prior to the nineteenth century, the full articulation of these domains was principally local, occasionally countrywide. After the final collapse of the Islamic empire in the eleventh century, the world Jewish polity existed only as a network of *posekim* within the *keter torah*.

Only in the nineteenth century were the Jews successful in beginning the reconstitution of a more articulated institutional structure for the *edah*, through the *keter malkhut* whose role was strengthened by the breakup of the unity of the *keter torah* as a result of religious reform, on one hand, and the emergence of countervailing ultra-Orthodoxy, on the other. In the course of the twentieth century, the fragmentation of the *keter torah* continued while the power of the *keter malkhut* was strengthened immeasurably by the establishment of the State of Israel and the emergence of corresponding bodies as dominant in the diaspora communities. The end of the first postwar generation brought with it a major step forward in the institutional concretization of the world Jewish polity through the reconstitution of the Jewish Agency for Israel, clearly an instrumentality of the *keter malkhut*. Not only did these changes involve a series of local reconstitutions but they marked a millennial shift in the distribution of authority and power within the Jewish polity. That shift is connected with the general reconstitution of the polity as a whole. To the extent that Jewish unity could only be maintained through the *keter malkhut,* that *keter* was strengthened within the overall framework of the Jewish polity. Thus the reconstitution of the Jewish polity in our times has been accompanied by a millennial shift of the balance of power from the *keter torah* to the *keter malkhut* in all three arenas of Jewish political organization -- local, countrywide, and *edah*-wide.

From another perspective, four types of institutions have emerged in the diaspora. Most comprehensive are the *government-like institutions,* such as the local and countrywide community federations dealing with fundraising and social planning, the representative

boards and community relations organizations dealing with external relations, local and countrywide boards of Jewish education, and similar organizations for assisting Israel. Parallel to them are *localistic institutions*, such as congregations and community and sports centers catering to the more immediately personal needs of Jews.

In addition there are *general-purpose mass-based organizations* which often seek to gain control of the government-like institutions, to give them a particular direction or ideological content, as in the case of the Zionist parties, or which have fraternal, educational, or social welfare purposes such as B'nai B'rith. Finally there are *special-interest institutions and organizations* devoted to very specific tasks such as individual schools, yeshivot, and rabbinical seminaries, hospitals, and health and welfare institutions. Most of these are local but some serve larger regional and countrywide constituencies.

Most of the institutions within this four-fold division fall within the *keter malkhut*, though in some cases, such as religious congregations, schools and yeshivot, they include institutions of the other two *ketarim* as well. In this sense the four-fold division reflects both the persistence of the *ketarim* as active domains and the new balance among them in contemporary Jewish life.

The Operational Spheres of the *Edah*

These institutions operate in the three principal arenas of the *edah* -- local, countrywide, and *edah*-wide -- where they also can be grouped according to spheres of activity. The most locally based of these is the *religious-congregational sphere*, anchored in individual synagogues but extending beyond that to countrywide religious institutions including religious movements, rabbinical seminaries, and *batei din*, and finally to the world synagogue movements, initially paper organizations, but since the World Zionist Organization opened its doors to them by encouraging them to establish Zionist parties to speak in the name of each movement, they, too, are becoming actors on the world Jewish stage.

A second sphere is the *educational-cultural sphere* which includes those instrumentalities of Jewish education and culture -- local, countrywide, and *edah*-wide. Schools, libraries, camps, ulpanim, Jewish studies programs, informal educational efforts, grounded in local communities but initiated and supported with the assistance of countrywide and *edah*-wide bodies, in the latter case, particularly the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. In this sphere, too, are the museums, theaters, art galleries, publishing houses, and the like that emphasize Jewish and Hebrew culture.

In the diaspora, the educational-cultural sphere serves as something of a bridge between the institutions and movements of the religious-congregational sphere which have a great stake in Jewish education, and the third sphere, the *communal-welfare sphere*, which

speaks in the name of the total Jewish community. It has already been noted that the centers of communal power in the diaspora have moved into the communal-welfare organizations. That sphere has taken up a critical framing role in every arena of the *edah*. It includes the Jewish community federations, the FSJU, those representative boards engaged in internal communal governance and in the provision of social services to their community, as well as the institutions that actually provide the social services -- Jewish community centers, Jewish family service organizations, hospitals, old age homes, and the like. In many communities the communal-welfare sphere is predominantly countrywide in character although, as in the case of most of Jewish life, there is a heavy local tilt in it as well. It is perhaps least manifested as a sphere in the *edah* as a whole, although bodies like the JDC constitute its *edah*-wide manifestation.

External relations constitutes a fourth sphere, including all those institutions and organizations serving the Jewish people in their relations with the non-Jewish world, ranging from local Jewish community relations councils to countrywide organizations such as the CRIF in France, the Board of Deputies in Great Britain, and the "national" community relations organizations in the United States (e.g., NJCRAC, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith). *Edah*-wide, the World Jewish Congress, the World Zionist Organization, and the State of Israel are the pillars of this sphere.

Finally, there is the *Israel-edah sphere* which includes those comprehensive institutions designed to deal with Israel and the *edah* as a whole. The first and foremost of these is, of course, the State of Israel itself. Along with it is the network whose fulcrum is the Jewish Agency for Israel and includes the World Zionist Organization, the Magbiot (United Jewish Appeal, United Israel Appeal, Keren Hayesod), the Jewish National Fund, the various other national institutions serving the Jewish people as a whole, and bodies such as the World Jewish Congress and the JDC. It is this sphere which is presently in the process of being institutionalized more comprehensively than at any time since the days of the *resh galuta* and *gaonim* in Babylonia came to an end 1,000 years ago. These spheres acquired separate articulation in the course of the past century. Prior to 1948, they were substantially separate in their operations. Since then they have been growing closer together, following the general patterns of institutional linkage in the late twentieth century. Today the activities of each generate externalities having real consequences for the others even as the spheres themselves remain distinct within the new institutional complex of the *edah*.

The Renewed World Jewish Polity

Guiding and shaping the reemergence of a world Jewish polity is the principal constitutional and organizational task of our generation. In the mid-nineteenth century, leading Jewish figures in the various European countries of the Emancipation such as Adolph Criemieux in France and Sir Moses Montefiore in Britain assumed the role of

shtadlanim, using their influence, backed by the governments of their respective countries acting for their own reasons of state, to try to alleviate the conditions of Jews in those countries not yet emancipated. They formed a network that represented the first visible contemporary expression of the *keter malkhut edah*-wide. With the founding of the Alliance Israelite Universalle in 1860 and continuing through the founding of similar organizations in the other countries of Western Europe and the United States, the work of these *shtadlanim* was institutionalized in what we might call *shtadlanic* organizations, dominated by local notables, that cooperated with each other to try to achieve the security goals of the Jewish people.

In the late nineteenth century, there was a popular revolt against domination of Jewish affairs by *shtadlanim.* This revolt was manifested in organizations such as the Jewish Workers Bund and more importantly the World Zionist Organization, whose efforts to capture the communities is a well-known chapter of Zionist history and which in a larger sense had to do with the struggle over how the world Jewish polity would be reconstituted. In World War I, the World Zionist Organization won a major victory as a result of the Balfour Declaration and the British conquest of Eretz Israel. While it was not yet able to speak in the name of a majority of the Jewish people, it became the driving force for Jewish national self-expression. In the interwar period it struggled with the JDC, the final organizational product of the emancipationist worldview, founded in the U.S. in 1914 to coordinate American Jewish rescue workers in World War I. Recognizing its limits outside of the sphere of rebuilding the Jewish national home in Palestine, it gave birth to the World Jewish Congress in 1936 to extend its reach to the fight against anti-Semitism in the diaspora as Nazism reached its peak.

World War II and the Holocaust gave Zionism its triumph under tragic circumstances. All other Jewish organizations, with one or two minor exceptions, joined with the WZO to secure the establishment of the state. With its establishment, the state became the dominant actor in the world Jewish polity, but it was limited by its obligations as a politically sovereign state and by the reluctance of the diaspora leaders as citizens of their own states to commit their communities to its direction.

The problem of linking a politically sovereign state and voluntary diaspora communities required an institutional solution of its own. The World Zionist Organization and its creature, the Jewish Agency for Israel, which had been founded in 1929 pursuant to the terms of the British Mandate, led the Yishuv in the 1930s and 1940s and then gave way to the government of the state after 1948. During most of the first generation of the new state, the WZO and JAFI languished as the state's arm for mobilizing diaspora funding for the absorption of immigrants, but, in time, they came to provide a basis for the new institutional structure.

After the Six-Day War, when a new enthusiasm for Jewish peoplehood emerged within the state and the diaspora communities, the Jewish Agency was reconstituted to include representatives of the Magbiot in its governance alongside of those of the WZO. In a relatively short time, the representatives chosen by the principal Magbiot were

determined by the diaspora communities they served so that the Jewish Agency became the institutional bridge between Israel, represented through the WZO, and the major diaspora communities, represented through the institutions of the communal-welfare and Israel-*edah* spheres. Recently, the introduction of representatives of the religious-congregational sphere into the WZO brought that body, which had previously at least partially represented the external relations sphere of the diaspora communities as well as Israel, to represent the religious-congregational sphere as well. As indicated, the Jewish Agency became the fulcrum of this newly constituted network of *edah*-wide and major countrywide organizations, including the Council of Jewish Federations in the United States and Israel's major political parties. This new institutional structure is still in its beginning stages, but for the first time in 1,000 years it has given the *edah* a framework for decision-making that links all of its arenas and is reasonably comprehensive in and of itself.

Key Questions for Further Study

This leaves us with certain key questions for continued and further study:

1. Now that we have a framework within which to study them, we need to better examine the functions of the Jewish polity such as defense, education, religious affairs, health and welfare services, and the general problems of self-government in a people with both a state and a diaspora.

2. Key questions of citizenship and affiliation with the Jewish polity, including the great question of who is a Jew in the new context of assimilation and intermarriage need to be addressed from the perspective of the Jewish polity. On one hand, probably a majority of Jews would still like a definition of Jewishness that would be *halakhically* valid, while on the other, reality suggests that many of those who identify as Jews would not be considered Jewish from a *halakhic* point of view. In such a situation, this becomes a critical issue for the *edah* as an *edah*. The *edah* has to determine and employ certain criteria of citizenship for purposes of affiliation and leadership recruitment in the diaspora and to determine status in Israel. Simply understanding being Jewish as a matter of citizenship could be helpful.

3. This leads to some critical questions with regard to patterns of participation. The *edah* today, especially but not exclusively in the diaspora, can be seen as a series of concentric circles. At its core is a small circle consisting of those Jews who live complete Jewish lives in every day, in every way, according to a Jewish rhythm. Surrounding them is a circle of highly committed Jews, very much involved in Jewish affairs but whose rhythm of life is not necessarily fully Jewish in the same way. Around that circle is yet another, of those who are moderately active in Jewish life and affairs. Around that circle is a larger one of those who are Jewishly-affiliated in some way and "pay their dues" as it were, but are not especially active as Jews in Jewish affairs. Around them is another

circle of those who identify as Jews, periodically affiliate or are involved in Jewish life in some way, but mostly go about their own business. Beyond that circle is another one of those who do not deny their Jewishness but do not identify with the Jewish people in any particular way. Finally there is an outer circle of those whose very Jewishness is unclear, the products of intermarriage. These circles are of unequal size. The boundaries between them are somewhat indefinite and always permeable, and the body of circles has no clear ending at its edges, as we read almost day-by-day in connection with the Jews of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Moreover, there appears to be a growing gap between the inner and outer circles, with the inner circle pulling together more tightly and the outer circles drifting further away. Times of crisis may shift people from one circle to another but rarely do they move more than two circles in either direction.

Another element in the pattern of Jewish participation is the division between cosmopolitans and locals. Cosmopolitans are those who see the larger picture and who are concerned with their communities as a whole, and as a result, with the Jewish people as a whole. Locals see only the narrow aspects of their own lives as Jews and are involved accordingly. The cosmopolitan-local distinction is an essentially human one, with all human beings either cosmopolitans or locals. Organized Jewish life is built to accommodate both. Locals tend to concentrate in the localistic institutions of the religious-congregational sphere and cosmopolitans in the communal-welfare, external relations, and Israel-edah spheres. Only the educational-cultural sphere tends to reach out to both in about equal proportions.

4. As we have seen, there are significant issues of authority and power to be explored, including changing sources of legitimacy and issues of federal versus hierarchical arrangements. The shift in power among the *ketarim* is, on one hand, an accomplished fact, strengthened by the fact that it is only in the domain of the *keter malkhut* that all Jews will still sit together, even those who will not recognize each other's legitimacy within the framework of the *keter torah* or those who have no interest in the activities of the *keter kehunah*. On the other hand, the *keter malkhut* is now beginning to consider whether it needs to acquire the ability to grant Jewish legitimacy on its own. Up to now it has accepted the constitutional role of the *keter torah* as the source of that legitimacy, indirectly if not directly. The secular elements in the Zionist movement were the first to challenge the authority of the *keter torah* in this way, but the who is a Jew issue is universalizing the challenge beyond the State of Israel.

While the *edah* was always federal in character, both in the original sense of being founded on a covenant (the word federal is derived from the Latin *foedus* which means covenant and is a direct translation of the Hebrew *brit*) and in its political-communal organization which involves a matrix of centers bound together within the common frame of Torah-as-constitution and sometimes common institutional frameworks in addition to the Torah. However, in the last centuries before the modernization of the Jewish people, rule within the *edah* had become increasingly oligarchical and, with the intervention of the non-Jewish authorities, it was easy for oligarchies to become hierarchical as well. In the contemporary diaspora, this hierarchical structure has fallen by the wayside because

voluntary communities require the active consent of their members, which among Jews can only be done through the recognition of the basic equality of all Jews and the broad distribution of power among many centers.

In Israel, the founders of the new state borrowed a hierarchical model of government from Eastern and Central Europe which has turned out to be very dysfunctional in terms of Jewish political culture and behavior and after the first generation with regard to such matters as economic development as well. It is significant that the Israel Defense Forces, which as an army could be expected to be the most hierarchical institution, has actually done the most to accommodate the egalitarian and federal elements in Jewish life within its framework, as a result has been perhaps the state's most successful institution.

5. This, in turn, leads to the question of accommodating Jewish political culture and behavior in frameworks of organized Jewish life, particularly in questions of leadership and representation. What is representation in a voluntary context? How do a state and diaspora live together? How do they represent their respective constituencies? How do their leaders, chosen in such different ways, share power and interact? This task is further complicated among Jews by the fact that in a small people, Jewish leaders, like most other Jews, play multiple roles. They do so in order to accomplish the many tasks before us with the limited manpower available.

6. Another set of questions revolve around the emerging constitution of the contemporary *edah*. Until modernization, the Torah, as interpreted, was unequivocally the constitution of the Jewish people. During the modern epoch, this unequivocal position of the Torah disappeared. Torah was no longer understood or interpreted within a common framework and there were those who rejected the Torah as constitution altogether, as they rejected the religious dimension of being Jewish. At the end of the modern epoch the very notion of a common constitution seemed extremely problematic.

More recently, however, there seems to be a reassertion of the principle of constitutionalism for the *edah*, with the Torah, however interpreted, in some way at its core and Eretz Israel as its rallying point. The full impact of this question has yet to touch us. At present we are still struggling with the reconstitution of the *edah*, just as the previous generation struggled with the consolidation of the state and the reconstitution of the individual countrywide communities and the generation before struggled to achieve the establishment of the state and the emergence of new Jewish centers in the diaspora. Even if it is not the principal question for us to address at this point, at sometime within the next 30 years we will probably have to begin addressing it.

7. This raises the whole question of the relationship between the so-called religious and secular dimensions of Jewish life, a separation almost impossible to achieve within the classical Jewish framework but which has become real enough as Jews have become part of the modern world. This question involves both matters of commitment and ideology and matters of authority and power. The struggle between those who claim authority on religious grounds and those who claim it on civil or secular is visible enough. It is

intensified by the problems of religious commitment, on one hand, and the ideological divisions among those who see themselves as religiously committed as well as those who reject religious commitment.

8. Another question has to do with the division into public and private in Jewish life. In classical Jewish life, there was hardly any such division, just as there was not in the ancient *polis*. It is the hallmark of modernity that such a division should exist, that there should be spheres of private behavior in which individuals are not subject to the dictates of the public sector -- civil or religious -- except by their own choice. The modern epoch invented the idea of civil society, that is to say, a political order that has both public and private space. Public space is necessary for the political order to exist as a *res publica*, the only legitimate political order. In modern political thought and belief, a proper *res publica*, a republic, must be a democratic republic which rests upon individual rights or the existence of a private sphere. Contemporary Jewish institutions willy-nilly recognize this: Israel by design; diaspora communities because as voluntary associations they cannot be comprehensive. In Israel there is a continuing struggle regarding the boundaries between public and private, especially in the sphere of the Jewishness of the state. In the diaspora, there are problems of the extent to which the private behavior of Jews interferes with Jewish public purposes. There is another dimension here and that is which diaspora institutions should be considered public and which private.

9. Another issue revolves around the relations between citizens and politicians in Israel, volunteers and professionals in the diaspora. In Israel, for historic reasons, professional politicians have come to dominate the country's public leadership, leaving little room for citizens who do not choose politics as a career to participate in the public sphere. In the diaspora, especially in the United States, the development of a Jewish civil service has been a major gain in Jewish life but it has also encroached upon the old role of voluntary leadership. At the present time in both settings citizens and volunteers have challenged the professionals for redistribution of power between them. This is an issue on the current Jewish agenda, one that is likely to continue to be a permanent one which each generation will have to resolve in its own way.

10. The edah must also cope with the facts of a new Jewish public, not only divided between the religious of various kinds and the non-religious, but in more complex and sophisticated ways. For example, there have been Sephardim and Ashkenazim in Jewish life for 1,000 years, but it is only in our time that they have had to share the same political and communal structures. While the Sephardic-Ashkenazic division, a product of a certain diaspora milieu, may be on its way out, for the moment it does involve a certain amount of tension and stress within Jewish life.

Perhaps more important in the long run is the renormalization of the Jewish people. For the Jewish people, normalization is not as the original Zionists thought to be *kakhol hagoyim* (like all the nations). Rather it is the revival of the three camps that have been present in Jewish life when the Jews have lived in their own land: the Pharisees, the Sadducees and the Essenes.

The Pharisee camp emphasizes the role of the *keter torah* as expressed through the *halakhah* in all its detail and with its primary emphasis on maintaining detailed control over the behavior of every Jew through the study and internalization of its norms and practices with an end to making all Jews holy. It triumphed after the destruction of the Second Commonwealth when the portability of the Pharisaic system became extraordinarily functional for a people exiled from its land, always on the move, and in need of a sense of its special status among the nations. It survives among the traditionally religious, its militant form among the ultra-Orthodox.

The Essene camp emphasizes the achievement of holiness through the development of small, self-contained communities of those dedicated to its pursuit. It disappeared when there no longer was a state to protect it. A neo-Essene camp reemerged in the early days of the Zionist enterprise in the form of Israel's kibbutzim that both separate themselves in their way of life from the larger Jewish society but also see themselves as a vanguard within it.

The Sadducean camp emphasized the role of the state and its civil religion (in ancient times, the Temple and its world) as the basis of Jewish identity. It disappeared with the loss of Jewish control over any part of Eretz Israel. With the restoration of that control, it has reemerged, especially among the non-religious Jewish community. At first these non-religious Jews appeared to be simply secularists. In the last generation, however, we have come to see that they are developing a form of Judaism of their own, a neo-Sadducean Judaism, rooted in the State of Israel and the civil religion that is developing to accompany it.

As these last two camps have reappeared in Israel, they have developed parallels in the diaspora. By and large, the Essene parallels are to be found in the periodic Jewish counter cultural movements -- the North American *havurot*, for example -- but they are inevitably quite fragile since they do not have the dual protections of land and state. Neo-Sadduceanism has been more successful, at the very least becoming the civil religion of the Jewish leadership of the *keter malkhut* in the communities. The relationships among these three camps are in the formative stages, just as the camps are themselves, but they undoubtedly represent the basis for conflict and cooperation in the Jewish world in the future.

11. Finally there is the question of what is the real strength of a community. In a sense, Jewish political and communal organization is stronger and more comprehensive than it has been at any time in at least 1,000 and perhaps 2,000 years. At the same time, that structure rests increasingly on a base of shifting sands, of a Jewish people that is less well-defined than ever before in Jewish history, at least since the days of the Patriarchs, and more open to the world around it with all that entails in the way of assimilation. Indeed, it may very well be the organized Jewish community that holds Jews together who could not be held together in any other way under contemporary circumstances. A structured *edah* is clearly a necessary condition for contemporary Jewish survival. Whether it is a sufficient one remains to be seen.

The Jewish Agency and Other Worldwide Instrumentalities of the Jewish People

Introduction

Even the casual observer of the Jewish scene understands that the establishment of the State of Israel marks a decisive turning point in the constitutional history of the Jewish people, and has brought in its wake both the possibility and the necessity to reconstitute the Jewish polity. This is not the first time that the Jewish people have entered a period of reconstitution. Indeed, it is only the latest of many such reconstitutions.[1] We all know the reasons why such a reconstitution is necessary viz: the reemergence of a politically independent Jewish state after two millennia, the massive shift of Jewish population centers to new sites, changes in diaspora community organization and in the balance between the religious and secular forces in Jewish life, and the entry of all Jewry into a post-emancipation era in which the old rules are changed, willy-nilly.

That reconstitution is happening already, one way or another, for better or for worse. It is up to those in leadership positions to try to shape it and guide it in the right direction. Knowing that a reconstitution is in progress is not the same as actually accomplishing the task. Exactly what form the reconstitution will take may not be something that is decided once and for all around the table in a conference room. It maybe a process requiring several generations to achieve. Nevertheless, having made a significant start with the reconstitution of the Jewish Agency and all that has followed it, it is incumbent upon this generation of world Jewish leadership to take the next steps -- to "stretch the envelope" toward a workable institutional framework that will serve the Jewish people worldwide. The Jewish Agency must be at the head of that effort and play a leading role.

We have already passed through the first generation since the reestablishment of the state, and are well into the second. During the first generation several of the cornerstones for the impending reconstitution became visible.

- First among them was the establishment of the centrality of Israel in the hearts and minds of Jews everywhere coupled with a bipolar division of powers between Israel and the Jewish community of the United States, the two major focal points of the post-war Jewish world.
- A second was the reemergence of Hebrew as the dominant language of Jewish civilization coupled with the emergence of English as the dominant language of Jewish discourse.
- A third was the emergence of new or reconstituted institutional structures within the major Jewish communities -- the state structure in Israel and diaspora bodies whose major focus was on fundraising for Israel and local needs and whose power flowed from their control over the pursestrings.

- A fourth was extensive Jewish reliance on the new technologies of transportation and communication (in particular the telephone, jet plane and the fax) which enable the Jewish people to conduct its day-to-day business on a worldwide basis.
- A fifth factor was the emergence of a number of multi-country functional authorities whose task it became to undertake the common business of the Jewish people which transcended the boundaries of the individual states in which the Jews found themselves. In effect, these latter replaced the striving for a world Jewish parliament which had been at least a feature of the rhetoric of the previous generation. That idea was rejected by Israel because its leaders could not see the state subordinated to any such voluntary body and by the diaspora Jewish communities who were uneasy over the image which such a body might present.

The Jewish Agency as a Functional Authority

The Jewish Agency stands preeminent among these functional authorities. Its evolution over the first generation of the new epoch has made this clear. With the establishment of the state, many of its original functions and most of its key people were transferred to the new government. For awhile, it seemed as if the very existence of the Agency as a separate organization was in doubt. For reasons that were partly institutional and partly political, the Agency survived. Those who remained with the WZO wanted to keep it as their vehicle for political participation and the requirements of U.S. Internal Revenue laws made a non-governmental vehicle for channeling American funds into Israeli development a necessity for the "philanthropists."

The result was the 1952 covenant between the World Zionist Organization as the proprietor of the Jewish Agency and the Government of Israel, and the subsequent Knesset legislation which established the basis for the relationship between the WZO, the Jewish Agency, and the State of Israel. Under the terms of this covenant, the Jewish Agency was recognized as the third element in the constellation of institutions governing Israel but was decidedly subordinate to the government of the state. Because it remained entirely in the hands of the WZO, its position was ambiguous to say the least. According to Zionist theory, the WZO spoke for the Jewish people but in reality Zionist organizations in most diaspora communities were in the process of losing power and influence, thus making it impossible for them to speak for their communities.

This was particularly true in the United States where the Zionist movement never achieved a power position that came close to the Zionist model, and after 1948 rapidly lost whatever influence it had. Indeed, the Israeli leadership played a leading role in the decline in American Zionism when David Ben-Gurion and his associates decided to embrace the fundraising leadership instead as more likely to serve the new state's needs.

For the next 15 years, this paradoxical situation prevailed. The Agency, rather than diminishing in importance, became rooted in as part of the system of governance of the

Jewish state, while at the same time becoming more and more an arm of the state. This led, in turn, to the reconstitution of 1969-70 under the leadership of the late Louis Pincus and Max Fisher who saw the need to overcome the Agency's problematic position and to give it a proper one within the constellation of the world Jewish polity as well as the State of Israel. Their achievement marked the culmination of the postwar generation for the Jewish Agency.

The reconstitution process with its separation of the WZO and the Agency and the restructuring of the governing organs of the latter so that the new representatives of the diaspora communities were included in them in strength, brought the Jewish Agency into a new stage of development. The change was formally marked by a revision of the covenant between the Agency and the State. This time the Agency that emerged was not simply an instrumentality of the Israeli Government, designed to achieve limited political and institutional ends, but, at least potentially, an instrumentality of the Jewish people and a key element in the reemerging world Jewish polity. It marked an intermediate step in the transition from the Jewish Agency as a tool of the State of Israel to what may yet be the Jewish Agency as an instrumentality of the entire Jewish people.

The first achievement of the reorganization was the emergence of a more broadly-based world Jewish leadership tied into the country-wide and local communities of the diaspora, as well as into the Israeli party-political process. Obviously, the world Zionist movement had developed a worldwide leadership much earlier, which continued to exist after the establishment of the state, much diminished in power and influence. In fact, the leadership of the Zionist Movement had never attained the comprehensive scope which it sought. Now, in the reconstituted Jewish Agency, the merging of Zionist and so-called "non-Zionist" (better: community) leaders, the men and women who speak in the name of the diaspora communities, particularly those of the United States, offered an opportunity for the emergence of a truly comprehensive Jewish leadership.

The reconstituted Jewish Agency provided an arena within which such a leadership can function and in which the people who have entered that arena, on the whole with strong credentials, are able to take advantage of the opportunity. If anything, the first two decades after the reconstitution was a period of some frustration for many of them as the opportunities for them to act developed more slowly than they would have liked. Nevertheless, in the course of the first decade of exposure to one another that leadership began to take shape.

What Did the Reconstitution Achieve?

As is inevitably the case in human affairs, there were mixed expectations with regard to what the reconstitution was designed to accomplish. In the course of time, those who wanted minimal change found that their expectations would not be borne out. At the same time, those who expected an easy transition to a new era were also disappointed.

Slowly but surely, pressures from the reconstituted governing bodies led to improved Agency budgetary practices, opened up Agency activities for discussion and consideration and in a limited way began to influence the choice of office holders in senior Agency positions. Each step involved a struggle of its own. On the other hand, with each advance, the Agency acquired greater independence and truly began to function as an arm of the Jewish people. While progress in that direction has been slow at times, it is steady.

A new structure emerged out of the reorganization, in which representation in the governing institutions of the Agency was divided according to a formula balancing Zionist and community leaders, and Israeli, American, and other diaspora representatives. Theoretically, the Jewish Agency Assembly was intended to be the basic policy-making body, the board of Governors the principal governing body, and the Executive, the body handling day-to-day matters. In fact, as is always the case in such systems, the tail comes to wag the dog. The Executive is the body with the real power. The Board of Governors has been struggling valiantly to find a governance role for itself, given the fact that its members are scattered over much of the world and can assemble only a few times a year for brief periods. The Assembly at best briefly reviews policy matters presented to it, but has not really found an effective role for itself, something which generates a great deal of frustration on the part of many of the diaspora members who want to make their participation in the Assembly meaningful, especially since it comes at substantial personal expense.

While the reconstitution did not, in itself, change the functions of the Jewish Agency, in fact it set in motion a process which has led to a number of changes in function and which continues to move in the direction of even more changes. The Agency's direct role in immigrant absorption has diminished following the state's establishment of its own Absorption Ministry. Similarly, the role of the Agency in rural settlement has been on the decline, mostly because the bulk of the job had already been done. The Agency's role is higher education, once fiscally overwhelming, diminished drastically. There have been shifts in social welfare spending within Israel, with the Jewish Agency's role being slowly reduced in general social welfare. On the other hand, Project Renewal led to the Agency acquiring a commanding position in a major national endeavor. The Agency also has begun to take on greater responsibility for Jewish education in the diaspora, a matter of shared concern on the part of all Jewish leaders. Most of these shifts are symptomatic or what some diaspora leaders have suggested as a basic shift in the Agency's mission, from rebuilding the Jewish national home in Eretz Israel to forging stronger links between Israel and the diaspora.

Reconstitution has brought in its wake a whole set of new relationships within the Agency and between the Agency and other factors in the Jewish polity. The relationship between the Agency and the Government of Israel is slowly moving in the direction of greater independence for the former. In this respect, too, Project Renewal has been a major step and may prove a decisive factor. Since the inauguration of Project Renewal, the Agency has been able to develop direct relationships with local governments in Israel,

something that was prohibited to it prior to 1977. Finally, there is a changing relationship between the Agency and the diaspora communities. Once viewed strictly as a conduit for philanthropic contributions to help Israel's people and vehicle for helping diaspora fundraising efforts by the care and feeding of missions to Israel, the Jewish Agency has begun to be perceived as the diaspora's instrumentality within Israel and, for certain purposes, outside -- in short, as what it always purported to be, namely a "national institution" belonging to the entire Jewish nation which needs to be treated and developed as such, even further reorganized if necessary.

The relationship between the Agency and the diaspora communities is one that is studded with unresolved issues that did not surface at Caesarea or in the processes to which it gave birth. The organized American Jewish community, for example, has insisted upon stringent limits to Agency activities in the United States and has done so at least since the 1960s, making a clear point of its position that the Agency is not to function within the American Jewish framework except in marginal and supplementary ways.

Although the Jewish Agency has been a major presence in France since World War II, French Jewry has taken a similar stance in recent years. Yet recent events, especially the establishment of the Joint Education Authority, suggest that one of the principal functions of the Agency in the future will be to play a major role in Jewish education in the diaspora. As long as the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc were closed to organized Jewish activity, the Jewish Agency was restricted to a very limited set of activities either outside of the Communist world or in secret to arrange for the aliya of those Jews who could get out at various times. Since the collapse of the Communist bloc, a whole new relationship with the reemergent Jewish communities in those countries has become necessary. Curiously enough, some of the same people who are responsible for limiting the Agency's scope in their respective diaspora communities are members of the Board of Governors urging the Agency to embrace these new roles and, in that latter capacity, seem to have ignored this question.

JAFI and the World Jewish Polity

One of the issues that seems to have been left out is the question of relationships between the Agency and the rest of the world Jewish polity. One thing is certain, the Agency cannot function in a vacuum. Most immediately, its relationships with the government of Israel are frequently overpowering in their impact on the Agency's work. Certainly its relationships with the Israeli political party system are. The relationship between the WZO and the community leadership stands at the heart of the functioning of the Agency itself.

Then, too, the relationship between the Agency and the other Jewish multi-country functional authorities has to be clarified. for example, over the course of the past six decades, the Agency and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee have been

involved in activities in many Jewish communities which have brought them together in a kind of antagonistic cooperation with each appreciating the necessity of working with the other for common Jewish ends, albeit with perceived goals that are sufficiently different to generate certain tensions from time to time. There is nothing inherent in the goals of the Agency or the Joint as presently defined which demands the perpetuation of such tensions but they must be dealt with as both the Agency and the JDC move down new paths, some of which will be competitive with each others work and others of which will demand close cooperation between the Agency and the other functional authorities.

How the Jews Function as a People

The Jewish people functions in three arenas: an immediately local arena consisting of local Jewish communities around the world of varying sizes, under varying forms of communal organization. Whether we are speaking of Dallas or Chicago, Capetown or Stockholm, Ramat Gan or Afula, the local community remains the basic cell of Jewish communal life, the place where the basic institutions that serve the Jewish community are organized and function, where Jews, bound by ties of kinship, consent in one way or another to be participants in the Jewish body politic through participation in municipal elections (in Israel), through membership in a congregation and contributions to the local welfare fund (in the diaspora), or whatever.

Beyond the local arena, there is a larger, country-wide arena, within which the Jews in particular countries or states organize for common purposes. The organizational expressions of that arena include such phenomena as the State of Israel, the Canadian Jewish Congress, and the congeries of "national" (meaning country-wide) organizations of American Jewry framed by the Council of Jewish Federations. Fundraising for Israel, for example, depends upon work in local communities but is generally organized on a country by country basis, in this second arena. Formally the members of the Jewish Agency Assembly and Board of Governors are designated by bodies serving this second arena although in the case of the United States, the community leaders are designated by the United Israel Appeal in tandem with the major local community federations.

Beyond the second arena, there is a third, that of the Jewish people as a whole, the *edah* to use its classic Hebrew name, first applied to the people assembled as a polity in Mosaic times and subsequently used regularly (with its synonym, Knesset) throughout Jewish history. It is this arena which was extremely weak for nearly a millennium and which has been given new institutional form within the last century, most particularly in our time. The *edah* is the main focus of the reconstitution of the Jewish people as a whole. It is the arena served by the Jewish Agency and the one in which the Jewish Agency should play a major, if not the major, role. The Agency will only be able to do so, however, if its leaders appreciate the nature of the arena and its relationships with the other arenas and the other "players" within the *edah*.

One thing is clear. The Jewish Agency will either transform itself into a major instrumentality of the third arena within the new generation now upon us and truly become a vital instrumentality of the Jewish people as a whole for whatever tasks it assumes or are given to it, or it will wither down to become an increasingly useless appendage of the State of Israel, kept alive only as an approved conduit for tax exempt funds and as a source of patronage for Israeli political parties.

The Jewish people needs an effective Jewish Agency as a true national institution. Assuming that the Jewish people is not seeking to establish a Jewish parliament, it still requires national institutions to do its work as an *edah*. There is not another institution in existence which has a better claim to playing a preeminent role than the Jewish Agency, but in order to do so, it must be ready to confront the difficult questions, draw the appropriate conclusions, and make the necessary changes.

What is to be Done?

If the Jewish Agency is to attain its potential and provide the *edah* with a primary functional authority that could provide a frame for the *edah* as a whole, it can only do so through the constitutionalization of:

1. Its status, role, and general functioning within the body politic in relation to the other major institutions serving the three arenas; most particularly the Joint Distribution Committee and the World Jewish Congress, in addition to its present constituent, the World Zionist Organization, and its present partner, the State of Israel.
2. The structure and composition of all of the *edah* institutions, including those whose primary role is to serve the other arenas, including the way in which the various components are represented in the *edah*.
3. The distribution and sharing of powers or competencies, and
4. A process for changing that constitutional framework when necessary.

The necessity for a proper constitutional framework cannot be overemphasized. Its importance has already been recognized in the several covenants between the Jewish Agency, the WZO and the State of Israel and in constitution-like agreements between JAFI and some of the other "authorities." Despite Israel's hesitancy to write a single constitutional document for itself, even the Israeli leadership perceived the necessity to establish, in writing, at least the basic terms of the relationship between the Jewish Agency as a Jewish national institution and the State of Israel as the Jewish state.

Among the issues that remain open, however, is the achievement of satisfactory governance relationships within the Jewish Agency itself. A major source of the tension in current Agency governance stems from different orientations of the Israeli and diaspora (particularly North American) leaders involved. The Israelis, for the most part,

see the Jewish Agency primarily as a political actor within Israel and thus are most comfortable with the political actor model of governance in practice. The various department heads are political appointments with substantial independence in internal operations, working under the cabinet-like Executive which controls most of the real power.

In contrast, the diaspora partners see the Agency as a philanthropic service-provider, and prefer models based on either the business-CEO model or the local Jewish federation model. The business model puts primary authority in the hands of a single chief executive officer who supervises professional department heads. The federation model variant interlaces lay people with the professional staff. Our study will examine these and other operational models which can synthesize the different approaches identified.

It is clear, however, that we must go beyond those covenants at this point. The Agency can never be effective if the government of Israel is going to decide at every turn what its stated position is on issues or what are to be its functions, or if there is no clear cut way to enable it to delineate its roles, structure and powers. The nature of the Jewish polity is such that it is essentially federal in character, functioning through numerous semi-autonomous bodies serving the three arenas described above. At its best, it has been organized as a federation or confederation. That is what is needed now. Relations between the institutions serving different arenas in federal systems must be constitutionalized if the system is to function effectively. As part of its reconstitution, the Jewish people must take that next step.

Beyond that, this question of governance can only be properly answered by clarifying:

1. The role of the Jewish Agency in the context of the world Jewish polity;
2. The role of the Government of Israel in matters pertaining to the Jewish people; and
3. The role of the other Jewish multicountry associations and countrywide bodies within which the Jewish Agency must work.

The Study

This is a study of these governance options in the larger context of the role of the Jewish Agency in the emergent world Jewish polity so as to be able to recommend what governance mechanisms are needed for the Jewish Agency to play its proper role. Here we:

1. explore the role of the Jewish Agency and its relationships with other bodies within the Jewish world, identifying options and possibilities.

2. identify and examine the different governance models presently in effect or that have been put forward with regard to their ability to fulfill its various possible roles.
3. recommend a future course of action with regard to both.

This study includes research conducted specifically for it and draws on previous research conducted by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on the Jewish Agency, Jewish political institutions and organizations, and political organizations generally. The study draws upon the results developed in the field of Jewish political studies and on earlier studies of constitutional design in the Jewish community and the world. With that knowledge and data base, we conducted interviews with key people who have been involved in issues of world Jewish governance in order to sharpen our own understanding of what is needed.

Drawing on our scholarly resources, a study team was assembled to focus questions of governance and policy. The result of this study provides a knowledge base that should enable the leadership of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish world to address the crucial problem of the reconstitution of the world Jewish polity as a more effective organizational network, and either a blueprint or a number of options for the reconstitution, which can then be implemented by the community leadership.

The Renewed Polity

First Steps toward Jewish Polity in Modern Times

A primary characteristic of the Emancipation era was the effort of Jews in the Western world to redefine themselves politically strictly as citizens of their respective states, though of a different religious persuasion. With that came the effort by many to detach themselves from the common fate of fellow Jews. This effort received its strongest formal expression in the formulations of the Napoleonic Sanhedrin (1806) where the Jews of France, under some duress, abjured any transstate ties. Nevertheless, the Jews were at least ambivalent about this aspect of their search for emancipation and citizenship as individuals. No longer comfortable speaking about their brethren as members of a common nation, English-speaking Jews in the nineteenth century coined the term coreligionists, a philological barbarism designed to reflect the persistence of ties but on a limited and careful basis.

A change in name did not change reality, however. The common interests of Jews the world over did not disappear. Indeed, those interests intensified during the nineteenth century. Significantly, the attitude of the European nation-states, new or old, where most Jews lived, did not shift either. Despite their demands that "their" Jews become citizens or subjects on an individual basis, they still viewed the Jews as a separate group. Thus, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 addressed "the Jewish question" as part of its agenda;

since then hardly any important international meeting has been without some Jewish issue before it.

At first, the Jewish question was addressed without the direct involvement of the Jews themselves. This was not a situation that the Jews could tolerate. Even under conditions of emancipation and denationalization, they were not prepared to allow others the exclusive right to determine their interests and destiny. Moreover, not even all emancipated Jews had abandoned the sense of nationhood. It was precisely in the United Kingdom and the United States, where Jews were most free to become citizens on an individual basis, that many felt least constrained to abandon the sense that a Jewish nation existed. Early in the twentieth century, the term peoplehood came into use, first in the United States, to provide a more acceptable expression of that sentiment.

The first Jewish political responses (as distinct from philanthropic ones) to transstate Jewish problems were made through individual notables working quietly behind the scenes on behalf of Jewish interests -- a revival in new form of shtadlanut (the historic name for the situation in which Jewish notables with positions or connections to the non-Jewish world around them, interceded on the Jews' behalf when necessary), which had prevailed in medieval Europe. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Board of Deputies of British Jews made representations to the British and foreign governments about the situation of Jews in other lands, but they were more symbolic than real until the shtadlanim began acting with the Board's blessing. The greatest Jewish shtadlan of the nineteenth century was Sir Moses Montefiore of Great Britain, but he was by no means the only one.

By and large, these nineteenth century shtadlanim were activated on behalf of Jewish brethren in lands not yet touched by emancipation or where promises of emancipation were not fulfilled, chiefly Eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, plus North Africa. The first intervention to attract worldwide attention came in 1840 in the case of the Damascus blood libel. It was undertaken by individual shtadlanim, but, significantly, the shtadlanim from the major western European countries found it in their interest to coordinate their work in what was perhaps the first modern world-wide expression of Jewish political activity.

A decade later, the construction of the first housing outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem was a classic example of this trend. Montefiore of Great Britain was entrusted with money bequeathed by Judah Touro of the United States to be used for the Jewish poor of Eretz Israel. The result: Mishkenot Sha'ananim. Thus at the very outset of the effort, its two primary targets were identified: Jewish rights and security in the diaspora and rebuilding Eretz Israel. They have remained primary ever since.

As the western European great powers became increasingly involved in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish notables capitalized on their positions in their respective powers (particularly Austria, France, Great Britain, and, later, Germany) to intervene on behalf of their brethren. Similarly, the Board of Deputies of American

Israelites, founded in 1859, included among its purposes the defense of Jewish interests overseas. Nevertheless, even though it was the first countrywide Jewish governance body organized on democratic principles in the United States, its efforts were made meaningful (as much as they were) by quasi-*shtadlanic* methods. The offices of the United States government were used to obtain consular or ministerial appointments for American Jewish notables in countries where they had an interest in working for the improvement of the condition of the Jews. Thus armed with American government credentials, the notables could enhance their *shtadlanic* roles.

Between the 1840s and the 1870s the number of problems requiring such joint action grew, or, at the least, the concern of the western Jewish communities with those problems expanded. As involvement increased and a pattern of response emerged, more institutionalized methods of handling the increased work load were introduced in the form of *shtadlanic* organizations such as the Alliance Israelite Universelle in France, the Anglo-Jewish Association in Britain, and the Hilfsverein for Deutschen Juden in Germany. While their efforts to create a single worldwide Jewish organization were frustrated by the opposition of the governments of their respective countries who were in tension with one another, the *shtadlanic* organizations also found it advantageous to cooperate with one another. In this way, interventions were regularly carried out in Russia, in Romania, the Ottoman Empire, and North Africa and in other countries as needed.

Shtadlanut was able to hold its own as long as the large body of Jews was not awakened politically. The emergence of the Zionist movement changed all that. Theodor Herzl's convening of the first Zionist Congress in 1897 marked a turning point in worldwide Jewish organization. Herzl transformed the basis of Jewish contacts with foreign powers and the character of the demands Jews made by the establishment of the World Zionist Organization. One of the principles of the Basel program was "the organization and uniting of the whole of Jewry, by means of appropriate institutions, both local and international," thus serving notice that the Jews were prepared to act as a body, organized democratically on a worldwide basis to achieve their political goals.

The Zionists were opposed by the notables and their organizations as much for ideological reasons as for any others. The notables were committed emancipationists and bitterly opposed to the revival of Jewish nationalism. For the remainder of that generation, the struggle between the two approaches continued, culminating in the victory of the Zionists during World War I in the course of the struggle over the Balfour Declaration. After the end of that war, shtadlanut, even in its institutionalized form, receded into the background, and the field of worldwide Jewish activity was taken over by multicountry organizations with avowedly, if not exclusively, political goals. The basis for a worldwide Jewish polity was now in place.

In the interim, the first worldwide Jewish fraternal organization had also emerged, significantly, an American Jewish creation. B'nai B'rith was founded in New York in 1843 as a modern expression of the Jewish desire to maintain communal bonds on an

individual plane in a secular age. It rapidly spread to every part of the United States where Jews lived. In 1882, the first overseas lodge was founded in Germany and, by the turn of the century, even Eretz Israel had a lodge. In the United States, B'nai B'rith was a broad-based organization; in Europe and the Middle East it became an elite group. Until the end of the nineteenth century, its leaders also played local roles as *shtadlanim.* In some countries they still do. Subsequently, the international leadership became active in the world Jewish arena.

The victory of the Zionists meant far more than the ultimate establishment of a Jewish state. It marked the reestablishment of a Jewish political consciousness, either willingly or reluctantly, and the reestablishment of a sense of Jewish peoplehood with all that this implied. The form of the Jewish polity today is the direct product of the Zionist victory; Jewish responses to contemporary events are based on the "facts" that the Zionists established among the Jews and within the non-Jewish world.

The Forging of a New Jewish Polity in the Twentieth Century

While the beginnings of an institutionalized structure for world Jewry were developing, massive demographic changes were taking place in the Jewish world. The world Jewish population grew geometrically as the conditions under which the Jews lived improved. From an estimated 2.5 million in 1800, the number of Jews in the world increased to 10.5 million a century later and to 16.5 million in 1939.

The Jews also began to evacuate what had been the major centers of Jewish life in the Old World and to establish new centers in the New World of the great European frontier, North and South America, South Africa and Australia, or in France and Great Britain -- areas outside of or peripheral to Jewish life for centuries. This process, which had become a flood by the end of the nineteenth century, was given additional impetus by World War I and the Russian Revolution. It received its final form as a result of World War II, the Holocaust, and the establishment of the State of Israel.

By the middle of the twentieth century, not a single Jewish area of settlement that had been prominent at the time of the American and French revolutions remained in the forefront of Jewish life, and hardly a single Jewish community remained undisturbed anywhere in the world. The Eastern European Jewish centers were destroyed, either physically or socially. Even in the Soviet Union, most Jews were no longer located in the areas of traditional Jewish settlement. The establishment of the State of Israel effectively ended organized Jewish life in the Arab lands. Even the centers that had emerged in continental Europe in the nineteenth century were either physically destroyed or so reduced in numbers and morale as a result of the Holocaust that they were unable to play their earlier role. The United States had emerged as the largest Jewish community functioning as a unit under one government in all Jewish history. Most Jews of the world lived in English-speaking countries and had adopted English as their native language.

Hebrew, the language of Israel and Israelis, had been restored to its premier place in Jewish civilization. Yiddish, Ladino, and other diaspora Jewish languages survived as remnants, primarily in Latin America, Canada, and (paradoxically enough) Israel, rather than in the lands of their origin.

While this process was going on, new organizations had emerged to serve world Jewry. The Americans contributed the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), organized in 1914 to provide war relief to Jews caught by World War I in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. After the war, it tried to bring relief to the war-devastated Jewish communities of Eastern Europe and the Russian revolution. In 1929 the Jewish Agency for Palestine was organized to unite world Jewry in the effort to rebuild Eretz Israel. In 1936 the World Jewish Congress (WJC) was organized, mostly by the Jewries of Europe under WZO auspices, to try to protect Jewish rights in an age of growing Fascist anti-Semitism. From the beginning, these organizations developed areas of functional specialization, by design or by virtue of their situation.

Crowning the establishment of new centers and new organizations was the renewal of independent Jewish national existence in Eretz Israel within a politically sovereign state. As a state, Israel transformed all previous relationships among Jewish communities. A state, possessing political sovereignty with the powers and responsibilities that go with it, could not be treated simply as another Jewish community on the world scene. At the same time, because it had a relatively small percentage of the total number of Jews in the world (only in the 1970s did it become the second largest Jewish community, today approximately four-fifths the size of the largest), it could not become the sole voice of the Jewish people, either internally or externally, much as its leaders would have liked it to. Thus the blessings of statehood brought a new set of political problems for the Jewish people -- good problems but problems nevertheless.

The first formal effort to define the role of the state as the spokesman for the Jewish people took the form of an exchange of letters between David Ben-Gurion, then Israel's prime minister, and Jacob Blaustein, then president of the American Jewish Committee, in 1950. The Committee was at that time the leading *shtadlanic* organization in the United States and was known as non-Zionist. Following a modified version of the emancipationist ideology, Blaustein wanted to make it clear to the world and to the Israelis that the Jews of the diaspora were citizens of their respective countries, owed no political allegiance to Israel, and did not see Israel as their political spokesman in Jewish affairs. Ben-Gurion, interested in strengthening Israel's alliance with the Jewish notables in the United States and not eager to start a war with them, more or less accepted Blaustein's terms and limited Israeli claims along those lines.

A generation later their correspondence reads like an anachronism, but it must be remembered that the first generation of leaders to face these problems was a product of the last generation of the nineteenth century when the struggle between the Zionists and the *shtadlanim* was at its height. Thus the understandings and assumptions they brought with them were those of a much earlier age. The Ben Gurion-Blaustein agreement reflects

the effort of two men of good will trying to come to grips with a new situation, but bound by their own experience and even the phraseology of an earlier age.

What characterized the first two generations of the twentieth century, when this new Jewish polity was being forged, was growing Jewish collective political action on a wide variety of fronts, coupled with strenuous denials of its being political. Only now, in the second generation of Jewish statehood and postwar reconstitution, has a generation of Jewish leaders emerged whose formative experiences have taken place in this new context and who are able and willing to face up to it and its implications. This new generation is not afraid to talk about Jewish political interests and to make Israel the major subject on their political agenda.

The Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War, six and a half years later, did much to end this dichotomy. If anything, the Jewish people in their numbers demonstrated how open they were to recognizing the political realities of the State of Israel and their attachment to it. Jews who in no overt way differed from their neighbors in their private lives were prepared to go into the streets in frankly political demonstrations for Israel. This marked a reversal of the emancipationist dictum of Haskalah poet Y.L. Gordon, "Be a Jew in your home and a man in the street"; Jews who no longer knew how to be Jews in their homes went into the streets to demonstrate their Jewish attachments.

New Structures and Relationships

During and after World War II, other Israeli and American Jewish organizations and institutions also became involved in the world Jewish scene. The American Jewish Committee undertook to develop an international program of some scope after World War II. The B'nai B'rith and ADL expanded their operations outside the United States. The three American synagogue movements and the Jewish community centers established worldwide associations. Israel, in the meantime, was busy establishing offices or tributary organizations to raise money to assist in the rebuilding of the land or to provide support in other ways. Thus, in the years between 1945 and 1955, a subsidiary network of worldwide organizations was developed, focusing either on the United States or Israel, but also involving Jewries in many other countries.

The multiplication of organizations led to a concern for restructuring the institutional framework of the emerging Jewish polity to limit duplication and promote coordination. Some bodies, new and old, were working at cross purposes with one another, some in the pursuit of different goals, but many in the pursuit of the same ones. In a manner familiar to American Jews, the community relations organizations presented the biggest problem. The number of defenders of Jewish interests that came forward was such that, at times, the efforts at defense were jeopardized. For example, once the Jewish-Catholic rapprochement began, it became difficult for the Vatican to decide which among the many Jewish claimants to talk to. In time, a coordinating body was established to speak

with a harmonious set of voices, if not a single voice. It, too, collapsed and chaos reigned until the Vatican insisted that the Jews organize themselves properly. At that point, under the lead of the World Jewish Congress, the International Jewish Committee for Interreligious Consultations (IJCIC) was formed.

In the aid-to-Israel sphere, the multiplicity of organizations seeking to assist the Jewish state also led to demands for coordination. As Israel began trying to assist the diaspora in strengthening Jewish life, it initially did so in a manner that paid little attention to the established framework within the various diaspora communities. The Israelis were called to task and demands for coordination were raised.

One possible focal point for coordination after the war might have been the World Jewish Congress, but the Holocaust had destroyed whatever significant base it had by reducing the European Jewish communities to secondary or tertiary status on the Jewish map. Still, Nahum Goldmann, the founder and leader of the WJC, remained the preeminent political figure in the diaspora. He was successful in coordinating efforts to secure German reparations through the World Conference on Material claims against Germany (1951). Among its other activities, it entered into partnership with the JDC to assist in the rebuilding of Jewish life in Europe and with the Jewish Agency to assist in the rebuilding of Israel. Goldmann, recognizing the new limits on the WJC, took the lead in trying to stimulate a coordinating agency for those Jewish organizations involved in multicountry activities, out of which emerged the now defunct World Congress of Jewish Organizations (COJO) in 1958. At the time, this move was welcomed by the Jewish Agency, which underwent reconstitution itself to include non-Zionist as well as Zionist elements in 1970.

At first, those advocating structural changes to reflect the new realities sought an overarching framework that would unite all bodies serving the Jewish people. This dream has never been abandoned in theory, but in practice the Jewish people has come to make do with a far looser structure, a number of separate "authorities" with specialized areas of activity loosely tied together through coordinating councils. The Claims Conference, the JDC, and the Jewish Agency are examples of such authorities.

This situation has developed pragmatically on a de facto basis. It has never been formally recognized or given any formal legitimacy by participants in, or most commentators on, the world Jewish scene. At present it seems that unless a conscious effort is made in a different direction, for the indefinite future, world Jewry will be united only through the formal mechanisms of coordinating councils and the more important informal mechanism of overlapping leadership. Apparently the mass of the Jewish people does not seek a more comprehensive framework on a worldwide basis, particularly given the nature of contemporary Jewish life, most Jews are not even aware of the network that exists, even if they are interested in Jewish survival, while Jewish leadership is extremely protective of their respective "fiefs." Moreover, the religious and ideological differences that divide Jewry may prevent unity on anything other than a loose confederative basis.

The authorities that do exist and their coordinating organizations are dominated by Israel and American Jewry, sometimes by the one, sometimes by the other, and sometimes on a shared basis, depending on which authority is involved. The structure of the authorities is such that other Jewish communities are represented and even well represented, and the representatives of the stronger among them can and do play important roles, but on an ad hoc basis.

Perhaps the major problem facing multicountry Jewish bodies other than the functional authorities is not how to coordinate activities among themselves in a better way but how to link themselves with the realities of Jewish life in a world in which most Jewish activity is carried on locally in a large number of communities. Even the countrywide organizations and institutions of most Jewries are weak except insofar as they confine their activities to purposes that require the concentration of a critical mass (e.g., fundraising for Israel, representation before the government, support of a rabbinical seminary, or a placement service providing assistance to localities seeking professional personnel) or serve, for all intents and purposes, one very large local community. If the countrywide bodies tend to be weak, most of the worldwide ones are no more than forums where leaders in their respective communities can regularly meet to exchange views, almost totally outside the awareness of the communities they purport to lead and often with minimal effect on the activities or the quality of life within them.

Categories of World Jewish Organizations

Today's world Jewish polity comprises a network of single and multipurpose functional authorities, no single one of which encompasses the entire gamut of Jewish political interests, although several have attempted to do so. They include the following categories:

1. National institutions -- for example, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish National Fund, Keren HaYesod
2. Multicountry associations -- for example, ORT, World Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith
3. Educational institutions under the auspices of the entire Jewish people -- for example, the universities in Israel
4. Organizations under local sponsorship whose sphere of activity is multicountry -- for example, the Joint Distribution Committee

Ernest Stock has grouped the multicountry associations by their principal goals):

Principal Goal Characteristics	Organization(example)

Political-general purpose	World Zionist Organization
Political-special purpose	World Conference of Soviet Jewry
Distributive	Conference on Material Claims Against Germany
Services-operational	World ORT Union
Services-coordinating	European Council of Jewish Communities
Religious	World Union for Progressive Judaism Agudath Israel World Organization
Association-fraternal	B'nai B'rith International Council
Association-special interest	World Sephardi Federation World Union of Jewish Students

Source: Ernest Stock, "Jewish Multicountry Associations," *American Jewish Year Book, 1974-75,* vol. 75 (New York: American Jewish Committee and Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974), pp. 596-597.

The Historic and Continuing Structure of the *Edah*

Proper understanding of what the future could bring for this world Jewish organizational network and for the place of the Jewish Agency within it, first requires us to step back from the present to understand how authority and power in the Jewish polity have been constitutionally structured organized in the past the principles behind those structures, and how that basic structure continues into the present and is likely to continue in the future as well. What, on the surface, looks like a confusing melange of organizations and institutions, in fact has an identifiable internal logic of its own that has sustained the Jewish people for centuries. In the past Jews have violated that logic only at their own peril. Hence understanding that logic is critically necessary if proper steps are to be taken to improve our present situation.

While the Jewish polity of today is in so many ways sui generis, it is also the heir to a long and well-developed Jewish political tradition, an expression of patterns and processes of governance whose origins lie at the very founding of the Jewish people some 3,500 years ago. The Jewish political experience has been extremely varied over the years, ranging from independent statehood in the Land of Israel to communal autonomy in the very difficult circumstances of exile to voluntary association in the countries of emancipation. It has included monarchic, oligarchic, and democratic forms of government under different conditions; and has had to find ways of expression in almost every time and clime throughout the world. There are some constant and recurring

elements in the Jewish political tradition that continue to be echoed in the American Jewish polity.

The federal element has already been noted. It is part and parcel of the very foundation of the Jewish political experience and tradition, both in the sense of the covenantal founding of the Jewish people (federal is from the Latin foedus meaning covenant) and more explicitly in the predominant form of political organization throughout the history of the Jewish polity beginning with the federation of the twelve tribes. Covenant in Jewish tradition has a strong political as well as a theological dimension. Covenants have been the basis for all legitimate Jewish political organization from Abraham and Sinai to the present.

Brit (covenant) is quintessentially federal in that it conveys the sense of both separation and linkage, cutting and binding. A covenant creates a perpetual bond between parties having independent but not necessarily equal status, called upon to share in a common task. That bond is based upon mutual obligations and a commitment to undertake joint action to achieve certain defined ends, which may be limited or comprehensive, under conditions of mutual respect in such a way as to protect the fundamental integrity of all the parties involved. A covenant is much more than a contract -- though our modern system of contracts is related to the covenant idea -- because it involves a pledge of loyalty beyond that demanded for mutual advantage, often involving the development of a certain kind of community among the partners to the covenant, and ultimately based upon their moral commitment. As a political instrument, covenant resembles the political compacts of the seventeenth and eighteenth century except that it must be provided on a religio-moral base.

Jewish political institutions and behavior reflect this covenantal base in the way they give expression to the political relationship as a partnership based upon a morally grounded pact and, like all partnerships, oriented toward decision and policy-making through negotiation and bargaining. Beyond that, wherever the possibility has existed, Jews have organized their political institutions on a federal basis, whether in the form of the ancient tribal confederacy, the Hellenistic *politeuma,* the medieval confederations of local communities, the Council of the Four Lands in late medieval Poland, the communal federations of the contemporary diaspora based on territorial or country-of-origin communities, the federations of functional agencies as in the American Jewish community, or the party and settlement federations of modern Israel, to cite only a few of the most prominent examples.

By nature, a covenanted community is republican in the original sense of *res publica,* a public thing, rather than the private preserve of any person or institution. In the Bible, the Jewish republic is referred to as the *edah,* from the term for assembly, in other words, a body politic based on the general assembly of its citizens for decision-making purposes. The term and its later equivalent, *knesset,* derived from the Aramaic at the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, have continued to be used to describe the Jewish body-politic ever since *(adat bnei yisrael, knesset yisrael).* The original *edah* was presented literally as an

assembly of the entire people on constitutional matters and the men who had reached military age for others. As such, it parallels and historically precedes similar phenomena such as the Swiss *landesgemeinde,* the Icelandic *althing,* and the New England town meeting.

The basic characteristics of the *edah* can be summarized as follows: 1) Political equality exists for all those capable of taking on responsibility for the defense of the *edah*. 2) Decision-making is in the hands of an assembly that determines its own leaders. 3) The *edah* is portable and not confined to one place. 4) Nevertheless, for it to function completely, the *edah* needs Eretz Israel. 5) The Torah is the fundamental constitution of the *edah* in some appropriate way.

Through Jewish history, the *edah*, meeting as a whole or through some representative part, has been responsible for actions of a constitutional character, whether electing kings in ancient Israel, constituting the Council of the Four Lands in late medieval Poland, or forming communities in the modern United States. The congregational form itself -- the *kahal* or *kehilla* -- is a subsidiary product of the linkage of the covenant and the *edah*. Traditionally, any ten male Jews may come together to form a *kahal* by covenanting among themselves to establish a local framework within the larger framework of the Torah for the conduct of their religious, social and political life. The constitutional terminology of the *kahal* reflects its covenant orientation. Among Sephardic communities, for example, the articles of agreement establishing communities are known as *askamot,* from *haskama* or consent.

On the other hand, the fundamental egalitarianism of the *edah* should not obscure the fact that the Jewish political tradition has a strong aristocratic dimension, in the sense that those who hold the powers of government are trustees for both the people and the Torah, traditionally selected on the basis of some qualifications to be trustees -- Divine sanctification, scholarship, lineage, or wealth as well as talent. In the last analysis, however, the Jewish political tradition is based upon what S.D. Goitein has termed "religious democracy," using the term religious in its original sense of "binding" (as in Ezekiel's *masoret habrit* -- Ezekiel 20:35-37), uniting God, the citizenry and the human governors empowered under the particular regime in operation at the time through covenant.[2]

From earliest times the Jewish polity has been organized in three arenas -- the *edah* as a whole, an intermediate arena of medinot (used here in its original sense as a political jurisdiction, not necessarily a politically sovereign state) or *aretzot* (lands), and local *'arim* (cities, towns, or townships) or *kehillot.* At times the locus of power was with the *edah* as a whole, as it was in the desert and at the time of the united monarchy. At times it was with the *medinot* as during the Second Commonwealth when *Medinat Yahud* (Judea) was the central focus of the *edah*, or *aratzot* as with the Council of the Four Lands or the Jewish community of medieval Egypt. At times it was almost entirely local as was the case with the medieval European communities. In those times the *edah* as a whole was linked primarily through the *halakhic* correspondence between individual *posekim*

(*halakhic* authorities) which served as a communications network of extraordinary efficiency at a time when Jews were unable to sustain any other *edah*-wide political institutions. As befits a federal polity, these arenas were always organized on a non-centralized basis, that is to say, with no single center but rather a diffusion of powers among a network of centers of greater or lesser importance.

In this spirit, governance within the *edah* and its arenas was based upon the delegation and separation of powers. The diffusion of power characteristic of the organizational structure of the *edah* is to a large extent mirrored and amplified by the traditional insistence on its distribution within the various arenas of government. Hierarchical concentration of political authority is rejected, as it would be in any covenantal system true to its fundamental principles. Thus government normally is handled through various *reshuyot* (authorities).

These *reshuyot* have been grouped into three domains, dating back to Sinai and known in Hebrew since the time of the Second Commonwealth as *ketarim* (literally, crowns). According to biblical sources, each *keter* has a grant of authority directly from God, hence all are fundamentally equal as instruments of governance on earth. The three are the *keter torah*, whose task is to give programmatic expression to the Torah, Israel's Divinely-originated constitution; the *keter kehunah*, whose task is to bring God and the *edah* into close proximity through shared rituals and symbolic expressions; and the *keter malkhut*, whose task is to be the vehicle for civil authority to exercise power within the *edah*.

The *keter torah* constitutes the vehicle whereby God's teachings to Israel are interpreted, specified and transmitted; the *keter kehunah* the conduit through which God and the *edah* are brought into constant contact; and the *keter malkhut*, the legitimately empowered means whereby political and civic relationships are structured and regulated in accordance with the covenantal stipulations of a divinely-ordained constitution.

The first normally flows from God to the people through mediating institutions such as prophets, Torah sages, *poskim* and rabbis or rabbinical judges. It is embodied in such classic works as the Torah and the Talmud. The second, which is formally entrusted to the priestly descendants of Aaron, supplemented since the destruction of the Temple by religious and synagogue functionaries, normally involves human initiatives directed heavenward. The third, originally entrusted to patriarchs, elders and judges, then to kings, particularly of the House of David, and then to magistrates *(nesiim)*, exilarchs, and *parnasim* (community leaders) emphasizes human political relationships with other humans.

This unique tripartite division of authority allows the Jewish polity to encompass far more than the narrow functions of contemporary political systems. In effect it embraces religious and social as well as political institutions and expressions, thus constitutionalizing power-sharing in such a way as to reflect the multi-faceted character

of the Jewish people. Each *keter* has a share in the governance of the *edah* through the institutions and officers empowered by it. Each, however, does so from a different base.

What distinguishes this division of authority from a conventional separation of powers systems is that the *ketarim* address themselves first to the source, character, and purpose of authority, only then to issues of function (e.g., executive, legislative, judicial). The latter are usually shared by two or more of the *ketarim* by design. The distinction lies less in the need that each serves than in the perspective each brings to bear on political activities.

By tradition, each *keter* is to be regarded as a mediating institution between God and the *edah* in possession of a distinct focus, thereby enabling each to exercise a constitutional check on the others. Each possesses its own institutional structure. The three are interdependent. No Jewish polity is constitutionally complete unless it contains representatives of all three *ketarim* in one form or another.

While the *ketarim* may be equal in theory, in practice there have been shifts in the balance among them throughout Jewish history along with a degree of inter-*keter* conflict. For example, when David became king, he secured his throne and dynasty by securing the dominance of the *keter malkhut*. He did so by bringing the other two *ketarim* into his court, preserving them but at the same time subordinating them to the throne. Thus Nathan the Prophet could continue to prophesy -- within David's court while David appointed a new high priestly family from among the *kohanim.* During the Second Commonwealth there was a continuing conflict among the three *ketarim* which were rather equally balanced, but after the destruction of the Second Temple, the sages representing the *keter torah* made their *keter* the dominant one, aided by the unique ability of the *halakhah* to serve a community in exile with no political sovereignty. The *keter torah* not only remained dominant for the next 1800 years, it became the grounding for the *edah* in every respect. In our times, however, the reestablishment of the State of Israel, coupled with the increased secularization of Jewish life in both Israel and the diaspora, has led to a resurgence of the *keter malkhut* which has gained the upper hand although once again it is being challenged by the representatives of the *keter torah*.

What is important to note is that these conflicts are based on the premise that all three *ketarim* must continue to function for the polity to be legitimate. All are agreed on this, even if they contest for power within the framework. Periodically in Jewish history there have been efforts to combine or eliminate one or another of the *ketarim,* whether at the time of the prophet Samuel who took all three to himself, as at the time of Hasmonean rule during the Second Commonwealth when the ruling Hasmonean family combined the *keter kehunah* and *keter malkhut*, or in the early stages of the Zionist movement when some of the Zionist settlers and ideologues of Israel thought that only the *keter malkhut* was important. All have failed, in the first two cases disastrously.

All this points to the great force of constitutionalism in the Jewish political tradition. The Jewish polity is a constitutional polity above all, whose fundamental constitution has

remained Torat Moshe (the Torah of Moses), however interpreted throughout the ages. Despite its long and unbroken constitutional foundation, historical circumstances have caused the *edah* to undergo periodic reconstitutions in order to respond to changing conditions. For the *edah* as a whole, these reconstitutions have taken place approximately every ten generations or 300 years, thereby establishing a constitutional basis for the periodization of Jewish history. In each of those reconstitutions a new constitutional referent has been introduced as the principal vehicle for interpreting the original Torah, whether in the form of the prophetic literature, the Mishnah, the Gemarah, or the various medieval codes culminating in the Shulchan Aruch. In the modern epoch (mid-seventeenth to mid-twentieth centuries), there began a struggle between referents, a struggle not yet resolved, one that is at the base of almost all fundamental conflicts in contemporary Jewry.

The *edah* has passed through thirteen such historical epochs and is now in the early stages of the fourteenth (Figure 1). The Jewish world that we know is a product of the thirteenth epoch, whose characteristic regime was that of the voluntary association and which coincides with the modern epoch in world history. It has acquired its present form in the fourteenth epoch whose major manifestation is the restoration of the Jewish state and the role it has played in reconstituting the *edah* so that the Jewish people as a whole again has a structure.

One of the results of the modern epoch was to transform all diaspora Jewish communities into voluntary ones, and while Israel as a state is not a voluntary Jewish community in the same way, most of the Jews who settled in Israel did so voluntarily and involvement in the more Jewish aspects of the community is for the most part voluntary. Thus by the end of the modern epoch the new voluntary character of all Jewish communities has not only become a variable which must be taken into consideration, but a challenge to the survival of the Jewish people, the results of which will only be assessable in the future.

Figure 1

Historical Epochs of the *Edah*

1. *Ha-Avot*/The Forefathers c. 1850-c. 1570 BCE
2. *Avdut Mizrayim*/Egyptian Bondage c. 1570-c. 1280 BCE
3. *Adat Bnei Yisrael*/The Congregation of Israelites c. 1280-1004 BCE
4. *Brit ha-Melukhah*/The Federal Monarchy 1004-721 BCE
5. *Malkhut Yehudah*/The Kingdom of Judah 721-440 BCE
6. *Knesset ha-Gedolah*/The Great Assembly 440-145 BCE
7. *Hever ha-Yehudim*/The Jewish Commonwealth 145 BCE-140 CE
8. *Sanhedrin u-Nesi'ut*/The Sanhedrin and the Patriarchate 140-429 CE
9. *Ha-Yeshivot ve Rashei ha-Golah*/The Yeshivot and Exilarchs 429-748 CE
10. *Yeshivot ve-Geonim*/Yeshivot and the Geonim 748-1038 CE

11. *Ha-Kehillot*/The Kehillot 1038-1348 CE
12. *Ha-Va'adim*/Federations of the Kehillot 1348-1648 CE
13. *Hitagduyot*/Voluntary Associations 1648-1948 CE
14. *Medinah ve-Am*/State and People 1948- CE

Notes

1. Shlomo Dov Goitein, "Political Conflict and the Use of Power in the World of the Ganiza," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Kinship and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and Its Contemporary Uses* (Ramat Gan: Turtledove, 1981).

The Key Players

Instruments of the *Keter Malkhut*: The Key Players

The most concrete manifestation of the shift to preeminence of the *keter malkhut* was the emergence of a coherent set of institutions for that domain on an *edah*-wide basis. Those institutions are increasingly tied together by a sense of common purpose, shared leadership, and programmatic collaboration. Most of them are outgrowths or continuations of the organizations that emerged toward the end of the previous generation.

Our research has identified thirty-two Jewish organizations with principal and continuing interest in the world Jewish polity and its affairs as such, one fourth of which (eight) are anchored in the *keter torah* though they may be designed to operate in the *keter malkhut*, the other three-quarters of which are unequivocally within the *keter malkhut*. While some of these organizations are quite specialized, most are at the very least multi-purpose.

Of these organizations, four deserve designation as major players: the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the World Zionist Organization (WZO), the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the World Jewish Congress (WJC). To them we must add the Government of the State of Israel, which is the major player on the world Jewish scene, ex officio, so to speak. Any ranking of these five would put JAFI in second place with regard to total budget. The State of Israel is far and away in first place with total expenditures in the vicinity of forty billion dollars annually for all purposes, far in excess of any voluntary body. If those expenditures directly related to world Jewry were calculated, that figure would be much, much lower. JAFI's annual expenditure, in the vicinity of half a billion dollars, stands in second place, at the very least. JDC, with a budget of sixty million dollars is third; and fairly close to it is the WZO with forty million dollars, in part derived from the JAFI budget, and now sixty percent of it at least partly controlled by JAFI through the Joint Education Authority. The World Jewish Congress has a budget of four million dollars, of which five hundred thousand dollars consists of WZO support. Thus the direct world Jewry expenditures of the State of Israel and those of JAFI constitute a first tier, those of the JDC and the WZO a second tier, and the WJC a third tier. In matters of revenues, the State of Israel is still in first place with the Magbiot (UJA and Keren HaYesod), the principal revenue-raisers for JAFI, WZO and JDC in second, and the WJC a distant third.

When it comes to priorities, all four organizations equally place world Jewry as their first priority, each for its own specific purposes: JAFI to mobilize world Jewry for building the Jewish state and for fostering Jewish education in the diaspora, the WZO for the same purposes, JDC for relief and rehabilitation of Jews in distress, WJC for mobilization of

world Jewry against anti-Semitism. Three, JAFI, WZO and WJC, are governed by assemblies at least nominally representative of world Jewry.

All three draw from the Jewish communities through local Jewish organizations: JAFI through the Magbiot and in the United States and Canada, the local community federations; WZO, through the Zionist political parties; and WJC through country-wide representative organizations where they exist. JDC is formally governed by a board drawn from U.S. Jewish communities alone, although its civil service is international in character.

In addition to these five actors, the Magbiot and their powerful constituents that provide the revenue must be included for all practical purposes in this list of principal mobilizers of the world Jewish polity. The close intertwining of all of these entities at least in part can be followed through the transfers of payments between them and through their overlapping leadership. If both are followed through, JAFI stands at the very center of the network.

Jewish Agency for Israel. The reconstitution of the Jewish Agency in 1970-1971 separated the WZO and JAFI and restructured the Agency's governing organs so that the "non-Zionist" representatives of the diaspora communities through their fundraising arms were included in them as equal partners. The change was formally marked by a revision of the covenant between the Agency and the state. The Agency that emerged this time was not simply an instrumentality of the Israeli government, designed to achieve limited political and institutional ends; it was, at least potentially, an instrumentality of the Jewish people and a key element in the reemerging world Jewish polity.

The Jewish Agency functions in education, housing, immigration, settlement, and regional and urban rehabilitation, and provides some social services. It remains closely tied to the WZO, which is, in many respects, its alter ego for work in the diaspora. More recently, the Assembly has found its voice, the Board of Governors has found ways to effectively assert its authority, and the Executive has become more responsive to both.

Because the Jewish Agency has become the principal forum for diaspora Jewry to participate in *edah*-wide activities and especially the common tasks of the Jewish people in Eretz Israel, its status and importance have risen rapidly since its reconstitution. It has become the major arena for the internal politics of the *edah* and has attracted many talented and effective diaspora leaders who come to it through a network of organizations -- Zionist, fundraising, and communal-welfare -- of which it is rapidly becoming the nexus for *edah*-wide business. The expansion of its mandate in the early 1980s to include work in the diaspora to promote Jewish education and Aliya has been paralleled by the increase in diaspora community interest in its workings, which strengthens it further.

World Zionist Organization. The WZO was founded at the first Zionist Congress (1897) to attain a "legally secured, publicly recognized national home for the Jewish people." When the Balfour Declaration became part of the League of Nations Mandate for

Palestine (1922), Britain, the Mandatory power, acknowledged the WZO as the "Jewish agency" charged with representing the world Jewish interest in the implementation of the Mandate. WZO transferred that status to the separately constituted Jewish Agency in 1929. The two merged again the in the 1940s after the withdrawal of the non-Zionists from the Agency over the question of Jewish statehood. In 1971, when the Jewish Agency was reconstituted, the WZO resumed its independent status. The WZO retains a 50 percent partnership in the Jewish Agency and the key executive positions, thereby preserving for itself a key -- some would say dominant -- role in the Agency's work.

Today the WZO is charged with implementing the "Jerusalem Program" of 1968, which defines the aims of Zionism as "the unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of Israel in Jewish life;... the preservation of the identity of the Jewish people through the fostering of Jewish and Hebrew education and of Jewish spiritual and cultural values; (and) the protection of Jewish rights everywhere." This makes explicit the new role of the WZO as a diaspora-oriented body, though its original purpose had been to harness efforts of world Jewry for the Yishuv. In part, its functions are those that cannot be subsumed under the headings for which tax-exempt philanthropic money in the United States and elsewhere is contributed. For example, although agricultural settlement money for new immigrants is the domain of the Jewish Agency, the WZO finances and administers agricultural projects in the administered territories, because it is understood that the United States Internal Revenue Service does not want tax-exempt money to be used across the 1949 armistice lines.

Structurally, the WZO is a federation of ideological movements. Most of these constituent bodies have been linked with an Israeli counterpart since the development of the prestate Zionist party system. Increasingly, however, they imperfectly reflect the changes that have occurred in the Israeli party system. The World Confederation of General Zionists, for example, retains nomenclature that ceased to exist in Israel in the 1960s and is often referred to as the "nonparty party." In addition, there is a second tier of nonparty member organizations including the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO), the three worldwide synagogue movements, the World Maccabi Union, and the World Sephardi Federation, which have limited voting rights.

The WZO is governed by the World Zionist Congress, which, in theory, is an elected parliament. The more than six hundred seats in the congress, which meets every four years, are allocated geographically in the following proportions: 38 percent for Israel, 29 percent for the United States, and 33 percent for the other diaspora countries. In Israel, delegates are allocated to the Zionist political parties (that is, all except the Communist and exclusively Arab parties) in proportion to their representation in the Knesset. Each party then designates its delegates accordingly. The voting outside Israel is largely by party lists. In recent years, the parties in the various countries have negotiated the division of their country delegations roughly in proportion to their respective memberships, to avoid holding elections. This led to serious problems of credibility so, in 1986 the Zionist General Council voted to require actual elections as provided by the

WZO constitution. Accordingly, elections were held for the 1987 Congress. However, the parties went back to the negotiated system for the next Congress.

The Congress elects the Executive, in which the major parties are represented, and the General Council (Vaad HaPoel). The General Council meets once or twice a year between congresses. Governance of the WZO is in the hands of a wall-to-wall coalition on the principle that Zionist work is above party wars, with the chairmanship of the Executive and the Congress normally in the hands of the party at the head of the Israeli government at the time or a party in coalition with it.

The party composition of the Zionist movement long antedates the establishment of the state. Almost from its inception, the congresses were assemblies of parties as well as of delegates. Despite a widespread desire for structural changes after 1948, the WZO found it impossible to transcend the party structure, which undoubtedly reduced its effectiveness as a mass movement in the diaspora.

The WZO, as an *edah* instrumentality, never functioned as a representative body in Eretz Israel. After 1917, democratically elected parliamentary bodies were introduced to speak for the Jewish Yishuv. The Zionist parties contested with one another for seats in those bodies.

Periodically, attempts have been made to dilute the political character of the WZO by permitting individuals to affiliate directly with countrywide Zionist federations without first joining political groups and through the affiliations of the nonpolitical groups mentioned above plus B'nai B'rith as associate members. Full membership, however, remains reserved for the political groups while offices and rewards are distributed according to a modified party key.

In the federated structure that is the WZO, the influence of the Israeli center is greater than the sum of its parts. This is because the center represents Israel to the diaspora bodies: it originates programs, has a highly articulated bureaucracy, and allocates the financial resources. The status of the WZO in the diaspora is weakened by the lack of clarity about its tasks in the era of statehood. The effect of the late David Ben-Gurion's openly critical attitude toward the WZO has not yet worn off. The aims of the WZO are broad enough, and its apparatus wide-ranging enough, for it to assume the character of a conglomerate among multicountry Jewish organizations; but its party political structure sets limits to its acceptance on a broad popular basis. Party politics also has served to narrow the outlook of the WZO and prevent it from offering the Jewish Agency and the Jewish world a broad-based program the way that it could have.

Joint Distribution Committee. A major share of multicountry activity in education, welfare, and community organization is performed by organizations formally sponsored by individual countrywide communities. Outstanding among them is the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the chief overseas welfare agency of American Jewry and one of the two partners in the united Jewish Appeal. Although

sponsored and governed by American Jews, its staff is multicountry and its range of operations is probably greater than that of any other Jewish body.

The JDC organizes and finances rescue, relief, and rehabilitation programs for imperiled and needy Jews throughout the world; conducts a wide range of health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation programs; and provides aid to cultural and religious institutions. It serves some 430,000 Jews in twenty-five countries, including Israel. It contributes financially to the support of many other Jewish organizations, and it works with most of the other *edah* bodies in the fulfillment of its mission. Its headquarters are in New York, with regional headquarters in Paris and Jerusalem.

The evolution of the JDC since its founding in 1914 reflects the transformations that have taken place in Jewish life in the twentieth century. Its beginnings were in ad hoc relief, an American Jewish response to World War I, the first of the great crises to bring disaster to Jews in the twentieth century. As such, it became the embodiment of Jewish unity when under siege, as American Jews from all the ideological camps -- Socialist, Orthodox, and Progressive -- found a way to join with one another despite their great ideological differences to provide relief and restock for fellow Jews.

After the war's end, the Russian Revolution and the various eastern European regional wars created new needs, and the JDC was institutionalized as a permanent instrument for American Jewish relief efforts. It became a classic emancipationist institution, committed to enabling and even encouraging Jews to find their way within the countries in which they were located. In part, this was an American Jewish response to the severe limitations placed on immigration to the United States, but it is of great significance that effectively the response was anti-Zionist.

This orientation did not change until the impact of Nazism became apparent and the JDC had to reevaluate its stance. Even so, not until the takeover of the eastern European countries by Soviet-sponsored Communist regimes that sooner or later expelled the JDC, charging it with being a foreign agent, did the "Joint" truly shift its orientation. At approximately the same time, early in the 1950s, Ben-Gurion persuaded the JDC to undertake major responsibilities for the relief of the elderly and chronically ill refugees who had come to Israel as part of the mass immigration in the years immediately following the establishment of the state. This brought the "Joint" to Israel in a major way. Since then, there has been a consistent expansion of the JDC role in the Jewish state, most recently moving from relief, rehabilitation, and institutional support to concerns such as the improvement of civic life and local government in Israel.

In the meantime, the major thrust of the JDC relief activities outside Israel was shifted to the remnant Jewish communities in the Islamic world. In addition, the JDC played a major role in rebuilding European Jewry in the aftermath of World War II and continues to play a significant, if reduced, role in encouraging European Jews to strengthen their Jewish institutions. The JDC also returned to eastern Europe during a thaw in the cold war and continues its work there in a low-key way.

The JDC is held in high respect within the Jewish world and has succeeded in penetrating into places where Jewish institutions are usually forbidden or severely limited. Its success stems from its constant striving to be a professional rescue and relief organization, nonpolitical, and dedicated to maintain as low a profile as needed to achieve its tasks.

The JDC sees itself as a very professional organization, one in which professionals play a very major role in decision making. Its major concerns are in relief and rehabilitation with Jewish education a close second. Its programs and projects are all perceived by its leadership to be for as long as a need for JDC action exists rather than permanent ones. JDC has carefully cultivated a non-political stance, so that it was and is able to work in countries otherwise closed to world Jewish activities.

JDC cooperates with many partner organizations. Obviously the CJF and UJA are responsible for raising its funds. With UIA, its partner in the UJA, it decides on the formula for dividing the UJA funds. JDC cooperates with such diverse organizations as the Jewish National Fund, Keren HaYesod, WIZO, Alliance Israelite Universelle, ORT, B'nai B'rith and Hadassah. There is little duplication between the JDC and any of them.

The JDC-JAFI relationship, however, is far more complex than any other JDC linkage. They both have long term cooperative relationships with each other and JDC generally works well with JAFI field staff, but they have very different ways of doing business. JAFI has political relations while JDC seeks to be non-political. JAFI programs are established as permanent ones and not just on the basis of need. These are the kinds of differences that occur between a government and a philanthropy and include differences of style that can often be the most aggravating to representatives of both bodies. Nevertheless, both sides see the collaboration as beneficial except perhaps when each is competing for credit on projects that both undertake.

JDC has operated in over 70 countries throughout the world and has been involved in everything from rescuing the remnants of European Jewry after the Holocaust to rebuilding Jewish communities in Western Europe to supporting efforts to modernize Jewish life in African and Asia. JDC is recognized worldwide as a leader in what it does and had played its role in international aid programs via international development program in such body as the Interfaith Hunger Appeal. It is often give assignments by the United States and the United Nations in that context. Within the Jewish polity it has primary cooperative efforts with the AIU and ORT education and vocational training as well as JAFI.

World Jewish Congress. The World Jewish Congress (WJC) has as its main purpose the defense of Jewish rights, and to that end it aims to be representative of the widest possible spectrum of world Jewry. It is an avowedly diaspora-oriented organization. Its specific activities in recent years have included intervention on behalf of Jews in Arab countries; pressure for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals and for indemnification payments to their victims; contacts with Christian church bodies on questions of Israel and anti-Semitism; cultural assistance to small Jewish communities; relations with

international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe; espousal of the cause of Soviet Jewry; maintaining Jewish contacts with the Third World; and support of Israel in its diplomatic struggles.

Like the WZO, the World Jewish Congress has a federative structure. In theory it is a confederation of countrywide representative community bodies, with the general body deliberately limiting itself in scope. The members -- independent community organizations -- are free to determine their own policies locally. The WJC's constitution prohibits it from operating or speaking in a country unless its local constituents agree, except where no organized community exists or where a community cannot freely express its will.

On the other hand, the WJC may set up branches in countries without representative organizations or where the leading groups are unwilling to participate. Thus, when the Board of Deputies of British Jews refused to affiliate, the WJC established a British Section. In the United States, the American Jewish Congress initially functioned as the American arm of the WJC. When differences arose between the two groups, the WJC established a North American Section, which has recently begun to enroll rabbinical and congregational associations as affiliates. Conversely, the Canadian Jewish Congress and DAIA (the representative organization of Argentine Jewry) are, as representative organizations, directly affiliated with the WJC.

The WJC Executive works through four regional branches, each with its own constitution -- in North America, South America, Europe, and Israel -- that mediate between the parent body and affiliates. The European branch, which operates primarily in western Europe, also maintains ties with community organizations in the former Communist bloc. The Israeli branch does not have constituent organizations. Composed in keeping with the ubiquitous party key, its eighteen members are drawn from the spectrum of parliamentary parties.

Because its members are organizations, the number of individuals actually associated with the WJC is small. Some 400 to 500 delegates attend the quadrennial assemblies. Between assemblies, an executive committee of 120 meets annually, to which every member organization sends at least one delegate. There are also a governing council of 35, a secretary-general in Geneva, and a director-general in New York, since 1981 the center of its governance. Its cultural department is headquartered in Israel, its political department in Paris, and its policy research institute is in London. Among the members of the governing council is a strong contingent of prominent rabbis and diaspora Zionist leaders.

The WJC has complemented the WZO in areas where the latter could not operate, but it has also been the WZO's potential rival. For this reason, the Zionist leadership's attitude toward the WJC has always been one of ambivalence. In the 1930s, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, as the WZO president, stayed away from the founding assembly of the WJC,

persisting in his resolve to avoid diaspora Jewish politics. Although most of the Zionist Congress voted to designate the WJC as the most suitable instrument for the protection of Jewish rights, thereby ensuring WZO representation in (and in recent years subsidization of) the WJC, the concern that diaspora interests might compete with those of the Yishuv was never far submerged and has surfaced again in the era of the state. The notion of an organization representing world Jewry which might hold a position independent of Israel has little appeal to the state's policymakers.

A second, equally substantial element in the inability of the WJC to become the representative organization of world Jewry was the unwillingness of the major Jewish organizations in the United States and Britain to become part of the WJC structure. The real bases of the WJC are in Latin America and Europe. It may well be the dominant regional Jewish organization in Latin America, but that region is not strong enough on the world Jewish scene to be a real power base. The diminution of Europe's strength after the Holocaust, coupled with the emergence of the European Council of Jewish Community Services as an increasingly important regional force, has weakened the role of the WJC on that continent. Finally, the dominance of the WJC by Nahum Goldmann and his coterie of supporters for the entire postwar generation weakened the organization internally by discouraging new leadership and externally by making Goldmann's agenda -- and quarrels -- its own.

After Goldmann's death, the WJC went into a certain eclipse, modified only by the fact that in those years, at the height of the Cold War and the isolation of Israel from the Third World, the WJC continued to play a role in fostering and protecting the interests of Israel and world Jewry in those parts of the world where the state itself could not easily represent its own interests. When Edgar Bronfman accepted the presidency, he and his senior staff revitalized the organization through senior staff replacement, movement of the WJC offices, active public relations efforts, and reaching out to Jews in the smallest communities to bring them into WJC operations. Support from the WZO continued, but, with the new infusions of funding due to Bronfman's involvement, the WZO's contribution of five hundred thousand dollars a year became an increasingly smaller share of the WJC budget.

Government of Israel. The government of the State of Israel now acts as a principal defender of the physical welfare of the Jewish people under certain circumstances (for example, dealing with Nazi war criminals and terrorists) and maintains that it does so in the name of the *edah*. Thus, the security forces of Israel sometimes defend all Jews, the Knesset of Israel plays a major role in defining their status as Jews, and the prime minister or president sometimes speaks in their name. Beyond that, the government of Israel is involved in all major decisions of world Jewry that it chooses to be, formally or informally. If the State of Israel is directly affected, then its government usually will be formally involved. In any case, its voice carries great weight.

World Jewry directly spends between forty and forty-five billion dollars of public funds for its functions or sustenance. Those funds are drawn from Israeli taxpayers and diaspora

contributors. Perhaps ten percent of those funds go directly to the world purposes of the world Jewish polity, including the transportation and absorption of Jews emigrating from lands of stress to lands of freedom, principally Israel.

The relationship between these Big Five organizations is partly constitutionalized and partly informal. It is portrayed perhaps in its best form as a triangular relationship. The State of Israel is located at the middle of the triangle and has links to all four voluntary organizations. Those with JAFI and the WZO are institutionalized and constitutionalized. So is the relationship between the WZO and JAFI. The WZO also has a less extensive constitutionalized relationship with WJC. JAFI does not have a formally constitutionalized relationship with JDC but shares with it common funding and leadership and a long history of cooperation in one form or another. The least linkage is between WJC and JDC except when on an ad hoc cooperative basis. The State of Israel, on the other hand, has regular ad hoc and contractual relationships with both.

Instruments of the *Keter Torah* and *Keter Kehunah*

Because the new pluralism in Jewish life has generated differing interpretations of the Torah-as-constitution, the *keter torah* is organized on clearly sectoral lines. Within it, older institutions and officers continue to serve various segments of the *edah* in more or less traditional ways. At the same time, others have changed and new institutions have emerged to serve other groups in new ways and to maintain traditional patterns. Hence there are no *keter torah* organizations among the key organizations as such, although the *keter torah* is represented in some way in all of them.

Outstanding among the survivors from the previous epoch are a limited number of *posekim* (*halakhic* decision-makers) with *edah*-wide influence in their own camp and some similarly placed yeshivot. The chief *posekim* of the Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox are organized in the Moetzet Gedolei haTorah (Council of Torah Greats). Hassidic groups, whose centers are now transplanted either to Israel or to the United States, also survive (although their principal officer is now usually a rebbe, not a *tzaddik).* Conspicuous among those groups are the Chabad (Lubavitcher) Hassidim, one of the few Hassidic sects that attempts to reach out to the *edah*. More recently, a Sephardic *Moeztet Hakhmei haTorah* (Council of Torah Sages) has emerged, comprising leading *posekim* in the Sephardic world.

Non-Orthodox representatives of this *keter* are found primarily in or around seminaries of their movements, reflecting the combination of rabbinical and professorial status that marks the effort of the non-Orthodox to combine modern and traditional forms. Because the Reform movement is much less oriented to the concept of the *keter torah* than the Conservative, this phenomenon is more pronounced among the latter. In recent years, both movements have been given increasing emphasis to the rule of their rabbinical associations in deciding issues of Jewish law and custom.

Prominent among the new institutions in this keter are the professors of Jewish studies at Israeli and other universities who have acquired status as constitutional commentators and guides. These, and others drawn from the intellectual community, address themselves to Jewish concerns in an academic fashion; in so doing they lay the groundwork for new interpretations of the Torah-as-constitution. Many of the most prominent of them were also ordained as rabbis but who chose academic careers or at least academic bases for their careers. This gives them a double source of authority.

The same can be said of the *keter kehunah* only more so. The domain of the *keter kehunah* embraces various rabbinates and synagogue bodies that are occupied with ritual functions and their management. Some instruments of this *keter* have become more highly organized than at any time since the destruction of the Second Temple. The world synagogue movements and the organized rabbinates in the United Kingdom and Israel are outstanding examples. The rabbinates are important because they provide examples of how *medinah*-based instruments of this *keter* now attempt to perform an *edah*-wide function. For example, the Israeli chief rabbinate provides direct services for some small communities (e.g., Iran, India) as does the United Kingdom rabbinate of the United Synagogue for some communities in countries that once were part of the British Empire. The World Council of Synagogues (Conservative, established 1957) and the World Union for Progressive Judaism (Reform, established 1926) are associations of countrywide congregational bodies.

Other Players

Perhaps the best way to approach the roles of the other players in the world Jewish polity is through their relations with JAFI. A summary of those relationships for the past several decades would portray a relatively complex pattern of interrelationships which already has most of the principal world Jewish organizations linked to JAFI in one way or another. Indeed, the world Jewish polity is already manifested in a very real inter-organizational network. Let us look at a number of organizations in turn.

1. Agudath Israel World Organization (AIWO). AIWO was founded in 1912 by European ultra-Orthodox Jews to embrace those who rejected Zionism but were interested in the upbuilding of Eretz Israel in the traditional way without embracing what they saw as the rejection of God's will by the Zionist movement. As a result, while AIWO rejected Zionism in a number of ways, it cooperated with the Zionist authorities in Eretz Israel, at least since the 1920s, and continues to do so. In the prestate period and subsequently, it instructed its members to vote in Israel's elections, to sign Israel's declaration of independence and, more recently, to participate in Israel government coalitions. As an organization, it is deliberately dominated by the Council of Torah Greats, rabbis they consider the leading *halakhic* authorities in the world at any given time, but also representing the individual groups that together form Agudath Israel. The Council ties AIWO closely to the *keter torah* but enables it to be involved in various activities of the *keter malkhut* through subsidiary leadership and institutions. AIWO does not seek to be in the mainstream of Jewish organizational life. Moreover, since the divisions which have taken place in the ultra-Orthodox camp in the 1980s, it no longer represents the world of ultra-Orthodoxy either, the way it once did, only parts of it.

Past Agudath Israel activities in the diaspora concentrated heavily on institution building, particularly yeshivot and schools, the rescue of Jews in difficult situations, whether from the nazis or from the Communists. It makes and has made extensive efforts in the sphere of traditional Jewish education at times in the past and presently and has received UIA funds via JAFI and grants from the JDC and the Israeli government principally in connection with education activities. It established the independent education system in Israel. AIWO is quite political. Prior to World War II it elected representatives to "Jewish seats" in various European parliaments and has always elected members to the Knesset. While it seems to be so out of the mainstream, in fact, because of its position in Israeli politics, it has more influence than might otherwise be expected. It also is one of the most traditionally organized of Jewish organizations in terms of providing space and roles for the three ketarim within its structure and assuming that part of being Jewish is maintaining a serious governance effort and being involved politically. Beyond that, while the total numbers of people counted as Agudat Israel's constituency may be considerably smaller than the constituencies of the "mainstream" Jewish organizations, most of those in its constituency are serious members of the constituency, aware of its structure and functions and loyal to it, unlike most of the "members" of the mainstream

constituencies who are probably not in any respect aware that they are even being counted within them.

2. Alliance Israelite Universelle. The oldest of all world Jewish organizations and undisputably within the *keter malkhut*, the AIU was founded in France in 1860 by French Jewish emancipationist assimilationists who sought to secure Jewish rights in the lands of the east and at the same time to educate Jews to be citizens of their respective countries. In the late 19th century, AIU established a network of schools in the Balkans, Asia, and North Africa where it made a major contribution to Jewish efforts to leave their backward and isolated conditions. Its role declined when French influence was replaced by American in the twentieth century and English became the new world language. Not only did the French-speaking AIU lose its leading role, but it was further weakened by the evacuation of the Jewish populations of the Muslim lands after 1948. Today it is only a shadow of its former self. As a French-based organization, it has difficulty playing a role in a predominantly English-speaking Jewish world. Its schools do receive subsidies from JDC and its leadership is involved in the appropriate Jewish bodies.

3. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL). This is an organization located well within the *keter malkhut*. ADL was founded in 1913 by B'nai B'rith to fight anti-Semitism in the United States in the wake of the Leo Frank trial. Since then, it has grown to be independent of B'nai B'rith in all but name to become one of the three major Jewish human relations agencies in the United States.

In the aftermath of World War II, ADL expanded it foreign involvement in North American, Canada, Latin American, Europe, and Israel. It now has offices and, in some cases, active programs in all. Its principal tasks are fighting against ongoing manifestations of anti-semitism and monitoring hate groups, developing school curricula and teacher training programs that emphasize the ideals of civil rights and anti-extremist tendencies. ADL in Israel also deals with the Israel-U.S. relationships and coordinates activities in the fight against anti-Semitism with the Israeli government. It plays a major role on the Canadian Jewry scene and competes with WJC in some European countries.

ADL cooperates on an ad hoc basis with the other organizations that are part of the "Jewish lobby" in Washington. Collaboration with JAFI is almost non-existent. The ADL leadership had indicated that it is not in favor of any kind of all embracing umbrella organization.

4. Arzenu. Arzenu is the Zionist party of the world Reform movement. It primary purposes include advocacy of Zionism among Reform Jews and advocacy of equal status for Reform Judaism in Israel. It is an integral part of the World Zionist Organization. Since it is represented in the WZO as a Zionist party and an integral part of the WZO, it is within the network in every respect.

5. B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations. This is one of the few B'nai B'rith functions that can be seen as part of the *keter torah*. Since the first B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations were

founded in 1923, they have spread throughout the United States, and after World War II, in both Americas, Europe, Australia, and Israel. It has become the principle campus organization serving Jewish university students. Given its position, it is unlikely to have formal relationships with the other organizations of world Jewish polity but to cooperate with them on an ad hoc programming basis. Local foundations often receive funding from local communities and may receive some from other communal institutions as well as international B'nai B'rith. They do have an important influence on the young people perhaps through the foundations while at the University. In that sense, it has an influence on the future leadership of the world Jewish polity.

6. B'nai B'rith International (BB). This is a major worldwide Jewish organization, just below the Big Five in importance, and now connected to them through the WZO. It is another instrumentality of the *keter malkhut*. It was founded in the United States in 1843 before the AIU although it was not extended internationally until shortly after the AIU was founded. By the turn of the century, it already had lodges throughout Europe and the Middle East. Rapidly declining in the United States, B'nai B'rith fraternal, educational, social, and humanitarian activities are the vehicle for certain segments of the Jewish leadership to advance in the Jewish world. Most of its functions are located in the lodge or district arenas. Its international leadership are primarily engaged in Jewish polities, so it is one of the organizations that has to be especially conciliated to bring it into a more comprehensive network if the Big Five were to go in that direction.

7. Central British Fund -- World Jewish Relief. While its philanthropies extend beyond Britain, its activities, organizations are confined to the British Isles and it does not play a significant world role.

8. Chabad. Chabad, the official name of the Lubavitch Hassidic movement, has sought since World War II to become almost a parallel structure for world Jewry. Convinced as it is of the righteousness of its ultra-Orthodox cause and empowered by its members' deep faith in the Lubavitcher Rebbe, they have managed to grow phenomenally, under his direction, and establish bases and outposts throughout the world including, at least for a while, capturing the Agudat Israel political party in Israel as their vehicle in the 1988 elections. Chabad generally relates to the rest of the Jewish world when it wants to ask for something, either funding for its institutions or legislation on who is a Jew. Otherwise it does not seek to be an active player in the world Jewish polity except on its own terms, which means as a separate entity without accepting any kind of overall discipline.

9. Coalition for the Advancement of Jewish Education (CAJE). An American product of the 1960s, CAJE has been very successful in providing a forum for Jewish educators for an exchange of ideas in Jewish education. After its success in the United States, it stimulated the development of a similar coalition in Europe and has held a convention in Israel. It has connected with the American institutions involved with the JAFI Joint Education Authority. It is a player on the world scene only within the narrow compass of its *keter torah*-related concerns. It works with JAFI and the WZO representatives in the United States.

10. Council for Jewish Federations (CJF). This preeminent body on the North American Jewish scene is classically located in the *keter malkhut* and is connected to the Big Five with close ties with JAFI, JDC, and the State of Israel. Although not formally among the Big Five because of its primary countrywide role as the major American Jewish power in the JAFI partnership, it is formally excluded from that circle by a technicality and actually is very influential within it, formally as part of the JAFI constituency and leadership group.

CJF describes its mission as building Jewish community life around the world and insuring Jewish continuity across the generations via the transmission of Jewish values. It serves as the collective instrument of the North American Jewish federations and strives to foster links between Jewish communities everywhere. It has myriad connections with the leading organizations of the world Jewish polity and provides a substantial portion of its leaders. Although it may be formally an equal among the other organizations, it will always be a "first among equals."

11. Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. It was established at the initiative of the World Jewish Congress as a single purpose organization within the *keter malkhut*, to gain reparations from the German authorities at the time when Germany was pursuing its return to the world stage as a democracy. It pursued its single purpose singularly well as far as the Federal Republic of Germany was concerned but had no success in Communist East Germany. Its major task completed, it remained in existence as a shadow of its former self until the fall of the iron curtain after 1989, when issues of reparations of the eastern bloc reemerged on the table. A creature of the World Jewish Congress, which maintains close ties with that organization, WJC stepped in to supersede it and managed to do so by the early 1990s. It is a classic example of a successful specialized single purpose authority established by the world Jewish leadership to respond to a need and "assigned" to one of the Big Five. It plays in the game only within its assigned sphere of activity and even there it has become very weak.

12. Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations (CCJO). A coordinating body of *keter malkhut* organizations, defined by the United Nations as a non-governmental organization with consultative status with the United Nations, UNESCO, ILO, UNICEF, and the Council of Europe, particularly in matters of human rights and other matters of an economic, social, cultural, and educational nature involving Jews. It was established as part of an attempt to prevent the Jews from speaking with too many different voices before those organizations. It has developed no standing and is not significant in the world Jewish polity.

13. Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations (CBJO). This body links B'nai B'rith, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the South African Board of Jewish Deputies for representation before the united Nations international bodies. It is the mirror image of CCJO serving a different set of organizations and has almost no serious independent existence.

14. Hadassah. Hadassah claims to be the largest women's Zionist organization in the world. It is a cross between a Zionist political party and the dominant force in the Confederation of General Zionists, the "non-party bloc" in the WZO. It is the social-cultural philanthropic organization for Jewish women, particularly in the United States, but in recent years, also in Israel and Europe on a more modest scale. As a leading member of the WZO, its leaders play an active role among the Big Five organizations and their network. Still it is primarily an American Jewish membership organization. Established in 1912, it is the principal point of contact with Jewish life for many American Jewish women, and also a powerful actor in world Jewish politics. It is the sponsor of a number of worthwhile social and health projects in Israel, and the potent force in world Jewish organizational politics. It has special connections to Hadassah hospitals in Jerusalem, Youth Aliyah, and the Young Judean youth movement in the United States. It is squarely within the *keter malkhut*.

15. Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). While principally an American Jewish organization, HIAS is tied into the world Jewish network because it receives its funding through UJA, and is frequently involved in either competition or antagonistic cooperation with JAFI with regard to the resettlement of Jewish refugees in Israel or the United States. HIAS is strongly committed to "freedom of choice" and actively promotes the resettlement of Jewish refugees in the United States. It is also a specialized *keter malkhut* organization.

16. Herut-Hatzohar. Herut-Hatzohar is the worldwide expression of the Likud (Herut) party including the Zionist Revisionists. It functions as a member of the WZO and to mobilize support for the Likud throughout the world.

17. International Association of Jewish Vocational Services (IAJVS). This body is an expansion of the National Association of Jewish Vocational Services, established in the United States in 1939. It serves as the coordinator and clearinghouse for its affiliates. Its field of interest includes 29 Jewish vocational affiliates in North America and Israel, and assists other organizations around the world. In recent years it has been preoccupied with finding employment for Soviet Jewish refugees. While the International Association is very small, it claims that its affiliates serve nearly 50,000 annually. It is basically an American Jewish organization that can define itself to its area of interest. It is a *keter malkhut* authority.

18. International Jewish Committee for Interreligious Consultations (IJCIC). This body was established at the initiative of the World Jewish Congress to coordinate Jewish representations to the Christian world, particularly the Vatican, and to eliminate a kind of free-for-all competition of Jewish organizations seeking access to the Catholic hierarchy. Indeed, it was stimulated by the desire of the Church leadership to have an address with whom they could speak rather than having to weigh and balance the claims of different organizations. Since its founding it has played that role under the informal leadership of the World Jewish Congress.

19. International Sephardic Education Foundation. Established in 1977 to provide funds for educating Israeli students, primarily of Sephardic background, to make use of their full potential in Israeli society by studying in their chosen fields in Israel and abroad, and is strictly an educational funding institution. It plays no role in political affairs.

20. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA). This policy studies institute has its origins in an academic consortium established in 1968 and achieved its present form in 1976. It is a policy studies institute serving Israel and the Jewish people and has specialized in doing policy studies for state and local government in Israel, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the World Zionist Organization, and others of the Big Five Jewish community, federations in North American and many other organizations in various parts of the Jewish world. It is a non-partisan body whose principal political concerns are to strengthen world Jewry and its various parts as a polity. It maintains ties to all of the Big Five organizations and many of the other ones. It is influential to the extent that it provides knowledge and understanding for those involved in the world Jewish polity.

21. Jewish Colonization Association (ICA). Founded in 1891 to provide assistance for European Jews seeking a better life, primarily through emigration. Baron Edmund Rothschild used it as a mechanism to provide support for early Jewish colonization in Eretz Israel. It and its sister organization, the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA), lie within the complex of Rothschild institutions devoted to support of Jewish settlement in Israel, but play no overt role other than a philanthropic one.

22. Jewish Educational Service of North America (JESNA). JESNA is a specialized umbrella body associated with the countrywide Council of Jewish Federations and located in adjacent quarters. JESNA is the successor to the American Association for Jewish Education and acts as the service agency of the local bureaus of Jewish education and to some extent also includes the countrywide organizations that claim to have a major interest in Jewish education. It provides technical services and studies educational needs and problems.

23. Jewish National Fund (JNF). The Jewish National Fund was established by the WZO in 1901 to undertake the task of purchasing and reclaiming land in Eretz Israel. It still plays that role, albeit in more sophisticated ways. The Jewish National Fund is an integral component of the WZO complex. It functions worldwide and with branches and local chapters in many countries. Its work remains within the sphere where it began but it shifted to a development emphasis after 1948 and extended that work in Judea, Samaria and Gaza after 1967. It developed a more explicitly environmentalist focus in the 1970s. The provision of park and recreation facilities are among its principal functions. Since its fundraising is separate, its budget is not part of the WZO package although its expenditures are basically controlled by Zionist party members who form its leadership. It is a national institution of the Jewish people.

24. Keren HaYesod -- United Israel Appeal (KH). As a constituent institution of JAFI, KH is very close to the Big Five. It is in the anomalous position of being a creature of the

WZO, yet as an independent organization its leaders are drawn from separate country-wide KH organizations throughout the world. It is a very influential player in the world Jewish polity and especially within the Jewish Agency. Curiously enough, it probably has more influence within JAFI than within its parent WZO which has a different set of organizing principals. Occupants of its key positions do represent its member political parties, while the voluntary KH leadership stays out of the party framework in its organization and strives to distance itself from it. KH was established in 1920 to raise funds for the development of a Jewish national home in Eretz Israel. Today it conducts campaigns in 47 countries with over two million Jews. The United Palestine Appeal, later the United Israel Appeal, took over KH functions in the United States in 1925. Since then, KH has served everywhere else in the Jewish world, except in the USA. The overwhelming involvement of KH is in fundraising and in developing new leadership to serve that end. It is located in the *keter malkhut*.

25. Maccabi World Union. The Maccabi World Union is "non-political and non-partisan youth/sports movement" founded in 1921. Its secondary purpose is Zionist education, especially as a member of the WZO. It has country-wide subsidiaries throughout the world. Its primary function is to recruit and prepare athletes for the Quadrennial Maccabiah Games held in Israel. Its role on the world scene beyond that is essentially through WZO. Politically, it is in the General Zionist or Liberal sphere. It is located in the *keter malkhut*.

26. Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. The Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture was established in 1965 with funds remaining from the reparations given the Jewish people by the Federal Republic of Germany. Its purpose was and is to restore the Jewish culture destroyed in the Holocaust and to encourage the spread of Jewish culture beyond that. A foundation, it is composed of 54 member organizations representing all streams and viewpoints along the Jewish spectrum, and even claims to have evolved into a kind of cultural parliament of the Jewish people. The original gift of ten million dollars produces its funding but is too small to allow it to expend sufficient funds to play the role it was intended to play.

For many years it was the principal source of funding for restoring Jewish cultural monuments in Europe, publishing Jewish works and training Jewish scholars, but today it has been eclipsed by many privately endowed foundations established by wealthy Jews in the intervening years with up to 30 times as much endowment. Nevertheless, the foundation has made an important contribution to the Jewish scene. It is the closest thing the world Jewish polity has to a cultural authority. The Memorial Foundation itself generally sticks to its educational and cultural purposes.

27. Mercaz. Merkaz is the Zionist arm of the Conservative/Masorti movement and represents Conservative Judaism within the World Zionist Organization. Its primary strength comes from the United States, although it also has representatives from other parts of the world where Masorati Judaism has a presence. It plays the role of any political party within the WZO, although somewhat reluctantly. Because of its

predominantly religious orientation, its leaders feel somewhat uncomfortable with out and out party political activity. It seeks support for eligible Masorti institutions in Israel and educational activities in Israel and the diaspora.

28. Simon Wiesenthal Center. Founded in 1977 to pursue research and education in connection with the Holocaust, the Wiesenthal Center, after a phenomenal mail order fundraising record, has become a significant actor on the world Jewish scene by virtue of its ability to capture headlines and get itself recognized by the media as an authoritative spokesman on Holocaust matters and to mobilize funds from a wide spectrum of Jews, particularly in North America, otherwise little connected with the more established institutions of the world Jewish polity. It does not seek to work with the rest of the world Jewish polity, but rather to pursue its own course for its own gain. It must be reckoned with in some way but is not a team player, nor does it seek to be.

29. United Israel Appeal. The official representative body for American Jewry in the JAFI partnership, it is the channel through which most American Jewish representation to JAFI is filtered. UIA relies upon Jewish community federations as the source of most of that representation. It serves as the conduit for UJA funds to JAFI. It is the overseeing body for those funds and U.S. government grants to JAFI. It is also the largest formal owner of property in Israel after the Israeli government. Because of UIA's critical role in overseeing JAFI funds and in connecting the communities of American Jewry with JAFI, it is a major player in the world Jewish polity.

30. United Jewish Appeal. Like the KH, it is essentially a fundraising organization that also undertakes leadership development and educational activities designed to support its primary mission. It is confined to fundraising in the United States for the United Israel Appeal, Joint Distribution Committee and the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA). Its fundraising is done through the community federations in the United States. Nevertheless, its influence is substantial by virtue of the amount of money it and the federations raise which provides approximately eighty percent of the JAFI budget. It is well represented in the UIA representation in JAFI. Hence, it is very much part of the JAFI component of the partnership.

31. Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO). WIZO was founded in 1920 and operates in Israel and the rest of the world. It did not have a presence in the United States until Hadassah began establishing chapters outside of North America, at which time WIZO began to build a new presence in the United States which is still very small, but exists. WIZO operates a network of educational, social and philanthropic institutions in Israel and chapters throughout the world designed to promote Jewish ties for women and to raise funds for its Israel projects. WIZO is a member of the World Zionist Organization and its representative bodies, where it functions primarily to protect its perceived organizational interests.

32. World Conference of Jewish Communal Service. This is the professional association of those employed in serving Jewish communities throughout the world. Its offices are

located in Israel but unquestionably the initiative for its establishment came from the Jewish Communal Service Association of North America. It has slowly grown to embrace its counterparts in Israel and other diaspora communities as well. Its principal activity is a quadrennial world congress. Should the worldwide Jewish civil service develop, this may become a body of greater significant in the future. Even now it is a main channel of communication and a rallying point for those who have committed themselves professionally to Jewish communal service throughout the world.

33. World Conference of Synagogues. This organization was established as an apolitical vehicle for modern Orthodox Jews to participate in the WZO. At present, it is in the process of reorganization and is designed to serve as a counterpart to the World Union for Progressive Judaism and the World Council of Synagogues. As such, it is represented in the world Zionist institutions.

34. World Council of Synagogues. This is the world organization of Conservative and Masorti congregations, the formal expression of world Masorti Judaism in Israel. Actually it is more a creature of the United Synagogue of America, by far the most powerful congregational body in the Conservative movement, but in recent years it has been increasing its world reach and representation.

35. World Labor Zionist Movement. The World Labor Zionist Movement is the worldwide organization of the Israel Labor Party and its party identified supports. Its principal functions in the world Jewish polity are within the WZO, while its branches in the countries around the world promote identification with the Labor Party in Israel and its programs. The World Labor Zionist Movement operates in 18 countries.

36. World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries (WOJAC). WOJAC was founded in 1975 to present the case of the Jews of Arab countries that came to Israel after 1948 and are seeking restitution for properties left behind. It was designed principally to balance Arab refugee claims that might be raised at the time of the peace negotiations. Initially, it was not looked on with particular favor by the Israeli government, which, for Zionist reasons has argued that Jews coming to Israel are never to be considered refugees. It pursues its substantive purpose and does not get involved with the politics of world Jewry beyond that.

37. World ORT Union (ORT). ORT was established in Czarist Russia over 100 years ago to help prepare the Jews of the Russian Empire for emancipation by giving them appropriate vocational training. Since then it has spread throughout the Jewish world and has been so successful in its vocational training efforts that it has been called upon by international organizations to undertake the vocational training of refugees in general. While it raises money throughout the Jewish world, it sticks to its vocational education function. In that capacity, it cooperates with JAFI, Youth Aliyah, the Israeli government and the JDC. The latter is the most intensive and long-lasting partner of ORT, providing substantial amounts of funding for ORT since the 1920s. In turn, Ort works to establish vocational training centers in JDC-assisted communities.

38. World Sephardi Federation (WSF). Founded in the 1920s, the WSF was reorganized after World War II, and again in the later 1960s. Its primary function is to unify Sephardim throughout the word in an effort to perpetuate Sephardic culture and to secure a Sephardic voice in the Counsels of World Jewry to defend Sephardi interests. While it has had substantial success as an organization in spreading to wherever there are Sephardic Jews and in securing a Sephardic voice in Jewish communities throughout the world and in WZO and JAFI, it has not taken on many other activities of its own. Rather, since it has been represented in the World Zionist Organization, it has secured the establishment of the Department for Sephardic communities in the WZO. It has succeeded in raising the Sephardic issue on the Jewish agenda.

39. World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS). Founded after World War II, the World Union of Jewish Students attempts to bring together Jewish students throughout the world through country-wide and some regional student unions that are not party political. The student-run organization tries to become involved in world Jewish affairs through its leadership. It gives the students a voice. It also operates the Areivim program which sends student volunteers to small Jewish communities around the world with JAFI funding. It is a member of the WZO and in a relationship with antagonistic cooperation with it, the WZO seeking to limit its influence and its leaders seeking a greater voice.

40. World Union of Jewish Studies. The World Union of Jewish Studies was established in 1947 at the time of the First World Congress of Jewish Studies. It is an association of all university teachers of Jewish studies throughout the world. Its central activities are to hold a quadrennial congress in Jerusalem, to maintain a comprehensive mailing list of Jewish studies university lectures, and to issue a bulletin reporting on activities in Jewish studies. It is represented in the Memorial Foundation and receives funding from it, from the Israeli government, and various foundations. It is not active in world Jewish affairs, but sticks to its substantive agenda.

41. World Union for Progressive Judaism (WUPJ). The World Union for Progressive Judaism is the worldwide umbrella organization for Reform and Reconstructionist Judaism. Its primary interests are religious, not political except in so far as it seeks to protect Reform Judaism in Israel. It participates in the world Jewish polity for other purposes primarily through its Israel-based leadership. It is a member of the WZO. It is funded by JAFI for various Israeli-oriented educational programs. Reform movements in twenty countries are represented in the WUPJ.

Just about every one of the foregoing organizations is in some way linked to the Big Five, either as constituents of the structure comprising one or another of the Big Five or as beneficiaries of funding from one or more of them. Thus, the world Jewish polity may only be a network, but it is a network that has tangible and concrete ties holding it together.

The New Jewish Public

While most of these organizations have their origins in the modern epoch, today they serve postmodern purposes and interests, and all but a few of them have developed accordingly, either in support of the new trends or in an effort to counter them. The first point to be made about this new Jewish public is that it is unbounded. That already became the case in modern times as Jewish communities lost their authority and Jews could leave them at will without abandoning their Jewishness any more than they wanted to as individuals. With the exception of the Jews of the State of Israel who, as Israelis, are bounded by the Jewish state and who must live according to the laws of that state whether they want to or not, the Jews in the world today choose whether or not to be Jewish, how, and in what ways, and with what intensity or extent.

In the modern epoch, from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, the issue of compulsion to remain Jewish dropped away. Jews could not only convert out of Judaism but could leave their Jewishness behind them without formally acquiring any other religious identity, although those that did for the most part did so to acquire a new civic identity as citizens of their respective states. In this respect Benedict Spinoza can be seen as the first Jew to become well-known and visible outside of the Jewish community without becoming or feeling the necessity to become a Christian. Not only that, he articulated the terms under which Jews could take that step.

Soon, the same absence of compulsion which enabled Spinoza to become a Jew separated from the bonds of his community became well-nigh universal. But if Jews were no longer compelled to be Jewish, if they chose to be, their communities could require them to accept certain standards or forms of behavior. Then in the nineteenth century with the emergence first of non-Orthodox Jewry and then of Jewish secularism and the community's loss of its monopoly, Jews could even be Jews in ways of their choice and nobody had the power to prevent that. Still, for the most part Jews had to be within some framework, even a framework of choice, to be identified as Jews.

Then came Hitler, who reintroduced the dimension of compulsion, but only with regard to matters of racial definition, which had to do with dying as Jews, not living as Jews. The destruction of Nazism released those born Jews from that threat as well; after paying so great a price, they were free to drift off in any direction and so it has been in the postmodern epoch since World War II, especially since at the same time the world became more open to accepting Jews as individuals in any way, not only as equal citizens and as religiously acceptable, but also as business partners, neighbors, and even partners in marriage. All boundaries, even self-imposed boundaries, which separated Jews from non-Jews, collapsed.

Already by the late modern epoch, the Jewish world could be seen as one of concentric circles radiating out from a core of Judaism which functioned like a magnet to draw Jews

closer to whatever they defined as being at its center and radiating outward through degrees of Jewishness and Jewish identification, with each concentric circle being pulled less by the magnet at the core and more by external forces (other magnets) until the outer circles were hardly Jewish at all and, at the outer edges, the circles more or less faded off into the fields pulled by other magnetic attractions. It became impossible to have a single definition of who is a Jew or even to draw a precise line between who is and who is not, at least for civic or religious purposes.

What was clear, however, was that those who were affected more intensely by the magnetic pull of Judaism and were involved in the circles closer to the core became a new basic constituency for organized Jewry, to which Jewish organizations and institutions turned for support and membership. Since that constituency contained only a part of those who even by more stringent definitions were defined as being Jewish, namely those born of Jewish parents or converted to Judaism who identified as Jews or who were citizens of Israel and identified as Jews (and even many, if not most, of them did not share a common concern with the Jewish people and its polity), the relevant circle of constituents was even smaller. That is one reason why, although non-Orthodox and secular Jews seem to have the numbers behind them overwhelmingly, Orthodox and otherwise highly committed Jews actually carry so much weight within the Jewish polity since their total constituencies may be smaller but the commitment of those within them is more intense up and down the line.

The rapid spread of assimilation on a voluntary basis in a manner that does not reject being Jewish per se but which finds other pulls more attractive, further erodes this pool of Jews and makes efforts to organize them for whatever purposes that much more difficult. That is the first and most predominant characteristic of the Jewish world which is served by the reemergent world Jewish polity.

It should be added that this description was originally seen as applying to diaspora Jewry only, that Jews in Israel, the only bounded Jewish civil society defined by statehood, followed a different pattern. But for reasons which we cannot go into here, Israel is beginning in its way to fall into a very similar pattern with most of its citizens born Jews, neither knowing nor on an increasing basis particularly caring about the Jewish people, except perhaps with the weakest of sentimental ties. There are an increasing number of people entering the country under the Law of Return (which means as Jews or people connected with Jews) who are not Jewish at all. For the first generation of Jewish statehood, the dominance of the Orthodox religious establishment under the laws of the state still imposed certain standards of involvement for those people who were deemed Jews by those standards, but ever wider cracks are appearing even in that established situation which is unlikely to last for very much longer, for better or for worse.

The New Sadducees

Meanwhile, the processes that accompanied the emergence of Zionism, the resettlement of Jews in their land, and the reestablishment of the Jewish commonwealth have also brought about the reemergence of the classic threefold division that has shaped the internal life of the Jewish people whenever Jewish life has been centered in Eretz Israel. Those divisions are best known by the names attached to them in the Second Commonwealth: Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes. These three parties, as they are referred to by historians, or camps, to use a more appropriate term that reflects the internal complexity of each and is compatible with modern Hebrew usage, acquired their identities under these names in the last centuries of the Second Commonwealth. Each camp, however, can be traced at least to the Davidic monarchy when the Jewish people was divided into monarchists supporting the Davidic line, supporters of the prophetic school later identified with Elijah, and groups of ascetics such as the Rehabites who abjured town life.

Much has been said about the normalization of the Jewish people through the rebuilding of Zion, all of which assumes a change that will make the Jews "like all the nations. There is every reason to believe that normalization, for Jews, means the active restoration of these three camps in Judaism and Jewish life. That the current revival of Jewish national existence in the land has led to a revival of those two of the three camps which had disappeared during the long exile is the most clear-cut step toward truly Jewish normalization yet taken.

The Sadducees (including their predecessors) were the first camp in preeminence for over a millennium, from the time of King David to the end of the major Jewish revolts against Rome (roughly 1000 BCE - 135 CE). They were preeminently the party of Jewish statehood, in the sense that their Jewishness was principally expressed through the political institutions of a state and those religious institutions, such as the priesthood and the Temple, intimately bound up with statehood. In sum, they were most closely identified with the institutions of the *keter malkhut* and to extend the influence of the *keter malkhut* over the *keter torah*.

With the destruction of the state and the transformation of the Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel into a community existing on Roman sufferance, the Pharisaic system of Jewish life, with its special emphasis on the individual internalization of Jewish norms, became dominant. It ultimately came to embrace almost all Jews who remained in the fold. The Pharisees anchored their system in the *keter torah*. After the destruction of the Temple, they gained control of the principal instrumentalities of the *keter malkhut* in Eretz Israel and put down a challenge by the surviving priestly representatives of the *keter kehunah* to co-opt them. Because of the prominence of the Temple and its ritual in the *halakhah* of the Pharisees, it is worthwhile recalling that the Temple came into existence to emphasize the new statehood of David and Solomon and became the keystone of the renewed statehood of the Hasmoneans. The Pharisees, as part of their preemption of centrality in Jewish life, co-opted the Temple as a symbol after it was destroyed.

The Pharisaic system emphasized schools as the principal institutional expression of organized Jewish life and the locus of such political power as remained in Jewish hands, scholars as the principal spokesmen for the Jewish people, and the individual observance of a portable Law as the touchstone of Jewish identification and self-expression. It was uniquely adapted to the needs of the times. Thus the diaspora experience strengthened the Pharisaic camp in every respect. Lacking a proper political base, the Sadducean camp ultimately disappeared. Significantly, the last bastion of Sadducee ideology was in Babylonia, where the conditions of Jewish autonomy made the exilarch a focal point for its expression. But even the exilarch eventually had to come to terms with the heads of the academies and became tied to them.

The Essenes emphasized small collectivist communities as the means to fulfill the percepts of the Torah. They required the protection of a strong Jewish presence and power to maintain a shielded existence as a separatist messianic minority in the Jewish fold. Once that was gone, they could not sustain their colonies. Hence they simply disappeared when Jewish political autonomy was irrevocably lost, as their Rehabite predecessors had with the destruction of the First Commonwealth.

The Rise of the Neo-Sadducees

Pharisaic Judaism held fast for nearly eighteen hundred years and, with one important exception -- the Karaite challenge -- was almost unchallenged for fifteen hundred years. This is not to suggest that every Jew in the premodern world lived according to the *halakhah* as then interpreted, nor was there a uniform interpretation of *halakhah* in all times and climes. We have enough evidence of Jewish deviation from Pharisaic norms, even on the part of devout Jews, to know that this was not so; Pharisaic Judaism, however, was the norm and all recognized it as such even if all individuals did not meet it in the normative way. It was the form and fabric of a tradition society, which meant that there was considerable latitude within and among Jewish communities in *halakhic* interpretation as long as the differences could be contained in the traditional society.

Once the Pharisaic camp had won, it was no longer a camp within a larger framework but provided the framework itself. Only with the coming of the modern epoch in the seventeenth century did the order it imposed on the Jewish people begin to break down under the pressures of emancipation and modernization. By the early nineteenth century, assimilation was rampant among those Jews who had left the traditional society. Because the only Judaism they knew was Pharisaic, once they no longer accepted that, they were in a position to break completely to the point of conversion to a nominal Christianity in order to advance in the world around them. This provoked several responses.

One was the emergence of the Reform movement, which rejected Pharisaic Judaism entirely by rejecting the binding character of the *halakhah*, emphasizing instead the importance of religion in the western Protestant sense as a means of connecting people to

the transcendent deity rather than binding them to transcendent norms. The Reform movement rejected the *keter torah* for a new, sanitized version of the *keter kehunah*, which emphasized prayer in local "temples" under rabbis who served as ministers. Reform also rejected the *keter malkhut* by denying that Jews were a people and rejecting all Jewish national goals.

For those Jews who wanted less radical religious reform, historical, later Conservative, Judaism became the vehicle. The advocates of historical Judaism still saw themselves in the Pharisaic camp in that they recognized the binding character of *halakhah*, but they wished to stimulate *halakhic* change in keeping with modern times. In their efforts to be good citizens of the countries in which they lived, they minimized the claims of the *keter malkhut*. Their reliance on the new-style synagogue as their major vehicle also brought them to renew and emphasize the *keter kehunah*, though in the guise of reforming the *keter torah*.

In response to assimilation and these reform tendencies, those who saw themselves as remaining faithful to Pharisaic Judaism developed Orthodoxy, which is as much a modern movement as the other two. It was based on a new ideology emphasizing the immutability of Pharisaic forms and a set of doctrines that rejected the idea of change in the *halakhah*. The new Orthodoxy eventually sought to foster greater adherence to the minutiae of the *halakhah* as a demonstration of one's full commitment to Judaism.

For some time, the only nonreligious alternative to Pharisaic Judaism was assimilation, through either the adopting of local nationalism or socialism. Even the Sabbatean movement (an effort to break with Pharisaism) at the beginning of the modern epoch, which was certainly not ideologically assimilationist, led in that direction. Only with the rise of modern Jewish nationalism and, most particularly, Zionism did another alternative emerge. That alternative eventually became what may properly be called the Sadducean option, an authentically Jewish option based on the conditions of modernism and resting on much the same kind of political and high cultural base identified with the Sadducees of two millennia earlier.

The re-creation of Jewish national life in Eretz Israel that followed brought about the reestablishment of the tripartite framework that had informed earlier Jewish commonwealths. Even a variation of Essenism reemerged in the form of the kibbutz, whose collectivism, we now know since the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls and related materials, represents a recurring phenomenon in Jewish life -- an effort to express Jewish messianic aspirations in the framework of a community of the chosen expected to lead but, in the end, protected by the larger Jewish society.

Once Pharisaic Judaism lost its dominant position, the Pharisees again became a camp. today the Pharisaic camp can be defined as comprising Jews who see in *halakhah* the unifying principle of Judaism. After a century or more of retreat, that camp is again advancing. Its adherents have taken the offensive after years of being on the defensive and have now developed institutions designed to "convert the Jews." Their camp

represents perhaps a quarter of the population of Israel, and perhaps 15 percent of world Jewry can be considered part of it. If we include *halakhically*-committed Conservative Jews, perhaps one-fifth of world Jewry would fall into the Pharisaic camp.

Of those among the remainder of world Jewry who identify Jewishly in some conscious way, most may be considered Sadducees or, more accurately, neo-Sadducees. Today's Sadducees include Israeli Zionists, diaspora Jews who seek to be Jewish through identification with the Jewish people as a corporate entity, its history, culture, and tradition, but without necessarily accepting the authority or centrality of *halakhah* in defining their Jewishness. In essence, these people tend to have a political commitment to Judaism in the broadest sense. Thus they are firmly committed to the Jewish people, either as a whole or as it exists in Israel, seeing in the expression of peoplehood or nationhood what can be termed a religious obligation, though often in the sense of a civil religion.

The fate of the Conservative and Reform movements in this regard is instructive. Each defines itself in modern religious terms. The Conservative Jews are ambivalent when it comes to *halakhah*. Some, probably no more than one-fifth of their claimed membership, see themselves as continuing *halakhic* Judaism, and the rest have no ideology, only ties to Conservative synagogues. Their ideology as Jews undoubtedly stems from their strong commitment to the State of Israel, reinforced by a deep feeling that Jews everywhere share a common fate whether they will it or not. In short, they remain Jewish for Sadducean reasons. This is even more so in the Reform movement, which continues to reject the binding character of the *halakhah* in the name of religious liberalism even though it has abandoned its initial anti-Zionism and, on the contrary, has tried to link the movement with Israel in concrete institutional ways.

Increasingly, these neo-Sadducees have come to understand that the maintenance of Jewish peoplehood is a political act. Formerly, there were those who explicitly sought to deny the political aspects of their position, arguing that what was involved was cultural expression, but in recent years they have come to understand how profoundly political their commitment is.

A few may be defined as Essenes -- those who, in the Essene tradition, have sought to create total messianic societies in the framework of this world. Most are in the kibbutzim. In the late 1960s, an effort was made to develop what must be defined as an American Jewish Essene movement through the organization of communes and havurot on or near college campuses in the United States. Lacking the protection of appropriate political frameworks, that effort has produced limited results except insofar as the havurot became surrogate synagogues and hence within the *keter kehunah*.

Coming to Grips with a Pluralistic Judaism

It has been suggested here that Zionism is preeminently a Sadducean movement, even though there has been a Pharisee wing of Zionism from the first and contemporary Essenes are principally connected with the Zionist enterprise. The Zionist movement was the first to recognize that the survival of the Jewish people in a post-Pharisaic age required a political revival. Consequently, it was the first movement to redefine Jewish life in explicitly political terms, relating to Jewish history and tradition through that perspective.

Almost all Israel's present political leadership and most of the diaspora leadership are effectively in the Sadducean camp. They have created an alliance with those Pharisees who have joined them in the common enterprise. The Pharisees have had to join that enterprise principally on Sadducean terms, although they have been able to wring concessions from the Sadducees with regard to the public maintenance of Pharisaic norms, because for the Sadducean camp Jewish unity is important enough to warrant them. Moreover, the Sadducees' nostalgia for Jewish tradition makes those norms more acceptable, particularly because they have nothing workable to put in their place.

That implicit understanding of what the Mizrahi's alliance with the World Zionist Movement meant led to the deep conflict within the Orthodox camp during the early days of the Zionist revolution. The Agudath Israel sought to remain authentic perushim (they used -- and use - - the term) in the sense of being utterly willing to be separated from most Jews to maintain what they believed was the only correct approach to Judaism. Mizrahi was prepared to "taint itself" by association with the new non-Pharisaic majority to advance what it believed were common Jewish goals, which it understood as valid in the Pharisaic tradition.

Although the Pharisaic camp has a special commitment to *halakhic* Judaism as we know it, many Sadducees also share a strong commitment to Jewish religious tradition and practice. Many are traditional or observant Jews by any standard. A few are even "orthoprax": they practice *halakhic* Judaism without being Orthodox in their fundamental ideological commitments, which are Sadducean. Still, Pharisees and Sadducees alike tend to look upon them as less authentic in their Judaism, because we are still living in the shadow of Pharisaic dominance. After all, a significant number of Jews now in Israel came from communities where the Pharisaic tradition continued its dominance unbroken during their own lives there, although, naturally, their number is decreasing. Moreover, a two thousand-year tradition is not forgotten overnight.

Nevertheless, by now several generations of Jews have grown up outside any Jewish religious tradition and cannot cope with the religious aspect of their Jewishness. Because of them and the renewed Jewish state that inevitably pursues political goals, the Jewish people now must reconcile itself to the renewed classic party division in Jewish life and, whatever their individual commitments, to expect the continuation of a strong Sadducee camp. As Jews, they must insist that the Sadducean camp begin to understand itself for

what it is and develop an appropriately articulated Jewish framework in which to work. They cannot simply transform those elements of Pharisaic Judaism that are appealing into a kind of civil religion that is either no more than residually Jewish or that uses Jewish forms to promote non-Jewish content. The ancient Sadducees may not have accepted the Pharisaic understanding of Judaism, but they, too, shared a religious conception of Jewish existence. Although that task falls upon the entire Jewish people it is of particular concern and relevance to Israel, which, as the center of the Jewish world and the only place where an autonomous Jewish culture flourishes, must make a greater effort to make that culture truly Jewish in one way or another.

A civil religion indeed has emerged in Israel. It represents the first articulation of a revived Sadducean approach to maintaining the rhythm of Jewish life. No civilization can exist without having a rhythm. A great part of the genius of Judaism is found in the way it establishes a rhythm for all Jews. Normally, the life rhythm of a civilization is associated with a particular locale. Pharisaism was (and is) particularly adept in the way it transformed that rhythm into a portable one, which could be carried into exile in every diaspora. Zionism-as-Sadduceanism has emphasized the revaluation of traditional Jewish rhythms in ways that are tied to the Israeli locale but influenced by a universal culture.

Those in the Pharisaic camp will undoubtedly argue that the neo-Sadducean civil religion is not enough, and properly so -- in its present form they are right and they may even be right for the long term. But with some four-fifths of world Jewry outside the Pharisaic camp, a Sadducean Judaism will develop whether the Pharisees will it or not. The only open question -- a big one -- is, what will be its content?

The trend is toward separate Judaisms on one level, despite the Sadducean borrowing of Pharisaic practices for their civil religion. Israel may well come to be divided into the two if not three separate communities. On the other hand, their continued willingness to work together in the institutions of the *keter malkhut*, however strong their divisions in the other ketarim, offers an opportunity for maintaining Jewish unity under these new conditions. Let us hope that, in the Third Commonwealth, the intense conflicts that marked the Pharisee-Sadducee relationship in the Second Commonwealth will be avoided for the sake of the Jewish people.

Neo-Sadducees and the Jewish Political Tradition

Interaction between the two camps should not only be fostered for the sake of Jewish unity, but also for the fullest expression of the Jewish spirit. Precisely because the Sadducean camp has roots in the political expression of Judaism and Jewishness, the neo-Sadducees need a living Jewish political tradition. It, too, should be rooted in Jewish sources and experience, in light of their first principles and because they cannot depend on the *halakhah* to provide them the continuity that a tradition and a way of life offer. In short, the neo-Sadducees require a comprehensive political tradition in the way that

Pharisees require a comprehensive *halakhic* tradition. To suggest that the Sadducees are in special need of a Jewish political tradition is not to suggest that the Pharisees do not need one. To the contrary, just as Pharisaic Judaism managed to absorb the ideology and symbols of the Davidic line and the Temple ritual, the two most important Sadducean tradition, in order to provide a comprehensive approach to Judaism and Jewishness, so, too, have the Pharisees had to relate to the Jewish political tradition.

Why, then, has that tradition become obscure in Pharisaic Judaism? Under the conditions in which Pharisaic Judaism originally developed, it had become dangerous for Jews to have political consciousness as such. The consequences of three anti-Roman rebellions demonstrated that. So the Pharisees absorbed and hid that tradition in the mainstream of the *halakhah*, carefully avoiding any reference to it as a political tradition. In subsequent ages, this tradition survived and even thrived within the four ells of *halakhic* Judaism, in the life of Jewish communities wherever Jews settled. We are just now discovering how well it did.

As a consequence, we have a paradoxical situation today. The Jewish political tradition in its most authentic form lives in the Pharisee camp, but the Pharisees themselves are least willing to recognize it as a political tradition. Consequently they have done relatively little to come to grips with the problems of statehood in a *halakhic* framework. The Sadducees, on the other hand, although far more open to building their Jewishness on a political tradition, have ignored that tradition and have built their political ideologies on foreign traditions, mostly imported from Europe.

For the Sadducees to recover the tradition, they must learn not only from their experience as Jews confronting political situations, but by drinking deeply from sources preserved by the Pharisees. Similarly, although the Pharisees can continue to live off their own sources, to cope with statehood they must acquire Sadducean concerns and even norms to some degree. At a time when the Jewish people is threatened with breaking apart into separate camps or communities, most especially in Israel, this interdependence is a positive element, a basis on which to rebuild a more united Jewish people and a more Jewish state.

The New Sadducees and "Who is a Jew"

If the revival of the tripartite division between Sadducees, Pharisees, and Essenes is associated with a piece of a Jewish past, new definitions of who is a Jew, with which the Jewish people are wrestling, represent a brand new experience for Jews. While the Jewish definition of who is a Jew has changed at least once in the course of the long span of Jewish history, from the biblical patriarchal model to the matriarchal descent pattern of Rabbinic Judaism, it has otherwise remained remarkably stable over two periods of nearly two thousand years each. Since the beginning of the post-modern epoch, however, after World War II, we have seen new-style intermarriage, whereby Jews otherwise

desirous of remaining Jewish choose partners who are not Jewish and then try to find ways to do so. In an effort to respond to this situation, the Reform movement already has established a patrilineal descent option, along with traditional matrilineal descent, for children to be identified as Jewish, and a number of Reform congregations have provided for the membership of non-Jews who are not active in other religions, no doubt in an effort to respond to the problems of intermarriage.

The Jewish communities that were behind the Iron Curtain for many years before it fell, have already informally established that rule on an ethnic rather than a religious basis. Many of the most active Jews in those communities are not Jewish *halakhically* and would not have been accepted as Jewish any place else in the world until the 1970s. Now, even when knowledge of their status is readily available, no questions are asked. A very prominent Soviet Jew, himself the son of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother, offered the following definition of Jewishness in the Soviet Union several years ago: 1) those born Jewish and identified with the Jewish community by having their Jewish nationality identified on their passports; 2) those born Jewish who have been identified by some other nationality on their passports; and 3) those who are willing to share the fate of the Jewish people, i.e., non-Jews attached to Jews through family connections. Even earlier, the State of Israel's Law of Return, while it does not recognize such people as Jews, made it possible for them to gain all the benefits of the law if they settled in Israel with their Jewish spouses, parents, or children.

While the Reform movement in the diaspora has made its changes, the Conservative movement has formally refused to do so, but, in fact, is under considerable pressure from its membership either to change the rules or to bend them. Orthodoxy holds fast to traditional *halakhic* standards and because it is dominant in Israel has succeeded in maintaining those standards for Israeli identity. Non-Orthodox Israelis are also more flexible in practice.

Where do matters stand today? Within the religious domain or the *keter torah*, except for a small minority of Reform Jews in the world, the traditional *halakhic* definition formally prevails. However, the reality is more flexible, essentially allowing every countrywide community to set its own definition with no questions asked. If people come to another community recognized as Jews in their countries of settlement, for the most part they are accepted as such, not only as Jews in trouble needing rescue and relief assistance, but also as leaders in the ranks of world Jewish organizations. Moreover, even the most *halakhically* rigid on the issue deal with those Jews effectively as Jews within the framework of the *keter malkhut*. Nevertheless, this is an issue waiting, like a time bomb, to explode.

Existing Interrelationships in the World Jewish Polity

Enhancing Interorganizational Collaboration

How do the instrumentalities of the *edah* work out long-term means for cooperating to provide services to the Jewish world? Characteristic of the contemporary situation is that, where outside assistance or intervention is involved, it does not come simply from one body but almost invariably from several.

For example, take Iran before the Khomeini revolution. Even before the turn of the century, the Alliance Israelite Universelle established schools there to provide basic education for Iranian Jewry. Its entry into the country was facilitated through negotiations by the *shtadlanic* institutions with the then rulers of Iran and only after the application of considerable pressure by the Western powers, triggered by the *shtadlanim*. The Alliance was dominant until World War II, when the Iranian Jews perceived that French influence was on the decline in the world and American influence on the rise. At that point two American-sponsored institutions, the Joint Distribution Committee and the Otzar Ha-Torah (an organization established to build an maintain religiously oriented schools for Jews in the Middle East), came into Iran to undertake social and educational activities. The two have been there ever since, even now after Khomeini.

The Jewish Agency also arrived in Iran during the war, and , with the establishment of the State of Israel, an Israeli presence was also established. The Israelis' first efforts were directed toward encouraging the mass immigration of Iranian Jewry to Israel. By the mid-1950s, when it became apparent that tens of thousands of Jews would stay in Iran, the Israelis changed their orientation to include efforts to influence the Jewish community remaining in the direction of Zionism, aliya, and financial support of the Jewish state.

In pre-Khomeini Iran the Israel embassy was a major influence in the Jewish community. The Jewish Agency conducted fundraising and aliya campaigns and, whenever the Iranian government permitted it, sent *shlihim* to work with Jewish youth. The Israeli chief rabbinate served as the court of last resort for the *halakhic* problems of Iranian Jewry, and the young rabbis in the community, insofar as there were any, were trained in Israel. Support for internal social and educational needs was provided by the JDC and, for education, by the Otzar HaTorah and the Alliance, the JDC working closely with both. The professional leadership of the JDC originally consisted of American and British Jews. Subsequently, Israelis joined the staff. The Alliance relied more heavily on local people, with an occasional French Jew. Otzar HaTorah relied on local people, with Israelis filling the top professional positions. The Jewish schools run directly by the Iranian Jewish community with the support of the JDC, used Israeli personnel whenever the government permitted them do so, and they were then employed by the local schools.

The intermixture reflected the emerging worldwide Jewish civil service whose main people are drawn from several countries. Many have made career commitments to that civil service and not to any particular community in which they may be serving. (The first Israeli to serve with the JDC in Iran received his training and first fieldwork experience in Jewish community centers in the united States, went on to join the JDC staff in Geneva, developing cultural programming for European Jewry, returned to Israel to work with local community centers and Project Renewal, and then went to the United States as a community *shaliah*.)

The interlocking framework was developing even as tensions between the JDC and the Agency continued on the old basis. The JDC was committed to strengthening Jewish life in Iran; the Agency wanted to encourage the Iranian Jews to leave. Whatever the antagonisms between them, they did develop patterns of cooperation to advance the common goal of strengthening the Jewish life of Iranian Jewry to the point where neither could operate without the other.

Argentina is another example of the intervention of outside bodies. Once a community of more than 300,000 Jews, at one time it was at least self-sufficient, if not more. However, the combination of the breakdown of civil society in Argentina in the 1960s and the failures of the indigenous Jewish leadership to adjust to new world conditions forced the community into a struggle for its viability. In that struggle, it turned to the two great centers for support. It was encouraged to do so by the leaders of both centers, who understood that the sixth or seventh largest countrywide concentration of Jews was an asset that could not be abandoned to its own fate.

From the first days of Israel's independence, the Israeli role was actively welcomed and encouraged in Argentina. The original response of the Argentinean non-Jews was to recognize Israel as the *madre patria* (the mother fatherland) of Argentinean Jewry parallel to the mother fatherlands of Argentineans of Spanish, German, Italian, and other extractions. For Jews, this was a strong basis for an identity that was primarily secular, in a community whose institutions were so dominated by Zionists that the only parties that contested for control of them were the political parties supported by their Israeli counterparts. As time went on, the Israeli ambassador became an increasingly important figure in the decision making of Argentinean Jewry, and Israeli assistance in the form of *shlihim*, teachers, and rabbis became greater. In the late 1960s, as some communal institutions began to disintegrate, Argentinean dependence on Israel grew even more, almost as if Israel was called upon to replace a local lack of will and also finance certain communal functions.

Argentinean Jewry was less open in its welcome of American Jewish support, principally because of the chronic Latin American hostility to the big brother from the North. Nevertheless, shortly after World War II, the American Jewish Committee opened an office in Buenos Aires to help the Argentinean Jews deal with problems of anti-Semitism and to link them more closely with the rest of the Jewish world. Subsequently, the American Conservative movement sent a rabbi to Argentina who, after considerable

struggle, managed to build a substantial network of congregations, affiliated with the United Synagogue, with ancillary activities including a theological seminary, a Ramah camp, and a variety of educational programs. Through them he actually transformed the religious life of Argentine Jewry. More recently the National Jewish Welfare Board (now the Jewish Community Centers Association) has developed a technical assistance program for the Jewish sports clubs.

The principal point of sharing between Israeli and American Jewry is to be found in the special assistance programs of the Jewish Agency, which were launched with the endorsement of the American representative. Although Israeli and American activities have been less closely related in Argentina than they were in Iran because of the differences between the communities, the fact that both major centers have seen fit to devote considerable effort to Argentina is testimony in and of itself.

In France, a much larger and stronger Jewish community, where local forces play a much more important role and the respective interests of the two outside centers can be better articulated on the ground, the cooperation between the JDC and the Agency is less visible. The JDC's work in stimulating the creation of the Fonds Social Juif Unifie after World War II had a direct payoff not only in improving the community's internal structure but even in the improvement of fundraising for Israel. There the work of the JDC was carried out by a group of American Jewish social workers who spent their careers in Europe rebuilding European Jewish life, many of whom have since retired to Israel.

Europe remains the most important arena for Israeli and American Jewish efforts. The efforts of each often have been in different directions, although the gap has narrowed considerably in recent years. The cross-purposes at which the principal representatives of the two major communities worked in the interwar generation were to leave their scars well into the next generation, nor did the Holocaust entirely put an end to them. In the aftermath of World War II, the Agency and the JDC again found themselves working in the same field and at cross-purposes. By then, the ideological commitment of the JDC to discourage Jews from leaving their European lands of origin had disappeared. The JDC leadership, however, was strongly committed to the notion that the Jews who did want to resettle in Europe should be assisted and those who did not wish to settle in Israel were entitled to seek other homes with the support of world Jewry. The Jewish Agency, on the other hand, was committed to convincing the survivors to wait demonstratively in the displaced-persons camps until they could leave Europe for Israel and to discourage those who chose not to.

Matters were further complicated by the American-sponsored immigrant aid societies (the HIAS of today), whose avowed task was to assist Jewish displaced persons wanting to immigrate to the United States. Particularly between 1945 and 1947, when no Jewish state was immediately in the offing and the doors to Palestine were officially closed, the American organizations felt a moral responsibility to assist Jews to enter the United States. At the same time, the representatives of the Jewish Agency wanted all the

displaced persons to stand fast in the camps so as to intensify the problem and stimulate world support for Jewish statehood. Even so, the common interest of the parties in rescuing Jews and in helping them rebuild their lives brought them together in cooperative activity in the camps, albeit their antagonistic goals.

The issue was resolved by the establishment of the state and the immigration of most of the displaced persons to Israel. In the end, the JDC assisted in that immigration and established its own institutions in Israel to assist those unable to become self-supporting there. It also continued to assist the survivors who remained in Europe to rebuild Jewish life there. After awhile, the Israelis were reconciled to the realities of the renewal of a European diaspora, though on a limited basis, and they, too, began to work among European Jewry to tie them closely to Israel in commitment, if not through aliya.

The later conflict over the question of the *noshrim* (Jewish emigres from the Soviet Union who chose not to go to Israel) is reminiscent of that earlier struggle. The Israeli position, fully supported by the Zionist movement, was that Jews who were permitted to leave the USSR because they requested to immigrate to Israel as part of the reunification of families scheme (the formal reason why the Soviets let them go) should be required to complete the journey. At the very least, if they drop out they should not be eligible for assistance from other Jewish sources. The diaspora position, most prominent among the American Jewish leadership, was that the issue is one of rescuing Jews, which is a Jewish responsibility under any circumstances, and the destination of any Jews so rescued should be their personal choice.

A rather unpleasant standoff followed until American Jewry was successful in securing a larger quota for Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate to the United States, and the Soviets, under American pressure obliged, letting the Jews leave. Soon the costs and burdens of absorbing this very difficult population into the U.S. and the American Jewish community became apparent to the American Jewish leadership. Then they were happy to stop encouraging Soviet Jews to come to the United States, and put their full support behind the aliya movement.

What did occur as a result of the large immigration of Soviet Jews to the United States was that it forced the American Jewish community, then involved in a struggle between the local federations and the Council of Jewish Federations over the issue of developing certain countrywide ways and means to cope with what had become for many purposes a single North American Jewish community, to take steps in that direction because of the uneven distribution of the Soviet Jewish immigrants around the country and the necessity to raise massive funds to support them. The CJF developed a formula for application countrywide, whereby federations either absorbed more immigrants or paid their "fair share" into a common CJF-managed fund for distribution to those communities that did, a breakthrough in strengthening the Jewish countrywide institutions which had been talked about in principle in other spheres but which CJF the leadership had been unable to effectuate until this emergency situation developed. This became one of the most

prominent examples of how worldwide Jewish trends could even affect the internal life and structuring of the world's largest diaspora community.

The opening of the gates of the Soviet Union and then its breakup into different independent republics, effectively reduced the problem as more and more ex-Soviet Jews went to Israel. Limits were imposed by the U.S. government with American Jewish help on the number of Jews from the ex-Soviet Union to be admitted to the United States.

In place of the emigration controversies, a new set of problems developed. With the opening of the ex-Soviet republics to Jewish activity, virtually all of the Jewish organizations of the world Jewish polity and many of those of the United States and other countrywide diaspora communities rushed in with the manifest purpose of helping the Jews of those republics to restore Jewish life and the latent one of fostering and advancing their particular view of what Jewish life should be and their institutional interests. What followed was something resembling a mad rush for place and position in what has been described as "a wild West" situation. On some levels even antagonistic cooperation has been nonexistent and groups have competed with one another for segments of Soviet Jewry. Nevertheless, at the level of the major worldwide Jewish organizations -- JAFI, the State of Israel's Lishkat Hakesher, the JDC -- the situation forced a degree of cooperative activity despite all. The ultra-Orthodox organizations, especially Chabad, which was particularly active, stayed out of these cooperative arrangements except where they could get financial support for their efforts. At the same time, the local Jews, while accepting outside assistance, became increasingly resentful of what they saw as an imperialistic attitude on the part of world Jewry that essentially rejected the locals' view that they could handle their own affairs and only needed outside assistance to fund and staff them.

The latest front where American and Israeli efforts to serve the rest of the diaspora are now coming to the fore is in the provision of rabbis and teachers for those communities unable to train their own. The American Jewish community began by taking a few students from Latin America, Europe, and even India into its seminaries in the immediate postwar period. Today American rabbis are themselves going out to serve communities overseas. Mention has been made of Argentina. The chief rabbi of Sweden is a Philadelphian who is a graduate of the Jewish Theological Seminary. Japan invariably has an American rabbi.

Israel's importance here (which is of ancient vintage) is also growing, in both ways. Students come from various parts of the world to study in Israeli *yeshivot* and then go back to serve in their communities. Israelis who train for the rabbinate in Israel go out to serve communities in the diaspora from East Asia to Chile. Here Israel has even developed mechanisms for cooperative activity with diaspora communities other than the United States. So, for example, the Indian Jewish community, which has no rabbi, periodically sends young men to study in Israel to learn to be *shohetim* and *mohelim.* For years, the Jewish Agency *shaliah* in Bombay was from the Torah Education Department. He served as a conduit for rabbinical matters, passing on requests for such things as

divorces or conversion of *olim* to the rabbinate in Israel, providing them with the pertinent information as needed, and then executing their decisions. For conversion of olim to Israel, a complex procedure was developed. After the local *shaliah* undertook to train prospective converts, he provided them with certificates which they could bring with them to Israel. They were then sent via Turkey where the chief rabbi would convert them before their arrival in Israel, thus avoiding any problem with the local rabbinate of the kind that made integration of Indian Jews particularly difficult in the 1950s.

Thus, willy-nilly, a partnership between Israeli and world Jewry has been forged to serve Jews living outside the two centers. Each center has created its own instruments for the tasks at hand. This partnership, initially antagonistic, has become less so, as the issues that once divided them have diminished. To date, this kind of coordination has developed on an ad hoc basis. On one hand, this means that what has developed is real and in response to real needs and is not simply "window dressing" to serve some external demands. On the other, it involves real "start up" and "sorting out" costs anew each time.

Shaping a New World Leadership

The first thing achieved by the reorganization of the Jewish Agency was the emergence of a more broadly-based world Jewish leadership tied into the countrywide and local communities of the diaspora. The world Zionist movement had developed a worldwide leadership much earlier, a leadership that continued to exist after the establishment of the state, but much diminished in power and influence. The Zionist leadership never attained the comprehensive scope it sought. Now, in the reconstituted Jewish Agency, the merging of Zionist and community leaders, the men and women who speak for the diaspora communities, particularly those of the United States, offered an opportunity for the emergence of a truly comprehensive Jewish leadership. The Jewish Agency provided an arena within which such a leadership could work, and the people who entered that arena, on the whole with strong and impressive credentials, were ready to take advantage of the opportunity. If anything, the first decade was a period of frustration for many as the opportunities to function developed more slowly than they have liked. Nevertheless, during a decade of exposure to one another, that leadership began to take shape.

To understand the wider meaning of this, we must go back to the formal reconstitution, to examine:

1. The expectations of those involved in it.
2. The structures that emerged from it.
3. The functions entrusted to the reconstituted Jewish Agency, the relationships that developed between the agency and its various parts, the new leadership of the State of Israel, and the diaspora communities.

As is inevitable in human affairs, there were mixed expectations about what the reconstitution was designed to accomplish. Probably the most minimal expectations were those of many in the Israeli government and the WZO leadership who hoped that the change would be cosmetic and not alter established patterns. The community leaders, however, saw the change as an opportunity to raise the level of efficiency in the Agency, to gain greater accountability of the money they were raising for Israel, and to sharpen the Agency's policy focus and functions.

Those who initiated the reconstitution -- mainly insiders in the Jewish Agency -- expected to build a more effective instrumentality for the achievement of the Agency's mission in Israel and for the involvement of the diaspora in that mission.

As the process developed, those who wanted only minimal changes found that their expectations would not be borne out. Those who expected an easy transition to a new era were also disappointed. Pressures from the reconstituted governing bodies led to improved Agency budgetary practices, opened up Agency activities for discussion and consideration, and in a limited way began to influence the choice of officeholders in senior Agency positions. Each step meant a struggle, but with each advance, the Agency acquired greater independence and began to work truly as an arm of the Jewish people.

The division between Zionist and community leaders is greatest in matters of governance. The community leaders feel far more frustrated about the lack of an appropriate role because their experiences abroad have been in exercising real power and not simply in participating in general debate. The top Zionist leadership, however, tends to be concentrated in Israel and to sit on the Executive. Not only are they more accustomed to the general debate -- a Zionist and Israeli tradition -- but they can transcend it by exercising power through day-to-day roles as heads of departments within the Agency or the World Zionist Organization. In sum, on paper the new structure under the reconstitution offered a fair framework for joint activity; but it quickly became a source of endless frustration and puzzlement for many of the most active and committed participants in the Agency's work.

On the other hand, there was the least amount of divergence with regard to the functions of the Jewish Agency. Although there are disagreements as to how those functions should be implemented, it was generally agreed that the Agency's functions were appropriate to it and necessary, even vital, for Israel's development. Thus there has been relatively little struggle over the question of functions, only the questions of how they should be carried out and who should do what in connection with them.

Although at first the reconstitution did not change the functions of the Jewish Agency, it did set in motion a process that has led to changes in implementation and continues to move toward further changes. Parallel to the reconstitution was the decision by the Israeli government to assume responsibility for the absorption of immigrants, leaving the Jewish Agency which had previously dealt with aliya and absorption in their entirety, only with

aliya and limited initial absorption functions. Matters have not worked out precisely as intended, but the Agency's role in absorption has been substantially diminished.

Similarly, while the reconstitution was being implemented, the role of the Agency in rural settlement was declining, mostly because the bulk of the job had already been done. Moreover, the Agency could not directly undertake construction of settlements across the Green Line because of presumed American political constraints. Hence this task was formally assigned to the WZO. At the same time, the role of the Agency in urban areas began to grow. During the 1970s it continued to grow, culminating in 1977 in the launching of Project Renewal. The previous policy of the Israeli government, which had prevented the Agency from working directly with municipal governments in common programs, was reversed so that the Agency was given a direct role in urban redevelopment. Thus the Agency acquired a new frontier in the 1970s, one whose possibilities and problems seem unlimited.

Other shifts in Agency functions began to be manifested. The Agency's role in Israeli higher education, once fiscally overwhelming, began to diminish after a struggle between the Agency and the Israeli government as to whether the former would have a say in the expenditure of the funds it provided. The government quashed the Agency's bid for more than token influence, and since then the Agency has implemented a plan to substantially cut back its share of the higher education budget.

There have been shifts in social welfare spending within Israel, with the role of the Jewish Agency slowly being reduced in that sphere. On the other hand the Agency has begun to take on greater responsibility for Jewish education in the diaspora, a matter of shared concern for all Jewish leaders. All these changes are symptomatic of what some diaspora leaders have suggested as a basic shift in the Agency's mission, from rebuilding the Jewish national home in Eretz Israel to forging stronger links between Israel and the diaspora.

Reconstitution has brought in its wake a new set of relationships in the Agency and between the Agency and other forces in the Jewish polity. In the Agency, the first new relationship was between the Zionists and the community representatives. Formally, matters were worked out quickly. Beyond the formal level, the relationship is still uncertain and often uneasy. There is also the relationship between the Agency and the WZO, which remains quite ambiguous and a subject of much concern, though the balance clearly has been tipped toward the Agency.

The relationship between the Agency and the government of Israel, as noted above, is moving toward greater independence for the former. This, too, is an issue in flux, with the government reluctant to encourage such independence but increasingly forced to do so by the diaspora community representatives. Project Renewal was a major factor in making the change real and may prove a decisive one. Through Project Renewal, for example, Israeli local government authorities developed ties not only with the Agency but also with their twinned diaspora communities. It did not take long for local leaders to

perceive that such ties, especially with the diaspora communities directly, could be invaluable in helping them in their efforts to gain more for their communities from the powers-that-be in the state. This served to weaken the otherwise hierarchical relationship between state and local government by introducing the *edah* as a third party.

There is also a changing relationship between the Agency and the diaspora communities. Once viewed strictly as a conduit for philanthropic contributions to help Israel's people and as a vehicle for helping diaspora fundraising efforts by the care and feeding of missions to Israel, the Jewish Agency has begun to be perceived as the diaspora's instrumentality in Israel and, for purposes outside Israel, to be what it always purported to be, a "national institution" belonging to the entire *edah*, which needs to be treated and developed as such, and, if necessary, reorganized further.

The Problem of Interorganizational Cooperation

What remains is the question of relationships between the Agency and the rest of the world Jewish polity. Most immediately, its relationships with the government of Israel are frequently overpowering in their effect on the Agency's work, the lion's share of which still is within the boundaries of the state. In particular, the Agency's relationship with the Israeli political party system is at issue, since the parties continue to dominate the choice of department heads and other personnel and, through them, the Agency Executive and daily operations.

Conversely, the relationship between the Agency as an adjusting body and the American Jewish community has been based on the latter's insistence on stringent limits to Agency activities in the United States. The policy that the Agency is not to work within the American Jewish community except in limited and supplementary ways has been in effect at least since 1960.

In the late 1950s the Jewish Agency, eager to promote day schools, decided to provide direct subsidies to a Jewish day school in at least one American Jewish community, after the school's request had been turned down by the local Jewish federation, then firmly opposed to day schools as a communal solution to the problem of Jewish education. The leadership of the local federation, which included some of the top leadership in the United Jewish Appeal countrywide, acted quickly and firmly to prevent the Agency from doing so, on the grounds that money collected through the federation for use in Israel was not to be used to bypass federation policies in their own community. The Agency reluctantly was forced to retreat and a countrywide policy was established in the wake of that experience. Since then, the Agency has provided funds for educational programs in Israel serving American Jewry, with the active cooperation of the local communities but has refrained from trying to bypass them and certainly not to counteract local policies.

French Jewry has tried to take a similar stance in recent years, though with less success since the Agency already has a well-established role in France. It is a sign of the times that some of the same people who were directly responsible for limiting the Agency's scope in their diaspora communities were and are prominent members of the Board of Governors.

The relationship between the Agency and other Jewish multicountry functional authorities will have to be clarified. For example, it has been noted that since World War II, the Agency or WZO and the Joint Distribution Committee have been involved in a kind of antagonistic cooperation. In the past, before the establishment of the State of Israel, there was a genuine conflict. Now nothing is inherent in the goals of the Agency or the JDC as presently defined that demands the perpetuation of such tensions. On the contrary, the new concern of the Agency with urban redevelopment in Israel and Jewish education in the diaspora will demand closer cooperation between the two authorities.

To take another example, direct relations between the Jewish Agency and the World Jewish Congress have been confined to a few select issues, such as the rescue of Soviet Jewry. At the same time the WZO has close ties with the WJC. For many years it probably was the WZO that kept the WJC alive. Since the accession of Edgar Bronfman to the presidency of the WJC, there has been a new infusion of energy and money into the organization, and some effort has been made to distance it from its previous backer. Unlike the JDC, which maintains a low profile in its activities, the WJC lives primarily off its public visibility. Hence, its announcements often lead to confrontation with the WZO-Jewish Agency complex. Here, too, a new relationship needs to be developed.

The crucial issues that must be addressed here are issues of access, representation, and feedback. With other *edah*-wide organizations, the active participants have tended to become isolated -- a closed circle in which people increasingly talk to people in their arena only and have less and less to communicate to the other arenas where the real action may be found. This situation exacerbates the perennial question raised in almost all the arenas: how representative are those who speak in the name of the Jews?

The Jewish Agency in its new form as a more broadly based representative body, could become the vehicle concerned Jews are seeking to frame the *edah.* The Agency, however, must first resolve its own questions of access and representation. By building an arena for a new and more broadly based world Jewish leadership and recruiting important people to participate in that arena, the reconstituted Jewish Agency has done much to develop such a leadership. It is, however, the nature of the arena that, as the leadership forms, it, too, becomes increasingly isolated from the other arenas of Jewish activity. The extent of that isolation need not be overdrawn; each leader on the Board of Governors wears many hats and has many connections with other areas of the Jewish world. Still, as time goes by, their experiences remove them from their peers who have not shared those experiences. This has been the fate of other congeries of "world Jewish leaders," who have ultimately come to dance only with one another. It may be an inevitable concomitant, because people have only so much time and energy and cannot work in all

arenas at once. It is a problem, though, precisely because of the issues of access, representation, and feedback, which accompany Jewish organizations today.

Questions also have been raised about how the leaders of the world Jewish polity achieve their leadership positions, because elections to them are mostly pro forma ratification of slates presented by closed nominating committees, and only people with sufficient time and money can offer themselves for leadership roles, especially beyond the local arena. This is particularly blatant because real or nominal responsibility for choosing representatives is in the hands of either the World Zionist Organization, which favors a narrow circle of politicians, or the Keren Hayesod and the United Israel Appeal, the two major bodies responsible for fundraising in Israel, who naturally favor big contributors.

In one sense, neither grouping can make a serious claim to being representative. In the diaspora, the lack of bounded polities makes it almost impossible to choose representatives on a popular democratic basis. Those countries that have communal elections have registered such low turnouts that their elections are frequently manipulated by small blocs that can gain disproportionate influence over the electoral process. Thus the "democratic elections" approach cannot offer much improvement. In Israel, the one bounded polity in the system, where a representative leadership could be chosen, the party system is such that those elected are hardly more representative of the community than those elected in the diaspora communities.

On another level, however, it can be argued that the leadership is not entirely unrepresentative. Moreover, if it is understood as a reflection of the *keter malkhut*, which represents only the civil dimension of the Jewish body politic and not the spiritual, religious, or intellectual dimensions, except by accident, a case can be make that it is not unduly unrepresentative in comparison with other systems of representation.

What is lacking, however, is proper access and feedback. Appropriate channels are only now being developed to provide Jews with access to their representatives on the Agency governing bodies, whether from the Zionist parties or from the communities. People can always talk to one another, and the Jewish world is not so big that any leaders are unreachable, but that is too haphazard a situation for effective access. How does a local community in Israel or the diaspora communicate its interests to the Jewish Agency? In North America, the establishment of committees on the Jewish Agency by the CJF and the larger community federations has introduced new channels of communication that formally are becoming institutionalized but, after a promising start, they have been neglected in many communities and have lost considerable momentum. The restructuring of the board of the UIA in the United States to include representatives from the community federations is another step in that direction. Until recently few local leaders, not to speak of other Jews, followed or were sufficiently aware of the work of the Agency to communicate their concerns. Development of institutionalized channels of access has already begun to change that. A few diaspora communities have established offices in Israel to maintain continuing contact with the Agency and the Israeli government with regard to programs serving their communities. These were an outgrowth of the Project

Renewal experience which introduced the concept of community representatives to bridge the gap between the twinned diaspora communities and the various Project Renewal authorities in Israel. They have since been widened in scope, at first against the opposition of many of the Israelis in government and the Jewish Agency who recognized that this would limit their own power to act. The major Jewish communities in North America followed in the footsteps of the British and South African Zionist organizations and opened comprehensive offices in Israel to serve their communities in a wide variety of programs. Wherever needed, they drew upon Israeli resources to serve their people. Today there are some twenty-five community representatives in Israel serving in this capacity.

Parallel to the question of access is that of feedback. How does the work of the Agency and its various instrumentalities and governing bodies get brought to the attention of the other arenas or, for that matter, to parallel bodies in the edah arena? There are few institutionalized channels of feedback, something clearly reflected in the problem of isolation noted above.

There is also the issue of accountability. The Jewish Agency is another example of a trusteeship institution in the history of the *edah*. Trusteeship is a useful device, but it is effective only if there is some way to keep the trustees accountable. Accountable to whom? It can be suggested that Jewish institutions must be accountable to those Jews involved in Jewish life, who have gone beyond their kinship ties to demonstrate their citizenship in the Jewish body politic. The effort to develop better means of accountability must be high on the contemporary Jewish political agenda.

It is the resolution of these problems of expectation, structure, and relationship that must precede decisions about changing the functions of the instrumentalities of the *edah*. There is too little public concern over *what* or *how well* these bodies do. Most discussions are confined to who does what. A major shift in emphasis, however -- especially in the directions suggested -- could lead to serious disputes unless these other problems are addressed and progress is made toward their resolution.

Assuming that the Jewish people is not seeking to establish a world Jewish parliament, it still requires effective national institutions to do its work as an *edah.* No other institution has a better claim to playing a preeminent role than the Jewish Agency; to do so, however, it must be ready to confront the difficult questions, draw the appropriate conclusions, and make the needed changes.

The Expansion of the Diaspora Role in Agency Affairs

The issue is considerably more complex when it comes to the participation of each center in the affairs of the other. Israel has been notably reluctant to encourage diaspora involvement in policies affecting it directly, even where diaspora money is involved.

Until the mid-1970s diaspora Jews were reluctant to press matters. For example, where Israel has demanded Jewish mobilization in the United States on its behalf, diaspora Jewry has been content to follow the Israeli lead on the grounds that Israel's vital interests are those most immediately affected. Similarly, American Jewry has strongly resisted Israeli attempts to intervene in its communal affairs for many of the same reasons. Though from time to time Israel has shown more interest in doing so, it generally has respected American Jewish wishes and pulled back when asked to do so. In matters affecting world Jewry, because they are the major centers of Jewish life, both feel free to act for the resolution of world Jewish problems or in the defense of world Jewish interests.

During the first generation of statehood, contact between Israel and the diaspora was like contact between two pyramids that touched at their tips. No more than a handful of leaders on each side had regular and meaningful contact with one another. In Israel, the prime minister, a few of his ministerial colleagues, the chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, and a few of his departmental colleagues handled almost all the regular contacts with a handful of diaspora leaders. The latter were drawn from the very top echelons of the fundraising organizations or, in a few instances, from the community relations bodies. After the Six-Day War, the ties began to stretch further down the pyramid. Project Renewal transformed the two pyramids into a single matrix. Not only were the ties between the top leadership intensified, but ties were developed between the second and third echelon leaders and then between ordinary Jewish activists and their Israeli counterparts through Project Renewal committees and volunteer programs. This transformation has not only helped further the integration of the Jewish people into a single entity, but also has made it impossible for the business of the *edah* to be conducted in the old pyramidal manner. The implications of this are yet to be fully felt.

Precisely because diaspora leaders are not present day to day and are not inside Israeli society -- the very things that make them diaspora leaders, namely, being in the diaspora and being inside other Jewish societies -- means that their ability to use their access is limited. By the very nature of the situation, there is no remedy for this nor should there be. Perhaps there are a few people who can be sufficiently inside both Israel and some diaspora Jewish society to have influence in both but it is likely to be a modest influence, because of the time and locational factors involved, and this ability is not given to more than a handful.

As Charles Liebman has pointed out, the degree of influence by the leaders or groups from one center on the internal life and activities of the other depends on three conditions: (1) how serious the desire for influence is, (2) how focused the effort is to bring influence to bear and perhaps how persistent as well, and (3) whether the particular group has strong allies in the other center. Thus Orthodox Jews have had more influence on religious issues in Israel than any other diaspora group because they best meet the three conditions. The issue is of extreme importance to them, they are willing to make focused and persistent efforts to exert their influence, and they have strong allies in Israel.

Similarly, the concern of Conservative and Reform Jews to gain official recognition in Israel has been limited in the sense that only recently have any of the "heavyweights" in their movements thrown their weight behind the effort. The effort has been sporadic and diffused, and those leading it had no strong allies within Israel. Nevertheless, when changes were proposed in the laws defining "Who is a Jew?" that would have substantially affected Conservative and Reform conversions, the two groups did get together and make a serious and focused attempt, for which they found allies in Israel and succeeded in tabling the matter whenever it has been raised.

Similar examples can be found in the other direction. Israeli efforts to influence Jewish education in the United States have been ambivalent, unfocused, and sporadic. Moreover, for a long time the Israelis had no firm allies in the United States except on the level of glittering generalities because only recently have they made an effort to develop close links with American Jewish educators. Hence their influence has been minimal. In the one or two areas where this is not so, it is precisely because in those program areas serious, focused, continuous efforts have been made in alliance with American Jewish counterparts. Cooperation in Israel programming and summer camping are examples of this, as are the community shaliah and scholar-in-residence programs.

On the other hand, in fundraising, the Israelis have been extremely serious. Their efforts have been focused and undeniably persistent, and they have strong local allies. The results speak for themselves. Despite periodic demands in the diaspora communities for reconsideration of the amounts allocated for Israel's needs, existing funding levels are at least maintained. From this, at least one point should be clear. Even under the best of circumstances, influence requires strong commitment, diligent work, and proper support. There is no avoiding that, no matter what frameworks are developed.

Tasks and Functions

The foregoing institutions, organizations, and programs do not exist in a vacuum. Because they developed on an incremental basis in response to perceived needs, they are parts of a network whose appearance is not neat, but that exists to serve the following tasks and functions.

Common Tasks and Functions of the World Jewish Polity

1. Nation-building.
2. Development of Israel.
3. Relief and rescue of communities in need.
4. Fighting anti-semitism
5. Representation of Jewish interests in world affairs.
6. Mobilization of activists.
7. Governance.
8. Assuring the Existence of Appropriate Authorities to Carry Out Necessary Functions.
9. Fundraising.
10. Oversight.
11. Interorganization relations.

1. Nation-building

1.1 Among the Big Five, there is a broad general consensus that this is the primary task of the instrumentalities of the world Jewish polity today. For the State of Israel this task is clearly identified with the development of the state, although it has always included the idea of the strengthening of the diaspora as well, if only for instrumental purposes. Before the establishment of the state and until 1967 those ideas were essentially focused on strengthening Jewish life in the diaspora so as to make diaspora Jews more interested in settling in Israel. Since 1967 it has included a strong component of maintaining Jewish life in the diaspora for its own sake or, in our terms, for the sake of the building and survival of the Jewish nation, read Jewish people.

1.2 JAFI was originally founded to serve as the arm of the World Zionist Organization and such diaspora leaders as identified with its purposes in this respect to build the Jewish national home in Eretz Israel. It has since the establishment of the state and most particularly since the reconstitution devoted more time to discussing and even in a sense trying to define nation-building as a joint Israel-diaspora task. While all of its leadership

acknowledges that JAFI's primary task is nation-building, in some cases it is hardly more than formal acknowledgement since deep down (and sometimes not so deep) the diaspora leadership still may perceive much of its work as philanthropy, saving Jews in distress, rather than nation-building. We discuss this in more detail in "The UIA-KH-WZO Partnership in JAFI: Options for the Future," the first report in this series.

1.3 The WZO and Keren Hayesod, its creature, obviously share the strongest and most Israel-centered definition of national-building although in fact with the weakened survival capacity of the WZO in the diaspora and the development of Keren Hayesod into a Jewish rather than a Zionist fundraising body, the diaspora leadership of both have in some cases come closer to a diasporist or philanthropic definition of what nation-building is all about.

1.4 JDC, among the Big Five, is the least committed to nation-building, whether in Israel or the diaspora, in theory, though in practice it fully shares the nation-building goals of the majority. Originally established as an American philanthropic organization to provide relief and rehabilitation for Jews within their countries of residence, to make them good and productive citizens of those countries, in the early days it not only was in competition with Zionism for funds but also ideologically. Much of its early leadership even opposed the goals of Zionism, even when it undertook relief and rehabilitation operations in Eretz Israel. It took the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust to change that.

Since World War II, JDC has more or less abandoned its emancipationist ideology, although more than any other organization it holds, both formally and informally, to the idea that Jewish life in the diaspora should be strengthened for those Jews who choose to remain outside of Israel. This remains a source of tension with the State of Israel and JAFI, although operationally their differences are very small. JDC has embraced the idea of the Jewish people even if it interprets that idea geographically more broadly than the Zionist movement, so the tensions in the partnership are frequently over strategy and tactics rather than goals.

1.5 In that respect, the WJC, although its founding was initiated by the WZO, is perhaps the most diasporist of the Big Five organizations, having the least prominent role in Israel and relying heavily on the idea that its main mission is to serve the Jewish people in the diaspora. Still, in the last years it has expanded its mission in Israel as well, through such devices as the initiation on sponsorship of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations. Nevertheless, WJC's diasporism is fully oriented toward Jewish peoplehood as a variant of the nation-building theme which was implanted in the organization at its founding and brought to a high state of development in the days of Nahum Goldmann.

Goldmann and those who surrounded him were old-time diaspora Jewish nationalists. They may have been uncomfortable with many aspects of life in the State of Israel but they saw themselves as, first and foremost, citizens of the Jewish people. Their life-work was conducted very much within that framework, even at a time when the framework itself was breaking down both in Israel and in the New World diasporas, where Jews

were accepted as fully equal citizens of the countries in which they found themselves and remained Jews formally by religion and informally as a result of their ethnicity without any national component prominent in their eyes or in the eyes of their fellow countrymen.

Thus nation-building, with its variant of peoplehood, is a strongly shared goal of all five organizations and a primary task for all of them -- this means in all of its facets -- and all of the Big Five are committed to it as a central proposition of Jewish existence.

2. The Development of Israel

Whether for nation-building or for philanthropic reasons, every one of the Big Five sees itself as committed to this task which stands as the first and foremost one in its public and undoubtedly in its private self-perceptions. Needless to say, each sees its task in its own way.

2.1 Only the State of Israel can conduct those tasks of governance and self-defense which lie at the bedrock of the development of the State of Israel.

2.2 JAFI has its set of tasks revolving around aliya, klita, and rural and urban development. Those are the original tasks of JAFI and while they now share the stage with other nation-building tasks, they remain the primary tasks of the JAFI and of those who contribute to the support of JAFI.

2.3 The WZO was called into being to build the state and make it possible, and while its tasks today are more diaspora-oriented, they are diaspora-oriented in the name of the development of the State of Israel.

2.4 JDC was called into being for purposes of relief and rehabilitation, but among its very first tasks during World War I was to provide relief and rehabilitation for the Jewish population in Eretz Israel at the time, a task which has undergone a number of permutations but which it has never relinquished and which acquired new expression after 1948.

2.5 The WJC perhaps has the least in the way of a concrete role with regard to the development of the State of Israel, but it, too, over the years acquired more of one, serving as Israel's entry into regions and countries of the world that were unwilling to develop direct ties with the Jewish state, particularly in the Communist bloc and the Third World during the time when Israel was excluded from direct formal contacts with both.

3. Relief and Rescue of Jewish Communities in Need

3.1 This was the precise reason why the JDC was called into existence and it has always undertaken to do this on diasporist premises, that is to say, Jews may choose to live in the diaspora or not, but if they do so choose, the Jewish people have an obligation to help them live securely and well. As indicated above, before the Holocaust the JDC pursued these aims on an emancipationist basis and since the establishment of the state on a more Israel-oriented diasporist basis. Within the JDC the two trends clashed at the point of transition in the 1940s when the emancipationists wanted to keep the JDC activities in Israel to a minimum and their opponents argued that in view of the JDC's self-assumed mandate to help Jews wherever they were, the Joint had an obligation to help those in Israel as much as those in other countries.

3.2 The WZO also entered into this activity as part of its Zionist mission with the purpose of its relief and rehabilitation efforts tied in to the aliya of diaspora Jewry to Israel on the argument that only in Israel could there be true relief and rehabilitation of Jews. In fact, the WZO was able to do relatively little in this regard because it was basically a political organization without the appropriate welfare and social services structure. Also, it was very identified with a political ideology that was very often rejected by the rulers of the lands where Jews needed the most relief and rehabilitation. Indeed, a great part of JDC's success was achieved by its assuming a profile of being very much non-political and strictly philanthropic. This was easy for JDC's founders, a few of whom in any case wanted the Jews to have much visibility as a political entity on the world scene. As it proved to be functional in terms of JDC's mission, it became a cardinal principle of all of JDC's leadership, voluntary and professional, regardless of where they stood individually on matters of Jewish politics. WZO was avowedly political from the first, hence could not abjure its political role for other purposes.

3.3 The State of Israel assumed the mantle of the WZO with respect to relief and rehabilitation after 1948. It, too, was limited because it was not only political but a politically sovereign state in the family of nations. At the same time that standing also gave it certain advantages. It had more money at its disposal because it could tax. It had an army with equipment. It had a secret service good at infiltrating into difficult places. At first, its mission also was rather well-confined to bringing Jews in distress to Israel, but after the end of the first mass aliya in the 1950s it slowly began to expand its activities to defend and assist Jews wherever they happened to be, albeit still with the ultimate intention of stimulating aliya.

3.4 Early on, JAFI began to serve as an arm, first of the WZO and then of the State of Israel with respect to the relief and rehabilitation of Jews both in the diaspora, in stimulating and overseeing their aliya to israel, and then in Israel to make their klita possible. These have always been principal JAFI functions and remain so to this day.

3.5 The role of the WJC in all of this is not only to endorse these efforts but to fight for them on the political front, to secure the political rights, security and protection for Jews

in the diaspora, especially in their communities, and the right of Jews in the diaspora to organize in communities. More than any of the others of the Big Five, the WJC's mission is political. They have neither the budget nor the responsibility for functioning on other than in the political arena.

4. Fighting Anti-Semitism

4.1 Here the WJC is in its element. This is its primary task and it does so on the principle of maximum possible visibility, working behind the scenes only where it feels it to be absolutely necessary and trying to bring in the bright light of publicity in most cases.

4.2 JDC functions in this area primarily in relief, rehabilitation and rescue, even working with anti-semites where necessary to bring about the successful completion of its mission.

4.3 The State of Israel shows great concern about anti-semitism but always as an instrument of Israeli policy, either as an argument for aliya or to strengthen Israel's hand in its particular definition of its mission to defend Jews wherever they are.

4.4 JAFI has no primary role in the fight against anti-semitism, but quite naturally its work with regard to aliya and klita bring it into contact with this issue.

5. Representing Collective Jewish Interests in World Affairs

The definition of what are collective Jewish interests is often a matter of dispute as are questions of how best to represent them. Still, all of the Big Five agree that it is a fundamental task of the world Jewish polity to represent those interests.

5.1 Probably the organization most clearly designated to represent collective Jewish interests in world affairs is the World Jewish Congress which was established in 1936 for that purpose at the initiative of the WZO when the latter felt that it was limited in doing so because of its Zionist identification. WJC survives first and foremost on the claim that it is doing just that, which it does by claiming to represent all of world Jewry, even, in a somewhat less than fully direct way, the State of Israel, which is represented in the WJC through the WZO.

5.2 The State of Israel also has a certain claim to be the representative of collective Jewish interests in world affairs, although Ben-Gurion formally abjured it in his exchange of letters with Jacob Blaustein in 1952. Still, the state has not often hesitated in its efforts to do so, although its interpretation of what are collective Jewish interests is obviously very Israel-centered and at times Israel has needed pushing to assert those interests in a

different way by groups in the diaspora. For example, on the Soviet Jewry issue the Israeli government was very reluctant to get involved for fear of further antagonizing the USSR, but was pushed to do so by Soviet Jewry activists in various diaspora communities around the world. So, too, with Ethiopian Jews in the 1950s, the Israeli government did not want to bring them to Israel on the grounds that their absorption would present major problems. As pressure on their behalf built up among Jewish activists in the diaspora, the Israeli government was forced to reconsider its position and finally used the resources of the state to mount a very visible and successful massive airlift of a few years ago.

The question of how best to represent the collective Jewish interests of Jews in the ex-Soviet republics remains an issue very much on the table with the state's arm, the Lishkat HaKesher, asserting the Israeli government position, whatever that may be at the time, not only in tension with that of JDC but also with that of JAFI, presumably a sister Israeli institution. Still, the state has means of representing what it feels to be collective Jewish interests on the world scene that no other Jewish body has. Perhaps a classic example of that was the kidnapping of Adolph Eichmann from Argentina over thirty years ago. The state was able to activate the Mossad, its embassy in Argentina, and the Israeli airforce, inter alia, to carry out that mission.

5.3 The WZO has also claimed from the first to be representing collective Jewish interests in world affairs but of course in a Zionist manner and directed toward Zionist goals. It has, in fact, limited its ability to do so, having neither the power of a state nor the comprehensiveness of other organizations. That is the major reason why it took the lead in founding the WJC. Still, by participating in the other organizations it asserts its position regularly and occasionally even undertakes actions on its own.

5.4 The JDC has as much of a mandate as any body to represent the collective Jewish interests in world affairs but only in the very narrow area of relief and rehabilitation.

5.5 Of the Big Five, JAFI probably has the least formal role in representing collective Jewish interests in world affairs. Before the establishment of the state, it played the role that the government of Israel plays today, as best it could, but it transferred that role to the new government as soon as the state was declared, except in a few countries where the government of Israel could not operate in any way, but over the years it has lost those missions to others as well. Except for the fact that like the WZO, JAFI may be represented in these other bodies, it has very little direct role of its own. In this respect, WJC and JAFI are polar opposites and JDC is on another point on the triangle.

6. Mobilization of Leadership and Activists to Undertake the Functions of the World Jewish Polity

All five organizations undertake to mobilize leadership, each in its own way, for their own survival and for the Jewish world as a whole. Obviously, the greatest differences in the mobilization process are between the State of Israel, where the normal democratic politics of a state, its government, and the electoral process come into play, and the diaspora bodies, all of which are voluntary organizations and depend more on self-selection. Money figures in the mobilization of leadership in both the state and the other organizations, but in different ways, with far more reliance on the part of the non-state organizations on private wealth as a necessity for leadership than in the state. While all bodies do this separately, they all have a mutual interest in seeing that it is done well. In some cases there may be competition between them in theory, but in fact there is relatively little since people tend to gravitate to where their interests are best expressed, their needs best met, and their achievement level most satisfactory.

6.1 Thus the State of Israel recruits very broadly from all income levels but essentially from those who have an aptitude for politics and the kind of public leadership that can mobilize other politicians and the public.

6.2 JAFI recruits from two very different groups: the Zionist leadership, consisting primarily of diaspora politicians, that is to say, those in the diaspora who have a particular affect for the political dimensions of public affairs but who, unlike those in Israel, do not have constituencies to mobilize except in the narrowest sense. They are, rather, those who are adept in the internal politics of their organizations and in the representation of those organizations to other players. On the other hand, the representatives from the Magbiot are primarily the bigger givers who are also interested in taking an active role in Jewish affairs, either people interested in fundraising or in community planning in the edah arena after having had experience in their local and countrywide arenas.

6.3 The WZO recruits political figures both from Israel and abroad. The Israelis are more likely to be those particularly interested in Israel-diaspora relations.

6.4 WJC also recruits people with political interests, especially those who are better at political concerns than fundraising or community planning and with more interest in the diaspora as their arena of activity than in Israel.

6.5 The JDC recruits people interested in community planning, normally with some capacity to contribute or raise funds as well.

7. Governance Functions in the World Jewish Polity

Here, too, all five bodies share in those tasks that can be defined as governance functions. We have already discussed the principal missions of each body from which flow their functions. Briefly put, they can be summarized as follows:

7.1 The State of Israel is comprehensively responsible for the governance of the Jews living within its territory and assumes partial responsibility for the security, relief, if necessary rescue, rehabilitation, and resettlement of diaspora Jewry. It also assumes some responsibility for the Jewish education of Jews in the diaspora, for supplying their religious needs, especially for Orthodox and traditional Jews. By simply being, it fills certain cultural, academic and spiritual needs for all Jews. Whatever decline it may have suffered in the hearts and minds of world Jewry, in the past decade, Israel still remains the great magnet of the Jewish people and usually plays a Jewish governance role accordingly.

7.2 JAFI plays a governance role primarily in connection with aliya and klita, certain social and increasingly economic services at least nominally connected with klita, urban and regional development and redevelopment in Israel, Jewish education, principally in the diaspora, and providing an opportunity for diaspora Jews to participate in governance activities involving nation-building in Israel and linked to the organs of the state.

7.3 The WZO plays a secondary role to the Jewish Agency in most of the same spheres, although it has much less to do with aliya or klita on the Israeli side of the old "green line." What it does, it does mostly in partnership, formal and informal, with the Jewish Agency and the government of Israel. In some communities, its institutions, organizations and leadership play a direct role in communal governance.

7.4 JDC handles relief and rehabilitation or rescue operations in the diaspora principally within those communities in greatest need but increasingly in communities where their Jewish survival requires outside help. It also provides selected and increasingly limited social services in Israel and has expanded its role as a promoter of experiments in that field. It also promotes experiments in matters of local and regional governance and development within Israel.

7.5 The WJC serves as a kind of diaspora-oriented foreign ministry for the Jewish people, intervening in various parts of the world, usually on the basis of its own decision, often with minimal influence from any of the other bodies, to protect or advance Jewish rights, including in the religious sphere.

8. Assuring that There are Appropriate Bodies for the Carrying On of the Functions of the World Jewish Polity

No doubt, this is an area that needs further development and in which joint efforts could be encouraged.

9. Raising Funds to Cover the Costs of These Functions

The bodies have different ways of doing this.

9.1 The State of Israel levies and collects taxes, borrows money from other governments or from private individuals and institutions, or secures grants to cover its needs.

9.2 JAFI relies upon fundraising through Keren Hayesod or, in the United States, the United Jewish Appeal for perhaps four-fifths of its budget. It secures government grants mostly from the American government for most of the rest, benefits from some transfers of payment from the Israeli government, and periodically borrows funds from private institutions.

9.3 The JDC secures the bulk of its funding through the UJA in the United States and the remainder through U.S. government and occasional Israeli government grants.

9.4 The WZO secures its funding from the Jewish Agency and hence indirectly from the Keren Hayesod and also through some Israeli governmental transfers as part of various formulas between it, JAFI, and the government of Israel.

9.5 WJC secures its funding from private contributors, the Magbiot, JAFI, WZO, and, for some purposes, the government of Israel. Its lifeline in recent years has depended upon some major private gifts.

10. Oversight of the Organizations and Institutions Handling the Functions

Here, too, there are pronounced differences among the five bodies.

10.1 The State of Israel has the full compliment of oversight mechanisms designed to keep government democratic, honest and efficient: elections, laws, and administrative agencies. They work in the accepted manner of states and governments.

10.2 Nominally, JAFI has similar institutions and devices, but because it is a voluntary organization, elections are contested only at certain points. There is a certain amount of

self-selection among office-seekers based on factors other than those of a democratic state and there are certain limits imposed by political reality.

10.3 The same is the case with regard to the WZO.

10.4 JDC, because it is guided by philanthropic rather than political principles, relies essentially on administrative other than board control for oversight functions.

10.5 The same can be said for the WJC but in fact the WJC executive leadership has quite a free hand in conducting WJC operations.

11. Developing Appropriate Interorganizational Relations both Among the Authorities that Comprise the World Jewish Polity and the Local, Countrywide, Regional and Worldwide Arenas with which They are Connected and of Jewish Life Generally

This is an ongoing process in which there are most demands for improvement. As a whole, this work is done through various joint authorities or joint committees in which two or more bodies are represented, perhaps along with others of more limited significance.

11.1 The State of Israel also relies on its network of embassies and consulates to maintain its relationships with diaspora Jewish communities as well as various emissaries that it sends out for one purpose or another on an ad hoc basis.

11.2 JAFI relies upon its system of governance which includes leaders and activists who hold significant positions in the other bodies as well. It has much expanded its use of joint authorities, especially with the Israeli government and the WZO, and it has organic connections through the governance system with bodies in the other arenas. In addition it has various joint committees with both sets of bodies of varying degrees of effectiveness. It probably has the most elaborate network of any of the Big Five, which is one of the reasons why it stands at the nexus of the world Jewish polity.

11.3 The WZO maintains frameworks similar to those of JAFI within its particular organizational and institutional network as well as in conjunction with JAFI and the Israeli government, but since it is constituted differently it is more able to act from the center than JAFI which must respond to its various constituents, most of whom are powerful in their own right. JAFI and the WZO both have regular emissaries to the various diaspora Jewish communities including senior resident representatives in both the United States and Europe who have responsibilities in the field of day-to-day operations and liaison.

11.4 JDC is far more self-contained than either of the first three, though it maintains close liaison with the government of Israel and a modicum of liaison with the Jewish Agency, although its relations with the latter body are often tense and even conflictual. It also maintains liaison with its American partners, the UIA, the UJA, and the Council of Jewish Federations on an institutionalized or semi-institutionalized basis.

11.5 The WJC is perhaps the least connected of the Big Five. It maintains continuing ad hoc contacts with the government of Israel through its Israel office plus ad hoc contacts at its highest levels and there are various of its committees on which the others are represented or committees of others on which it is represented. This in part is a reflection of the fact that it has been less necessary for it to do so because of its substantially different role, although there are fields in which greater liaison and coordination could clearly be helpful.

The relationship between the priorities of the Big Five entities and these eleven functions is portrayed in the following table. An effort has been made to rank each function relative to each organization. The rankings in the table will be useful also in assigning functional responsibilities in any subsequent developments.

FUNCTIONS AND PRIORITIES OF THE "BIG FIVE"

	State of Israel	**JAFI**	**WZO**	**JDC**	**WJC**
Nation-building	1	1	1	2	1
Development of Israel	1	1	1	2	2
Relief and rescue	2	2	2	1	2
Fighting anti-semitism	3	3	2	3	1
Represent Jewish interests in world	2	2	2	2	1
Mobilization of activists	2	2	2	2	2
Governance	2	2	2	2	2
Assuring existence of authorities	2	1	2	2	3
Fundraising	2	2	2	2	2
Oversight	3	2	2	2	3
Interorganizational relations	3	2	3	3	3
Key: 1=premier priority; 2=shared priority; 3=periodic concern					

Tensions, Squeak Points, and Conflicts

Where are the tensions, squeak points, and conflicts in this system? On one hand, there seem to be many of them within and between the various bodies. On the other hand, there are remarkably few. If one starts with a model that perfect harmony is both a desired and expected goal, any deviation from it represents some kind of malfunction or at least misfunction. If one assumes that we are still living in reality and that the messianic age is not upon us, then not only are tensions, squeak points and conflicts to be expected, but many are to be welcomed, in a world where any individual's, group's or institution's knowledge of the truth is at best imperfect and where there are legitimate different and even contradictory or competing interests that require balancing.

The best way that we have found to deal with all of the above is through open, democratic politics. The vast majority of opinion-makers in the world today agree that pluralism is a good thing, but pluralism in all too many quarters has been defined erroneously as "you do your thing and I'll do mine and we will both try to avoid being judgmental about the other." True pluralism recognizes that not only do people have broad rights to claim that they can make legitimate decisions regarding their own lives and how they want to live but that interests do clash or at the very least function at cross-purposes, that resources are limited and decisions have to be made as to how they will be allocated in the face of what remain scarcity, where not everything can be done as much as we might wish that it could be. In the realities of an imperfect world, the pluralism of democratic politics has a great deal to recommend it even if, for all except those who enjoy the process, at times it may seem to be wearing, uncomfortable, and even unpleasant.

There are, however, certain principles of democratic politics which must be maintained if democratic politics is to work. Most of the tensions, squeak points and conflicts within the world Jewish polity honestly must be attributed to the working of democratic politics and most of the discomfiture with them has its source in relying upon people for whom the political way is not the one with which they are most comfortable. Still, the only way to deal with such tensions, squeak points and conflicts is on an issue-specific basis because they revolve around legitimate questions and legitimate differences of outlook and opinion. That is one reason why there must always be those whose necessary task it is to harmonize the differing views and interests of the various powers and others who can try to take a longer view of the system in which such tensions, squeak points and conflicts occur to ascertain that decisions are not made and actions taken on the basis of the most short-term of interests but are in harmony with the system itself and will serve to keep it working and, where possible, make it work better.

This raises another point. Democratic politics does have its own rules of operation which must be adhered to as faithfully as possible for the system to work. These principles and rules include the following:

1. Democratic politics, indeed, democratic life as a whole, is based upon the assumption of moral responsibility, the existence of a modicum of faith in one's fellows, and the extension of both to the exercise of substantial trust among those committed to a particular democratic system or bargain. When any of those three are diminished past certain red lines, the whole system unravels.

2. Those three elements in turn rest upon a sense that the system is based upon rules applied equally or with sufficient equity to all parties within the system so that no one is substantially disadvantaged by them, that equity is maintained, that the system remains open, and its processes remain sufficiently open for all who wish to make the effort to view and understand. So, for example, all political systems involve bargaining, but there is the difference between the "Byzantine" bargaining done as much as possible behind everyone's back and the open bargaining of the democratic process, so that not only are decisions known but so that they can be judged by sufficient knowledge of the processes through which they were reached and the actors involved in those processes.

An example of this was the conflict between Israel and its Zionist supporters in the diaspora and many of the diaspora community leaders, with the backing of many in their communities, regarding the emigration of Soviet Jews in the 1970s and 1980s. The former insisted that all efforts and Jewish funds be devoted to the aliya of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel while the others held that all Jews should have freedom of choice and that the Jewish people should support their emigration to their lands of choice even if Israel were the nationally preferred designation to be encouraged. However, wherever one stood on this issue, one could perceive it as a legitimate conflict between Jews' different views of the Jewish future which could be legitimately settled only in the political arena, which it was. At first the idea of supporting any Jew to anywhere won out, but then as Jews began to opt for the diaspora, diaspora Jewish communities found out how expensive that was for them so their leadership joined with that of Israel in quiet collusion to send emigres to the Jewish state.

A somewhat different kind of conflict also involving the ex-Soviet Union has been the competition for place on the part of Jewish organizations in an effort to assist the revival of Jewish life. While Israel and the Zionists have taken their stance that in principle Jews in the Soviet Union should be encouraged to emigrate and not to revive Jewish life locally, their organized arms have recognized the necessity to be involved in the latter task. Meanwhile, the Jewish organizations in the diaspora, particularly the United States, have seen great institutional and public relations opportunities, as well as sharing the common Jewish goals of all, by becoming involved with the new communities in the ex-Soviet republics, so they have moved in, in various ways, often with more publicity than action.

In the meantime, the JDC has seen important new responsibilities for it on the ground in the former Soviet Union, providing the kind of assistance in community building as well as in other rescue and relief ways that have been its specialty. Moreover, all of this is further complicated by the institutional-based conflict between two putative allies: the

Lishkat HaKesher, an arm of the State of Israel, and JAFI. In the meantime, the new local leadership emerging in the ex-Soviet republics have demanded to be treated as independent equals. They appeared at international Jewish gatherings and were very soon vocal participants, and back home they insisted on their prerogatives in their own communities.

At the present moment, none of these tensions have been resolved and many Jewish organizations outside of the Big Five and their constituents are running around Russia with their own agendas and no apparent interest in coordinating their efforts with others. In part, these tensions will also be resolved in the political arena, but here it may be possible to argue that the introduction of other structures and frameworks will also be helpful, if indeed that is possible.

Hence the first step in making a proper analysis is to distinguish between those tensions, squeak points, and conflicts which are inherent in any democratic or pluralist system and which need to be resolved through the political processes of that system and those which represent structural or constitutional weaknesses in a particular system. Even if the world Jewish polity is not and probably cannot be structured as a democracy in the fullest sense or even as a democratic state would be, because in the end it is based upon two very different pillars: a state with the boundaries and powers of coercion that it possesses and voluntary Jewish organizations in the diaspora whose adherents and activists come together on a voluntary basis and which has no really enforceable boundaries. In both, some people are more involved than others in the work of the polity, but in Israel Jews are citizens willy-nilly while in the diaspora most who associate with the polity do so out of choice.

Indeed, as the world becomes more open for Jews, so many Jews in both Israel and the diaspora, nominally or potentially within that polity, are unaware of its very existence or even of the existence of its components except in a vague way. Thus we must understand the nature of the polity with which we are working in order to effectively prescribe for its improvement.

The Jewish polity is a series of four concentric circles. In the center are those Jews who perceive themselves and act as part of the Jewish polity in what might be called "every day in every way." These range from the elected leaders of the government of Israel to non-Orthodox rabbis in the diaspora to soldiers doing their military service in the Israel Defense Forces who see their task as flowing from the fact that they are not only Israelis but Jews. Surrounding that circle is a second containing those Jews within the boundaries of the State of Israel who have chosen to be active in Jewish affairs. A third circle surrounding the second consists of those who are associated with relevant Jewish institutions and organizations either as members or as contributors, even though they may not be conscious of the existence of the Jewish polity and its major constituents. They are the ones who appear, ready to be mobilized when a war breaks out or some other crisis occurs. The fourth circle consists of those recognized or who perceive themselves as Jews, whether associated with Jewish institutions and organizations or not. They form a

kind of potential force for mobilization. Beyond those four circles there are no clear boundaries but the circles fade out into the non-Jewish world.

In a situation like this built around concentric circles with vague boundaries separating each of them from the others and all of them from the rest of the world, the limits of democracy are to be found in the fact that with the partial exception of those living in the State of Israel, all acts of participation in the world Jewish polity are entirely voluntary and many people are not even aware enough to know that they could volunteer, nor do they care, seeing the polity as a congeries of separate institutions and organizations rather than a network with its own processes and rules. Thus the processes and the rules must be designed to bring about the most representative results feasible under the circumstances.

Even in that there are limits imposed by the model and the situation. In a sense this model is parallel to that for the Big Five organizations and the other organizations tied to them. That figure shows that on one hand there are close connections within the State of Israel and the Zionist movement and those parts of the organizations that are within either or both. On the other hand, we see a gap in the linking circles that is greatest between the WJC and the JDC and the others. Here we have some indication of where our efforts to change may need to be directed and the connections between those bodies, rather than being towards the center of the circle, come further out through the overlapping memberships of constituent bodies.

There is a second ring around the Big Five and at least the outlines, probably more, of a third. Both consist primarily of the regional, countrywide and local constituents or satellites of the Big Five, the most powerful of which are the United Jewish Appeal, the United Israel Appeal, and the Council of Jewish Federations, all connected with the local Jewish community federations in the United States. Somewhat less powerful are the representative boards and community-wide Magbiot affiliated with the WJC and KH respectively. They are in principle less powerful because they are less comprehensive, having separated the functions of representation and fundraising in almost all cases. Where there are links between the two, either formal or informal, or through shared leadership, they are often strong relative to their communities as the American Jewish complex, although because their communities are so much smaller they have less weight on the world Jewish scene except insofar as their leaders become the leaders of the WJC or Keren Hayesod.

Ranked slightly below them are the countrywide and local Zionist federations linked to the world Zionist political movements, which are in turn linked to the Israeli political parties within the Zionist camp, meaning the major Jewish parties. Their ranking is slightly lower because in all but two or three communities their countrywide and local influence is so much less and they are not treated as having much power by their Israeli counterparts either. It may be unfortunate that this is the position of the Zionist movement today, but even in such former bastions of Zionism as Latin America and South Africa there has been a continuing decline of the power and position of the Zionist movement and its countrywide and local outlets. Still, they can hardly be dismissed,

especially since they play a rather direct role in the work of the Big Five through their representation in the WZO and the connections of their leaders to their respective Israeli political parties.

Thanks to the WZO, a few of the sectoral bodies are also included more or less in that third circle. Groups such as the World Maccabi Union and the World Sephardi Federation have been brought into the WZO and hence into JAFI, but their leadership mostly confines itself to sectoral issues and tasks both within the Big Five and in their own spheres.

An equally major achievement of the WZO was to bring in the world religious movements beyond the National Religious Party. The Conservative and Reform movements organized Zionist parties of their own and the world synagogue organizations of the major religious movements have become affiliated in other ways. On the surface this seems like a major step toward greater comprehensiveness and linkage in the world Jewish polity through the WZO. In fact, however, the penetration of the sense of affiliation and involvement is confined to the very top of the religious movements' leadership pyramids or to a very narrow sector that extends down out into countrywide and local bases. Nevertheless, the potential is there to expand that feeling of linkage and involvement, though there would be a political price to pay for it on the part of the other components of the network.

These are the linked bodies. There are others less formally linked, some of whom have informal ties and connections and overlapping leadership with those firmly planted in the network, others of which do not but go their own way, and still others of which not only do not seek such linkage but actually seek to go it alone, often in competition with the network, with varying degrees of success. The first group consists of the other great world and countrywide Jewish organizations that are principally specialists in one sector or another. The second consists of smaller world, regional, and countrywide organizations, all specialists with purposes that are usually more insulated from the politics of world Jewry. The third consists principally of Hassidic organizations such as Chabad and Satmar that for one reason or another reject the mainstream of the world Jewish polity and try to be comprehensive and worldwide in their own right as alternatives. To some extent Agudat Israel falls into that category, though its position is more ambivalent since it is connected closely with the political system of Israel and to the WJC and JDC for their specialized purposes. There is also the Simon Wiesenthal Center which was developed in an effort to become first the leading voice in matters pertaining to the Holocaust and then an independent voice "representing" the Jewish people in matters of anti-semitism, positions to which it has succeeded to some extent in reaching through excellent fundraising and public relations skills.

Whatever "anarchy" there may be in the Jewish world today stems from these other bodies to the extent that they "encroach" on the concerns of the mainstream bodies of the polity. Different strategies have to be pursued with regard to each group. In the case of the first group it may be possible to pull them more closely into the network. In the case

of the second it may not be worth trying. In the case of the third it may be extremely difficult to pull them into the network per se, but partial and ad hoc cooperative arrangements can be made with some of them in certain cases. Since the steps necessary in the case of the second and the third group and perhaps even in the case of the first will involve expenditure of scarce funds, it may not be attractive to those now in the mainstream.

Another way to divide the organizations in these circles is by function. Three major groupings appear to be relevant: the specialists -- those that specialize in specific tasks; the partisans -- those whose primary mission is to express, mobilize, and provide support from particular political, religious, or ideological positions; and the independents -- both multi-functional and transpartisan.

Cut this way, we see a different pattern emerging. Needless to say, the partisan organizations are the main mobilizers of Jewish activity, but some of the functional specialists are better at mobilizing the funding. As to the independents, unless they are at the very top, they tend to be lost among the successful partisan and specialist organizations and institutions.

Dividing and Sharing Tasks and Functions: Three Periods

As we have seen, at no time has the modern or contemporary Jewish world had anything like a hierarchy of institutions and organizations or any authoritative source capable of allocating functions. Rather, the Jewish world has functioned more in the manner of a market. This is part of the special character of Jewish life and is a situation not likely to be altered in the foreseeable future. Nor are there many Jews who would like to alter it, either as a matter of general principle or when their special interests are involved. Nevertheless, as a market, the polity has worked rather well in sorting out tasks and functions, especially in recent years.

Three periods of development can be identified since the emergence of the first outlines of the modern world Jewish polity some 150 years ago. In the first period there were very few institutions and organizations so there was relatively little overlap, even when, in response to the governments of the states in which each was located, they had to be established as separate bodies and could not establish any formal links with similar institutions in other countries. The second period began when: a) those external restrictions were relaxed, and b) worldwide Jewish mass movements such as the World Zionist Organization, the Bund, or Agudath Israel emerged to absorb Jewish energy, confront common Jewish tasks, mobilize Jews for both, and compete with one another ideologically as well.

The second was the period of the greatest "anarchy" and "duplication." It persisted into the post-World War II period but basically came to an end as authoritative institutions

and organizations emerged in the contemporary world to inaugurate the third period, first and foremost among them the State of Israel, but also in major diaspora communities. These institutions and organizations were authoritative within the market, not beyond it, but that was sufficient to lead to something of a sorting out of tasks and responsibilities or of tasks and responsibilities within shared functions. Those are the arrangements and that is the situation that we see around us today. All in all, it is a good beginning. Now is the time for the next steps.