JEWS AND UKRAINIANS IN CANADA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIASPORA-HOMELAND RELATIONS

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A relatively neglected area of inquiry in the field of ethnic relations is the impact of homeland events and relations on diaspora communities, and, indeed, on interminority relations in those diasporas. This essay represents a case study of diaspora homeland relations as these have affected Ukrainians and Jews in Canada. The nature of these relations in Canada today is a product of socio-demographic characteristics of the two communities, the real and perceived legacy of historical relations which existed in Ukraine, and contemporary events in both Israel and Ukraine.

This paper is rooted in a lengthy study of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Canada, in the context of the government commission of inquiry on Nazi war criminals, established in 1985, and which reported in 1987. The Ukrainian and Jewish polities in Canada are high profile, with interesting differences and similarities in the character of relations to Ukraine and Israel, respectively. In addition, homeland events affect interethnic relations of interacting diaspora communities.

For Ukrainians, the homeland is Ukraine, and it remains operative in idealized form, given Ukraine's status as a captive nation, which has never enjoyed true political independence. (The short-lived republic of 1917-1920 was never fully stabilized.)

Jews in Canada enjoy two homelands — their country of ancestral origin and, primarily, Israel. Israel is the adopted homeland of all diaspora Jews — and is a real homeland, enjoying political independence.

Immigration

Both the Ukrainian and Jewish communities in Canada have been built up through successive waves of immigration, arriving for the most part in similar time periods. Within both groups, internal divisions reflect differences in the demographic and cultural backgrounds of the various waves. Events and ideological currents in the homeland shaped these waves, and thus the diaspora communities which emerged.

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The first wave of Ukrainian migration to Canada took place between 1896 and 1914. The reasons were simple enough. Canada had a vast expanse of land in the west crying out for settlers for development and as a bulwark against possible American encroachment. Ukrainians, then primarily a farming people, thirsted for land. This thirst could not be satisfied in Ukraine, with its still semi-feudal conditions, overpopulation and general impoverishment. Class oppression, poverty, foreign domination and compulsory military service added to the push towards Canada. About 170,000 Ukrainians emigrated to Canada from 1896 to 1914, settling mainly in the prairie west.[1]

While the terrain and climate of the prairies reminded many Ukrainian immigrants of the wheat-producing areas of Ukraine, it was not home, not yet. Ukrainian homesteaders and laborers encountered a full measure of discrimination and snobbish hostility. Many, perhaps most, of the immigrants were illiterate. In 1908 Galicia, over four and a half million of the seven and a half million residents were illiterate.[2]

World War I brought unexpected hardship to Canada's Ukrainian immigrants, adding to the normal problems of economic adjustment and slow acculturation. During the war, thousands of Ukrainian immigrants from areas of Ukraine now controlled by the Austro-Hungarian enemy were suddenly suspect. Those who had not been naturalized at least fifteen years earlier were disenfranchised. Approximately 6,000 were ripped away from their families and interned in large camps in the mountains. Even those who dutifully registered suffered economic hardship and, suspected as possible subversives, remained under police surveillance.[3] For many Canadians of Ukrainian descent, this episode remains a historic wrong similar in kind to the forced evacuation of Japanese Canadians during World War II.

The first-wave immigrants were concerned with keeping body and soul together. Ukrainian churches provided an oasis of spiritual warmth and social and communal organization. They also encouraged a sense of Ukrainian identity and cultural education. Tied to the land, unfamiliar with the language and customs of Canada, the first generation lived an insular, simple, hardworking life.

Jewish immigration to Canada likewise occurred in waves.[4] The first major wave of Jewish mass migration from Eastern Europe was motivated by crippling poverty brought about by overpopulation and increased competition in certain economic sectors from recently enfranchised serfs and other Eastern Europeans. But what turned a large economic migration into a population upheaval was the onset of violent pogroms, beginning in 1881, and again in the 1890s and 1903.

Unlike the Ukrainians who went west, the vast majority of Jewish immigrants joined existing Jews in major cities of Quebec and later Ontario. A small number moved to the west, primarily to urban Winnipeg. Peak years of this immigration were 1905 to 1915. By 1901 there were in all of Canada about 17,000 Jews, increasing to 75,000 by 1911, and 126,000 by 1921.

These Jewish immigrants were largely skilled or semi-skilled working-class people. Few had been farmers or farm laborers; most had worked in urban factories or as artisans, petty traders and merchants in small towns in rural Eastern Europe. Almost all the men, if not the women, were literate in Yiddish and some in Hebrew. Most spoke and not a few were literate in one or more of Polish, German, Russian or Ukrainian. Many were strongly committed to political ideologies. The first two decades of the twentieth century were turbulent years of ideological debate as Europe's Jews struggled to discover answers to the perplexing "Jewish question." Nor was this debate reserved for the elite. It involved Jews of all classes and backgrounds. Thus Zionists of every political stripe, socialists, Bundists, Yiddishists, territorialists, anarchists, Orthodox Jews, assimilationists and others could be found among Canadian Jewish immigrants.

Here we find a subtle difference between the Canadian and American "world of our fathers." The Eastern European migration to America was weighted more to the 1880-1900 period, compared to Canada's 1900-1920. Those coming to Canada had experienced more fully the growth of Zionist sentiment, the disappointments of the pogroms of 1903 and the failed revolution of 1905. Thus the Eastern European Jewish community in Canada was far more culturally nationalist, traditional, and Zionist in nature than the American, where an earlier assimilationist-socialist ethic was more pronounced.

The Jewish masses brought with them, and to a certain extent found in the Canadian Jewish community, a deep tradition of elaborate communal organization, voluntarism, philanthropy, and self-help. The Ukrainian immigrants, of largely peasant background, had to struggle to develop these organizations and structures. Many of these functions were assumed by the church, but not without difficulty. Key Ukrainian religious leaders, like their Jewish counterparts, were reluctant to leave the old country, and Ukrainian lay leadership in rural Canada was slow to crystallize.

The second great wave of Ukrainian migration to Canada arrived in the interwar period, 1918-1939. Of an estimated 68-70,000 Ukrainians, nearly 56,000 arrived between 1926 and 1930.[5] Many of these immigrants came to Canada like the very first wave, seeking economic opportunity. But their historical baggage was different. A fair number had military experience. Some had fought for Ukrainian independence or had forged their national consciousness through the battle for the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic which emerged from World War I. Thus they were politically aware, attuned to ideological controversies which animated life in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. These immigrants who included adherents of nationalism and socialism in

their various shadings were more urbanized and more educated than those arriving before World War I, and were less likely to work the land.

To many of this second wave, the first-wave Ukrainians and more particularly their children may have seemed too Canadian, or simply, too assimilated. But all would soon be swept up in the political debates which exploded in the community. The ideological and organizational foundations of left-wing Ukrainian life were laid before World War I. But the years of the 1920s and especially the Depression of the 1930s were an era of keen rivalry between pro and anti-Soviet factions, fuelled by the new immigration. The proper attitude towards Ukraine and the new Soviet experiment became a defining issue of cultural and social life dividing not just the community but families as well. Thus there were strong similarities between the second wave of Ukrainian mass immigration and the pre-World War I Jewish wave. Each was marked by tensions with those who had arrived earlier and who seemed more assimilated. Both groups were predominantly non-agricultural, with a strong working-class and urban element. Both were awash in internal debate on questions of political, national and cultural importance.

Both the Ukrainian and Jewish communities in Canada absorbed substantial numbers of immigrants in the post-World War II period. An estimated 44,000 Jews arrived in Canada from 1945 to 1954, the vast majority of these survivors of the Holocaust from many European countries, but in the main from Poland and the Soviet Union, including Ukraine.

The survivors slowly became established and began to sink roots in the community. When they had arrived they had been DPs, dependent on the existing Jewish community. With the passage of time and the new importance accorded the Holocaust in Jewish self-understanding, the survivors emerged from the shadows and assumed the role of conscience of the Jewish community on matters relating to the Holocaust and anti-Semitism. And the experience of the Holocaust was never far from mind. They formed associations of survivors of specific concentration camps, as well as general organizations of Holocaust survivors. These associations are noted for their militant opposition to anti-Semitism, and for their unwavering support for Zionism and Israel.[6]

The Ukrainian third wave, which arrived after 1945, shares many similarities with the Jewish survivor immigration, though neither group might appreciate the comparison. From 1947 to 1952 inclusive, close to 33,000 Ukrainians arrived in Canada. This postwar or third wave was primarily drawn from among the ranks of DPs. A substantial number of them had higher education and had worked in professions. Many had proudly played military or paramilitary roles during the war, fighting the Soviets, the Nazis, or both. Some had been members of the Halychyna (Galician) Division of the S.S. Others accused of the offense of Ukrainian nationalism had been imprisoned in labor or concentration camps, or carted off to farms or factories in manpower-short Germany. Unlike earlier Ukrainian immigrant waves, largely from Galicia and Bukovina, the third wave was drawn from all areas of Ukraine, both previously Polish western and Soviet eastern Ukraine.[7]

As in the case of the interwar Ukrainian migration, the third wave also brought an ideological fervor and nationalist commitment far greater than that which awaited them in Canada. They had fought and bled for Ukraine. Their national and ideological passions were stoked in the DP camps of Germany, Italy and Austria. Once in Canada they reinvigorated the communal tie to and concern for Ukraine. For the majority of these immigrants there was a strong and singular ideological mission, militant anti-Communism combined with a strong commitment to Ukrainian nationalism and the survival of Ukrainian culture. Some dreamed of a liberated, independent Ukraine, but the majority oriented themselves to maximizing the rights of Ukrainians now living under Soviet rule, supporting dissidents and religious leaders, and advocating a generally hardline anti-Communist foreign policy in Canada.

The Communities Today

Table 1 presents 1981 census data on the two communities. There were 264,000 Canadians who identified themselves as Jewish only, and an additional 30,000 who identified themselves as partly Jewish. For Ukrainians, the comparable figures were 530,000 and 216,000.

Both groups can be considered "old" groups, in that the majority of the members are Canadian born. In 1981 Ukrainians were almost 90 percent Canadian born, the highest for any non-French or non-English immigrant origin group in Canada. For Jews, the figure was only 66 percent, reflecting more recent waves of immigration from North Africa, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Israel.

The Ukrainian-Canadian population, already larger than the Jewish, is also likely to grow more rapidly because of their higher fertility and younger age structure.

Many Ukrainian Canadians are likely to claim Ukrainian as both a mother tongue, which is the language first learned and still understood, and as language of home use. But many Ukrainians and Jews may also have a passive knowledge of the language, or some words, phrases or songs of symbolic importance used at festivals, religious occasions and the like. This kind of knowledge may well be far short of fluency or complete literacy, but it is important. It bonds people to the language and to the community. This knowledge can come from community

Table 1

JEWISH AND UKRAINIAN GROUPS IN CANADA, 1981

	Jewish	Ukrainian	All Canadian
Size in 000s	294	746	24,083
% born in Canada	66	89	84
Age Structure			
% 0 - 14	20	23	23
15 - 24	14	19	19
25 - 44	30	28	29
45 - 64	18	20	19
65 -	15	10	10
Languages			
% with ethnic mother tongue	13	37	13
% with ethnic home languages	4	12	7
% able to speak			
English	99	99	82
French	30	5	32
Neither	1	—	—
Geographic Distribution			
% urban	99	76	76
% living in cities of 500,000	92	44	41
% living in Ontario and Quebec	84	28	62
% living in Western provinces	15	71	29
ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT			
Unemployment Rate			
% Male	4.7	4.8	6.5
% Female	6.9	n.a.	8.7
Occupation			
% Manager/Administrative	19	9	9
% Technical/Scientific	13	6	7
% Medicine/Health	7	—	10
Education			
% < grade 9	12	22	20
% some university	41	17	16
Income ($ 000s)			
Average male	26.4	17.1	16.9
Average female	12.0	8.6	8.4

Source: Census of Canada, 1981, as compiled in *Socio-economic Profiles of Selected Ethnic Visible Minority Groups*. 1981 Census, Multiculturalism Canada, March 1986, and *Statistics Canada*, 1981. Census of Canada, *Population*, Ethnic origin. Catalogue 92-911. Minister of Supply and Services, 1984.

schools or churches, language lessons, or from interaction with parents or grandparents. This nurturing role of the ethnic language is not picked up by the census questions, since the census does not take an inventory of all the languages Canadians know or use.

For Jews, an additional factor is that as Yiddish declines, Hebrew has increased as a language of knowledge and use, both because of its role as the language of religious prayers and holidays, and because of the impact of Hebrew-speaking Israel on modern Jewish culture. Roughly half of Canadian Jewish children today receive some form of intensive instruction in Hebrew, whether at full-time day school or afternoon schools often staffed by Israeli teachers, through special programs.[8] This is a higher proportion than can be estimated among Ukrainian Canadians.[9]

Finally, as can be seen from the data in the table, Jews and Ukrainians have "made it" economically. But Jews rank ahead of all ethnic groups in terms of average income and in the numbers of wealthy Jewish families. This level of affluence bears directly on the respective community's ability to sustain diverse organizational life. Canadian Ukrainians and Jews, having largely overcome the problems of historical discrimination and immigrant adaptation in Canada, have developed communal organizations devoted to the goals of enhanced

survival of group culture and political concern for the welfare of a homeland — Israel and Ukraine respectively.

Homeland, Identity, and Polity

The majority of Canadian Jews and Ukrainian Canadians share a similar ancestral place of origin: Eastern Europe. Common features of the Slavic experience and environment can be found in Eastern European Jewish culture and vice versa. The *shtetl*, the cradle of so much Eastern European Jewish folklore, was nestled within a Slavic, often Ukrainian environment. Ashkenazi Jewish and Israeli music and dance remain to this day strongly influenced by the folk culture of Christian Eastern Europe — there is nothing intrinsically Jewish or Israeli about the hora danced at every Jewish celebration. Foods such as blintzes or nalyshnyky, stuffed cabbage or holubtsi are common in both Slavic/Ukrainian and Jewish cuisine.

Both Jews and Ukrainians are also peoples with deep historical memory, and one of the on-going characteristics of Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue is that both Jews and Ukrainians perceive themselves as victims and the other as a dominant or superior entity. Thus Ukrainians understand their history as a centuries long effort to achieve independence and freedom in Ukraine, struggling gallantly but unsuccessfully against Czarist Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Nazi and Soviet domination, and they see the continuing oppression of nationalists and clerics by the Soviet regime today.

Ukrainian agony is epitomized by the famine of 1932. Many Ukrainians feel that this greatest of their modern national catastrophes has tended to be ignored in the subsequent history and historiography. It has not touched the consciousness of nations as have other twentieth century tragedies, such as the Holocaust of European Jewry, the Armenian massacres of 1915 or the auto-genocidal tragedy of Cambodia. For some Ukrainian Canadians, Jews appear in the historical legacy as alien, subversive and corrupting elements in Ukraine. Thus, and this comes as a shock to most Jews, Ukrainian historical images describe Jews as having blood on their hands. Ukrainians in Canada certainly recognize and sympathize with the horrors of the exterminations engineered by the Nazis on their victims. But Jews have one advantage which soothes the historical trauma of the Holocaust. The Jews now have a homeland, Israel, an independent Jewish state, while Ukraine is still unfree. The Ukrainian diaspora remains dispossessed.

For many Canadian Jews, on the other hand, Ukrainians still appear as a collective representation of evil. Thus when confronted, albeit infrequently, by Ukrainian sorrows these Jews find it hard to feel sympathy for those whom they feel have been their persecutors.

Added to this uneasy sense of the Ukrainian as heir to a pogromist tradition is a cultural prejudice which pictures the Ukrainian as simple peasant — both in the old country and in Canada.[10] Moreover, the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war finished the process of separating the notions of old country and homeland. These are now two distinct entities. The old country is the place from which Jewish parents or grandparents emigrated or fled — a world of poverty, oppression and finally mass murder. By the third generation, many Canadian Jews would be hard pressed to recall, or to locate on a map, the precise town or even province of their ancestors.

After the trauma of the Holocaust, most of which took place on Eastern European soil, interest in the old country is usually expressed by Jews only when it comes to the "rescue" of those few Jews who remain there. Few Jews wallow in nostalgia for the Ukraine of the non-Jews. Theirs were two different worlds. Even towns or cities were pronounced differently: Lviv for the Ukrainians, Lvov or Lemberg for the Jews, more often influenced by Yiddish or Polish forms.

For Ukrainians, of course, the old country and the homeland are one. Ukraine was — is — their ancestral home, waiting to be freed from the yoke of Soviet domination. The care and concern which Jews lavish on Israel, militant Ukrainian nationalists similarly lavish on Ukraine, or rather, on Ukrainian dissidents, religious leaders and ordinary citizens chafing under the Soviet regime. Third or fourth-generation Ukrainian Canadians — like their Jewish counterparts — may no longer recall the names and location of ancestral villages; few, if any, would leave Canada and return to an independent Ukraine, any more than Jewish Canadians have moved to Israel. But for some Ukrainian Canadians, Ukraine still serves as a vital rallying point for identity in the diaspora.

With some irony, the rebirth of a Jewish state in Israel serves as a model for Ukrainian nationalists. They preserve the hope that the Soviet Empire will yet collapse, and a free and truly independent Ukraine emerge from the rubble.

In Canada today, history and homeland continue to play major roles for both groups as they — or specifically their leaders and major organizations — wage the struggle for group survival. They provide the emotional and intellectual glue that joins the members of each group as they organize to shape its future.

Today, both the Jewish and Ukrainian polities are among the most "institutionally complete" in Canada.[11] They boast a myriad of ethnic organizations and institutions of different types and objectives. An institutionally complete ethnic community can parallel the state, offering a cradle-to-grave cocoon for interested group members. Ethnic schools, newspapers, and community festivals can punctuate life's rhythms, and the elderly can live out their final years in special old-

age homes that capture the cultural ambience in which they feel most comfortable.

But institutional completeness does not mean communal uniformity. Both communities have been marked with intra-communal tensions or conflict. Some of this has been ideological. The Jewish polity has split on standard left-right social issues, on Zionism and the degree of support for Israeli policy, and on religious issues.

These ideological disputes are also mirrored in the Ukrainian polity. Left-right rivalries are now somewhat muted as the Ukrainian community, like the Jewish, has become overwhelmingly anti-Communist. Pro-Soviet factions are a tiny and increasingly aged minority. Yet even the nationalists have bickered among themselves about strategy, tactics and policies to be adopted vis-a-vis the Soviet regime and the struggle for human rights and cultural freedom in Ukraine. They also differ about how much energy to focus on Ukraine versus more local Canadian issues. For many Ukrainians, particularly in western Canada and among third and fourth generations, a constant focus on the homeland, and certainly dreaming about a liberated Ukraine, seems misdirected. It deflects from the real task of building Ukrainian life in Canada and of contributing to Canadian society. Similarly, at the 1986 Canadian Jewish Congress triennial plenary session, outgoing President Rabbi Gunther Plaut called for greater external involvement on the part of Canadian Jews in the affairs and needs of other groups. It was time, he argued, to move beyond an almost exclusive focus on Jewish concerns and Jewish victimization.

To what degree are members of a group aware of this type of activity by their ethnic organization? Are their leaders generals without troops? Do group members feel lobbying is effective and worthwhile? A 1978-79 survey of ethnic groups in Toronto sheds some light here.[12] For Jews, 89 percent knew of ethnic organizations and 67 percent indicated they were now or had been members, compared to 57 percent and 51 percent for Ukrainians. Moreover, 49 percent of the Jews said they knew their leaders personally and 31 percent claimed frequent or occasional contact with them. The corresponding percentages for Ukrainians were 34 percent and 25 percent. Jews also tend to feel that politicians take their leaders seriously, and that their leaders have enough contacts, to a greater extent than do Ukrainians. All of these survey findings confirm widespread impressionistic assessments of the two communities. As perceived by the members of the respective ethnic groups and outsiders, the Jewish polity is thought to be better organized than the Ukrainian. But — and this is key — both groups are more active and better organized than any other ethnic communities in Canada.

The Toronto survey also provides some revealing data about the quality of ethnic life today for Jews and Ukrainians living in Canada's largest ethnic metropolis.[13]

Overall, as seen in Table 2, the survivalist imperative seems strongest for Jewish respondents. The pattern holds for a host of measures. Indeed, according to an ethnic identity scale devised by Toronto sociologist Wsevolod Isajiw, in the second generation — those with immigrant parents — 55 percent of the Jews and 28 percent of the Ukrainians score "high." But in the third generation, Jews are up to 60 percent and Ukrainians down to 4 percent.

There is a dramatic gulf between the fervently nationalistic and highly identified postwar immigrant Ukrainians and their children — both deeply affected by the events of World War II and the immediate postwar period — and third or fourth generation Ukrainian Canadians. The latter are a more western Canadian, more assimilated, more intermarried group. They have less knowledge of current community politics or facility in the Ukrainian language. What are the tools available to Ukrainian Canadians to strengthen Ukrainian consciousness and identity? What, if anything, can be learned from the Jewish diaspora model of intergenerational survival in North America?

The imperatives of Jewish charity and communal involvement are continually reinforced by the unfolding drama of Jewish history. Jewish scholars have argued that the two decisive events shaping Jewish consciousness in the twentieth century are the Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel. Indeed, Israel and the Holocaust continue to play dominant roles in Jewish self-definition. Many Canadian Jews visit Israel or receive visits from Israeli friends or relatives.

But Israel is more than a place to visit. As a symbol, it is intertwined inextricably with the Holocaust. It is the triumph of resilience and hope over chaos and despair. Israel and the Holocaust, more so in the 1980s and 1990s than earlier, are integrated into Western historical experience. They thrust themselves onto center stage of cultural, political and intellectual concerns of the West. Any Canadian Jew reading the front page of his or her daily newspaper has his or her Jewishness reinforced. There are stories dealing with Israel and the Middle East conflict, as well as stories about Keegstra or Zundel in Canada, or Waldheim, Barbie and Demjanjuk abroad.

For Ukrainian Canadians, Ukraine at present cannot serve, in practical terms, the psychic and sociological roles Israel does for North American Jews. Ukrainian Canadians do not have the same luxury of exchanging visits with family or friends in Ukraine. Ukraine does not enjoy the independence of Israel. Nor, as yet, have the travails of Ukraine or Ukrainians in this century, such as the famine, captured attention to the same extent as the Jewish Holocaust, perhaps because in the very homeland of Ukrainians, such subjects have been for so long suppressed by the Soviet regime.

For some time, Ukrainian Canadian scholars and communal leaders have been struggling with the task of analyzing and strengthening

Table 2

UKRAINIAN AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN TORONTO, 1979

External Identity	UKRAINIANS Generation			JEWS Generation		
Variables	1	2	3	1	2	3
1. Knowledge of mother tongue	97.0	71.3	17.7	33.5	25.9	0
2. Knowledge of ethnic language when English is mother tongue	45.6	90.9	24.1	74.9	88.0	57.2
3. Read ethnic language	80.3	37.1	8.2	59.9	41.5	57.2
4. Write ethnic language	79.9	36.2	6.3	46.3	26.3	23.2
5. Use ethnic language	80.0	54.0	3.1	42.6	15.7	8.5
6. 1-3 close friends of own ethnic group	75.3	55.0	26.3	98.4	90.1	90.0
7. Participate in ethnic functions	70.5	57.8	35.7	54.2	49.8	41.8
8. Use ethnic facilities	47.1	15.7	1.8	21.1	27.4	34.0
9. Hear/watch ethnic radio/TV	53.7	34.2	4.0	39.6	28.9	30.1
10. Read ethnic newspapers	63.7	23.3	1.5	65.7	60.5	51.6
11. Eat ethnic food on holidays	91.7	72.8	67.1	91.2	96.9	84.8
12. Eat ethnic food more often than holidays	95.1	60.2	81.0	93.4	92.8	92.8
13. Practice ethnic customs	89.3	46.0	35.9	90.3	92.0	83.2
14. Possess ethnic articles	94.3	69.7	46.0	91.6	85.4	86.5
15. Speak or spoke ethnic language, or English and ethnic language to parents	99.4	95.5	23.2	54.0	14.5	0
16. Parents speak or spoke ethnic language, or English and ethnic language to children	80.8	95.9	36.2	69.5	50.6	3.9
Average	77.7	57.2	26.1	64.1	55.4	46.5

Internal Identity	UKRAINIANS Generation			JEWS Generation		
Variables	1	2	3	1	2	3
Ethnic identity index						
1. High	69.3	28.3	4.0	64.9	55.2	60.4
2. Medium	18.1	39.2	53.5	26.1	37.1	21.6
Group obligations						
3. Have job that benefits self and group	36.1	32.0	2.1	46.0	14.8	26.6
4. Hire group members for job	27.9	22.4	2.0	24.8	11.5	29.5
5. Help group members find job	76.7	45.5	55.0	60.1	68.9	79.4
6. Marry in-group	50.4	36.8	1.0	82.0	76.3	69.2
7. Support group causes	76.9	46.4	45.0	85.0	87.9	67.5
8. Teach children ethnic language	87.5	60.7	31.7	67.3	70.8	82.7
Average	55.4	38.9	24.3	57.0	52.8	54.6
N =	148	114	91	144	116	88

Source: Isajiw, 1983, pp. 213-214, 219.

contemporary Ukrainian identity in Canada. The importance of symbols, whether in material artifacts, rituals or ideas, has been central to this effort. And the symbolic role of Ukraine as ravaged homeland may have an important part to play in that effort. But Ukrainians are not just victims of a local tyranny. Their history of victimization must, like the Holocaust's, be incorporated into the large historical narrative of Western society. Robert Conquest's scholarly study of the famine, and recent film depicting its devastation, are examples of that attempt.[14] Certainly the Ukrainian legacy of sorrow is a long and profound one. But, as one Ukrainian observer noted, Ukrainians, like others, may perceive and resent a Jewish monopoly on suffering.

> Ukrainian dancers for the Queen are fine, but millions churned into mud for fertilizer following an artificially induced and orchestrated Famine do not dance for the Queen; they are silent. Until very recently they had no place in language. Images of perogies are acceptable, images of pysanky and colorful costumes are magnificent, but thousands, hands tied behind their backs with chicken wire, shot in the nape of the neck with .22 calibre pistols are too grisly to contemplate. Vinnytsia, Mordovia, Kolyma — these are past history and not of this social formation. And what of children left to freeze and starve on the Canadian prairies because some immigration official feared the possibility of contagious diseases that did not exist? What of internment camps for the bohunks? The question is not of one oppressed and suffering people, but of the generalized oppression and torment of people. We are shown Auschwitz; we are shown Buchenwald. We are not shown Kolyma; we are not shown Mordovia; we do not hear millions of Armenians; we do not see the smallpox imported on trade-blankets for native Indians. We are not told the whole truth.[15]

Both Jews and Ukrainians are increasingly turning to ceremony and ritual to mark their respective tragedies; statues, commemorative events, books and films abound. But Jews have a head start. The past ten years have seen an outpouring of books both scholarly and popular, film treatments of all types, university courses, seminars and discussions, and Presidential Commissions focused on the Holocaust. Elie Wiesel, its chronicler, has won the Nobel Peace Prize.

In what they see as a cruel irony, when it comes to the Holocaust, Ukrainians have been cast, through war crimes media coverage and investigations, as persecutors rather than as the victims they often were and largely perceive themselves to be. Homelands offer to ethnic groups an attachment to history and source of identity. But people may not share the same vision of history. Historic events in Ukraine during World War II, and current events like the Demjanjuk trial in Israel,

have cast a long shadow over contacts between Ukrainians and Jews in Canada, making institutional relations difficult. Undoubtedly, contacts between individual Ukrainians and Jews will increase as both communities share the same urban landscape, middle class professional values and aspirations in an ever more open Canadian society. But will this bridge the distance between the corporate Ukrainian polity and its Jewish counterpart in Canada? This is hard to know. Each community wears its own strait-jacket of moral self-righteousness. Each retains a deeply pained conviction of having been maligned, victimized and repressed partly at the hands of the other.

Some might argue this is all in the past and thousands of miles from Canada's shores; it should be set aside, forgotten. These antagonisms were exacerbated by the creation of the Deschenes Commission of Inquiry in Canada and the Ukrainian response to the Demjanjuk trial. Thus past and current events in Ukraine and Israel shape not only their respective communities, but intercommunal relations as well.

Indeed, events in the Gorbachev era may have unusual effects on Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Reports from the Soviet Union have suggested that in Ukraine, the Ukrainian nationalist organization Rukh has been actively opposing anti-Semitic tendencies among Ukrainians and in the Soviet Union generally. At the same time, the rise of a xenophobic and anti-Semitic strain of Russian nationalism, exemplified by Pamyat, might serve to strengthen Ukrainian-Jewish ties in the Soviet Union. By 1990 the direction and pace of political change in Eastern Europe, including the USSR, has become unpredictable.

Notes

* Portions of this article are adapted from Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, *Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians, and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

1. Two major sources on Ukrainian Canadian history are William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980); and M.H. Marunchak, *The Ukrainians in Canada: A History* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1970).
2. Marunchak, *The Ukrainians*, p. 161.
3. For a review of the Ukrainian internment of World War I, see F. Swyripa and J.H. Thompson, eds., *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Conflict during the Great War* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983).

4. For a review of Jewish immigration to Canada, see Joseph Kage, *With Faith and Thanksgiving* (Montreal: Eagle Publishing, 1962).
5. Marunchak, *The Ukrainians*, p. 372.
6. Apart from the Holocaust Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress, there are organizations such as the Association of Survivors of Nazi Oppression, and the Canadian Holocaust Remembrance Association, as well as the Toronto branch of the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Institute. Indeed, the Congress Holocaust Committee, Quebec Region, lists 31 organizations (including 6 branches of the Workmen's Circle) as comprising the complete list of "survivor organizations" in Montreal. Rosenfeld to Weinfeld, June 18, 1986, personal communication.
7. Marunchak, *The Ukrainians*, p. 579. Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Refugee Migration to Canada After World War II*, unpublished Ph.D., University of Alberta, 1984.
8. For Jewish enrollment estimates, see Y. Glickman, "Jewish Education: Success or Failure," in M. Weinfeld, W. Shaffir, and J. Cotler, eds., *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic* (Rexdale, Ontario: John Wiley of Canada, 1981), pp. 113-128; and M. Weinfeld, *The System of Jewish Education in Montreal* (Montreal: Jewish Education Council of Montreal, November 1985).
9. V. Balan, "Ukrainian Language Education in Canada: Summary of Statistical Data 1980-81," in J. Rozumnyj, ed., *New Soil, Old Roots: The Ukrainian Experience in Canada* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1983).
10. This is illustrated by a 1958 passage from *Canada Made Me* by Norman Levine, a Canadian writer living in England. "The hockey player was a Ukrainian, twenty-eight, blond straight hair, well built, a flat unintelligent face. He has been playing hockey since he left high school..." in Michael Czuboka, *Ukrainian Canadian: The Ukrainians of Canada and Elsewhere as Perceived by Themselves and Others* (Winnipeg: Communigraphics, 1983), p. 66. Such passages provide the stereotype of "the dumb Ukrainian jock," according to Czuboka. McGill historian John Thompson, reminiscing about fraternity life on Manitoba campuses in the early 1960s, recalls the prevailing stereotypes with which both groups had to contend: "The Ukrainians were the jocks, the Jews were the brains." Interview with John Thompson, March 13, 1986, Montreal.
11. The idea of "institutional completeness" was first outlined in Raymond Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants," *American Journal of Sociology* (September 1964): 193-205.
12. Raymond Breton, "The Ethnic Community as a Resource in Relation to Community Problems: Perceptions and Attitudes" (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, May, 1981). This paper is an important empirical contribution to our understanding of ethnic polities in Canada.