I think the survival of the State of Israel rather important. In Schwarzschild's rendering this becomes Right-wing *golus*-mentality and servility before the State. In the contrast he draws between my position and what he attributes to the late Leon Roth and to "classical Judaism," he disdains concern for the survival of Israel. It is "parochial," "narrowly conceived Jewish self-interest," "demoralizing" – that is, despiritualizing; in traditional Christian theology "carnal." So far I understand.

Is the "true" jew really against a jewish state?
There is something I do not understand. Schwarzschild says I have a *golus*-mentality. Fine, I am a bad guy. But Roth was a good guy. Why does Schwarzschild take care to tell us that Roth was "excoriated as a '*golus*-Jew'?"

Perhaps Schwarzschild means that the bad guys who thought they were insulting Roth by calling him a *golus*-Jew were unwittingly praising him, because the only real Jew is the *golus*-Jew, the Jew who exalts "worldly Jewish helplessness." For Schwarzschild "worldly Jewish helplessness defined" – and still defines – "the nature of classical Judaism." That is, to be for a Jewish State is to be against true Judaism, it is to be for merely human Jewish law and ethics and against divine Jewish law and ethics. (I know little about Leon Roth and the reference to excoriation eludes me, but I wonder how comfortable he would have been in Schwarzschild's embrace.) The "*golus*-mentality" and "servility" of Jews who are for a Jewish State would then consist in our having exiled ourselves from the Judaism of helplessness, submission to which is freedom.

A midrash on liberation from slavery and exile
Thus a midrash on Exodus 32: 16– "The tablets were God's work, and the writing was God's writing, incised (*harut*) upon the tablets" – puns on *harut* as *herut* "freedom, liberation"; though, unfortunately for Schwarzschild, it is a liberation precisely from "moralizing" helplessness – from exile (*galuyot*, the plural of *galut/golus*), suffering, and even the Angel of Death.

Exodus 14:10-14: *As Pharaoh drew near, the Israelites caught sight of the Egyptians advancing upon them. Greatly frightened, the Israelites cried out to the LORD. And they said to Moses, "Was it for want of graves in Egypt that you brought us to die in the wilderness? What have you done to us, taking us out of Egypt? Is this not the very thing we told you in Egypt, saying, 'Let us be, and we will serve the Egyptians, for it is better for us to serve the Egyptians than to die in the wilderness'?" But Moses said to the people, "Have no fear! Stand by, and witness the deliverance which the LORD will work for you today; for the Egyptians whom you see today you will never see again. The LORD will battle for you; you hold your peace!"*

Ibn Ezra: *"Stand by and witness the deliverance which the LORD will work." It is a puzzle how a great host of 600,000 men could be afraid of their pursuers, and why they did not fight for their lives and their children. The answer is that the Egyptians had been the Israelites' masters, and the generation of the exodus had been habituated from childhood to bear the Egyptian yoke. Sluggish and untrained for warfare, mean-spirited, how could the Israelites now do battle against their masters? . . . Because they lacked the strength to do battle against the Canaanites, the Lord . . . caused all the Israelite males who had been in Egypt to die, to be succeeded by the next generation, the generation of the wilderness, who had not experienced exile (*galut/golus*) and were high-spirited . . . .*

Poor unclassical Ibn Ezra, so blind to the spiritual beauty of worldly helplessness!

Ecclesiastes, classical enough for the Rabbis to have included it in the biblical canon and for Ashkenazim to read it in the synagogue as the Megillah for Sukkot, advises us in 7:16: "Do not be overrighteous . . . ." On that verse the Targum, Rashi, Ibn Ezra, Sforno, and Mezudat David in their several ways deplore Schwarzschild's king of "moralizing."

In the meantime, Schwarzschild might stop hinting about the "consequences" that "one may have to draw." Let him take heart from the example of some other contemporary upholders of "universal moral standards as over against narrowly conceived Jewish self-interest," the Satmarer Rebbe and Natore Qarta. Let him say openly and in so many words that he does not want a State of Israel to exist.

Ethics and "the purity of arms"

Zvi Yaron

Steven Schwarzschild's astonishing distortion of the "purity of arms" issue (*Sh'ma*, 7/124) makes me wonder whether we should not first do some honest thinking about "the purity of language." He writes that the chief question raised in my essay on "Religion and Morality in Israel and in the Dispersion" is military ethics. The fact is, that this question is dis-

cussed in a short passage of 15 lines, with an additional 5 lines of source references, out of 15 pages total. I explained that "the purity of arms" (*tohar haneshek*) in Israel means this: "It is a general rule of moral guidance for the soldier on what has to be done in fighting and on what must be absolutely ruled out." But Schwarzschild comes up with the following staggering and mind-numbing monstrosity: "There is surely something frighteningly Prussian about the very phrase 'the purity of arms'." He goes on to quote a single article by one rabbi and to present him as representative of "the more sophisticated religious and military personages" in Israel, whilst totally ignoring the normative and educational principles of behavior expressed in authorative writings.

A more balanced and critical reading of the material available would have saved him from indulging in an outburst of rancor and innuendo, which unfortunately obfuscates his accustomed lucidity and moral fervor. The "purity of arms" issue is far more serious and important than the question of Schwarzschild's treatment of the material. This was brought out recently in an essay by Nathan Rotenstreich on "The Israeli Society and its Values" (*Forum* 1976, No. 1). I can only quote here his incisive definition of the *tohar haneshek* principle (p. 14): "That principle, as many moral norms go, can perhaps best be formulated in a negative way: Do not employ weapons except in situations where it is necessary and totally unavoidable."

The ethics of self-preservation

Baruch Stern

Sh'ma is to be commended for a penetrating essay on "The question of jewish ethics today" by Steven S. Schwarzschild (*Sh'ma* 7/124). I would like to limit myself to 3 points of the above lengthy essay:

1. The author quotes Harav Lichtenstein's statement to the effect that *lifnim mishurat hadin* is not optional but is part and parcel of the *din* itself.
2. The author quotes the Gemara Baba Metzia 62a: "two men have enough water to see only one of them out of the desert alive, ben-Petura holds that both shall share the same risk of death – both shall drink –, while R. Akiba holds – as the author translates "I am nearest to myself."
3. The author's conclusion: if Rav Lichtenstein's thesis cannot be refuted, all authorities would have to follow ben-Petura, whose view is morally superior to R. Akiba's view which appears egoistic.

That Rav Lichtenstein's thesis can hardly be refuted is easily seen from another passage in B.M. 83a: "Some porters broke a barrel of wine belonging to Rabbah, son of R. Huna. Thereupon, he seized their garments: so they went and complained to Rab. 'Return them their garments' he ordered. 'Is that the law?' he inquired. 'Yes' he answered: 'That thou mayest walk in the way of good men.' Their garments having been returned, they observed, 'We are poor men who worked all day and are in need: are we to get nothing?' 'Go and pay them' he ordered. 'Is that the law?' he asked. 'Yes' was his reply: 'and keep the path of the righteous.' " Indeed, that *lifnim mishurat hadin* must be added to each and every *din* is axiomatic to Rab. However, to deduce from here that we ought to follow ben-Petura, betrays a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the Gemara B.M. 62a. The Gemara discusses a hypothetical case – I will soon try to prove that it is not so hypothetical – of 2 men walking in the desert having an amount of water sufficient only for one to survive. Ben-Petura holds both shall drink so that A shall not see the death of B. R. Akiba holds "*chyecho kodmin*" – your life takes precedence over anyone else's.

Now, if this was merely a case of "a risk of death" – as Dr. Schwarzschild translates – instead of certain death, surely R. Akiba would agree that A must share the water with B because otherwise he would transgress the *lav* (negative commandment) of "that thou shalt not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor." The Gemara does not discuss the case of a mere *risk* of dying, but of, humanly seen, sure death for A without any human chance of rescuing B. In the view of R. Akiba, if A were to share the scarce water, he would commit the most serious sin of "and surely your blood of your lives will I require," because sharing the water would be tantamount to indirect suicide. That is the meaning of "*chyecho kodmin*" – your life comes first.

Akiba is not egoistic; ben-petura is not realistic

Ben-Petura's reasoning, on the other hand, requires explanation: "A should share the water with B so that he shall not *see* the death of his friend." Ben-Petura does not say, so that he shall not "cause" the death of his friend. One wonders: Is *seeing* someone die without being able to help, a sin? To use a modern-day analogy: A critically ill patient needs a blood transfusion. His is a very rare blood type. One man who is anemic has that blood type. Shall the doctors tell the anemic person to give his blood although it is clear the anemic person would conse-